L'arrestation citoyenne et les déclarations du suspect faites à la personne personne procédant à son arrestation

R. v. Raymond, 2017 ONSC 4864

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            2.         Applicable Principles

A.  Voluntariness and Persons in Authority

[115]      Generally, an accused’s out-of-court statements are admissible at trial under the “party admissions” exception to the hearsay rule:  see R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 20.  When such statements are made to ordinary persons, they are presumptively admissible without the requirement of a voir dire: see S.G.T., at para. 20.

[116]      A different rule applies when such statements are made to persons in authority.  This is the confessions rule.  Where an accused has made a statement to a person in authority, the Crown must prove the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt on a voir dire as a prerequisite to its admission:  see S.G.T., at para. 20; R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 34.  Voluntariness, in this regard, encompasses not only the classic Ibrahim rule – “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” – but also embraces the absence of an “atmosphere of oppression”, the operating mind doctrine, and police trickery:  see R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 24, 27, 63 & 65.  A contextual approach is required:  see R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 11. 

[117]      Before embarking on a voluntariness voir dire resolution, however, the “person in authority” issue is a threshold question. 

[118]      Whether the recipient of a statement is a person in authority is determined from the point of view of the accused:  see S.G.T., at para. 22; Grandinetti, at para. 38; R. v. Hodgson, 1998 CanLII 798 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at paras. 32 - 34.  In S.G.T., at para. 22, the Supreme Court states:

To be considered a person in authority, the accused must believe that the recipient of the statement can control or influence the proceedings against him or her, and that belief must be reasonable.

[119]      In other words, according to Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 4, persons in authority are

[t]hose persons whom the accused reasonably believes are acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceedings against him or her ….

[120]      The accused bears an evidential burden to establish that there is a valid issue for consideration in relation to the person in authority requirement:   see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37.  Once that burden is met, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the recipient was not a person in authority or, if it is found that the recipient was a person in authority, that the statement was voluntary:  see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37. 

            B.  Citizen’s Arrest

[121]      Arrests by citizens are statutorily authorized pursuant to s. 494(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46:

                        (1)        Any one may arrest without warrant

            (a)     a person whom he finds committing an indictable offence; or

            (b)     a person who, on reasonable grounds, he believes

                     (i)      has committed a criminal offence, and

                     (ii)     is escaping from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to arrest that person.

[122]      A person making a citizen’s arrest has a statutory duty to turn the arrested person over to the police “forthwith” pursuant to s.494(3):

                                    Any one other than a peace officer who arrests a person without warrant shall forthwith deliver the person to a peace officer.

                        C.  Exclusion of Statements under Common Law

[123]      In R. v. Wells, 2003 BCCA 242, the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted, at para. 64, the existence of an alternative avenue for exclusion of statements where the recipient is not a person in authority:

[I]n my respectful view, the majority opinion in Hodgson cannot be taken to require that all confessions to persons not in authority, regardless of whether the confession is obtained by violence or threats of violence, must be admitted into evidence.  To so hold would ignore the court’s discretion to exclude evidence, the probative value of which is outweighed by [its] prejudicial effect, and the power and discretion of the courts to ensure the fair trial of an accused.

[124]      In reaching this conclusion, the Wells court relied on R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, and R. v. Terry, 1996 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207, where the Supreme Court found that a trial judge has discretion under common law to exclude evidence that would result in an unfair trial. 

[125]      A similar rationale was subsequently endorsed in Grandinetti where the Supreme Court concluded, at para. 36:

There is no doubt, as the Court observed in Hodgson at para. 26, that statements can sometimes be made in such coercive circumstances that their reliability is jeopardized even if they were not made to a person in authority.  The admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like abuse of process at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to prevent the admission of statements that undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

                        D.  Tainting

[126]      A prior involuntary statement can taint a subsequent statement rendering the subsequent statement involuntary as well:  see R. v. I.(L.R.), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504.  However, a necessary predicate is a prior involuntary statement.