En matière d'aveuglement volontaire, la question n'est pas de savoir si un accusé aurait dû être suspicieux, mais plutôt s'il l'a été

R. v. Laronde, 2010 BCCA 430

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[31]           Wilful blindness is not based on an objective standard. As was stated by the Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Comtois Barbeau (1996), 1996 CanLII 6391 (QC CA), 50 C.R. (4^th) 357 at para. 85: 

The test was not whether the appellant “should” have known or should “normally” have known from the suspicious circumstances that her husband was probably involved in a conspiracy to import cocaine. The question was whether the circumstances were such that she, herself, was, in fact suspicious that this was the case but deliberately refrained from making inquiries so that she could remain in ignorance as to the truth.

[32]           The question is not whether the accused should have been suspicious but whether the accused was in fact suspicious. (R. v Malfara, 2006 CanLII 17318 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2069). As Doherty J.A. said in R v Duong, (1998), 1998 CanLII 7124 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (3d) 161 at 169:

Liability turns on the decision not to inquire once real suspicions arise and not on the hypothetical result of inquiries which were never made. Where an accused chooses to make no inquiries preferring to remain deliberately ignorant speculation as to what the accused would have learned had he chosen to make the necessary inquiries is irrelevant to the determination of the blameworthiness of the accused’s state of mind.