Il est établi qu’il existe une distinction entre les cas d’identification par un inconnu et ceux de reconnaissance par une personne familière avec l’accusé

R. v. Campbell, 2017 ONCA 65

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[10]      This court has confirmed that “recognition evidence is merely a form of identification evidence” and, as such, “[t]he same concerns apply and the same caution must be taken in considering its reliability as in dealing with any other identification evidence”: R. v. Olliffe, 2015 ONCA 242, 322 C.C.C. (3d) 501, at para. 39. This court also noted in that paragraph, however, that “[t]he level of familiarity between the accused and the witness may serve to enhance the reliability of the evidence.” Unlike cases involving the identification of a stranger, the reliability of recognition evidence depends heavily on the extent of the previous acquaintanceship and the opportunity for observation during the incident: R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 1996 CanLII 1268 (ON CA), 30 O.R. (3d) 419 (C.A.), at p. 424, citing R. v. Smierciak (1946), 1946 CanLII 331 (ON CA), 87 C.C.C. 175, at p. 177. Recently, in R. v. Charles, 2016 ONCA 892, at paras. 50-51, this court noted the “critical difference” between recognition cases and cases involving identification by a witness of a complete stranger, and referred to the relevance of the “timeline of the identification narrative”. See also R. v. Peterpaul (2001), 2001 CanLII 24119 (ON CA), 52 O.R. (3d) 631 (C.A.), at p. 638.