Le crime de proférer des menaces sous 264.1 Ccr est un crime d'intention spécifique et cette intention peut être déduite des mots utilisés, du contexte où ils sont tenus et à la personne à qui elle s'adresse

R. v. Noble (P.D.J.), 2010 MBCA 60 

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5                    The mens rea for the criminal harassment offence can either be “knowing that another person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed” (emphasis added) (see s. 264(1) of the Code).  Unlike criminal harassment, the uttering threats offence carries only the “knowingly” fault element:  it has no “recklessly” element.  The uttering threats section, as it pertains to this case, reads as follows:

UTTERING THREATS

264.1(1)   Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly utters, conveys or causes any person to receive a threat

 

. . . . .

 

(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property; ....

                                               [emphasis added] 

6                    On a charge of uttering threats, the actus reus is the uttering of threatening words.  Whether the words uttered constitute a threat, must be viewed objectively and involves a determination as to whether or not a reasonable person would consider the words uttered as being threatening.  They are to be reviewed in light of the circumstances in which they were uttered, the manner in which they were spoken, and the person to whom they were addressed (see R. v. McCraw, 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 at 82-83, and R. v. Clemente, 1994 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758 at 763). 

7                    In addition, and as was stated in Clemente, at p. 763, it is not a necessary element of the offence that the intended victim be aware of the threat.  Furthermore, “[t]he threat need not be carried out; the offence is completed when the threat is made” (see McCraw, at p. 81). 

8                    As to the mens rea, the trial judge must be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence “knowingly.”  Therefore, because of the inclusion of the word “knowingly,” the mens rea carries a subjective intent component.  It is not enough to merely utter the words which constitute the threat.  The accused must utter the words with the intent that the threat be taken seriously or to intimidate.  It does not matter whether the accused meant to carry out the threat.  As a result, the trial judge must be satisfied that the accused meant that the words uttered would be taken seriously or would intimidate the complainant (see McCraw, at pp. 81-82; R. v. K.W.B. (1993), 1993 CanLII 14888 (MB CA), 85 Man.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.); and Clemente, at pp. 762-63). 

9                    When the accused does not take the stand, as in this case, the intent of the accused can be inferred from:  a) the words used; b) the context in which they were spoken; and c) the person to whom they were directed (see McCraw, at pp. 81-82, and Clemente, at pp. 762-63).