[28] In the appeal of R. v. Osman, 2025 ONCA 516, heard together with this appeal and released concurrently, I review the law in relation to accessory after the fact offences in general and accessory after the fact to murder in particular. I do not repeat that analysis here, but focus on the aspects of it that are relevant to the wilful blindness issue in this appeal.
[29] Accessory after the fact offences require that the accessory accused have knowledge of the specific offence they are alleged to have assisted the principal to flee at the time they assist the principal. Knowledge that the principal has committed some criminal offence is insufficient: R. v. Duong (1998), 1998 CanLII 7124 (ON CA), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 392 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 399-401, 403.
[30] The parties agree that the knowledge requirement for accessory offences can be satisfied by actual knowledge or wilful blindness: Duong, at pp. 401-02.
[31] The parties agree that as an element of the offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder, the Crown must prove that the accessory’s acts that are alleged to have assisted the principal were committed after the victim is dead: Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by Sir William Blackstone, 1898, Book Four, p. 1454; R. v. Knott, 2006 CanLII 6588 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 9; R. v. B.(A.), 1999 CanLII 6762 (B.C.S.C.), at paras. 19-22.
[32] For an accessory accused to be guilty of being an accessory after the fact to murder, the knowledge requirement of the offence requires that at the time the accessory assisted the principal to flee, the accessory knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the principal had committed the specified offence – murder. For the accessory accused to have the required knowledge, they must, at the time they assist the principal to flee, know that the victim is dead or be wilfully blind to that fact.
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