Il est du devoir du juge d'exclure une preuve inadmissible sans que cela ne lui soit demandé

Regina v. D.C.B., 1994 CanLII 6412 (MB CA)

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In R. y. D. (L.E.) (1989), 1989 CanLII 74 (SCC), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 142, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 111, 71 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), Sopinka J. for the majority quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of Limerick J.A. in R. v. Ambrose (1975), 1975 CanLII 1434 (NB CA), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 90, 11 N.B.R. (2d) 376 (N.B.S.C.A.D.); affirmed 1976 CanLII 201 (SCC), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 97, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 673, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 717 (S.C.C.). The passage in question is this (at p. 91): "In a criminal trial there is a duty on the trial Judge to exclude inadmissible evidence even though adduced by counsel for the accused or not objected to ...".

And in Stirland v. D.P.P., [1944] A.C. 315 (H.L. (E.)), Viscount Simon L.C., said (at pp. 327-8):

It has been said more than once that a judge when trying a case should not wait for objection to be taken to the admissibility of the evidence, but should stop such questions himself: see Rex v. Ellis ([1910] 2 K.B. 746, 764). If that be the judge's duty, it can hardly be fatal to an appeal founded on the admission of an improper question that counsel failed at the time to raise the matter.

If it is the duty of a trial judge to exclude inadmissible evidence without being asked to do so, surely it is the duty of an appellate judge who observes that clearly inadmissible evidence has been relied on by the trier of fact to raise the question and, if no satisfactory explanation is given, to propose allowing the appeal on that ground. A person should not stand convicted on the strength of clearly inadmissible evidence.