[51] I do not accept the appellant's argument. The word "fear" or "fears" should not be considered in isolation but together with the modifying words in s. 810.1(1) "on reasonable grounds". Fear alone connotes a state of belief or an apprehension that a future event, thought to be undesirable, may or will occur. But "on reasonable grounds" lends objectivity to the apprehension. In other words, the phrase "fears on reasonable grounds" in s. 810.1(1) connotes a reasonably based sense of apprehension about a future event, or as Then J. put it, it "equates to a belief, objectively established, that the individual will commit an offence" (at p. 381).
[52] Moreover, although an informant's fear triggers an application under s. 810.1, under s-s. (3) a recognizance order can only be made if the presiding judge is satisfied by "evidence" that the fear is reasonably based. Section 810.1(3) therefore requires the judge to come to his or her own conclusion about the likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the offences listed in s-s (1). Although the "evidence" the judge relies on might include hearsay, a recognizance could only be ordered on evidence that is credible and trustworthy.
[53] Despite the need for the informant's state of belief to be objectively assessed and for the presiding judge to come to an independent conclusion, I acknowledge some imprecision in the phrase "fears on reasonable grounds". But some imprecision is to be expected because s. 810.1 requires a prediction about future dangerousness. So too does s. 810, which uses the same phrase. The phrase is not so imprecise that it fails to delineate an area of risk or fails to provide an adequate basis for legal debate. Moreover, it is surrounded by requirements in s. 810.1 -- the information, the summons, the hearing itself -- that give the defendant fair notice of the conduct sought to be prevented; and if a recognizance is ordered, the defendant will have fair notice of the conditions imposed and, thus, will know how to comply. The threshold for declaring a law void for vagueness is appropriately high. Section 810.1 does not pass this threshold. I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
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