L'audience quant à un engagement de ne pas troubler l’ordre public selon l'article 810 Ccr permet la preuve par ouï-dire

R. v. Schafer, 2020 YKCA 3

Lien vers la décision

[30]        Respectfully, the appellant places more weight on the underlined portion of McIvor than it can bear. The nature of a peace bond hearing, as legislated in the Code, requires a flexible approach to the rules of evidence that allows a judge to rely on credible and trustworthy hearsay to determine if he or she is satisfied that the informant’s fear is reasonable.

[38]        I provide this context not to cast any doubt on the Court’s statement, at para. 19, that hearings are conducted in accordance with the normal rules of evidence where the Criminal Code is silent. But context is important, and the nature of the hearing itself may in some cases contemplate a more flexible approach to the rules of evidence.

[39]        In other words, the Criminal Code may evince an intention that a hearing be conducted on more flexible evidentiary standards because of the nature of the issue to be decided, without explicitly providing for alternative rules of evidence. Zeolkowski is an apt example, and one that shares many similarities with the case at hand.

[46]        Much can taken from the analysis in Zeolkowski that bears on a peace bond hearing. A peace bond hearing is also not a criminal trial. The Supreme Court of Canada recently described a peace bond hearing as resembling “to a certain extent a civil injunction”, given that a peace bond is an instrument of preventive justice and “based on the reasonable fear of the informant, rather than the guilt of the defendant.”: R. v. Penunsi,  2019 SCC 39at para. 61.

[47]        An informant in a peace bond hearing is not required to act solely on the basis of evidence admissible at a trial; it is sufficient to do so on the basis of evidence establishing reasonable grounds. A judge must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the informant’s fear. The role of the judge is to assess whether the grounds tendered in support of the stated fear are objectively reasonable and sufficient to justify the imposition of a recognizance with terms and conditions. In my view, hearsay evidence that is credible and trustworthy is relevant to that question.

[48]        Hearsay evidence is admissible, if it is probative of the existence of reasonable grounds, unless the section evinces an intention to exclude it. Just as the phrase “all relevant evidence” does not exclude relevant hearsay evidence, the use of the phrase “evidence adduced” does not evince an intention to exclude it. Finally, it is for the judge to assess the weight of the evidence and its frailties including any explanation provided for not making the best evidence available.

[49]        It is important to emphasize that the hearsay evidence should be in a form that allows a judge to assess whether it is credible and trustworthy. I do not think such evidence is presumptively inadmissible given the test to meet before a peace bond is ordered. Whether the subjective belief is objectively reasonable, based on credible and trustworthy evidence, is a matter that falls to be decided by the hearing judge, weighing the evidence.

[50]        The applicable standard of proof on a peace bond hearing is also not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, under s. 810.2(3), a judge must be “satisfied by the evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear.” This statutory language has been viewed as importing a burden of proof on a balance of probabilities: see Haydock v. Baker, 2001 YKTC 502 at para. 17; R. v. Budreo (1996), 1996 CanLII 11800 (ON SC), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 245 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) at para. 23 [Budreo S.C.]; Vachon v. Hartland, 2018 YKSC 23 at para. 19.

[51]        In this case, as noted, the trial judge expressed concern about the sufficiency of the evidence before her. In assessing the evidence, she considered the hearsay evidence alongside the fact that no objection was taken to it, it was not contested, the appellant’s own evidence confirmed the reasonableness of the evidence, and that the live issue was whether the appellant was a changed person who no longer posed the risk reasonably supported by the hearsay evidence. In my view, the judge committed no error in this assessment. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as endorsing the proposition that the peace officer’s evidence, presented in the manner it was here, will always lay a sufficient basis to justify a reasonable fear. Whether it does so is a matter of weight for a trial judge, and is to be assessed robustly given the interests at stake.

[52]        In my view, the admissibility of hearsay evidence in this case is consistent with the rules of admissibility in other circumstances involving reasonable grounds and/or a more relaxed approach to the rules of evidence. These include bail hearings (although the test is different), applications for search warrants, wiretap authorizations, and applications for firearms prohibitions. As explained above, Zeolkowski is an example.

[53]        I also agree with the opinion of the summary conviction appeal judge that the recognition of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in Budreo C.A. can not be lightly set aside as obiter dicta. The relevant statement in Budreo C.A. is:

[52]      Moreover, although an informant's fear triggers an application under s. 810.1, under s-s. (3) a recognizance order can only be made if the presiding judge is satisfied by "evidence" that the fear is reasonably based. Section 810.1(3) therefore requires the judge to come to his or her own conclusion about the likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the offences listed in s-s (1). Although the "evidence" the judge relies on might include hearsay, a recognizance could only be ordered on evidence that is credible and trustworthy.

[54]        This comment was made in the context of assessing the constitutionality of s. 810.1. Given the issues at stake in the constitutional challenge, the scope and nature of the contemplated hearing, the procedural safeguards and basis (including the evidentiary foundations) on which a peace bond could be ordered are all important factors informing the analysis. The observation that the evidence a judge relies on might include hearsay is not incidental to the outcome of the case. At the very least, the comment is highly persuasive. I note too that this conclusion did not attract any adverse comment in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Penunsi.

[55]        This conclusion is also supported by the purposes and objects of peace bonds as they have been explained in Penunsi. The issue in that case was the application of the provisions relating to judicial interim release to the peace bond process. Nonetheless, the Court’s reasoning illustrates the purpose and object of the peace bond regime in a manner that informs the necessary statutory interpretation. Of particular importance is the Court’s affirmation that peace bonds are instruments of preventive justice, not penal justice.

[56]        After describing the origin of common law peace bonds, the Court charted the development of the peace bond within the Criminal Code. The Court recognized that the process involved in ordering peace bonds had become more procedurally robust. The underlying rationale remained however, at para. 38:

[38]      Then J. in Budreo S.C. stated the policy rationale behind peace bonds:

. . . where the reasonably certain commission of an offence can be prevented, it may be in the interest of the likely offender, his potential victim and of society to prevent the offence. This is particularly true when the preventive measures employed are less restrictive than the punishment that might flow from a conviction. [p. 372]

[57]        At para. 50 the Court recognized that a peace bond defendant is not in the same place as an accused person. At para. 53 the Court accepted that a defendant to a peace bond proceeding is of an entirely different character to a defendant to a criminal charge. These comments reinforce the relevance of the approach in Zeolkowski to the current case.

[58]        The court recognized at para. 60 that the interpretation of the peace bond provisions is informed by the context and purpose of peace bonds, and the competing interests of protecting public safety and safeguarding the liberty of the defendant who is not accused of any criminal offence. At paras. 61, 63 and 80, the court said:

[61]      As discussed above, the peace bond is an instrument of preventive justice, based on the reasonable fear of the informant, rather than the guilt of the defendant. I agree with the respondent that though it is a valid expression of the criminal law power, the peace bond resembles to a certain extent a civil injunction (R.F., at para. 8). As noted by de Villiers Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. Gill, [1991] B.C.J. No. 3255 (QL):

It is true that the effect of a recognizance is to restrict the liberty of the defendant somewhat, but, as in the case of a civil injunction that restrains a defendant from committing a tort, that may also be a crime, the recognizance is not in its essence a restriction of lawful activity. [p. 6]

…

[63]      When exercising the discretion whether to hold a hearing, the justice must consider whether the fear sworn to in the Information is reasonably held. It was raised before this Court that the peace bond under s. 810.2 is a “tool . . . often used when an offender is nearing their warrant expiry”, or shortly after an individual has completed a custodial sentence, as was the case with Mr. Penunsi himself (I.F., Attorney General of Ontario, at para. 13; see also R. v. Schafer, 2018 YKTC 12, at paras. 38-39). Initiating a s. 810.2 peace bond proceeding upon a person’s release from prison risks a further deprivation of liberty after the completion of a sentence already determined to be proportionate. Without further evidence that the feared conduct will occur (for example, the existence of threats or other violent conduct while in custody) a fear based solely on the offence for which a defendant is serving a sentence will not be sufficient. A s. 810.2 peace bond ordered on that basis alone would be improper. It would serve as a de facto probation order, not as a prospective tool of preventative justice.

…

[80]      Practically speaking, the interim conditions regarding public safety placed on a peace bond defendant will likely form the basis for the recognizance following a meritorious peace bond application. These conditions will address, inter alia, concerns regarding the safety of the person whose protection is the objective of the peace bond. Judges should be mindful that a breach of interim conditions will result in a peace bond defendant — not accused of any crime — becoming subject to a criminal charge. It bears repeating that any public safety conditions should have a nexus with the specific fear sworn to in the Information. I underline this with respect to the imposition of conditions prohibiting the consumption of drugs and alcohol. Where the condition is not demonstrably connected to the alleged fear, it may merely set the defendant up for breach, especially where the defendant is known to have a substance use disorder [citation omitted]. Any condition should not be so onerous as effectively to constitute a detention order by setting the defendant up to fail [citation omitted].

[59]        The Court clearly endorsed the use of peace bonds as instruments of preventive justice, recognizing that a defendant is not in the same position as a person accused of a criminal offence. This commentary on the purpose of peace bonds informs the interpretation of types of evidence admissible on a peace bond hearing. In my view, hearsay evidence is presumptively admissible in order for a judge to assess whether reasonable grounds exist for the informant’s subjective fear that a defendant will commit a serious personal injury offence.

[60]        Peace bonds have, as explained in Penunsi, deep roots in the common law. Peace bonds were and are often ordered to protect specific individuals from risks posed to them by a defendant. Informants are often private persons. It would undermine the efficacy of peace bonds in these circumstances, as I have already noted, if hearsay evidence was presumptively inadmissible. In this case, the informant is a police officer, not an individual personally at risk. The evidentiary conditions stipulated in the Code for issuing peace bonds do not distinguish between these two situations.

[61]        Amendments to the Code facilitate an officer of the state acting as an informant to protect the safety of the public generally and vulnerable potential victims, often vulnerable women and children, in particular. The ability of an agent of the state to act as an informant has been grafted onto a regime originally used principally to protect particular identifiable individuals at risk. Parliament has not created a stand alone regime governing the ordering of peace bonds at the instance of a state agent, nor has it provided for different rules for the admissibility of evidence to apply to applications initiated by a state actor.

On n’a pas besoin d’un plaignant pour débuter une enquête criminelle

R. c. Lajoie, 2017 QCCQ 10228

Lien vers la décision

[55]        Il est vrai, qu’habituellement, une victime communique avec les policiers qui mènent ensuite une enquête[19]. Toutefois, ce n’est pas l’unique voie. Comme le mentionne le juge Michel Babin de la Cour du Québec dans Gagnon c. R.[20], on n’a pas besoin d’un plaignant pour débuter une enquête criminelle. Dans cette affaire Gagnon, un policier est d’abord enquêté sur une question d’abus de confiance. Le tout conduit à une enquête sur un autre sujet (prévarication à l’égard de constats d’infraction), et ce, sans plaignant formel. Le juge rejette la requête du policier en abus de procédure.

[56]        En outre, selon l'article 504 C.cr. « Quiconque croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu’une personne a commis un acte criminel peut faire une dénonciation par écrit et sous serment devant un juge de paix, et celui-ci doit recevoir la dénonciation […] »[21]. La procédure pénale ne se limite donc pas à la victime.

C'est une erreur de principe que de déterminer qu’un accusé soit un nouvel arrivant plutôt qu’une personne née et élevée au Canada soit astreint à une norme de conduite inférieure en matière de violence conjugale

R. v. Bytyqi, 2004 CanLII 14964 (ON CA)

Lien vers la décision

[4]               By the time of trial, the family was separated, the children lived with the wife, and there was no contact between the children and their father or their paternal grandparents.  The trial judge expressed his hope that the children would resume seeing their father and grandparents.  He also expressed his appreciation of the “pressures and frustrations” caused by the family’s move from Kosovo to Canada.  In his reasons, the trial judge said that had Mr. Bytyqi been born or raised in Canada, he would have imposed a significant jail term.  In our view, it is an error in principle to hold individuals “born or raised” in Canada – on that ground alone – to a higher standard of conduct than those who chose to move to Canada as adults. 

Aucune différence ethnique, religieuse ou culturelle ne doit être prise en compte, pour tenter de minimiser la problématique de la violence conjugale

R. v. H.E., 2015 ONCA 531

Lien vers la décision

[29]      The sentencing judge’s reasons indicate that he considered the cultural impact in his determination of the appropriate sentence. Although his reasons are unclear, it appears as though he considered culture as a mitigating factor. This is an error for two reasons.  First, the respondent never took the position that cultural differences impacted his conduct.  On the contrary, in the pre-sentence report he expressly disavowed any suggestion that he felt culturally justified in assaulting his wife and children; his defence was denial of the events. The respondent’s factum in this court took the same position.

[30]      Second, and more importantly, cultural norms that condone or tolerate conduct contrary to Canadian criminal law must not be considered a mitigating factor on sentencing.

[31]      The Alberta Court of Appeal commented on this issue in R. v. Teclesenbet, 2009 ABCA 389, 469 A.R. 193. In that case, the offender had immigrated to Canada five days before slapping his wife and beating her with a shoe. The wife was hospitalized, and the offender was convicted of assault causing bodily harm. The sentencing judge accepted as a mitigating factor the offender’s claim that, in his home country of Sudan, his behaviour was commonplace. The offender received a conditional discharge and 12 months’ probation. The Crown’s appeal was allowed.  McDonald J.A. wrote for the court, at para. 9:

The law of Canada applies equally to all who are in Canada regardless of the length of time they have resided here.  To suggest that it might be acceptable to beat one’s wife with a stick elsewhere does not mitigate the seriousness of the offence and is contrary to the purpose of domestic violence laws.

[32]      Earlier, in R. v. Brown (1992), 1992 ABCA 132 (CanLII), 125 A.R. 150 (C.A.), the same court wrote, at para. 29:

Even if there were before the court a more articulated submission based on social attitudes within a particular ethnic or religious community to which the accused belongs, the courts of this province and of this country should be alert to the risk of moderating sentencing policy in such a case where to do so would mean that some women in Canadian society would be afforded less protection than others.

[33]      A cultural practice that is criminal in Canada does not mitigate the perpetrator’s conduct for sentencing purposes. Cultural differences do not excuse or mitigate criminal conduct. To hold otherwise undermines the equality of all individuals before and under the law, a crucial Charter value.  It would also create a second class of person in our society – those who fall victim to offenders who import such practices. This is of particular significance in the context of domestic violence. All women in Canada are entitled to the same level of protection from abusers. The need to strongly denounce domestic violence is in no way diminished when that conduct is the product of cultural beliefs that render women acceptable targets of male violence.  If anything, cultural beliefs may be an aggravating factor enhancing the need for specific deterrence in cases where the sentencing judge is satisfied that the offender continues to maintain those views at the time of sentencing.

Les principes relatifs à la violence conjugale

R. c. Abdul Jabar, 2023 QCCQ 405

Lien vers la décision

[16]        Au Canada, nous vivons dans une société civilisée et démocratique où chaque personne a droit à son intégrité physique et où la loi du plus fort ne s’applique pas[11]. La société canadienne est déterminée à protéger l’intégrité personnelle, tant physique que psychologique, de tout individu[12]. Elle vise l’élimination de la violence conjugale et l’établissement de rapports égalitaires entre les sexes[13].

[17]        L’un des droits fondamentaux de notre société est qu’on ne peut porter atteinte à la sécurité physique d’une personne sans son consentement, et l’un des buts principaux du droit criminel est de protéger les membres de la société contre une telle atteinte[14].

[18]        Historiquement, on jugeait que la violence conjugale relevait de la sphère privée et les tribunaux s’efforçaient davantage à préserver l’intégrité de l’unité familiale qu’à mettre un terme à la violence[15]. Ceci explique pourquoi la violence conjugale a longtemps été minimisée et banalisée[16]. Cela était une erreur[17].

[19]        Aucun homme n’a le droit de brutaliser sa femme[18]. On ne règle pas des problèmes conjugaux en frappant sur sa conjointe[19].

[20]        Toute personne a le droit d’être protégée de la violence de son partenaire intime comme le serait un inconnu[20]. À cet égard, le Tribunal fait sien l’enseignement de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’arrêt R. v. Glen :

[14] (…) This Court has a duty to make it clear that however unhappy a spouse may be about his or her marital life, and however great the marital stress may become, resorting to violence is not the answer. The sanctions for violence will be severe[21].

[21]        De même, aucune personne ne possède un droit de propriété sur son conjoint[22] et ce dernier a le droit de mettre fin à une relation sans craindre pour sa sécurité et sa paix d’esprit[23]. L’ère de la tolérance pour la violence conjugale est maintenant révolue et les tribunaux doivent exprimer, au moyen de sanctions suffisamment sévères, l’intolérance de la société à l’endroit de ces violences[24].

[22]        La violence conjugale est criminelle[25] et doit être dénoncée[26]. Elle est présente dans toutes les sociétés et au sein de toutes les classes sociales[27]. Elle est maintenant reconnue comme une préoccupation publique d’importance au Canada et dans le monde[28]. Le sérieux de la problématique de la violence conjugale est reconnu partout au Canada[29] et est considérée comme un fléau social[30]. EIle se doit d’être éradiquée[31].

[23]        Tout crime de violence affecte l’ensemble de la communauté[32]. Au cours des années, plusieurs plans d’action gouvernementaux en matière de violence conjugale ont été élaborés pour contrer cette problématique.

[24]        L'intention des autorités gouvernementales est ferme : « tolérance zéro en matière de violence conjugale ». Il est tout naturel que le pouvoir judiciaire emboîte le pas[33]. D’ailleurs, en matière de violence par les hommes sur leurs conjointes, le législateur a exprimé la volonté que les peines soient dissuasives[34]. Ceux qui seraient tentés d'opter pour cette voie à proscrire doivent être prévenus : les tribunaux se montreront de plus en plus sévères pour ce genre de crime[35].

[25]        Les peines infligées en matière de violence conjugale doivent refléter la réprobation de la société face à de tels gestes[36]. Le rôle des tribunaux est de condamner la violence, de protéger les plus faibles et de contribuer à l’élaboration d’une société qui sera la plus saine et la plus sécuritaire possible[37].

[26]        En matière de violence conjugale, la peine répond à deux impératifs : dénoncer le caractère inacceptable et criminel de la violence conjugale et accroître la confiance des victimes et du public dans l’administration de la justice[38].

[27]        Par ailleurs, il est de jurisprudence constante que les principes de dissuasion et de dénonciation doivent être priorisés en matière de violence conjugale[39]. Cela est encore plus vrai lorsque la violence au sein du couple est cyclique et persistante[40]. Il en est de même, dans les cas où la violence a perduré pendant des années, qu’elle touche aussi des jeunes enfants et qu’elle ait été accompagnée de menaces constantes[41].

[28]        De même, en matière de violence conjugale, il peut arriver que le principe de retenue doive céder, jusqu’à une certaine mesure, devant les principes de dénonciation et de protection des victimes[42].

[29]        L’auteur Clayton Ruby souligne qu’un accusé n’ayant aucun antécédent judiciaire peut recevoir une peine sévère, ou même, la peine maximale, lorsque les circonstances de l’infraction sont d’une gravité importante, qu’il s’agit d’un cas où plusieurs infractions ont été commises sur une longue période, que la culpabilité morale de l’accusé est élevée ou lorsqu’il s’agit d’infractions commises dans un contexte de violence conjugale[43].

[30]        Toutefois, le Tribunal ne doit pas se laisser guider par la clameur publique, car il n’y a pas de place pour la vengeance dans la détermination de la peine[44]. La peine imposée doit plutôt chercher à responsabiliser le délinquant et lui faire réaliser le mal que sa conduite a fait non seulement à la victime immédiate, mais aussi à l’ensemble de la société[45]. Comme le souligne de façon imagée le juge Valmont Beaulieu dans la décision R. c. Malo, une peine constitue un avertissement clair pour tous ceux qui pense qu’une conjointe n’est qu’un objet que l’on peut pousser lorsqu’on la trouve encombrante[46].

[31]        Pour le guider lors de la détermination de la peine, le Tribunal peut se poser la question suivante: « Quelle serait la peine appropriée si les gestes de l’accusé avaient été commis à l’endroit d’une victime inconnue de lui ? »[47].

[32]        Par ailleurs, la loi s’applique également à tous les Canadiens, aucune différence ethnique, religieuse ou culturelle ne doit être prise en compte, pour tenter de minimiser la problématique de la violence conjugale[48].

[33]        Le fait qu’un accusé soit un nouvel arrivant plutôt qu’une personne née et élevée au Canada ne constitue pas un facteur atténuant[49].

[34]      Cela dit, lors de la détermination de la peine, la « déclaration de la victime » se doit d’être prise en compte[50] pour s’informer des conséquences du crime. Toutefois,  l’opinion de la victime quant à la peine appropriée ne doit pas, en principe, être sollicitée ou prise en compte[51].