La juridiction pour casser un subpoena est la Cour supérieure & le pouvoir d'un juge d'instance sur le subpoena en fonction de sa pertinence

R. c. Ben Aïssa, 2016 QCCQ 2830

Lien vers la décision

Jurisdiction to quash a subpoena

[23]        On the matter of jurisdiction, the case law is unanimous: only a judge of the Superior Court has the power to quash a subpoena.

[24]        In R. v. Rashwan, 2001 CarswellOnt 5641, 56 W.C.B. (2d) 286, the Crown prosecutor applied for a motion to quash a subpoena issued at the behest of a self-represented accused. Justice Fernandes of the Ontario Court of justice ruled that he did not have the power to quash subpoenas issued by a Justice of the Peace, a judicial officer of the same court.[6]

[25]        The decision in Rashwan, was based on two precedents: R. v. Boissonneault (1993) O.J. 2485, a decision of Salhany J. of the Ontario Court (Gen. Div.) and R. v. Morissette (1990) O.J. 2487, a decision of Fontana J. of the Ontario Court, Provincial Division.  Both these cases support the proposition that the jurisdiction to quash a subpoena can only be exercised by a judge of the Superior of Court.[7]

[26]        Authority for the view that a subpoena can only be quashed by a court of superior jurisdiction can also be found in R. v. Primeau, 1995 CanLII 143 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 60, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. In that case, the central issue concerned the compellability of a witness subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary hearing of two individuals charged with murder. As the accused also faced a murder charge for the same crime (he was charged separately), he filed a motion seeking relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter to prevent him from being called as a witness and a writ of prohibition to prevent the Provincial Court judge from compelling his presence and testimony at the preliminary inquiry.

[27]        None of the parties took issue with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to hear the challenge to the subpoena. In fact, the Superior Court’s authority on the matter was taken for granted. The only procedural issue concerned the remedial powers of certiorari to include the Charter remedies sought through s. 24(1) of the Charter. However, the manner in which the Court framed and decided the procedural issue left no doubt that the Superior Court alone had the power to hear a third party challenge to a subpoena:

XIII. As a result of these two differences, the procedural route to follow for a third party is determined by the level of court issuing the order.  A provincial court order is to be challenged through an application to a superior court judge for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.  However, given that this remedy is limited to the quashing of an order, the Court decided that it was necessary, for specific circumstances, to enlarge the remedial scope of certiorari (at p. 866)[8] : (underlining added)

it is open to this Court to enlarge the remedial powers of certiorari and I do so now for limited circumstances.  Given that the common law rule authorizing publication bans must be consistent with Charter principles, I am of the view that the remedies available where a judge errs in applying this rule should be consistent with the remedial powers under the Charter.  Therefore, the remedial powers of certiorari should be expanded to include the remedies that are available through s. 24(1) of the Charter.  [Emphasis in original.]

XVI. As the order in question has been issued by the Provincial Court, the appellant must challenge it by seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari from a superior court judge.  Technically, of course, the appellant has not followed the correct procedure as he sought relief in the form of a s. 24(1) Charter remedy and by means of prohibition.  However, neither the appellant nor the superior court judge had the benefit of the reasons of this Court in Dagenais to guide them.  If one examines the nature of the application made by the appellant, there is considerable resemblance between prohibition and the s. 24(1) remedy sought, and the expanded notion of certiorari developed in Dagenais.  (emphasis added)

[28]        Not without consideration is the fact that my authority as a judge presiding a preliminary inquiry is strictly governed by statute (part XVIII of the Criminal Code). Thus, I have no inherent powers outside those that are specifically set out in the Criminal Code. As no statutory provision entitles me to quash a subpoena, I can only conclude that such an order is beyond the scope of my modest jurisdiction.

[29]        In short, both the weight of judicial authority and the limited powers of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, lend themselves to the conclusion that I cannot rule on an order to quash a subpoena.

-Power to adjudicate the subpoena on the basis of relevance

[30]        The want of jurisdiction with regards to quashing a subpoena does not mean that I do not have the authority to call upon the accused (Mr. Ben Aïssa) to explain how the object of the subpoena (the written defence) is likely to be relevant in the present proceeding. As Justice Fernandes explained at paras. 4 and 6 of his decision in Rashwan, supra,  such an inquiry is fundamental to the Court process:

Having ruled that it does not have jurisdiction to quash subpoenas issued by a justice of the peace, a member of this court, this court is of the view, however, that in the appropriate circumstances it has the authority to inquire of the party that has caused a subpoena to issue by a justice of the peace, to demonstrate how that particular witness under subpoena is likely to give material evidence in the proceedings. This is an appropriate function of the trial court.

Just because a subpoena has been issued by a justice of the peace does not mean that the trial judge is then stopped from inquiring in appropriate circumstances whether or not a witness has material evidence to give at that trial. This court invited Mr. Rashwan, no less than five times, to demonstrate how Mr. Ronald Oswald is a material witness likely to give material evidence at this trial, at this trial involving a charge of criminal harassment in which Mr. Rashwan stands as the accused.

[31]        In R. v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401 (CanLII), Justice Lane of the Ontario Court of Justice remanded applications to quash a subpoena to the Superior Court. At para. 4 of his judgement, he summarized the Superior Court’s decision holding that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice (provincial court)—though powerless to decide an application to quash—was entitled by virtue of s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code to hear submissions as to whether or not the evidence was receivable at the trial :

On May 15, 2006, Ducharme J. found that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice clearly has jurisdiction to hear an application under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code, and directed that I hear the submissions of the applicants and determine whether the witnesses should be excused. Ducharme J. applied Re. Chase and the Queen (1982) 1982 CanLII 304 (BC SC), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (B.C.S.C.) where MacKay J. found that, while it was quite true that only the superior court has jurisdiction to quash subpoenas, such an order was not necessary, and that it was for the trial judge to make a determination of whether or not the evidence of the applicant is receivable on the trial.  “If the trial judge concluded that the evidence was not receivable then he has the power, under s. 628(2) (now s. 700(2)) of the Criminal Code, to excuse the witness from attending.”  In the words of MacKay J., “the question is really one going to the admissibility of evidence….”

[32]        At para. 7 in Maleki, Justice Lane expanded on the case law authorizing a judge to inquire on the relevance of a witness’ testimony and to excuse them if the testimony was immaterial to the proceedings :

The power of a justice of the Ontario Court of Justice to excuse witnesses under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code has been upheld in other situations: R. v. Rashwan [2004] O.J. No. 4747 (Spiegel J. of the Ont. S.C.) agreeing with similar rulings by Trafford J. (at para. 12) and by Dambrot J. (at para. 13); R. v. Sunoco Inc. [1986] O.J. No. 2319 (Rosenberg J. of the Ont. S.C.).  In a recent application to quash subpoenas in the Superior Court by the C.B.C., O’Driscoll J. held that the matter should properly be argued before the trial judge, and remitted the case back to the Ontario Court of Justice: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada 2006 ONCJ 54 (CanLII), [2006] O.J. No. 722 (Cole J. O.C.J.).  In light of this jurisprudence, it appears that  the finding of my brother Knazen J. in R. v. E. (R.) [1991] O.J. No. 841 (Ont. C. Prov. Div.) restricting the use of section 700(2) of the Criminal Code to physical attendance, as opposed to a discretion to excuse, and the decision of my brother Fontana J. in R. v. Morissette [1990] O.J. No. 2487 (Ont. C. Prov. Div.) declining all jurisdiction to excuse witnesses, have been bypassed. Further to the direction of Justice Ducharme, I find that I do have jurisdiction to deal with the applications before me.

[33]        The said decisions are consistent with the powers of a preliminary inquiry judge to make all evidentiary rulings, with admissibility determined by relevance, a concept which is not governed solely by the narrow test for committal.[9] As explained by Justice Arthur W.D. Pickup in R. v. Ellis, 2012 NSSC 329 (CanLII), para. 17 : 

It is important to note that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to make all evidentiary rulings, and the issue of whether these witnesses are relevant to the inquiry can be put squarely before the preliminary inquiry judge to resolve. The preliminary inquiry judge can determine the nature and scope of the examination of witnesses, and rule on any objections.

Comment apprécier si les interventions d'un juge lors d'un contre-interrogatoire mine ou non le droit à une défense pleine et entière

R. v Churchill, 2016 NLCA 29

Lien vers la décision

[18]        This Court in C.H. outlined the considerations that are relevant when determining whether or not the accused’s right to make full answer and defense has been unjustifiably violated by the intervention of the trial judge:

[18]     From the foregoing a number of principles applicable to the case at bar can readily be identified. They are as follows:

(1) A trial judge has both the right and the duty to intervene in examination or cross-examination to clear up ambiguities, provide further information on a matter left vague, provide information on something apparently relevant but left out, and to limit unnecessary repetition and protect witnesses from unnecessarily harassing cross-examination;

(2) The right of intervention must be exercised with judicial discretion and is best left to a point in time when counsel has concluded or is passing to a new subject;

(3) The intervention must not fetter the right of an accused, through his counsel, to subject any witness’s testimony to the test of cross-examination and in particular cross-examination relevant to the issue of credibility must not be improperly curtailed;

(4) Where the interventions by the trial judge seriously limit or impair the ability of counsel to test credibility, particularly of a witness whose evidence is critical to the question of the guilt or innocence of an accused, the accused will have been so prejudiced as to be deprived of a fair trial;

(5) The events of interference must be viewed cumulatively, not as isolated occurrences;

(6) Every alleged departure during trial, from the accepted standards of judicial conduct, must be examined with respect to its effect on the fairness of the trial;

(7) An appellate court is required by s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code to intervene where the appearance of fairness is so lacking as to result in a miscarriage of justice;

(8) The ultimate question to be answered is not whether the accused was in fact prejudiced by the interventions but whether he might reasonably consider that he had not had a fair trial or whether a reasonably minded person who had been present throughout the trial would consider that the accused had not had a fair trial;

(9) Because the ability to effectively cross-examine prosecution witnesses is of fundamental importance to a criminal trial, going to the right to make full answer and defence, it is now protected by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and should be interpreted in the broad and generous manner befitting its constitutional status, and

(10) An accused in a criminal trial has the right of cross-examination in the fullest and widest sense of the word, as long as he does not abuse that right, and improper interference with that right will result in the conviction being quashed.

(See also Schmaltz at paras. 19-20.)

[19]        Sometimes, a number of unwarranted interruptions will undermine the right to make full answer and defense due to the disruption of counsel’s examination (Brouillard at p. 48).

[20]        The appellant submits that the judge interfered with counsel’s cross-examination more than 20 times and that some of these interventions curtailed effective cross-examination.

[27]        This interruption was premature. It is well established the defense does not need to lead evidence in order to put a theory to the witness in good faith (R. v. Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193). The trial judge should have provided counsel with the opportunity to demonstrate the relevance of the inquiry before interrupting counsel’s very first question to the witness. It sent a message to counsel and the witness that counsel’s questioning was going to be perceived as irrelevant and need not be taken seriously.

[28]        The second interruption occurred when counsel was cross-examining the complaint about the medications that she was taking for her back. The judge guessed counsel’s ultimate question and offered it to the witness for a response.

[29]        This interruption was inappropriate. There was nothing confusing that needed clarification. The judge chose to guess what counsel’s next question would be and tell the witness. This kind of interruption disrupts the rhythm of cross-examination and counsel’s psychological control over the witness (Lyttle at para. 7, see also Kendall v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2010 BCSC 1556 at para 41).

[33]        If treated in isolation none of these incidents would rise to the level of curtailing cross-examination. However, when taken together, I would conclude they disrupted the flow of counsel’s cross-examination, undermined his authority in the eyes of the witness and thereby prevented the accused from effectively putting his theory to the complainant. Thus the right to make full answer and defense was undermined. The conclusion becomes even stronger since I also conclude the trial judge’s conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Ce qu'est la déclaration d'un accusé à haut risque

Lebel c. R., 2024 QCCA 1666 

Lien vers la décision

[4]         L’appelant se pourvoit contre un jugement de la Cour supérieure qui le déclare accusé à haut risque. Cette décision repose sur l’application du paragraphe 672.64(1) du Code criminel. Le paragraphe 672.64(1) prévoit deux critères disjonctifs[3] selon lesquels un juge peut déclarer à haut risque un accusé de dix‑huit ans ou plus qui a fait l’objet d’un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux en lien avec une infraction grave contre la personne :

a) il est convaincu qu’il y a une probabilité marquée que l’accusé usera de violence de façon qu’il pourrait mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité d’une autre personne;

b) il est d’avis que les actes à l’origine de l’infraction étaient d’une nature si brutale qu’il y a un risque de préjudice grave — physique ou psychologique — pour une autre personne.

[5]         Ce régime de déclaration qu’un accusé est à haut risque a été décrit et analysé en 2022 par notre Cour dans l’arrêt Lafrenière c. R.[4]. J’en reprends les traits essentiels. Il s’agit d’un régime d’exception puisque le droit criminel, par l’intervention des tribunaux judiciaires, conserve son emprise sur un accusé qui a été déclaré non criminellement responsable d’un crime grave[5]. La déclaration en cause comporte des modalités de détention qui sont plus restrictives que celles qui peuvent être ordonnées par la Commission d’examen des troubles mentaux[6].

[6]         En effet, en application du paragraphe 672.64(3) du Code criminel, le tribunal qui déclare un accusé à haut risque ordonne sa détention dans un hôpital et ses sorties éventuelles doivent être strictement encadrées. Il ne peut séjourner à l’extérieur que si le responsable de l’hôpital considère que la sortie est appropriée pour des raisons médicales ou pour son traitement, pour autant que l’accusé soit escorté et qu’un projet structuré ait été établi pour mitiger les risques, que la sortie ne présente pas un risque inacceptable pour le public.

[7]         L’objectif prépondérant visé par le régime de déclaration établi à l’article 672.64 du Code criminel est d’assurer la protection du public contre des personnes qui ont été reconnues non criminellement responsables et qui sont considérées comme très dangereuses, sur la base d’une évaluation des risques[7]. À cet égard, l’alinéa 672.64(1)a) du Code criminel requiert la preuve d’une « probabilité marquée » d’usage ultérieur de violence par l’accusé pouvant mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité d’autrui. Il s’agit d’un risque élevé et substantiel[8]. Le danger à la vie ou à la sécurité d’autrui cible un préjudice sérieux[9]. Le tribunal doit évaluer la dangerosité dans un contexte où l’accusé ne serait plus soumis à des contraintes externes[10]. La probabilité marquée doit être démontrée par le ministère public selon la prépondérance des probabilités[11]. 

[8]         L’alinéa 672.64(1)b) du Code criminel prévoit une seconde voie permettant de déclarer un accusé à haut risque[12]. L’alinéa 672.64(1)b) se concentre plutôt sur les circonstances du crime[13], à savoir la brutalité des gestes, et requiert une preuve de risque moins élevé que l’alinéa 672.64(1)a)[14]. Il s’agit de déterminer si, compte tenu de la brutalité[15] des gestes délictueux de l’accusé et des facteurs énoncés au paragraphe 672.64(2) du Code criminel, il existe un risque réel, non pas hypothétique, plus que « minime » ou « minuscule »[16], que celui-ci commette à nouveau une violence qui causera des dommages physiques ou psychologiques graves à une autre personne[17].

[9]         Même si la violence et la brutalité du crime ne suffisent pas pour fonder une déclaration qu’un accusé est un accusé à haut risque[18], dans l’application de ce critère, ces facteurs sont centraux à l’analyse. Encore une fois, cette évaluation doit être faite dans la perspective où l’accusé ne serait pas soumis à des contraintes en milieu hospitalier sécurisé. La brutalité des gestes délictueux réfère à des comportements hors normes, cruels, sauvages et inhumains[19]. Les caractéristiques de la « brutalité » d’un comportement comprennent : la gratuité des gestes, le fait que l’attaque a ciblé une personne parfaitement inconnue, le fait que le geste ne découlait d’aucune provocation, le fait que la violence était non nécessaire et prolongée, alors que la victime n’était plus en mesure de se défendre[20]. Tous ces éléments sont des indices importants d’imprévisibilité et de dangerosité éventuelle de l’accusé[21].

[10]      Pour décider s’il déclare ou non un accusé à haut risque[22], selon le paragraphe 672.64(2) du Code criminel, le tribunal prend en compte tout élément de preuve pertinent, notamment : a) la nature et les circonstances de l’infraction; b) la répétition d’actes comme celui qui est à l’origine de l’infraction; c) l’état mental actuel de l’accusé; d) les traitements suivis et à venir de l’accusé et la volonté de celui-ci de les suivre; e) l’avis des experts qui l’ont examiné. Ces éléments ne sont pas des prérequis à une déclaration qu’il est un accusé à haut risque et ne sont pas exhaustifs non plus[23]. Ce régime de déclaration d’un accusé à haut risque a donc une importante composante discrétionnaire[24].

[11]      Il est important de préciser que la déclaration à l’effet qu’une personne est un accusé à haut risque n’est pas un verrou qui la condamne à une détention indéfinie. L’accusé continue d’être évalué par la Commission d’examen des troubles mentaux.

[12]      En application de l’article 672.84 du Code criminel, si la Commission d’examen est convaincue, au terme d’une audience, qu’il n’y a pas de probabilité marquée que la personne déclarée accusée à haut risque usera de violence de façon à mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité d’une autre personne, elle est tenue de renvoyer l’affaire à la cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle pour révision de la déclaration. Ce mécanisme s’applique que l’accusé ait été déclaré à haut risque en application de l’alinéa 672.64(1)a) ou de l’alinéa 672.64(1)b). Selon le paragraphe 672.84(3) du Code criminel, la cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle révoque la déclaration si elle est convaincue qu’il n’y a pas de probabilité marquée que l’accusé fera usage de violence de façon à mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité d’une autre personne. La personne visée retombe alors sous la juridiction de la Commission d’examen des troubles mentaux.

Que doit établir la Poursuite pour administrer une preuve vidéo sous 715.1 Ccr?

R. v. P.S., 2019 ONCA 637

Lien vers la décision

[12]      As can be seen, s. 715.1(1) contains four mandatory statutory prerequisites to admission of a video-recorded statement. To introduce the statement, the Crown must establish on a balance of probabilities that:

(1)         the video-recorded statement was provided by a complainant or witness who was under the age of eighteen years “at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed”;

(2)         the video recording was made “within a reasonable time after the alleged offence”;

(3)         the complainant or witness describes the “acts complained of” in the video recording; and

(4)         while “testifying”, the complainant or witness “adopts the contents of the video recording”.

[13]      In R. v. L. (D.O.), 1993 CanLII 46 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, the decision upholding the constitutional validity of s. 715.1,^[1] both the majority and concurring opinions discussed a residual judicial discretion at common law to exclude statements on the basis that their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial effect: L. (D.O.), at p. 429, Lamer C.J.; at p. 461, L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring. See also: R. v. F. (C.C.), 1997 CanLII 306 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1183, at paras. 51-52. That residual discretion was later explicitly embedded in s. 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code by virtue of An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 2005, c. 32, s. 23, which came into force January 2, 2006. Therefore, even where the four statutory prerequisites to admission have been met, s. 715.1(1) now requires exclusion where the “admission of the video recording in evidence would interfere with the proper administration of justice.”

Une admission mixte de faits et de droit ne lie pas le juge du procès

R. v. R.A.H., 2017 PECA 5

Lien vers la décision

[52]           The admission that the requirements of s.715.1 were met is not an admission of fact.  It is only counsel's opinion.  The authors of Phipson on Evidence (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 17^th Ed.), at para.4-15, state as follows:

 

Law and fact. Admissions are receivable to prove matters of law, or mixed law and fact, though (unless amounting to estoppels) these are generally of little weight, being necessarily founded on mere opinion. ...  

 

[53]           An admission of law, or mixed fact and law, cannot bind the trial judge (Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105), and can be withdrawn at any time even at the Court of Appeal level (R. v. Baty, [1958] CanLII 93 (Ont.C.A.), Highly v. C.P.R., 1929 CanLII 410 (ON CA), [1930] 1 D.L.R. 630 (Ont.C.A.)), as happened in this case.  While the trial judge was entitled to consider an experienced defence counsel's admission of law or mixed fact and law, defence counsel's opinion cannot usurp the trial judge's duty to ensure the requirements of s.715.1 are met before admitting the video statements.  It is the trial judge who must be satisfied that these conditions are met, not defence counsel.  The trial judge has a duty to direct his or her mind to the requirements of s.715.1 before deciding the admissibility of the video-recorded statements.  Failure to do so is a reversible error.