Comment apprécier les délais lorsqu'un accusé demande la tenue d'une enquête préliminaire et y renonce avant sa tenue & la mauvaise évaluation de bonne foi des parties quant à la durée du procès constitue une circonstance exceptionnelle

R. v. Antic, 2019 ONCA 160

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[4]         The first issue involves the time needed to set a date for a preliminary inquiry that ultimately never occurred.  This resulted from the fact that the accused changed counsel on the day that the preliminary inquiry was to commence.  The appellant, with his new counsel, eventually waived the preliminary inquiry in favour of proceeding with a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[5]         The appellant accepts that the delay from the scheduled start of the preliminary inquiry to the time when the trial date was set is defence delay.  However, the trial judge also attributed the time, from when the preliminary inquiry date was set to the planned commencement of the preliminary inquiry, to the defence.  The trial judge reasoned that, while the time to set the preliminary inquiry date would normally be considered institutional delay, in this case since the preliminary inquiry was eventually waived, it was not properly considered institutional delay.  In other words, had the appellant decided on a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice at the outset, there would have been institutional delay arising from setting the trial date, which there was in this case in any event, but there would not also have been the institutional delay from setting a preliminary inquiry date. 

[6]         We do not see any error in the trial judge’s analysis on this point. There wound up being two institutional delays arising from the setting of dates – one was the preliminary inquiry date and the other was the trial date.  Had the appellant waived the right to a preliminary inquiry at the outset, the institutional delay in setting a date for the preliminary inquiry would have been avoided.  At the very least, had the appellant decided to waive the preliminary hearing well in advance of its scheduled commencement, the time could have been used for other matters. The Crown had subpoenaed witnesses and was prepared to conduct the preliminary inquiry on the scheduled date.  The appellant appeared on that date and without warning to any of the other participants indicated that he wanted an adjournment to retain new counsel. Jordan indicates at para. 138 that defence counsel are expected to use court time efficiently. The fact that that delay was not avoided lies at the feet of the appellant. The trial judge was correct to deduct that period of time as defence delay.

[7]         The second issue is with respect to the delays that occurred when the trial was not completed in the time frame originally contemplated.  Dates for the continuation of the trial had to be found.  One set of dates was made available in July and a further set of dates was made available in December.  While the court was available on certain earlier dates, either Crown counsel or defence counsel was not.  The trial judge began by considering the delay in getting to the continuation of the trial as having to be attributed between the Crown and the defence and attributed one and one-half months to the defence.

[8]         However, later in her analysis, the trial judge deducted the entire five month period between July and December as an exceptional circumstance. She concluded that the additional time needed to complete the case was unpredicted by both counsel. It was the result of unforeseeable or unavoidable developments and thus constituted an exceptional circumstance: Jordan at para. 73. As noted in R. v. Jurkus 2018 ONCA 489 at para. [55], “where a trial goes longer than “reasonably expected”, even where the parties have in good faith attempted to establish realistic timelines” it is “likely that the delay was unavoidable.” In our view, the trial judge correctly treated this period of delay as an exceptional circumstance given her findings as to how it arose.  We note, in passing, that this case does not engage the type of individual analysis arising from the unavailability of defence counsel when there are joint accused, that this court had to consider in R. v. Gopie,  2017 ONCA 728, 140 O.R. (3d) 171. The appellant’s reliance on that case is misplaced.

Le point de départ Jordan est toujours l'inculpation, même si la Poursuite dépose un acte d'accusation direct

Pennington v R, 2020 SKQB 198

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[30]                     One critical distinction is that Gryba was decided before the release of the judgments in Jordan and Cody. Gryba was not faced with, and could not possibly contemplate, the presumptive ceilings established by the Supreme Court. As a consequence, Gryba has little, if any, impact on the consideration of delay. As pointed out in R v Bulhosen, 2019 ONCA 600 at para 97, 377 CCC (3d) 309 [Bulhosen]:

[97] Other than in transitional cases, …, pre-Jordan constructs have little utility in the Jordan analysis.

         (b) A Review of the Case Authorities

[33]                     Turning to a consideration of the legal authorities, the case law offers overwhelming support for the view that delay is calculated from the date of the swearing of the Information.

[34]                     While there appear to be relatively few cases in Saskatchewan on point, an important example is found in R v Pastuch, 2017 SKQB 211 [Pastuch].

         (d) Consideration of Jordan’s Goals 

[54]                     A consideration of the core principles enunciated in Jordan and Cody also support the conclusion that delay should be calculated from the date the Information was sworn.  

[55]                     As pointed out by Strathy C.J.O. in Bulhosen, the Supreme Court intended these decisions to be a siren call for change in the criminal justice system. He held, at paras. 98-99:

[98]      Jordan’s goal was to promote behaviour modification and predictability by encouraging parties to “manage ‘each case in advance to achieve future compliance with consistent standards’”: Jordan, at para. 35, quoting Michael A. Code, Trial Within a Reasonable Time: A Short History of Recent Controversies Surrounding Speedy Trial Rights in Canada and the United States (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992), at p. 117 (Emphasis in original).

[99]      In so doing, Jordan departed from Morin’s [R v Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771] retrospective inquiry, which focused on institutional delay and classifying stages of a case into categories of delay that could or could not be visited upon the Crown: see R. v. Baron, 2017 ONCA 772, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 212, at para. 46. Instead, Jordan relies on presumptive ceilings. As Jordan points out, particularly at paras. 52-56, the presumptive ceilings take account of the factors that “can reasonably contribute to the time it takes to prosecute a case”: para. 53. This includes the “inherent time requirements of the case”, institutional delay in the provincial court and in the superior court following committal for trial and “the increased complexity of criminal trials since Morin”: para. 53. The Supreme Court also stressed that the presumptive ceiling includes a public interest component by giving clarity and assurance concerning the duration of trials, thereby building public confidence in the administration of justice.  [Emphasis added]

[56]                     In my ruling on the First Indictment reported at 2019 SKQB 319 at paras. 7-8, I attempted to convey a similar message to that sent by Bulhosen:  

[7]   [In Jordan] the court lamented the criminal justice system had lost its way (para. 29) and it expressed concern that a culture of complacency regarding delay had grown (paras. 40-41). This was troubling, the court said, because timely trials are constitutionally required (para. 141) and the failure to deliver this erodes public confidence in the administration of justice (para. 22). In fact, this failure leads to contempt for court procedures (para. 25) and presents a threat to the legitimacy of our system:

[26] Extended delays undermine public confidence in the system. And public confidence is essential to the survival of the system itself, as “a fair and balanced criminal justice system simply cannot exist without the support of the community” (Askov [1990 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1199], at p. 1221).

[8]   Therefore, Jordan held a change in culture was necessary (paras. 5, 44 and 112) and the court imposed specific time limits for trials to occur. While the court acknowledged the imposition of presumptive ceilings might cause discomfort in the short term (para. 134), it held this was necessary given the indisputably high stakes (para. 3).  [Emphasis added]

[57]                     Jordan and Cody provide unmistakable direction to “promote behaviour modification and predictability”. In those cases, a presumptive ceiling was defined in order to achieve those goals. The Crown’s position – that delay in this case should be calculated from a different date, and a date the Crown chooses – is antithetical to those goals. The goals of predictability, clarity and consistency are not served by allowing the Crown to re-start the Jordan clock any time it chooses to exercise its discretion to file a direct indictment.

[58]                     It is clear courts have consistently ruled that all cases must now be conducted in compliance with the principles set out in Jordan. Courts have not created a special category for computer-based offences (see, for example, R v Swanson, 2017 ONSC 710 and R v Lee, 2017 ONSC 4862) or any other offences.

[59]                     Further, in light of the unmistakable direction given by Jordan and repeated in Cody, it is not the role of trial courts to carve out new exceptions. The doctrine of stare decisis demands adherence to those rulings and if the presumptive ceilings are to be altered in some fashion, or in some circumstances, that task properly falls to an appellate court; see, for example, R v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 at paras 60 and 68, 361 DLR (4th) 132.  

         (e) Summary

[60]                     In the end analysis, the consistent weight of the case authorities establishes Jordan delay is calculated from the date of the swearing of the Information. The filing of a direct indictment does not, in my respectful view, re-start the clock.

L’évitement d’un délai déraisonnable est un motif approprié pour le dépôt d’un acte d’accusation direct

R. v. Bulhosen, 2019 ONCA 600

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[86]      The appellants say that after allowing for 5 months of “intake”, they spent 7.5 months in the Ontario Court of Justice waiting for a preliminary inquiry that never materialized. This time, between February and October 2015, was “wasted” and, unless explained, cannot be cured by preferring an indictment. They say the 30-month presumptive ceiling reflects the inherent time requirements of a case with a preliminary inquiry. If the Crown prefers an indictment during the “normal intake period” there is no reason why a higher presumptive ceiling should apply. If the indictment is preferred at a later date, so the argument goes, the Crown must explain why it “wasted” time preparing for the preliminary. If it fails to do so, preferring the indictment cannot cure unexplained “past delay”.

[87]      I do not agree.

[88]      It is well settled that the Crown’s decision to prefer an indictment is a matter of prosecutorial discretion and is reviewable only for abuse of process: R. v. S.J.L., 2009 SCC 14, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 426, at para. 24; and R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at paras. 44, 48, 51. The Crown has no obligation to give reasons to justify its decision, absent an evidentiary basis for a claim of abuse of process: Anderson, at para. 55; and R. v. St. Amand, 2017 ONCA 913, 358 C.C.C. (3d) 226, at para. 23.

[89]      It has been recognized for some time that the avoidance of unreasonable delay is an appropriate basis on which to prefer an indictment: see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 62, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: The Attorney General and the Crown Prosecutor (1990), at pp. 93-94; R. v. Charlie (1998), 1998 CanLII 4145 (BC CA), 126 C.C.C. (3d) 513 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 32; and S.J.L., at para. 38.

[90]      Thus, in Manasseri, at para. 376, n. 5, Watt J.A. observed:

Direct indictments under s. 577(a) of the Criminal Code have been infrequent in this province. However, after Jordan, with full disclosure as required by Stinchcombe, the Crown should give very serious consideration to preferring direct indictments to fulfill its mandate under s. 11(b) and to ensure, to the extent reasonably possible, that criminal trial proceedings do not exceed the presumptive ceilings set by Jordan.

This recommendation was expressly endorsed by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. C.M.M., 2017 MBCA 105, [2018] 2 W.W.R. 213, at para. 14. Moreover, as previously noted, the case management judge in the Ontario Court of Justice specifically advised the Crown in this case that it might need to seek a direct indictment in order to keep the proceedings moving forward.

[91]      I do not accept the appellants’ distinction between “past delay” and “future delay”, a distinction found nowhere in Jordan. Nor do I accept the appellants’ premise that preferring an indictment lowers the presumptive ceiling unless explained. This approach would restrict the utility of the preferred indictment as a remedial tool to ensure the protection of s. 11(b) rights.

[92]      Nor do I accept that the time in the Ontario Court of Justice prior to the preferred indictment was “wasted”. Similar arguments were rejected in Maone, at paras. 20-21, and in Millard, at para. 58, where Code J. observed:

[T]he main premise of the Applicant Smich’s argument in favour of the eighteen month ceiling is that the time spent in the Ontario Court of Justice is “wasted,” when a direct Indictment is preferred, because the accused has been denied the benefit of a preliminary inquiry. In particular, it was submitted that the time has been “wasted” when the Indictment is preferred “on the eve of the preliminary inquiry.” I do not accept this premise. The time that a case spends in the Ontario Court of Justice, prior to a preliminary inquiry, is extremely valuable. Bail hearings are held, the accused has time to retain counsel, initial Crown disclosure is made and then reviewed by the defence, ongoing Crown disclosure is substantially completed and defence requests for further disclosure are made, counsel interview witnesses and preserve evidence that may be needed at trial, counsel take instructions from the client and negotiate resolutions, judicial pre-trials are held where the case against certain accused can be finally resolved and where admissions that shorten and simplify the case can be negotiated. See: R. v. Maone et al., 2017 ONSC 3537 at para. 21. In short, the time spent in the Ontario Court of Justice prior to preferring a direct Indictment is not “wasted” and it cannot simply be discounted or ignored, when determining a reasonable presumptive ceiling for overall delay. It is valuable time that the parties use and need.

[93]      The same occurred here. During the so-called “wasted” time between February and October 2015, some of the accused were still seeking counsel, Crown disclosure was taking place and there were three case management conferences. Resolution discussions took place and 4 of the original 14 co-accused pleaded guilty. Efforts were made by the Crown, albeit sometimes unsuccessful at the time, to shorten and simplify the case. While not all of these efforts were immediately successful, they helped to pave the way for expedited trials for five of the seven appellants – trials that were, in fact, completed within the 30-month presumptive ceiling. The application judge did not err in failing to characterize the time spent in the Ontario Court of Justice prior to the preferring of the direct indictment as “wasted”.

[94]      For these reasons, I reject the appellants’ submission that the Crown was required to explain the delay in preferring the indictment and that this had the effect of reducing the presumptive ceiling.

Comment le Tribunal doit se gouverner face à la demande d'un co-accusé d'avoir un procès séparé de ses complices

R. v. Zvolensky, 2017 ONCA 273

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[245] It is difficult to underestimate the importance of a principled, case-specific approach to claims advanced by some or all jointly indicted accused of entitlement to separate trials. What is essential is that trial judges construct their analysis on a proper foundation and reach their conclusions on the basis of a reasoned consideration of all the relevant circumstances. This is not the place for the application of what are sometimes offered as [page454] the functional equivalent of bright-line exceptions, which are said, without more, to dislodge basic principle.

[246] The basic rule originates in the common law and is of venerable lineage. The prima facie rule is that where the essence of the case for the Crown is that the persons charged were engaged in a common enterprise, they should be jointly indicted and jointly tried: R. v. Grondkowski; R. v. Malinowski, [1946] K.B. 369, [1946] 1 All E.R. 559 (C.C.A.), at p. 371 K.B.

[247] The prima facie rule of the common law, sometimes characterized as a presumptive rule, is grounded in sound social policy reasons. These reasons have been adequately rehearsed elsewhere, including by my colleague, and are in no need of restatement here. However, what should not be forgotten about this common law rule is that it was not developed in a vacuum. Like other common law rules, it is the product of judicial experience in the trial of criminal cases. And that experience no doubt would have included commonplace joint trial events such as antagonistic or cutthroat defences, evidence of limited admissibility and differences in the nature and extent of the evidence inculpatory of various accused. Yet, the prima facie rule of joint venture -- joint trial remains.

[248] This common law rule continues to apply in Canada under s. 8(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 except to the extent that it is altered, varied, modified or affected by the Code or other federal enactment. The Criminal Code contains no express general provision about joinder of accused, like it does for joinder of counts in s. 591(1).

[249] What the Criminal Code does do, in s. 591(3), is settle the standard to be met before the discretion to order separate trials for jointly indicted accused is engaged: "the interests of justice so require".

[250] The language used to formulate the standard or test for severance is important. The "interests of justice" are not coextensive with the "interests of the accused". If that were so, not only would the standard be expressed in different terms, but also such a construction would substitute a rule of law for an exercise of judicial discretion: Grondkowski; Malinowski, at p. 372 K.B.

[251] The phrase "interests of justice" requires consideration of the interest of the prosecution as an essential component of the analysis: R. v. X, [2012] EWCA Crim. 2276, [2012] All E.R. (D) 09, at para. 17.

[252] The fact that a co-accused in a joint trial is running an antagonistic or "cutthroat" defence is common. Sometimes, as [page455] here, all advance similar claims. Equally familiar is the fact that one co-accused has implicated another or others in the offence(s) charged in a police interview or otherwise, something denied by the other co-accused and not admissible as evidence against them. So too the case of a co-accused who has exculpated himself but implicated others in an out-of-court statement may decide not to testify and rely on his out-of-court statement. On other occasions, a co-accused may give evidence adverse to another co-accused who has already given evidence and closed his case. See, generally, R. v. Miah, [2011] EWCA Crim. 945, [2011] All E.R. (D) 167 (C.C.A.), at para. 59; R. v. Cairns, [2002] EWCA Crim. 2838, [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 38, at para. 52.

[253] In many cases of joint criminal activity involving several co-accused, the evidence against one may be (or appear) much stronger than against another or others. In such cases, once the jury is sure that one accused is guilty, it may become more likely that they will be equally convinced of the guilt of another or others: X, at para. 16.

[254] The examples given in the preceding paragraphs illustrate factors that a trial judge should consider in deciding whether the "interests of justice" require a separate trial for any or all co-accused. But they are not, as sometimes seems to be thought and advanced as dispositive nowadays, categorical exceptions to the presumptive rule of joint venture -- joint trial. Their mere assertion is not a ticket out of Dodge. To be certain, where the case for severance is strong enough, the prejudice great enough, the circumstances particular enough, the presumptive rule must give way: R. v. Lake (1976), 64 Cr. App. R. 172 (C.A.), at p. 175. But not otherwise.

Le renvoi devant le tribunal d’une autre circonscription territoriale (aussi appelé changement de venue)

A c. R., 2025 QCCA 300

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[41]      L’affaire a évidemment fait grand bruit là où elle est survenue, mais aussi à la grandeur du Québec. Or, l’article 599 C.cr. prévoit qu’un tribunal peut renvoyer l’affaire devant le tribunal d’une autre circonscription territoriale de la même province (ou « district judiciaire », comme on dit au Québec) si « la chose paraît utile aux fins de la justice / it appears expedient to the ends of justice ».

[51]      Une telle décision relève de l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge, ce qui signifie que la déférence s’impose en appel : R. v. Charest (1990), 76 C.R. (3d) 63, p. 100 et 102, 1990 CanLII 3425 (C.A. Qc). De plus, il n’existe pas de droit de choisir le district où aura lieu le procès. Les parties ont eu l’occasion de présenter leur preuve et leurs arguments. Le juge a tout simplement estimé qu’ils ne permettaient pas de trancher en faveur du district de Montréal. Je ne vois aucune erreur dans cette conclusion. S’il est vrai que Montréal est le district le plus populeux du Québec, il reste que cette affaire a fait grand bruit partout au Québec, de sorte que la situation à cet égard serait analogue dans toutes les circonscriptions territoriales.

[52]      Après que le juge a conclu que le procès ne pouvait décemment se tenir à Granby (district de Bedford), le choix du district lui revenait en fonction de la preuve, d’autant qu’il a laissé pleine liberté aux parties de présenter les éléments factuels qu’elles considéraient pertinents.

[53]      Or, le dossier ne fait état d’aucun préjudice subi par l’appelante en raison du renvoi à Trois-Rivières plutôt qu’à Montréal, alors que le préjudice constitue le principal élément lors de l’analyse de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire.

[54]      En somme, l’appelante a présenté une preuve satisfaisante que le procès ne pouvait avoir lieu dans le district de Bedford, ce que le juge a reconnu au motif que la population de la région de Granby était davantage touchée par ces événements que celle des autres régions du Québec, de sorte que le renvoi pouvait constituer une solution utile pour assurer un procès équitable. En revanche, la seule preuve portant sur un autre district cherchait à démontrer que Montréal était un endroit approprié parce que populeux et susceptible de faciliter la constitution d’un jury impartial, sans toutefois que la preuve justifie l’exclusion de Trois-Rivières. Le juge rappelle d’ailleurs que la présomption d’impartialité du jury s’applique à tous les districts judiciaires et, évidemment, pas seulement à celui de Montréal. Il devait aussi tenir compte de la durée du procès et de la nécessité qu’il se tienne dans des délais raisonnables.

[55]      Bref, l’appelante a été pleinement entendue sur son choix, mais n’a pas déposé de preuve permettant de conclure que seul ce choix pouvait assurer la tenue d’un procès équitable. À cet égard, la situation ne se compare pas à celle de Supermarchés Jean Labrecque inc. c. Flamand, 1987 CanLII 19 (CSC), [1987] 2 R.C.S. 219, sur lequel elle se fonde au motif que la situation serait semblable à celle du présent dossier. Il n’en est rien. En effet, dans cette affaire, contrairement à la présente, le juge avait, d’office, transféré le procès dans un autre district judiciaire à une autre date, sans même en informer les parties.

[56]      En l’espèce, le juge a exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire et l’appelante ne démontre pas d’erreur pouvant mener à la réformation de la décision. Je rappelle qu’une cour d’appel n’interviendra en la matière qu’en présence d’une erreur de principe ou de l’exercice déraisonnable du pouvoir discrétionnaire, notamment lorsque le juge omet de tenir compte des facteurs pertinents ou tient compte de facteurs non pertinents : R.B. c. R., 2018 QCCA 1761, paragr. 43. Ce n’est pas le cas ici.