Le fait de ne pas communiquer des faits importants peut constituer un comportement frauduleux si l'accusé est soumis à une obligation de divulgation dû à sa relation avec la victime

R. v. Feddema, 2005 ABCA 236

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[53]           To establish  fraud, the Crown must prove that the accused deprived the public or a person of property, money, valuable security or any service by the use of deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means.  The phrase “other fraudulent means” includes means that are not in the nature of a falsehood or deceit; it encompasses all other means which can properly be stigmatized as dishonest: R. v. Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175, 5 C.R. (3d) 1 at 5.  As McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote in R. v. Zlatic, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29 at 44-45:

 

Most frauds continue to involve either deceit or falsehood.  As is pointed out in Théroux, [1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5] proof of deceit or falsehood is sufficient to establish the actus reus of fraud; no further proof of dishonest action is needed. However, the third category of “other fraudulent means” has been used to support convictions in a number of situations where deceit or falsehood cannot be shown. These situations include, to date, the use of corporate funds for personal purposes, non-disclosure of important facts, exploiting the weakness of another, unauthorized diversion of funds, and unauthorized arrogation of funds or property:

                                                                                                                              [citations excluded]

 

[54]           A failure to disclose material facts can amount to fraudulent conduct. The Quebec Court of Appeal said in R. v. Émond (1997), 1997 CanLII 10605 (QC CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 275 (leave to appeal to SCC denied) at 284:

 

The falsehood can consist of a positive act, but also sometimes a mere omission, that is to say a situation where, through his silence, an individual hides from the other person a fundamental and essential element. This is what Beverley McLachlin J. called, in R. v. Théroux, ... the “non-disclosure of important facts”.

 

 

[55]           The accused must be under some duty to disclose the material facts before inaction or non disclosure will constitute fraud. Such a duty to disclose may exist by reason of the accused’s relationship with the victim of the alleged fraud (see R. v. Émond, supra).  Legislation may create a duty to disclose. The failure to report in breach of such statutory requirements may constitute fraud: R. v. Monkman (1980), 1980 CanLII 3119 (MB KB), 4 Man. R. (2d) 352 (Co. Ct.); R. v. D’amour (2002), 2002 CanLII 45015 (ON CA), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 477 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. L.S.E., 2002 BCSC 615; R. v. Vanderveen, 2002 BCSC 236.