Beck c. R., 2015 QCCS 4160
[21] In Girimonte, Doherty J. states that:
« Initial disclosure must occur sufficiently before the accused is called upon to elect or plead so as to permit the accused to make an informed decision as to the mode of trial and the appropriate plea. In a perfect world, initial disclosure would also be complete disclosure. However, as is recognized in Stinchcombe [reference omitted], the Crown will often be unable to make complete disclosure at the initial stage of the disclosure process. […] If full disclosure cannot be made when initial disclosure is provided, the Crown's obligation to disclose is an ongoing one and requires that disclosure be made as it becomes available and be completed as soon as is reasonably possible. In any event, an accused will not be compelled to elect or plead if the accused has not received sufficient disclosure to allow the accused to make an informed decision. »[9] (our emphasis)
[22] There are basically two main periods when the failure of the Crown to comply with its disclosure duty will concretely affect the exercise of an accused’s protected rights:
• when he is called upon to enter a plea or elect a mode of trial, and
• at his trial.
[23] In situations where the initial disclosure bars the accused from entering a plea or electing a mode of trial, because of its form, method or manner, a Superior Court will justifiably intervene in disclosure issues prior to trial. Blencowe and Hallstone are decisions that stand for this proposition[10].
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