Même si la poursuite ne connait pas tous les détails des témoignages qu'un témoin fournira, cela n’est pas un obstacle à son assignation, pourvu que son témoignage soit pertinent

Mazhari c. R., 2009 QCCA 1880

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[62]           If it is evident that if the person causing the subpoena to be issued does not know whether there is any material evidence which the witness can likely provide or if it is evident from the proof already adduced, or the circumstances of the case, that no material evidence can likely be obtained from the person subpoenaed, the requirement of s. 698 of the Criminal Code has not been met and the subpoena can be quashed.

[63]           Radio-Canada and Ms. Kovacs invoke s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter which guarantees freedom of expression and specifically mentions freedom of the press. This may properly be raised in a Motion to quash a subpoena when it is a journalist who is subpoenaed to give testimony with respect to activities carried out in the performance of his or her professional activities as a journalist and is to be decided according to principles which govern that issue. It is not, however necessary to deal with that issue because appellant was seeking testimony which was inadmissible.

[64]           Appellant invokes his right to make full answer and defence and his right to a fair trial. It appears that the sole purpose, for the subpoena, was the hope that the answers of the witness would provide material for attacking the credibility of one or more of the Crown witnesses with respect to whether they informed anybody of the anonymous letter sent to Ms. Roth. Those witnesses were all subject to cross-examination by appellant and whatever answers they gave regarding the letter were on a collateral matter. Evidence to impugn or attack the credibility of those witnesses on a collateral matter is not admissible. The Crown's position that the testimony sought is not of a nature to justify the issue of a subpoena is stated, in part, in the following terms:

Le premier juge était bien fondé d'empêcher le témoignage de la journaliste qui n'était pas «susceptible de fournir quelque preuve substantielle au procès» (art. 698(1)). Au mieux, le contenu de son témoignage anticipé n'était que du ouï-dire, des renseignements collectionnés dans le cadre de son travail de journaliste. La simple possibilité d'«un lien avec la crédibilité des témoins de la poursuite» ne lui conférait aucune pertinence additionnelle. Au contraire, la règle interdisant la preuve de faits collatéraux ne permettait pas de faire témoigner une personne (journaliste ou autre) afin de contredire un autre témoin sur des questions incidentes: R. c. Krause, [1986] 2 R.C.S. f466 et voir la revue de la jurisprudence sur le sujet par cette Cour dans R. c. Fortin, [2002] J.Q. no. 3561.

Tel que souligné par le premier juge, le contenu du témoignage de Mme Kovacks était inconnu de l'appelant et sans pouvoir indiquer comment ce témoignage pouvait être «substantiel» (en anglais "material"), sa convocation à la Cour devenait une expédition de pêche. Il n'était pas nécessaire de tenir un voir-dire pour décider de la question puisque le but recherché énoncé par l'appelant dénotait un manque total de pertinence à ce témoignage.

[65]           Appellant hoped that he would get answers from the person he subpoenaed with respect to a collateral matter which could serve to attack the credibility of one or more of the Crown's witnesses.

[66]           I agree with the Crown's submission that the evidence sought with respect to a collateral matter was inadmissible. In my view, this justified the quashing of the subpoena.

[67]           I wish to emphasize, however, that it is not because appellant does not know the answers which the witness would give in testimony which justifies the quashing of the subpoena, but rather because the evidence sought is inadmissible with respect to a collateral matter regarding credibility. A party may, with respect to material evidence, for instance regarding the res gestae, subpoena a witness and is entitled to have the evidence, even if the party does not know the answers to the questions asked. In that instance, the evidence regarding the commission of the offence is material, relevant and admissible.