La séquestration peut découler d'une contrainte psychologique (peur, menace ou intimidation)

R. v. Kematch (S.D.) et al., 2010 MBCA 18

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55.            While I will discuss and explain later the full implications of the concept of “unlawful confinement” in the context of this case, it will be useful now to explain that concept as it applies here, albeit in a summary form.  Unlawful confinement involves the confinement of one person by another person, without lawful authority.  It requires the victim to be physically restrained in the sense that the person’s freedom to move from the place of confinement is restricted.  That physical restraint may be effected by actual, physical means, such as by locking a door or tying the person with a rope to a fixed object.  However, as in a case like this, physical restraint may also be effected by non-physical or psychological means, such as by threats, intimidation or the imposition of fear.  Preventing a person from leaving a place by threatening him with a gun if he moves, is an example of a person being physically restrained by non-physical, psychological means.  I emphasize that there are additional nuances inherent in the concept, which will be dealt with later.

60.            Before leaving this issue for now, I however refer to what Watt J. (as he then was) said in R. v. Bottineau, [2007] O.J. No. 1495 (S.C.J.) (QL), when he was also dealing with a motion for directed verdict in a case dealing with unlawful confinement following a death (at paras. 32-33):

 

Unlawful confinement is an offence under s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code. It involves the confinement of one by another without lawful authority. It does not require proof of any specific or ulterior mental element beyond the intent to deprive another of freedom of movement. See, R. v. B. (S.J.) (2002), 2002 ABCA 143 (CanLII), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 537, 552 (Alta. C.A.) per Berger J.A.

 

The unlawful confinement offence of s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code does not require the total physical restraint of the victim. What is required is a physical restraint, contrary to the wishes of the person restrained, but to which the victim submits unwillingly, thereby depriving the person of his or her liberty to move about from one place to another. See, R. v. Gratton (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 462, 473 (Ont. C.A.) per Cory J.A. The confinement may, but does not have to include the application of bindings or restraints. See, R. v. Gratton, above, at p. 473 per Cory J.A.