R. c. Jamali, 2017 QCCS 6078
[28] De plus, il est possible de conclure que Mme Djermane avait connaissance de la recette pour fabriquer une bombe en application de la doctrine de common law de la connaissance présumée du contenu des documents trouvés en possession de l’accusée, en raison du fait que l’ensemble de la preuve permet l’inférence qu’elle est en possession personnelle du document.
[29] Les auteurs Lederman, Bryant et Fuerst dans The Law of Evidence in Canada au paragr. 18.19 expliquent la portée de cette doctrine en ces termes :
« The threshold element for the document in possession doctrine in criminal cases is whether the document is or had been in the possession of the accused. Section 4(3) of the Criminal Code requires that the Crown adduce evidence from which it may be inferred that the accused had knowledge of the existence of the document in order to establish possession. Once the trier of fact is satisfied that the accused possessed the document, the tribunal may infer that the accused had knowledge of its content. A document found in the personal possession of the accused is sufficient evidence of knowledge of possession in order to trigger the documents in possession doctrine. »
(Nos soulignements)
[30] Dans l’affaire R. c Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349, paragr. 260 et 262, le juge Hill résume de façon concise l’application de la doctrine pour inférer une connaissance du contenu d’un document :
« 260 The most widely accepted articulation of the documents in possession doctrine is found in Phipson on Evidence (15th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2000), at p. 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them.
[Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original]
This passage, repeated from prior Phipson editions, has received wide-spread approval: R. v. Turlon (1989), 1989 CanLII 7206 (ON CA), 49 C.C.C. (3d) 186 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 190; R. v. Drakes, [2005] O.J. No. 2863 (S.C.J.) (QL), at para. 76 (aff'd, 2009 ONCA 560; leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 381); R. v. Container Materials Ltd. (1940), 1940 CanLII 369 (ON SC), 74 C.C.C. 113 (Ont. H.C.), at pp. 128-132 (varied on a different basis, (1941), 1941 CanLII 315 (ON CA), 76 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.); aff'd (1941), 1942 CanLII 1 (SCC), 77 C.C.C. 129 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Wood (2001), 2001 NSCA 38 (CanLII), 157 C.C.C. (3d) 389 (N.S.C.A.), at para. 113; R. v. Partridge (1973), 1973 CanLII 1516 (PE SCAD), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 434 (P.E.I.C.A.), at p. 437; Hillcrest Housing Ltd. (Re), 1990 CanLII 8119 (PE SCTD), [1990] P.E.I.J. No. 76 (S.C.) (QL), at pp. 3-5 (aff'd [1992] P.E.I.J. No. 83 (C.A.) (QL); leave to appeal refused [1992] S.C.C.A. No. 453, [1993] 1 S.C.R. vi); R. v. Wilder, 2006 BCCA 1 (CanLII), [2003] B.C.J. No. 2884 (S.C.) (QL), at para. 696 (aff'd (2006), 204 C.C.C. (3d) 332 (B.C.C.A.); leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 498).
[…]
262 Once possession of a document is established, even in the absence of evidence of the accused possessor having recognized, adopted or acted on the document, a trier of fact may circumstantially infer from the possession itself that the accused had knowledge and involvement in the subject matter or transactions described therein. »
[31] Dans l’affaire R. c. Ahmad et al., le juge Dawson affirme l’existence d’une présomption de connaissance du contenu d’un document en raison de cette doctrine de la common law en ces termes :
« In my view, once possession of the item is established (which in the case of a document requires proof of knowledge of the item but not of its contents) the doctrine provides that knowledge of the contents of the item may be inferred by the trier of fact based on a consideration of all of the evidence. However, this is permissive not mandatory and the trier of fact is free to reject such an inference if they decide it is not warranted: Ewart, pp. 245-246, 255-256. In a criminal case possession of the item will be governed by the definition of possession found in s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code: Ewart, pp. 239-240. Proof of knowledge of the item, as a constituent element of possession of the item, may be by inference from circumstantial evidence. »
(Nos soulignements)
[32] Voir également R. c. Ahmad et al., 2009 CanLII 8477, paragr. 17. Voir aussi les paragr. 13, 14, 16 et 29 de cette décision, ainsi que la décision de la juge Baltman dans R. c. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 1368, paragr. 25 à 30.
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