Bertrand c. R., 2011 QCCA 1412 (CanLII)
[172] Dans l'arrêt Lamontagne, le juge Proulx écrit ceci au sujet de la notion de harcèlement:
25 Le « harcèlement» n'est pas défini par le législateur à l'art. 264.
26 Dans les arrêts Ryback et Sillipp, supra, l'on s'entend pour donner à ce mot une interprétation contextuelle. ll ne suffit pas que la plaignante soit « vexed, disquieted or annoyed », encore faut-il démontrer que la conduite prohibée ait « tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedeviled and badgered », soulignent ces arrêts.
27 Enfin, Nicholas Bala dans « Criminal Code Amendments to Increase Protection to Children & Women: Bills C-126 & C-128 », 21 C.R. (4th) 365, adopte la définition du harcèlement proposée dans certaines décisions, comme signifiant le fait de « vex, trouble, annoy continually or chronically ».
28 De ces définitions du « harcèlement » auxquelles je me range, je retiens que l'on ne se limite pas au sens classique et restreint du mot qui est de « soumettre sans répit à de petites attaques réitérées, à de rapides assauts incessants » (Le Petit Robert I, 1987). « Harceler » peut tout aussi bien signifier le fait d'« importuner (qqn) par des demandes, des sollicitations, des incitations » (Le Grand Robert de la langue française, 1992), ce qui traduit bien l'idée qu'il doit s'agir d'un comportement qui a pour effet d'importuner en raison de sa continuité ou de sa répétition, (« vex, trouble, annoy continually or chronically »).
29 En raison de la distinction que fait le législateur entre l'acte interdit au sens du par. (2) et le harcèlement comme conséquence ultime de l'acte, on ne peut donc tout simplement faire l'équation entre les deux, d'où la nécessité, comme je viens de l'exposer, de s'interroger sur la définition de l'état d'« harcèlement », indépendamment des actes interdits qui peuvent générer cet état et qui sont expressément prévus au par. (2).
30 En l'espèce, de cet incident unique caractérisé par les mots employés par l'appelant dans le contexte qu'il précise et qui est retenu par la juge, compte tenu également du silence de la plaignante quant à son état, ne peut se dégager la conclusion que de fait elle a été harcelée de quelque façon que ce soit. Le défaut de prouver cet élément devait entraîner l'acquittement.
[173] Tout comme le juge d'instance, je ne doute absolument pas que « l’état psychologique des plaignants démontr[e] qu’ils ont été troublés, inquiétés ou importunés ». La seule question est de savoir si la deuxième partie de sa conclusion selon laquelle « et, par conséquent, victimes de harcèlement criminel » est fondée.
[174] Je partage l'affirmation du juge d'instance qui estime, s'appuyant sur l'arrêt Kosikar de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario, que l'infraction de harcèlement peut être commise lors d'un seul incident.
[175] Dans une décision postérieure à l'arrêt Kosikar et au jugement entrepris, l'arrêt Kohl, le juge Armstrong de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario procède à l'analyse des arrêts Kosikar et O'Connor dans le contexte d'une affaire où la conduite de l'accusé à l'égard d'une joggeuse, bien que brève, était à la fois menaçante et harcelante.
[177] Le juge Armstrong analyse la jurisprudence sur la notion de harcèlement criminel. Il écrit ce qui suit à ce sujet :
26 Counsel for the appellant submits that, for a single incident to constitute harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code such incident must be linked to past conduct or "carry with it the threat of future contact." He relies upon this court's reasons for judgment in R. v. Kosikar 1999 CanLII 3775 (ON CA), (1999), 138 C.C.C. (3d) 217 at para. 28 where Goudge J.A. said:
Moreover, while in this case the prior contact is important proof of the consequence caused to the complainant, it is possible to imagine a case where the complainant's feeling harassed would be proven not through the context of prior contact but by evidence of a single incident that carried the real future prospect of the continuing tormenting of the complainant. In other words, prior contact may not be the only way of proving the necessary consequence of a single act of threatening conduct.
27 In Kosikar, the conduct relied upon by the Crown was an abusive letter sent after a previous conviction for harassing the complainant. The issue before the court was whether a single incident (the letter) could found a conviction under s. 264, given the harassment element of the offence. Goudge J.A. concluded that a single incident could be sufficient to support a conviction. He said at para. 20:
As a matter of statutory interpretation I do not think that s. 264(2)(d) is limited to repeated threatening conduct to the exclusion of a single threatening act. Parliament expressly required repeated conduct in defining the prohibited acts in s. 264(2)(a) and (b). The absence of such a qualification in s. 264(2)(d) strongly suggests to me a legislative intention not to confine that prohibition to repeated threatening conduct, but to encompass a single threatening act as well.
Goudge J.A. went on to say that the threatening conduct need not be repetitious provided that it produces in the complainant a state of being harassed. Relying in part on Sillipp, Goudge J.A. concluded that a state of being harassed involved the complainant being "tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedevilled and badgered".
28 In a more recent judgment of this court, R. v. O'Connor, 2008 ONCA 206 (CanLII), [2008] O.J. No. 1125, 2008 ONCA 206, Simmons J.A. appears to carry the analysis in Kosikar a step further. At paras. 4 and 5, Simmons J.A. said:
In Kosikar, evidence of prior contact between the accused and the complainant was used to show that as the consequence of a letter the complainant felt harassed. However, Goudge J.A. also stated, "it is possible to imagine a case where the complainant's feeling harassed would be proven ... by evidence of a single incident that carried the real future prospect of the continuing tormenting of the complainant."
On the facts of this case, in my view, it was open to the trial judge to find that the complainant was harassed both because the appellant's behaviour during the incident was persistent and because the incident occurred while the appellant was subject to a probation order requiring that he have no contact with the complainant.
29 I would adopt the approach taken by the court in O'Connor. Even though the conduct in this case occurred over a relatively short period of time and there was no prior contact, it was highly threatening and persistent. The appellant jumped out of the bushes, blocked the progress of the complainant with outstretched arms, chased her down the road where she fled from him, then stood outside the Montgomery residence and stared at her. The trial judge properly described the appellant's conduct as persistent:
When the persistence of his actions are taken into consideration with the fact that during this time he spoke no words to ease what obviously from his apology appeared to him to have an unfavourable effect on the complainant, his actions may, as previously described, appear as threatening conduct ...
30 During the encounter with the appellant, brief as it was, the complainant reasonably feared for her safety and was clearly in a state of being harassed
[178] L'analyse du juge Armstrong commande l'adhésion.
[179] Les auteurs Manning, Mewett & Sankoff énoncent d'ailleurs une approche compatible avec l'analyse du juge Armstrong sur cette question :
Still, there will be instances where the physical aspect of harassment will be a contested element of the Crown's case, notwithstanding the victim's reasonably held fear. The distinction between the two elements is most clear when the prohibited conduct relates to a single act, such as where the accused engaged in threatening conduct. For example, in Lamontagne, the accused was convicted of criminally harassing his wife after he made a threatening comment while being arrested by police for another offence. There was no doubt that the comment in question could be taken as threatening and that it could cause a person to reasonably fear for their safety, but the Québec Court of Appeal nonetheless overturned the conviction, holding that there was no evidence of the complainant having been harassed. The court held that the independent element of harassment required "that the conduct must have the effect of bothering someone because of its continuity or repetition", and given the absence of evidence of any other incidents, it could not be said that the complainant was in fact harassed by the activity.
This conclusion seems reasonable enough, and demonstrates that the need for the victim to be harassed is a means of limiting the possibility of convicting an accused for a single incident. That said, a conviction may well occur where the surrounding context provides evidence that the victim was actually harassed by the individual action. In Kosikar, the accused had a 15-year history of harassing the complainant with letters, and had been convicted of criminal harassment and other offences previously. He then sent one final letter of a threatening nature, and was convicted under section 264. The trial and appellate courts had no difficulty in concluding that the victim was harassed by the single incident. …
…
This seems like a reasonable compromise. Where the focus of a charge is a single incident of threatening activity, it is unlikely to qualify as harassing without a significant amount of additional context. In Lamontagne, this supporting factual background was lacking, but in Kosikar, the prior conduct provided unassailable evidence that the victim was harassed.
[180] En l'espèce, il faut avoir à l'esprit une distinction importante énoncée par le juge Proulx dans l'arrêt Lamontagne.
[181] Selon lui, il ne faut pas faire d'équation entre l'acte, ici la conduite menaçante qui a fait raisonnablement craindre les plaignants pour leur sécurité, et la conséquence ultime de cet acte, l'état de harcèlement. Il s'agit d'un élément essentiel différent et supplémentaire dont la nature qualitative est distincte. Selon les termes mêmes de l'article 264 C.cr., les plaignants doivent s'être sentis harcelés.
[182] Même si l'infraction de harcèlement criminel peut être appliquée dans un contexte nouveau et inédit, la prudence s'impose si on ne veut pas la dénaturer et lui conférer une portée qu'elle n'a pas.
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