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mardi 3 juin 2025

Il existe des circonstances justifiant un délai dans l'exercice du droit à l'avocat & le droit à l’assistance d’un avocat est comme un « canal de communication » qui empêche le détenu d'être entièrement à la merci des policiers pendant sa détention

R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745

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[24Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees to anyone arrested or detained the right "to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right" (emphasis added).

[25] Section 10(b) obliges the police to advise a detained person of the right to speak with counsel without delay and, if the detained person exercises that right, the police must immediately provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel: R. v. Suberu[2009] 2 S.C.R. 460[2009] S.C.J. No. 332009 SCC 33, at paras. 38, 42; R. v. Bartle1994 CanLII 64 (SCC)[1994] 3 S.C.R. 173[1994] S.C.J. No. 74, at pp. 191-92 S.C.R.

[26] The s. 10(b) jurisprudence has, however, always recognized that specific circumstances may justify some delay in providing a detainee access to counsel. Those circumstances often relate to police safety, public safety or the preservation of evidence. For example, in R. v. Strachan1988 CanLII 25 (SCC)[1988] 2 S.C.R. 980[1998] S.C.J. No. 94, the court accepted that the police could delay providing access to counsel in order to properly gain control of the scene of the arrest and search for restricted weapons known to be at the scene. Subsequent cases have accepted that specific circumstances relating to the execution of search warrants can also justify delaying access to counsel until the warrant is executed: see, e.g.R. v. Learning[2010] O.J. No. 30922010 ONSC 3816258 C.C.C. (3d) 68 (S.C.J.), at paras. 71-75.

[27] These cases have, however, emphasized that concerns of a general or non-specific nature applicable to virtually any search cannot justify delaying access to counsel. The police may delay [page143] access only after turning their mind to the specifics of the circumstances and concluding, on some reasonable basis, that police or public safety, or the need to preserve evidence, justifies some delay in granting access to counsel. Even when those circumstances exist, the police must also take reasonable steps to minimize the delay in granting access to counsel: see, e.g.R. v. Patterson[2006] B.C.J. No. 1042006 BCCA 24206 C.C.C. (3d) 70, at para. 41R. v. Soto[2010] O.J. No. 16442010 ONSC 1734 (S.C.J.), at paras. 67-71Learning, at para. 75R. v. Wu[2017] O.J. No. 6532017 ONSC 100335 C.R. (7th) 101 (S.C.J.), at para. 78.

[28Wu, at para. 78, provides a helpful summary of the law. That summary includes the following:

The assessment of whether a delay or suspension of the right to counsel is justified involves a fact specific contextual determination. The case law on this issue reveals some general guiding principles that provide a framework for this assessment:

 a.   The suspension of the right to counsel is an exceptional step that should only be undertaken in cases where urgent and dangerous circumstances arise or where there are concerns for officer or public safety.


. . . . .

 e.   Police officers considering whether circumstances justify suspending the right to counsel must conduct a case by case assessment aided by their training and experience. A policy or practice routinely or categorically permitting the suspension of the right to counsel in certain types of investigations is inappropriate.


(Emphasis added)

[29] In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that the officers involved in this investigation followed a practice that routinely prevented arrested persons from accessing counsel if the police intended to obtain a warrant to search a place for drugs and believed that the place had a connection to the arrested person. The rationale behind this practice appears to be that there is always a possibility that allowing an arrested person to speak to their lawyer could put the officers executing the warrant at risk or jeopardize the preservation of evidence. Under this practice, the appellant, as the occupier of the place to be searched, was prevented from contacting his lawyer, as were the two women who had been arrested earlier that evening.

[32] The police practice described by the officers replaces the narrow, case-specific exception to the constitutional right to speak to counsel without delay upon arrest with a protocol that routinely delays an arrested person's access to counsel for an [page145] indeterminate time, usually hours, whenever the police, for whatever reason, deem it appropriate to arrest them before applying for a search warrant. There is no evidence that any of the officers turned their mind to the specific circumstances of this case before deciding that the appellant would be arrested and denied access to counsel for several hours while the police sought, obtained and executed a search warrant. On the evidence of the police, there was no need to consider the specifics of this case. For them, the decision to arrest the appellant before seeking the search warrant dictated that the appellant would not be allowed to contact a lawyer until the warrant was executed.

[33] In my view, to fall within the exception to the requirement that an arrested person be allowed to speak to counsel without delay, the police must actually turn their mind to the specific circumstances of the case, and they must have reasonable grounds to justify the delay. The justification may be premised on the risk of the destruction of evidence, public safety, police safety, or some other urgent or dangerous circumstance. Furthermore, if the police determine that some delay in allowing an arrested person to speak to counsel is justified to permit execution of the warrant, then they must consider whether it is necessary to arrest the individual before they execute the warrant. The police cannot create a justification for delaying access to counsel by choosing, for reasons of convenience or efficiency, to arrest an individual before seeking, obtaining and executing a search warrant. Police efficiency and convenience cannot justify delaying an arrested person's right to speak with counsel for several hours.

[45] The right to counsel is a lifeline for detained persons. Through that lifeline, detained persons obtain, not only legal advice and guidance about the procedures to which they will be subjected, but also the sense that they are not entirely at the mercy of the police while detained. The psychological value of access to counsel without delay should not be underestimated.

[34] The effective implementation of the right to counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) depends entirely on the police. The police must understand that right and be willing to facilitate contact with counsel. The practice under which the officers involved in this case operated demonstrates a disregard of a fundamental constitutional right. The appellant's right to speak with counsel was denied at the time of his arrest, when the police refused his request to speak with counsel.

Les policiers doivent s'abstenir de tenter de soutirer des éléments de preuve au détenu tant que celui-ci n'aura pas eu une possibilité raisonnable de recourir à l'assistance d'un avocat

R. v. Dupe, 2010 ONSC 6594

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[23]           Certainly the accused is correct that the case law requires the police to hold off from questioning a detainee about the offence charged until he or she has a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. Lamer J.  (as he then was) put it this way in Manninen, at para. 23:

Further, s. 10(b) imposes on the police the duty to cease questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the detainee until he has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. The purpose of the right to counsel is to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights. In this case, the police officers correctly informed the respondent of his right to remain silent and the main function of counsel would be to confirm the existence of that right and then to advise him as to how to exercise it. For the right to counsel to be effective, the detainee must have access to this advice before he is questioned or otherwise required to provide evidence. (Emphasis added.)

[24]           But it seems clear that Lamer J. did not intend, in Manninen, to oblige the authorities to stop all questioning of the accused while he or she is given the opportunity to consult counsel.  The use of the words “cease questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence” to describe the requirement to hold off sheds light on the sort of questioning that is prohibited – questioning intended to elicit evidence, sometimes referred to as investigative questioning. Questioning to assist the accused to exercise his rights, preserve his property, provide care for his family, or protect his health and safety or the health and safety of others, just to name the most obvious examples, are not prohibited by the language in Manninen. Nor should they be. Prohibiting such questions would not enhance the purpose of s. 10(b). An accused does not require the advice of counsel to assist him or her in determining how to answer such questions, while the best interests of not only the accused but those around him demand that they be asked. An accused only requires the advice of counsel to assist him or her in determining how to answer questions designed to elicit incriminatory evidence, or at least to elicit evidence relating to the offence under investigation.

[25]           My understanding of the purpose of s. 10(b) is reinforced by the view expressed by Professor Stuart in Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (5th ed.), (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), at p. 360, where he looks to Bartlesupra, to say that concerns about “protect[ing] the disadvantaged from the risk of self-incrimination” are at the core of s. 10(b), as an individual needs to be knowledgeable about how to exercise his or her legal rights.  The fact that the answer to an innocuous question asked for a different purpose may prove to be useful to the Crown does not change the character of the questioning.

[26]           The language used in Prosper leads me to the same conclusion. There, Lamer C.J., in para. 34, as noted above, in describing the duty to hold off, stated, “…  state agents must refrain from eliciting incriminatory evidence from the detainee until he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to reach counsel.” Questioning that is not designed to elicit incriminatory evidence, or at least to elicit evidence relating to the offence under investigation, is not prohibited.

[27]           Exactly what constitutes “attempting to elicit incriminatory evidence” has not been explored in depth in the case law. This is perhaps because it is normally obvious when a question is an attempt, whether overt or not, to elicit incriminatory evidence. What little assistance there is, however, supports my view of the matter. I turn first to the decision of Code J. in R. v. Learning2010 ONSC 3816258 C.C.C. (3d) 68. In that case, after being arrested for possession of an unauthorized firearm and advised of his right to counsel, the accused asked to speak to his lawyer “right now.” After being transported to a police station, the accused was paraded, asked booking questions, taken to an interview room and asked questions for the purpose of acquiring background processing information. All of this took place before the accused was given an opportunity to call his lawyer. 

[28]           The Crown sought to introduce the answers to the booking questions in evidence at trial. The accused brought an application to exclude the answers on the basis that they were obtained in a manner that violated the Charter. He said that the asking of the questions that elicited these answers was asked when the police were required to hold off, and so the answers were obtained in breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter. Code J. did not accept this argument. After considering what was said in Manninen, he stated, at para. 81:

81     I am satisfied that if Sgt. Schoch was merely asking the accused for background information for the Record of Arrest, such as his date of birth, address, phone number, height and weight, and was taking note of his clothing and any identifying features, this would not constitute "eliciting evidence from the detainee" or "calling upon the detainee to provide evidence". Indeed, the routine booking process when the accused first enters the station, involves similar kinds of questions that have no evidentiary value in relation to the charges against the accused …

[29]           Powers J. came to a similar conclusion in R. v. Sinclair2003 BCSC 2040, [2003] B.C.J. No. 3258, aff’d 2008 BCCA 127, 169 C.R.R. (2d) 232, aff’d 2010 SCC 35, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 443. In that case, the accused was arrested for murder in an apartment in which he was found sleeping. Upon being advised of his right to counsel, he signified that he wished to exercise it. The accused did not want to leave his effects in the apartment, and so the police gathered them. They asked him if certain clothing and a wallet were his, and he indicated that they were. The police subsequently seized and analyzed some of this clothing, and the Crown sought to have it admitted in evidence, along with the accused’s statement that it was his, because the Crown later discovered they were relevant to the murder. The accused argued that the statements were obtained in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter, and should be excluded, since the police were obliged to hold off questioning him until he had exercised his right to consult counsel.

[30]           Powers J. concluded that there was no violation of s. 10(b). He stated, at paras. 72-76:

72       I am satisfied that on that occasion the officers were not attempting to illicit information from Mr. Sinclair about the offence or to gather evidence or to interview him. Their obligation, once he asserted that he wished to speak to a lawyer, even though it may not have been right that second, was to either clarify whether he wanted to speak to a lawyer and, if so, to hold off and make sure that if he was waiving his right to speak to a lawyer that is what, in fact, he was doing.

73     That does not mean they cannot engage in normal conversation that is necessary for the purposes of telling him where to go, to get in the car, whatever, and in this case that is all that was happening. He is not in his own residence. There are other people around. He has some personal belongings there.

74     The officers knew that it was unlikely he would be coming back and I am satisfied they were merely gathering up his belongings for safekeeping at that time despite the fact that they may have become evidence later on.

75     There is clearly no issue about whether these statements were made voluntarily, that has not been argued. There were certainly no threats, inducements, no oppression. The only question is whether there was a breach of his right to counsel. He was certainly informed of that and whether they had somehow breached his right to counsel and his right to silence by asking him questions before he had an opportunity to exercise that right.

76     Again, I find that that was not what the officers were doing in this case. That it was only subsequent to these events that they even began to think that there might be some evidence on Mr. Sinclair's clothing. They did not even know that there might be any evidence in his wallet until subsequently when they were looking for his lawyer's card in that wallet for him and went through his wallet and found a birth certificate that had what may be blood on it. So they have not, in my opinion, breached his rights and those statements would be admissible.

[31]           The questions in Sinclair were designed to preserve the accused’s property. The questions here were designed to protect the accused, and others, and to ensure that the accused knew his rights. In both cases, the questions were related to the offence only in the most tangential way. The decision in Sinclair supports the view that the questioning here did not breach the rule that state agents must refrain from eliciting incriminatory evidence from the detainee until he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to reach counsel, and did not violate s. 10(b). 

[32]           I also note that, despite Sinclair reaching the Supreme Court of Canada on the scope of the application of s. 10(b) in the context of interrogation, Powers J.’s ruling on this issue was not even contested in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

[33]           Finally, I refer to the decision of Trafford J. in R. v. Smith (2007), 2007 CanLII 24098 (ON SC), 163 C.R.R. (2d) 41 (Ont. S.C.J.), which was relied upon by the accused. That case, like this one, involves answers to questions asked in the booking process. While the result in that case is the same as the result sought by the accused here, the reasoning is not consistent with the position of the defence.

[34]           In Smith, the accused, upon being arrested for murder, told the arresting officer that he wanted to speak to duty counsel. Prior to being permitted to do so, he was booked. In the course of the booking process, he was asked routine booking questions which, on their face, were “innocent” ones unrelated to the alleged murder. At trial, the accused brought an application to exclude his answers. Trafford J. concluded that the asking of such questions did not violate s. 10(b). He stated, at para. 71:

… Those questions were asked to properly care for the medical condition of the defendant and the safety of all persons in the station. In my view, R. v. Manninen, supra, does not prohibit such questions for such purposes.

[35]           Despite finding that the questioning did not violate s. 10(b), he excluded the answers. He stated, also in para. 71:

… However, it [R. v. Manninen] does prohibit any questions of an investigative purpose and, in my view, the subsequent use of any answers by the defendant to any question of the booking officer asked to care for the health or safety of people in the station. These circumstances undermined the defendant's right to choose to speak about the alleged murder. His responses are conscriptive evidence. The breach is a serious one …

[36]           With great respect to Trafford J., I do not understand how the subsequent use of answers given to properly asked questions can breach s. 10(b) of the Charter, far less how that use, which had not yet occurred, could have been a serious breach. Voluntary answers to booking questions are not analogous to compelled testimony, and do not attract use immunity. I do agree with him, however, that the questions asked in the booking process were not prohibited by s. 10(b).

La police est tenue d'être proactive lorsqu'elle constate objectivement que le détenu ne comprend pas son droit à l'avocat & le simple fait pour un détenu de dire qu'il veut parler à sa femme n'est pas suffisant pour forcer la police à donner suite à cette demande

R. v. Magalong, 2013 BCCA 478

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[28]        These cases all affirm the importance of the detainee’s understanding of his or her right as central to the detainee’s ability to exercise that right. In the context of language issues, it will often be apparent that the detainee does not understand. In other circumstances, however, a detainee may have facility in English, but better facility in his or her first language. If that case is so, it still may be possible that a detainee understands the information provided, in which case there can be no complaint by the detainee he or she did not receive the mandatory Charter warnings in the language of his or her choice. Where, however, the detainee does not understand, a question arises whether the police should have done more to ensure comprehension. I understand the jurisprudence I have just referred to requires police to do more where there is, objectively, something about the circumstances that positively indicate a lack of comprehension.

[33]        Nor in my view was the denial of Mr. Magalong’s request to speak to his wife a breach of his Charter right to counsel. As in R. v. K.W.J., the reasoning in which I would adopt, Mr. Magalong did not tell the police that he wanted to contact his wife to ask her to contact counsel for him. In these circumstances, denying Mr. Magalong’s single simple request to contact his wife does not establish a Charter violation.

Revue du droit par la Cour d'Appel de Saskatchewan quant à l’alinéa 10b), notamment sur la question de la compréhension du détenu de ses droits

R v C.L, 2023 SKCA 58

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[23]           Section 10(b) of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right, on arrest or detention … to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right”. The purpose of s. 10(b) is to provide detainees with “an opportunity to contact counsel in circumstances where they are deprived of liberty and in the control of the state, and thus vulnerable to the exercise of its power and in a position of legal jeopardy” (R v Willier2010 SCC 37 at para 28, [2010] 2 SCR 429 [Willier]). In this way, the protection offered by s. 10(b) ensures that detainees understand how to exercise their rights and are able to make choices about whether to speak to the police that are both free and informed (R v Sinclair2010 SCC 35 at paras 25-32, 259 CCC (3d) 443 [Sinclair]; R v Hebert1990 CanLII 118 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 151 at 176; R v Lafrance2022 SCC 32 at para 71, 416 CCC (3d) 183 [Lafrance]).

[24]           When a person is detained or arrested, s. 10(b) imposes three defined, positive duties on the police:

(a)               to inform the detainee of their right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel;

(b)               if the detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent or dangerous circumstances); and

(c)               to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until the detainee has had that reasonable opportunity.

The first of these duties is informational in nature. The second and third duties are implementational and are only triggered when the detainee indicates a desire to exercise their right to counsel (Willier at paras 29–30R v Bartle1994 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 173 at 192 [Bartle]; R v Ector2018 SKCA 46 at paras 41–42, 362 CCC (3d) 462 [Ector]).

[25]           The right to counsel is not absolute; a detainee bears some responsibility where its exercise is concerned. In Bartle, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nless a detainee invokes the right and is reasonably diligent in exercising it, the correlative duty on the police to provide a reasonable opportunity and to refrain from eliciting evidence will either not arise in the first place or will be suspended” (at 192). The right to counsel may also be waived, but any waiver must be clear and unequivocal, and it must be premised on proper information; “a person who waives a right must know what he or she is giving up” (R v Prosper1994 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 236 at 275; Bartle at 192; R v Cobham1994 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 360 at 370–371; and R v L.T.H.2008 SCC 49 at para 41, [2008] 2 SCR 739).

[26]           The circumstances of C.L.’s case implicate the conduct of the police at the informational stage. The information component of s. 10(b) is crucial and requires police officers to explain the right to counsel to detainees in a timely and comprehensible manner because, as observed in Bartle, “[u]nless they are clearly and fully informed of their rights at the outset, detainees cannot be expected to make informed choices and decisions about whether or not to contact counsel and, in turn, whether to exercise other rights, such as the right to silence” (at 193, emphasis in original).

[27]           The informational component of s. 10(b) has been described as one that is “relatively straightforward” (Willier at para 31), and it will usually not be difficult to for police officers to fulfil their duty at this stage. Generally speaking, a standard police caution that informs the detainee that they have the right to seek and receive legal advice immediately and free of charge will suffice, “absent special circumstances indicating that a detainee may not understand the s. 10(b) caution, such as language difficulties or a known or obvious mental disability” (Bartle at 193).

[28]           However, where there are circumstances that raise a question about whether the detainee understands the information conveyed to them concerning the right to counsel, more may be required of the police. It is settled law that, where a detainee positively indicates that they do not understand their right to counsel, “the police cannot rely on a mechanical recitation of that right and must facilitate that understanding” (Willier at para 31). The reason for this is obvious because, as noted in R v Evans1991 CanLII 98 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 869 at para 891 [Evans], “[a] person who does not understand [their] right to counsel cannot be expected to assert it”. 

[29]           Of course, this does not require that police officers be mind readers. Nor does it call upon them to thoroughly probe a detainee’s understanding of the right to counsel in every case. It will only be necessary to take further steps at the informational stage to address a detainee’s misunderstanding or lack of understanding of the right to counsel where there is a clear communication to that effect by the detainee, or where other objective factors signal confusion or misunderstanding on the detainee’s part (R v Dunford2017 SKCA 1 at para 27, 345 CCC (3d) 374. See also: Evans at 891; Bartle at 192–194; and Sinclair at para 55). Put another way, where there is something about the circumstances, viewed objectively, that positively indicates a possible lack of comprehension of the right to counsel on the part of the detainee, the police cannot presume that they have satisfactorily fulfilled their duty to inform (R v Magalong2013 BCCA 478 at para 28, 305 CCC (3d) 396).

On peut procéder à un contre-interrogatoire dans le but de déterminer si ce dont l'expert a tenu compte était pertinent, s'il y a des points pertinents qui n'ont pas été pris en considération et, naturellement, si l'expert aurait pu arriver à sa conclusion par suite de considérations qui ne se rapportent pas à son domaine d'expertise particulier

R. c. Howard, 1989 CanLII 99 (CSC)

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Les experts aident le juge des faits à arriver à une conclusion en appliquant à un ensemble de faits des connaissances scientifiques particulières, que ne possèdent ni le juge ni le jury, et en exprimant alors une opinion sur les conclusions que l'on peut en tirer.  Par conséquent, un expert ne peut pas tenir compte de faits qui ne sont pas soumis à son examen à titre d'expert professionnel, car ils n'ont pas de rapport avec son examen d'expert; à fortiori, on ne devrait pas lui communiquer ni lui demander de prendre en considération un fait qui corrobore l'une des possibilités qu'on lui demande d'établir scientifiquement car cela fausserait l'expertise elle-même.  Si les policiers avaient dit aux experts de la poursuite, lorsqu'on avait retenu leurs services, que Trudel avait avoué et qu'il reconnaissait les faits qui établissaient qu'il s'agissait de ses empreintes de pieds, il nous faudrait nous demander si leur conclusion est vraiment scientifique.  Il en est ainsi parce que leur domaine d'expertise ne s'étend pas à la crédibilité de Trudel et que ce qu'il a admis n'a absolument rien à voir avec ce qu'on leur a demandé de faire pour aider la Cour, c'est-à-dire d'appliquer leurs connaissances scientifiques aux "faits scientifiques" pertinents, à savoir les moules, etc. 

 


J'ai souligné le mot pertinent dans les jugements du lord juge Lawton dans R. v. Turner, précité, et du juge Fort dans State v. Smallwood, précité.  En effet, je suis d'accord avec ces jugements, car ils appuient la proposition selon laquelle on peut procéder à un contre-interrogatoire dans le but de déterminer si ce dont l'expert a tenu compte était pertinent, s'il y a des points pertinents qui n'ont pas été pris en considération et, naturellement, si l'expert aurait pu arriver à sa conclusion par suite de considérations qui ne se rapportent pas à son domaine d'expertise particulier.  Un expert peut évidemment être contre-interrogé pour savoir si des faits pertinents ont été écartés ou négligés et si des faits non pertinents ont été pris en considération, mais uniquement s'il s'agit de faits non pertinents qui appuient la conclusion tirée.  Comme le dit l'appelant dans son mémoire.

 

[TRADUCTION] La preuve établissant qu'un expert n'a pas fondé son opinion sur des bases scientifiques solides et a pris en considération des points non pertinents, est considérée pertinente quant à la validité de cette opinion.  Toutefois, ne serait pas pertinent le fait que l'expert n'a pas pris en considération un point non pertinent.  Le contre-interrogatoire projeté de M. Watt établirait au plus qu'il n'a pas pris en considération un point non pertinent et donc n'attaquerait pas la validité de son opinion.

La valeur d’une expertise est liée à la qualité de la preuve qui l’appuie

R. c. Boucher, 2005 CSC 72

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31                              L’opinion de l’expert sur le taux d’alcoolémie qu’aurait dû indiquer l’alcootest reposait sur le témoignage de M. Boucher.  L’expert n’a pas évalué la résistance de M. Boucher à l’alcool.  Il a simplement fourni des données moyennes concernant l’alcoolémie d’un homme de 28 ans pesant 175 livres et mesurant 5 pieds 11 pouces, qui aurait consommé, durant une période de deux à trois heures, 44 onces de bière contenant cinq pour cent d’alcool.  Si le juge ne croit pas qu’un accusé a consommé 44 onces de bière, le calcul fait par l’expert n’est d’aucune utilité. Ce témoignage ne fait qu’apporter des données théoriques qui diffèrent des faits servant d’assise au jugement. Si le témoignage de l’expert est fondé sur le témoignage de l’accusé et que celui-ci n’est pas cru, le témoignage du premier ne saurait éclairer le tribunal et constituer une preuve contraire. Que reste-t-il d’autre?

Le dédommagement à la victime doit toujours être envisagé lors de la détermination de la peine

Comment le Tribunal doit se gouverner face à la demande d'un co-accusé d'avoir un procès séparé de ses complices

R. v. Zvolensky, 2017 ONCA 273 Lien vers la décision [245] It is difficult to underestimate the importance of a principled, case-specific ap...