Les inférences pouvant être tirées d'un comportement postérieur à l’infraction

R. v. Cudjoe, 2009 ONCA 543

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[78]         Evidence of after-the-fact conduct is no different than any other circumstantial evidence. The inferences drawn from it must be reasonable, not speculative. They must be rooted in human experience and common sense. There is no fixed regime of inferences.  What may be inferred is case-specific, a function of several factors, including but not only:

i.         the nature of the conduct;

ii.         the facts sought to be inferred from the conduct;

iii.      the positions of the parties; and

iv.        the totality of the evidence.

R. v. Figueroa (2008), 2008 ONCA 106 (CanLII), 232 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 33 and 35.

[79]         It follows from the situation-specific nature of the process of drawing inferences that no prefabricated rule stamps certain kinds of after-the-fact conduct as always or never relevant to a particular fact in issue: Figueroa, at para. 33; R. v. White, 1998 CanLII 789 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 72, at paras. 19-22; R. v. Peavoy (1997), 1997 CanLII 3028 (ON CA), 34 O.R. (3d) 620 (C.A.), at pp. 629-631.

[80]         In some instances, evidence of after-the-fact conduct may be relevant to establish that an accused’s conduct was culpable rather than non-culpable, or to rebut a claim of a compromised mental state: Peavoy at pp. 629-631; R. v. Azzam (2008), 2008 ONCA 467 (CanLII), 91 O.R. (3d) 335 (C.A.), at para. 48; R. v. Walent, 2007 ONCA 871, at paras. 10-11; R. v. Fraser (2001), 2001 CanLII 8611 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at para. 17; R. v. Schell (2000), 2000 CanLII 16917 (ON CA), 148 C.C.C. (3d) 219 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 40-41; R. v. Younger (2004) 2004 MBCA 113 (CanLII), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 454 (Man. C.A.), at paras. 51-52.

[81]         Evidence of after-the-fact conduct is typical of many items of evidence adduced in a criminal trial:  it is evidence of limited admissibility.  The trier of fact may use this evidence for one or more purposes but not for another or others. It follows that its introduction imposes on the trial judge in a jury trial the obligation to explain both the permitted and prohibited use of the evidence: Figueroa at paras. 35 and 36; White, at para. 28; R. v. Rodrigue (2007), 2007 YKCA 9 (CanLII), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Y. C.A.), at para. 42.