La doctrine de la possession récente

R. c. Farruggia, 2019 QCCQ 7079

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[51]         In the seminal case of R. v. Kowlyk[27], the Supreme Court succinctly stated the doctrine of recent possession in the following terms:

 

[…] Upon proof of the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, the trier of fact may—but not must—draw an inference of guilt of theft or of offences incidental thereto. Where the circumstances are such that a question could arise as to whether the accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will be for the trier of fact upon a consideration of all the circumstances to decide which, if either, inference should be drawn. In all recent possession cases the inference of guilt is permissive, not mandatory, and when an explanation is offered which might reasonably be true, even though the trier of fact is not satisfied of its truth, the doctrine will not apply[28].

 

[52]         The doctrine of recent possession applies if the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that:

 

1.   the accused was in possession of the property;

 

2.   the property was stolen;

 

3.   the theft was recent; and

 

4.   the accused’s possession of the property was unexplained[29].

 

[53]         If applicable, the doctrine of recent possession permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to draw a common sense inference that a person in unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a thief, or is knowingly in possession of stolen goods[30].