Les inférences raisonnables selon l’expérience humaine et le bon sens

R. c. St-Jean, 2025 QCCA 178

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[48]      Selon un principe de droit bien connu, les « inférences doivent être raisonnables compte tenu d’une appréciation logique de la preuve ou de l’absence de preuve, et suivant l’expérience humaine et le bon sens »[12].

[52]      Les auteurs de l’ouvrage The Law of Evidence examinent le défi que pose le recours à l’expérience humaine et au bon sens pour identifier les inférences raisonnables pouvant être tirées de la preuve. À mon avis, leurs observations esquissent la voie à suivre pour résoudre ce désaccord au sujet des inférences que la preuve est susceptible d’étayer :

We draw inferences based on human experience and “common sense.” Yet, not everyone has had the same experiences or sees the world the same way. This can create controversy about whether evidence logically supports the desired inference. In R v White, the Supreme Court of Canada split starkly because of this. Some judges found that the failure of the accused to hesitate before running away after his illegal handgun discharged was logically more consistent with an intentional shooting than with the accidental shooting that the accused claimed. Other judges found this inference to be entirely speculative. “It seems to me every bit as plausible to conclude,” said Binnie J, “that a person in possession of an illegal handgun that just shot a stranger – accidentally or otherwise – would run away as fast and as far as he could without any hesitation.”

In general, given the room for debate that exists on questions of logical relevance, there are numerous sage passages suggesting that triers of fact should be given access to information they may find helpful in resolving the factual issues, even if others would disagree. After all, triers of fact are to render decisions according to their oaths and their consciences, and they should have available to them all the information they may consider to be of importance. If an inference is not “speculative or unreasonable,” the relevance standard will be met even if a judge would not personally rely on the evidence were they the trier of fact. As La Forest J said in R v Corbett:

[A]t the stage of the threshold inquiry into relevancy, basic principles of the law of evidence embody an inclusionary policy. . . .

In the absence of cogent evidence establishing that evidence . . . is irrelevant . . . the fact that reasonable people may disagree about its relevance merely attests to the fact that unanimity in matters of common sense and human experience is unattainable.[14]

[Les soulignements sont ajoutés et les références omises]