La défense d’apparence de droit exposée par le juge Cournoyer

R. c. Gaudreau, 2010 QCCS 4351 (CanLII)

[22] La question de l’apparence de droit a été examinée par la Cour d'appel du Québec dans R. c. Investissements Contempra Ltée, qui mettait en cause l'entreprise Remorquage québécois à vos frais, accusée de vol et de méfait.

[23] Dans cette affaire, le juge Proulx écrit ce qui suit :

Avec beaucoup d'égard pour le premier juge, je ne crois pas qu'il était essentiel pour la solution du litige de déterminer si l'appelante avait réussi à démontrer qu'en droit civil elle pouvait prétendre non seulement à un droit de remorquage mais de rétention. En premier lieu, la question ultime à trancher était celle de la responsabilité pénale de l'appelante en regard des éléments essentiels de l'accusation et cette cour, dans le cadre de cet appel, n'est pas plus justifiée de se prononcer sur cette question quand ce n'est pas le forum approprié. En second lieu, comme j'entends le développer ci-après, la notion de l'apparence de droit ne s'appuie pas sur la prémisse que le droit, dont on veut se prévaloir, a été démontré mais plutôt sur la croyance honnête en un droit, fut-elle mal fondée en droit.

Une prise de position par le juge du procès était d'autant plus à éviter que, comme nous le verrons plus loin, il y avait en Cour provinciale (division des Petites créances) des jugements contradictoires sur la question du droit de rétention.

i) L'apparence de droit

En matière de vol, l'apparence de droit se situe au niveau de l'actus reus de l'infraction, qui est ainsi libellée :

(...)

D'une part, l'actus reus du vol consiste dans la prise ou le détournement, acte qui doit être posé à la fois frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit. La mens rea du vol, d'autre part, se distingue par la volonté de poser l'acte constituant l'actus reus, mais en plus par l'intention spécifique ou additionnelle décrite à l'un des sous-paragraphes a), b), c) ou d) de cet art. 322.

Je dois insister au départ sur cet aspect car le premier juge, comme je l'ai souligné ci‑haut, a limité le débat à la seule question de l'apparence de droit, sans s'interroger en plus sur l'intention spécifique, qui constitue également un élément essentiel de l'accusation qui doit être établi par la poursuite.

Il en est autrement quant à l'infraction de méfait (art. 430 C.cr.), dont l'appelante était également inculpée. En effet, le méfait défini à l'art. 430 C.cr. n'exige comme élément intentionnel que l'aspect "volontaire" de l'acte tandis qu'au par. (2) de l'art. 429 C.cr., il est expressément prévu que nul ne peut être déclaré coupable de méfait « s'il prouve qu'il a agi avec une justification ou une excuse légale et avec apparence de droit ». Cet élément constitue donc ici un moyen de défense à la charge d'un inculpé tandis qu'en matière de vol, c'est le poursuivant qui doit établir, au niveau de l'actus reus, l'absence de l'apparence de droit au moment de la prise ou du détournement.

La notion d'apparence de droit se présente sous deux volets, soit (1) la croyance honnête en un état de fait qui, s'il eût existé, aurait en droit justifié ou excusé l'acte reproché et (2) une croyance honnête mais erronée en un droit légal (et non moral). Le professeur Stuart, dans son traité, exprime son accord avec cette nuance faite par le juge Martin dans l'arrêt R. c. Demarco (arrêt qui incidemment fait maintenant jurisprudence sur la question) :

One who is honestly asserting what he believes to be an honest claim cannot be said to act 'without colour of right', even though it may be unfounded in law or in fact. ...The term 'colour of right' is also used to denote an honest belief in a state of facts which, if it actually existed would at law justify or excuse the act done. ...The term when used in the latter sense is merely a particular application of the doctrine of mistake of fact.

L'apparence de droit peut donc découler d'une erreur de fait ou d'une erreur de droit et là-dessus, le premier juge a bien fait ressortir cette distinction. Toutefois, et je reviens sur ce que j'ai amorcé antérieurement, il s'agira d'une croyance en un droit sincère et honnête, et peu importe donc que ce droit soit fondé ou non, il suffira que le droit invoqué ait une vraisemblance, une apparence, soit un "honest claim". Ce serait assez paradoxal d'exiger, quant à l'"apparence" de droit, la "reconnaissance" de ce droit[5].

[24] La Cour d'appel de Terre-Neuve examine la même question dans R. c. Watson. Le juge Cameron écrit ce qui suit :

The parties are agreed: (1) that s. 429(2) does not place a burden of proof upon the accused but rather it is for the Crown to establish the absence of legal justification or excuse and colour of right; and (2) that the section creates two (perhaps three) separate defences "legal justification or excuse" and "colour of right." In other words the "and" which precedes the words "colour of right" is read as "or." (See: R. v. Creaghan reflex, (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3rd) 449 (Ont C.A.) and R. v. Gamey reflex, (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 117 (Man C.A.).) Neither party objects to the trial judge's instructions to the jury on these points.

Parenthetically, the trial judge also instructed the jury - as a matter of law - that the World Charter for Nature, did not constitute legal justification or excuse under s. 429(2). That instruction is not challenged in this appeal. A legal justification or excuse makes legal what would otherwise be a crime.

The most commonly used definition of colour of right is "an honest belief in a state of facts which, if it existed, would be a legal justification or excuse. (See: R. v. Johnson (1904), 8 C.C.C. 123 (Ont. H.C.)) As will be seen, this definition of colour of right, while accurate as far as it goes, does not really address whether colour of right extends to mistake of law which is at the heart of this appeal. However, certain characteristics of colour of right are well established and are not disputed by the parties. Those aspects are:

(1) that the defence is based on the honest belief of the accused that, at the time the offence was committed, he had a colour of right (Creaghan);

(2) that the test is a subjective one (R. v. Howson, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 348 (Ont. C.A.));

(3) that while the belief does not have to be a reasonable one the reasonableness of the belief is a factor for consideration by the jury in determining if there is an honest belief (R. v. Ninos and Walker, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 326 (N.S.S.C); see also Laskin J.A. in Howson); and

(4) that it is not sufficient that the accused had a moral belief in a colour of right (R. v. Hemmerly (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 141 (Ont. C.A.) R. v. Cinq-Mars reflex, (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 248 (Que. C.A.) and Gamey).

[25] Dans R. c. Manuel, la Cour d’appel de Colombie-Britannique applique les décisions de Howson et DeMarco, citées par le juge Proulx dans Investissements Contempra, de même que l'arrêt Watson. La juge Levine résume le critère en ces termes :

Both parties' arguments on appeal focused on the application of the defence of colour of right. There is no dispute concerning the definition of the defence: it is an honest belief in a state of facts or civil law which, if it existed, would negate the mens rea for the offence: see R. v. Watson 1999 CanLII 13906 (NL C.A.), (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 422 at para. 23 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. DeMarco (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 369 at 372 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Howson, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 348 at 356-57 (Ont. C.A.).

Section 429(2) of the Code provides that the defence of colour of right applies to offences under ss. 430 to 446. The Code does not expressly provide, however, that the defence applies to the charge of intimidation under s. 423, of which the appellants were convicted.

In written submissions following the hearing of the appeal, both parties clarified their positions on the defence claimed. They agree that the appellants' defence to the intimidation charge was "mistake of fact", and that for the purposes of this case, the definition of the defences of colour of right and mistake of fact are the same.

Mistake of fact is a common law defence preserved by s. 8(3) of the Code: see R. v. Roche reflex, (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 524 at 532 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Tolson (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 168 at 181, quoted in R. v. Pappajohn, 1980 CanLII 13 (S.C.C.), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 at 147.

The defence of mistake of fact is established if the accused has an honest belief in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would negate the mens rea of the offence: Pappajohn at 147-148; R. v. Davidson (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 509 at 515 (B.C.C.A.). One aspect of the mens rea for intimidation is that the accused acted "for the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing anything that he or she has a lawful right to do" (s. 423(1)). The appellants argued that if they acted under the honest belief that they were entitled to block the road because the land belongs exclusively to their people, they would not have the required mens rea. They would not have been acting with the intent to compel the motorists to abstain from doing something the motorists had a lawful right to do.

[26] Dans son traité, le professeur Stuart décrit la défense d'apparence de droit en ces termes :

In the case of offences in which the colour of right defence operates, the requirements of the defence are now reasonably clear. There must be a mistake rather than simple ignorance, advertence rather than not thinking at all. It is accepted that the belief must be as to a legal rather than a moral right. Since the offences for which the defence is available are full mens rea offences and none of the colour of right clauses import reasonableness, it is not surprising that the courts have, at least recently consistently required that the mistake be honest and not necessarily reasonable. Mistakes grounding successful claims of right have indeed involved mistakes as to civil law or, as it has been put, mistakes of private rather than public rights. This has been suggested to be a requirement of the English law of colour of right, and there are recent decisions to this effect in Canada. It has never been explained why this distinctions should be made. It is not sef‑evident why a belief based on an out‑of‑date criminal law text that it is not stealing to take another's title deeds without permission will not ground a claim of right, whereas a belief based on a misunderstanding of the law of property that another is witholding your title deeds, will. Greater receptivity to excusing mistakes as to private law might nevertheless account for the historical tendency in England, reflected in our Code, to allow colour of right defences almost exclusively in the area of property offences.

[27] Dans la quatrième édition de l'ouvrage Criminal Law par Manning, Mewett et Sankoff, les auteurs énoncent le critère subjectif qui doit être utilisé :

After this judgment, it became common to assert that there were two prerequisites for any successful claim of mistake: honesty and reasonableness. A bona fide or honest mistake merely means that it must be a mistake that the accused was actually labouring under. The reasonableness of the mistake is a totally different concern since it imposes an objective standard that deprives the accused of the ability to rely upon the mistake where it was an unreasonable one to make. As we discussed in an earlier chapter, this standard is highly objectionable, as it judges the accused's mental state on an objective basis, and has the potential to convict the accused in the absence of subjective knowledge of the relevant facts. It is now clear that, whatever the older cases said, a reasonableness test is not required. In Pappajohn, six of seven judges in the Supreme Court concurred in the view that while a mistake of fact had to be honest, there was no requirement for it to be reasonable.

This does not mean that the reasonableness of the accused's mistake is an irrelevant concern. As Cartwright J. stated in Beaver, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the accused was honestly mistaken, which involves drawing inferences from all the evidence presented and considering one's experience, common sense and logic. The more unreasonable the inference the trier of fact is asked to draw, the less likely it is that it will be drawn. As a result, if the mistake is one that the ordinary reasonable person would not have made it is less likely that the jury will believe that the accused was mistaken. As a matter of law, however, it remains open for the jury to find that the accused was unreasonably mistaken, or at least have a doubt about the matter. What is essential is that jurors not be left with the impression that they cannot find of the accused unless they conclude that the mistake was reasonable.

It is not an error, however, to instruct the jury that the reasonableness of the mistake be taken into consideration. Indeed, section 265(4), which applies to all cases of assault, though it seems clear that it is directed specifically to sexual assault, mandates the following:

Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject‑matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused's belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.