Le cadre juridique applicable à la perte de la preuve par la Poursuite et la discrétion de cette dernière de retirer des accusations

R. v. Burke, 2025 ONCA 619

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[10]      Disclosure/Lost Evidence: If the accused shows that relevant evidence has been lost, the Crown must show that loss was not due to unacceptable negligence, failing which a breach of the s. 7 Charter right to disclosure will be found. If the Crown shows that the loss was not due to unacceptable negligence, thereby rebutting this Charter claim, the accused must show actual prejudice to their fair-trial interests or that the loss was caused by an abuse of process to establish a Charter breach: R. v. La, 1997 CanLII 309 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680; R. v. Bero (2000), 2000 CanLII 16956 (ON CA), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Sheng, 2010 ONCA 296, 254 C.C.C. (3d) 153; R. v. Hersi, 2019 ONCA 94, 373 C.C.C. (3d) 229, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 406. Police and Crown are not held to a standard of perfection on the unacceptable negligence issue; reasonableness is assessed contextually at the time of loss, including retention policies and the perceived utility of continued storage.

[11]      Prosecutorial discretion: Decisions to withdraw charges are reviewable only for abuse of process on a proper evidentiary foundation; courts do not “[look] behind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion” absent that foundation: Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, at para. 46; R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167.

[12]      Section 24(1) remedy and stays: A stay is only imposed in the “clearest of cases” as a remedy of last resort: R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309; R. v. Brunelle, 2024 SCC 3, 488 D.L.R. (4th) 581, at paras. 112–13; R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297; R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 69. Where trial fairness and the integrity of the justice system are not materially impaired, alternative remedies suffice (e.g., limiting instructions, tailoring of similar-fact evidence use, weight and credibility adjustments, disassociation of the justice system from the impugned state conduct going forward), a stay is not warranted. If there is any uncertainty concerning the integrity branch, a stay is inappropriate if the balance of interests favours trial: Babos, at paras. 34-44.

[13]      Standard of Review: The trial judge enjoys broad remedial discretion: R. v. Nicholas, 2017 ONCA 646, 40 C.R. (7th) 83, at paras. 56–58. Appellate intervention is only warranted to correct legal errors, palpable and overriding factual errors, or a failure to exercise discretion judicially: Regan, at para. 117; R. v. Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 651, at para. 15; R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509, at para. 17.