Une instruction telle que « ne vous inquiétez pas, faites simplement ce qu'on vous dit » peut, selon les circonstances, éveiller des soupçons plutôt que les dissiper

R. v. Bisram, 2011 ONSC 3913

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[277]       An instruction, “[d]on’t worry, just do as you are told” may, depending on the circumstances, raise not dispel suspicions: R. v. Niemi (2006), 2006 CanLII 13949 (ON CA), 208 C.C.C. 119 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 78.  Where a person has real suspicion causing him or her to see the need for an inquiry, and inquiry is made, there may, depending on the factual context, arise an issue as to whether real suspicions remained with a failure to make yet further inquiries.  In R. v. Lagace (2004), 2003 CanLII 30886 (ON CA), 181 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 27-9, the court stated :

Counsel for the appellant also argues that as a matter of law, the doctrine of wilful

blindness could not operate against the appellant because he made an inquiry after his

suspicion was aroused.

 

I disagree.  Culpability on the basis of wilful blindness rests on a finding of deliberate

ignorance.  An accused who suspects that property is stolen but declines to make the

inquiries that will confirm that suspicion, preferring instead to remain ignorant is culpable. 

Where an accused makes some inquiry, the question remains whether that accused

harboured real suspicions after that inquiry and refrained from making further inquiries

because she preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.  Where some inquiry is made, the

nature of that inquiry will be an important consideration in determining whether the

accused remained suspicious and chose to refrain from further inquiry because she

preferred to remain deliberately ignorant of the truth.  For example, a finding that an

accused took all reasonable steps to determine the truth would be inconsistent with the

conclusion that the accused was wilfully blind:  R. v. Mara, 1997 CanLII 363 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630 at para.

51

 

I, of course, do not suggest that there is any onus on the accused to demonstrate that all

reasonable steps were taken.  In any case where the Crown relies on the doctrine of

wilful blindness and some inquiry has been made, the trier of fact will have to decide

whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that despite that inquiry the

accused remained suspicious and refrained from making any further inquiry because she

preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.