[42] Soccer is accepted to be a contact team sport. While not as violent a sport as rugby, American football, lacrosse, or ice hockey, physical contact is an essential element of soccer and its rules permit contact. See Brown at pp. 592‑93. The referee explained in his evidence that extreme forms of physical contact between players are not necessarily contrary to the rules of soccer, let alone beyond its playing culture particularly in a competitive league such as the MMSL.
[44] According to the evidence of the complainant (an experienced goalkeeper), it is foreseeable that a goalkeeper in a competitive amateur soccer game faces the risk of being stepped on or kicked in a struggle for control of the ball. It had happened to the complainant many times before the game with Polonia resulting in broken bones and medical attention.
[45] Such physical contact would be less tolerated in a recreational or developmental league or a league with “no contact” rules. See R. v. Krzysztofik (G.) (1992), 1992 CanLII 13029 (MB KB), 79 Man. R. (2d) 234 at para. 10 (Q.B.). However, the evidence before the trial judge was that injuries that would constitute “bodily harm” as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code occur frequently during play in the MMSL.
[50] According to the evidence of the referee and Messrs. Sheridan and Heral, which the trial judge accepted, part of Adamiec’s kicking was due to the fact the complainant had grabbed his right leg as part of attempting to grab the ball.
[51] Struggle for control of the ball is part of the essence of soccer, particularly close to a goal. In such a competitive setting as was the match here, it cannot be said that players do not consent to the high risk of injury and the potential of receiving reckless force from an opponent in such a struggle for a loose ball in the penalty area proximate to one side’s goal. Adamiec was quite within his rights under the playing culture of soccer to pursue his scoring chance, particularly as he was being grabbed at the same time by the complainant.
[52] It is undisputed that the degree of force employed by Adamiec during his kicking was significant. The injuries of the complainant amounted to “bodily harm” within the meaning of section 2 of the Criminal Code.
[54] There was no intent to injure the complainant or to use force for anything but a legitimate sporting purpose, albeit done in a manner contrary to the rules of soccer. Adamiec’s use of force was not motivated by a non-sporting purpose such as an intentional retaliatory attack designed to injure an opponent, as opposed to advance play. See R. v. Owen, [2004] O.J. No. 1410 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). Again, context is important in consideration of the risk of collision and resulting injury in a 50/50 ball in the course of a potential scoring play. The evidence before the trial judge was that the risk of serious injury is high in such situations. This does not excuse Adamiec’s conduct but does place it in the correct frame of reference. See Owen at para. 70.
[55] The trial judge erred in law in concluding the Crown negated consent for the purpose of section 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. A proper cumulative consideration of all of the objective criteria applied to the facts as found by the trial judge leads to the conclusion that although the conduct of Adamiec was contrary to the rules of soccer, it was not beyond soccer’s playing culture, let alone gravely so, which is required for sporting misconduct to be a crime.
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