La Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances prescrit l’immunité contre une accusation et une déclaration de culpabilité pour possession simple, mais aussi l’immunité contre une arrestation relativement à cette accusation (Loi sur les bons samaritains secourant les victimes de surdose)

R. c. Wilson, 2025 CSC 32 

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[71]                        Pour les motifs qui précèdent, je conclus que, par implication nécessaire, le par. 4.1(2) de la LRCDAS confère non seulement l’immunité contre une accusation et une déclaration de culpabilité pour possession simple, mais aussi l’immunité contre une arrestation relativement à cette accusation. Le but du Parlement étant de sauver des vies, il a créé une immunité afin d’inciter ceux qui sont présents sur les lieux d’une surdose à appeler les services d’urgence lorsque des vies sont en danger. Au moyen de l’immunité contre une accusation et une déclaration de culpabilité pour possession simple, le Parlement entendait créer une exception à l’exercice du pouvoir d’arrestation des policiers pour cette infraction. Il a reconnu que les personnes les plus susceptibles d’appeler les secours d’urgence dans des situations de surdose potentiellement mortelle sont souvent elles‑mêmes consommatrices de drogue : les bons samaritains ne sont pas tous respectueux de la loi.

C.            Les pouvoirs légaux des policiers sur les lieux d’une surdose de drogue

[72]                        L’immunité contre une arrestation pour possession d’une substance désignée prévue au par. 4.1(2) n’affecte pas les autres pouvoirs existants des policiers et ne les prive pas du pouvoir de protéger la sécurité du public sur les lieux d’une surdose de drogue. Les policiers disposent toujours de tous les autres pouvoirs pertinents lorsqu’ils interviennent dans une situation qui relève du par. 4.1(2). J’expose ci‑après certains des pouvoirs importants auxquels les policiers peuvent avoir recours.

[73]                        Premièrement, les policiers peuvent sécuriser les lieux et poser des questions concernant la surdose, lesquelles peuvent être utiles pour déterminer le traitement médical requis, empêcher autrui de consommer des drogues contaminées ou permettre d’identifier la source des drogues contaminées susceptibles de poser des risques supplémentaires de surdose. Comme l’a observé notre Cour dans l’arrêt R. c. Grant, 2009 CSC 32, [2009] 2 R.C.S. 353, « le policier qui répond à une urgence médicale à la suite d’un appel au 911 ne détient pas les personnes avec qui il interagit, et ce, même s’il restreint effectivement leur liberté de mouvement en prenant la direction des opérations » ou pose des questions aux personnes qui se trouvent sur les lieux pour « obtenir des renseignements susceptibles de [l’]aider dans [son] enquête » (par. 36‑37). Il peut être plus facile d’obtenir des réponses à ces questions de la part des personnes qui sont restées présentes sur les lieux si elles bénéficient clairement de l’immunité contre une arrestation pour les infractions de possession, prévue au par. 4.1(2).

[74]                        Deuxièmement, notre Cour a établi que les policiers disposent du pouvoir de détenir des individus « lorsqu’il est raisonnablement nécessaire eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances », après une mise en balance de l’importance du risque pour la sécurité du public ou d’une personne en particulier avec les intérêts à la liberté des membres du public qui se trouvent sur les lieux (Aucoin, par. 36, citant Clayton, par. 31).

[75]                        Troisièmement, les policiers peuvent toujours exercer de nombreux pouvoirs en matière de fouille, de perquisition et de saisie lorsqu’ils interviennent sur les lieux d’une surdose. Par exemple, en vertu du pouvoir qui les autorise à saisir des objets bien en vue, ils peuvent saisir les drogues et autres objets qui ont été obtenus par la perpétration d’une infraction et qui sont à découvert (Code criminel, par. 489(2)). Ils peuvent également, aux termes du par. 117.04(2) du Code criminel, fouiller une personne et saisir les armes à feu et autres armes dont elle a possession. En outre, dans l’arrêt MacDonald, notre Cour a établi que les policiers peuvent effectuer une fouille de sécurité lorsqu’elle « est raisonnablement nécessaire pour éliminer une menace imminente à leur sécurité ou à celle du public » (par. 40; voir aussi le par. 41). Lorsque l’urgence de la situation rend difficilement réalisable l’obtention d’un mandat, ils peuvent exercer leur pouvoir de fouille sans mandat en vertu de l’art. 487.11 du Code criminel et perquisitionner un lieu ou fouiller une personne en vue de saisir des substances désignées en vertu du par. 11(7) de la LRCDAS (voir, de façon générale, R. c. Paterson, 2017 CSC 15, [2017] 1 R.C.S. 202; R. c. Campbell, 2024 CSC 42). Ce serait donc fautif de dire qu’il est interdit aux policiers de chercher des armes et des drogues en vue d’assurer leur protection et celle du public sur les lieux d’une surdose.

[76]                        Enfin, tous les pouvoirs d’arrestation et de détention à l’extérieur du cadre d’application de l’immunité prévue au par. 4.1(2) demeurent à la disposition des policiers. Ces pouvoirs comprennent le pouvoir de détention aux fins d’enquête lorsqu’ils ont des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que la personne « est impliquée dans un crime donné » et qu’il est nécessaire de la détenir dans les circonstances (Mann, par. 45). Une telle détention aux fins d’enquête permet aux policiers de procéder à une fouille par palpation accessoire à la détention lorsqu’ils ont des motifs raisonnables de croire que leur propre sécurité ou celle du public est menacée (voir les par. 40‑44). Les policiers peuvent aussi exercer le pouvoir d’arrestation pour violation de la paix, ou le pouvoir d’arrestation relativement à des infractions autres que la possession simple lorsqu’une personne a commis ou est en train de commettre un acte criminel, ou lorsqu’ils ont des motifs raisonnables de croire que la personne a commis ou est sur le point de commettre un acte criminel (Code criminel, art. 31 et 495). Ces pouvoirs peuvent être exercés, par exemple, lorsqu’une personne sous l’influence de drogues tente de quitter les lieux au volant d’un véhicule, ou lorsqu’il y a suffisamment d’indices du trafic ou d’autres crimes pour donner aux policiers des motifs raisonnables de procéder à une arrestation relativement à ces infractions. Lorsqu’ils procèdent à de telles arrestations pour d’autres infractions, les policiers pourraient également effectuer des fouilles ou perquisitions accessoires à ces arrestations (voir Caslake, par. 19).

[77]                        Il importe de souligner que tous ces autres pouvoirs ont leurs propres critères et conditions préalables à leur exercice et que, comme l’a reconnu notre Cour, les policiers doivent souvent évaluer rapidement si ces conditions sont réunies lorsqu’ils interviennent dans une situation qui évolue (voir Fleming, par. 52; voir aussi Stairs, par. 74; MacDonald, par. 32). De plus, certains de ces critères sont plus exigeants que ceux qui doivent être appliqués à une arrestation effectuée en vertu de l’art. 495 et à la fouille ou perquisition accessoire à cette arrestation. Par exemple, les pouvoirs de fouille ou perquisition et de saisie énoncés au par. 11(7) de la LRCDAS et à l’art. 487.11 du Code criminel doivent satisfaire à un critère d’urgence. De même, dans l’arrêt MacDonald, notre Cour a reconnu que les policiers peuvent exercer le pouvoir de common law d’effectuer une fouille de sécurité dans des circonstances précises impliquant « une menace imminente à la sécurité du public ou des policiers » (par. 41). Ces conditions ne sont pas nécessairement requises dans le cas des arrestations sans mandat visées à l’art. 495. La thèse de la Couronne, selon laquelle le pouvoir d’arrestation pour possession est nécessaire aux fins générales d’enquête et pour des raisons de sécurité, va à l’encontre de la jurisprudence de notre Cour. Un tel pouvoir pourrait compromettre et esquiver les mécanismes de surveillance auxquels est soumis l’exercice des autres pouvoirs policiers aux fins d’enquête, comme ceux auxquels les policiers peuvent avoir recours en cas d’urgence ou pour faire face à des préoccupations relatives à la sécurité du public, ce qui serait contraire à la délimitation précise de ces pouvoirs policiers dans la loi. Tous les pouvoirs policiers sont le fruit d’un exercice minutieux de pondération entre la liberté personnelle et les exigences de l’application de la loi. Le présent pourvoi n’est pas le cadre approprié pour modifier sensiblement les pouvoirs policiers, car cela mettrait en péril les conditions déjà établies quant à leur exercice.

[78]                        Le directeur des poursuites pénales, intervenant en l’espèce, invite notre Cour à reconnaître un pouvoir autonome de fouille visant les substances désignées sur les lieux d’une surdose (m. interv., par. 3‑5). Il ne convient pas en l’espèce de se pencher sur l’existence de ce pouvoir inédit, qui n’est pas nécessaire pour trancher le présent pourvoi et qui n’a pas été soulevé par les parties ni devant les tribunaux de juridiction inférieure. Notre Cour a reconnu des pouvoirs de fouille limités lorsque cela est nécessaire pour écarter une menace imminente à la sécurité (voir, p. ex., MacDonald). Toutefois, la question de savoir si une fouille visant le retrait de substances désignées qui ont pu entraîner une surdose pourrait répondre à ce critère, ou satisfaire aux exigences requises pour la reconnaissance d’un nouveau pouvoir autonome de fouille et de saisie, est une question qui devra être tranchée dans une autre affaire, lorsque les faits s’y prêteront.

[79]                        Il n’est pas non plus nécessaire d’examiner le pouvoir de détention aux fins d’enquête lorsqu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner qu’une infraction de possession visée par l’immunité a été commise ni les pouvoirs d’effectuer des fouilles sans mandat lorsque les motifs raisonnables se rapportent à une infraction visée par une immunité. Personne n’a fait valoir que le par. 4.1(2) crée une immunité contre la détention aux fins d’enquête ni qu’il limite la capacité d’effectuer des fouilles sans mandat. Monsieur Wilson ne conteste pas la légalité de sa détention initiale aux fins d’enquête; il conteste plutôt son arrestation subséquente pour possession. La fouille qui a plus tard mené à l’obtention de la preuve en cause en l’espèce a été effectuée après cette arrestation qui, comme je l’explique plus loin, était illégale et justifie l’exclusion de la preuve.

[80]                        L’immunité prévue au par. 4.1(2) vise à sauver des vies. À part cette immunité limitée concernant la possession simple, la disposition ne retire aucun autre pouvoir policier reconnu en droit criminel qui permet aux policiers d’assurer leur propre sécurité et celle du public.

La fragilité de la preuve d'identification oculaire et l'appréciation de celle-ci lorsqu'elle est basée sur une connaissance préalable du prévenu

R. v. M.B., 2017 ONCA 653

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(a)         Frailty of eyewitness identification

[29]      Eyewitness identification is inherently unreliable. It is difficult to assess, is often deceptively reliable because it comes from credible and convincing witnesses, and is difficult to discredit on cross-examination for those same reasons. Studies have shown that triers of fact place undue reliance on such testimony when compared to other types of evidence. As a result, many wrongful convictions result from faulty, albeit convincing, eyewitness testimony, even in cases where multiple witnesses identify the same person. See R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 1996 CanLII 1268 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 450-451, and R. v. A. (F.) (2004), 2004 CanLII 10491 (ON CA), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 39.

[30]      For these reasons, although identification is a matter of fact, appellate courts will subject such findings to closer scrutiny than other findings of fact. Justice Doherty summarized this approach in the context of an unreasonable verdict argument in R. v. Tat (1997), 1997 CanLII 2234 (ON CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 99-100, where he said:

While recognizing the limited review permitted under s. 686(1)(a)(i), convictions based on eyewitness identification evidence are particularly well suited to review under that section. This is so because of the well-recognized potential for injustice in such cases and the suitability of the appellate review process to cases which turn primarily on the reliability of eyewitness evidence and not the credibility of the eyewitness.

[31]      As stated by Charron J.A. (as she then was) in Miaponoose, at p. 422: “Eyewitness testimony is in effect opinion evidence, the basis of which is very difficult to assess. The witness' opinion when she says ‘that is the man’ is partly based on a host of psychological and physiological factors, many of which are not well understood by jurists.” Justice Charron goes on to quote from the Law Reform Commission of Canada Study Paper on Pretrial Eyewitness Identification Procedures (1983), at p. 10:

Simply by way of illustration, psychologists have shown that much of what one thinks one saw is really perpetual filling-in. Contrary to the belief of most laymen, and indeed some judges, the signals received by the sense organs and transmitted to the brain do not constitute photographic representations of reality. The work of psychologists has shown that the process whereby sensory stimuli are converted into conscious experience is prone to error, because it is impossible for the brain to receive a total picture of any event. Since perception and memory are selective processes, viewers are inclined to fill in perceived events with other details, a process which enables them to create a logical sequence. The details people add to their actual perception of an event are largely governed by past experience and personal expectations. Thus the final recreation of the event in the observer's mind may be quite different from reality.

Witnesses are often completely unaware of the interpretive process whereby they fill in the necessary but missing data. They will relate their testimony in good faith, and as honestly as possible, without realizing the extent to which it has been distorted by their cognitive interpretive processes. Thus, although most eyewitnesses are not dishonest, they may nevertheless be grossly mistaken in their identification. [Emphasis added.]

Justice Charron continues: “While the circumstances surrounding the witness' identification can be subject to scrutiny in cross-examination, many of the more subjective processes that have led to it are impossible to expose in this fashion.”

[32]      Witness identification based on video recordings can under certain circumstances be more reliable as it allows repeated and unhurried consideration. For example, R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, at para. 23, contemplates a videotape of “sufficient clarity and quality” that it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to use it as the sole basis for identifying the accused:

It is precisely because videotape evidence can present such very clear and convincing evidence of identification that triers of fact can use it as the sole basis for the identification of the accused before them as the perpetrator of the crime. It is clear that a trier of fact may, despite all the potential frailties, find an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimony of a single eyewitness. It follows that the same result may be reached with even greater certainty upon the basis of good quality video evidence. Surely, if a jury had only the videotape and the accused before them, they would be at liberty to find that the accused they see in the box was the person shown in the videotape at the scene of the crime committing the offence. If an appellate court, upon a review of the tape, is satisfied that it is of sufficient clarity and quality that it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to identify the accused as the person in the tape beyond any reasonable doubt then that decision should not be disturbed. Similarly, a judge sitting alone can identify the accused as the person depicted in the videotape. [Emphasis added.]

The kind of clear video recording described in Nikolovski, however, sharply contrasts with the video recording in this case. The trier of fact must use greater caution where the video or photo quality is poor: R. v. Cuming (2001), 2001 CanLII 24118 (ON CA), 158 C.C.C. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 19.

(b)         Recognition evidence as a subset of eyewitness identification

[33]      Recognition evidence is a subset of eyewitness identification evidence, in which the eyewitness’ identification is based on prior acquaintance. The recognition witness may, or as in this case may not, have been present at the scene of the crime.

[34]      Hourigan J.A. stated in Olliffe at para. 39, “recognition evidence is merely a form of identification evidence”. As such, “[t]he same concerns apply and the same caution must be taken in considering its reliability as in dealing with any other identification evidence.”

[35]      The test for admitting recognition evidence is established in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Leaney, 1989 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393 and re-affirmed by Rosenberg J.A. in R. v. Brown, 2006 CanLII 42683 (ON CA), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.). At para. 39 of Brown, Rosenberg J.A. stated that "this type of non-expert opinion evidence is admissible provided that the witness has a prior acquaintance with the accused and is thus in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the perpetrator".

[36]      In Berhe, this court considered the proposition that a recognition witness must be able to point to idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement peculiar to the person identified in order for his or her opinion to satisfy threshold admissibility. The proposition was asserted by Harradence J.A. in his dissent in Leaney, 1987 ABCA 206, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 263, at para. 40:

Notwithstanding this general principle of exclusion, there may be occasions when non-expert opinion evidence will be relevant and admissible. Where a witness is so familiar with the accused that he can identify idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement, not apparent to the trier of fact in the courtroom, that witness should be able to give his opinion. Two criteria must be satisfied. First the witness must be sufficiently familiar with the accused so as to be aware of the unique features which form the basis of the opinion. Second, the witness must be able to state with particularity what the idiosyncrasies are and show where and how they are revealed on the videotape. In this way the witness is contributing knowledge not otherwise available to the trier of fact. Consideration of these issues should take place within the context of a voir dire so the accused can challenge the evidence before it is admitted.

[37]       This court rejected the proposition as a requirement for threshold admissibility. The court in Berhe instead held at para. 22 that the identification of idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement were relevant when considering the ultimate reliability of the evidence. I will expand further on this below.

La jurisprudence accepte le principe qu’il est possible de conclure que quelqu’un qui a agi pour le compte d’un acheteur de drogue a aidé au trafic et qu’il peut être jugé comme ayant participé à l’infraction de trafic; il faut cependant décider si l’accusé a véritablement aidé à la vente de stupéfiants ou l’a encouragé

R v Machushek, 2016 SKCA 41

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[38]           Crown counsel sets the bar too low when he implies that an accused must be found guilty if “the purchase would not have taken place without the assistance of the accused” or by asking “whether the drug transaction could have proceeded without Machushek’s assistance.” In my respectful view, these statements do not completely reflect the majority’s opinion in R v Poitras, 1973 CanLII 156 (SCC), [1974] SCR 649 [Poitras] and in Greyeyes. For the most part, Poitras stands for the proposition that once it is determined that an accused did not commit an act of trafficking, the issue is whether he or she is guilty of being a party to trafficking by virtue of s. 21(1)(b) or s. 21(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the burden is on the Crown to prove all of the elements of the offence it has alleged. The issues are not resolved by having recourse to the civil law of “agency” alone: Poitras at 653 and Greyeyes at para 34.

[39]           Greyeyes is part of the legal history of this province. It was an appeal from a decision of this Court (R v Greyeyes (1996), 1996 CanLII 5030 (SK CA), 144 Sask R 241), resulting in three sets of reasons (Wakeling J.A. and Bayda C.J. concurring as to the result only, which was to set aside an acquittal and enter a conviction, with Vancise J.A. in dissent). The common denominator among the two concurring opinions in this Court was a finding that Mr. Greyeyes had acted as a party so as to aid the seller to traffic drugs to an undercover police officer in Saskatoon.

[40]           In the Supreme Court of Canada, Cory J., writing for the minority, stated the issue this way: can someone acting either as an agent for a purchaser of narcotics or assisting a purchaser to buy narcotics be found to be a party to the offence of trafficking under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code by aiding or abetting in the sale of narcotics? Cory J. said yes to this question. L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for the majority agreed, but where the majority and the minority divided was with respect to how the law should be stated.

[41]           Cory J., for the minority in Greyeyes, would have stated the law thus:

[32] … Quite simply there is no reason to extend the exception for purchasers to those who assist or encourage purchasers in an illegal sale. The activities of an agent for a purchaser or one who assists a purchaser to buy narcotics certainly come within the definition of “aiding” or “abetting” under s. 21(1) of the Code. By bringing together the source of supply and the prospective purchaser, these persons obviously assist in the sale of narcotics. Acting as a spokesperson for a purchaser has the effect of assisting both the purchaser and the vendor to complete the transaction. It follows that an agent for a purchaser or one who assists the purchaser to buy the drugs can properly be found guilty as a party to the offence of trafficking under s. 21(1) of the Code.

…

[35] In summary, someone who acts on behalf of a purchaser of narcotics can be found to be a party to the offence of trafficking under s. 21(1) of the Code. This is so because such a person assists in the commission of the offence by bringing the purchaser to the seller. Without that intervention or assistance, the sale would never occur. There is nothing in the provisions of the Narcotic Control Act [now the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act], in any applicable principles of criminal law, or in reasons of policy which indicates that any special status should be granted to those assisting purchasers of drugs so as to exempt them from the clear provisions of s. 21 of the Code.

…

[37] Next it must be determined whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea or guilty mind to satisfy s. 21(b).

…

In other words, in order to satisfy the purpose requirement under s. 21(1)(b), the Crown is required to prove only that the accused intended the consequences that flowed from his or her aid to the principal offender, and need not show that he or she desired or approved of the consequences.

(Emphasis added)

[42]           In her majority reasons, L’Heureux-Dubé J. disagreed with this interpretation of the law, saying that it meant “any act of the person offering assistance to the purchaser, no matter how trivial, can lead (assuming the requisite knowledge and intent are also present) to a finding of guilt for this offence” (emphasis in original, at para 2). The majority resiled from the creation of such a wide net of culpability for trafficking, and emphasized the intent with which the accused acted:

[6] It should not be forgotten that the offence of trafficking is taken extremely seriously by both the courts and the public and a conviction brings along with it a great deal of social stigma. It goes without saying that someone branded as a “trafficker” is held in extremely low regard by the public. Additionally, sentencing for these offences tends to be quite high. I am reluctant to sanction an approach which encourages convictions in cases where the assistance rendered is solely to the purchaser.

[7] Moreover, I am of the view that in such a case, a charge of trafficking would actually be the incorrect legal result. …

[8] … In situations where the facts reveal no more than incidental assistance of the sale through rendering aid to the purchaser, it stands to reason that these persons should be treated as purchasers, and not as traffickers. The proper charge in these circumstances would be aiding or abetting the possession of a narcotic, and not trafficking.

…

[11] Perhaps more importantly, I believe this approach benefits from a certain symmetry. It is clear that someone whose acts are designed to aid a purchaser, yet incidentally benefit the seller, has assisted much more in the purchase of the narcotic than in the sale. As such, it is only fitting that this person share the culpability and stigma of the purchaser rather than that of the vendor.

(Italic emphasis in original, underline emphasis added)

[43]           It was of some significance for the majority in Greyeyes that the Crown is not without a remedy when the accused renders aid solely to the purchaser or provides no more than incidental assistance of the sale through rendering aid to the purchaser. The Crown can charge an accused who aids a buyer of drugs with aiding or abetting the possession of a drug and not trafficking. A charge of aiding or abetting the possession of a drug was found to be a more proportionate response than trafficking:

[9] The offence of aiding or abetting possession of a narcotic is a permissible legal result and has occurred on many occasions: see for example, R. v. Miller (1984), 1984 CanLII 637 (BC CA), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 54 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 87; Re Chambers and The Queen (1985), 1985 CanLII 169 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 440 (Ont. C.A.); Zanini v. The Queen, 1967 CanLII 16 (SCC), [1967] S.C.R. 715.

[10] In my view, this approach also offers a number of advantages. First, I believe it accords with the general notion that the “punishment” should be in accord with the crime: Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1991), at p. 28. A trafficking conviction, in the circumstances indicated above, is quite harsh, carries with it considerable stigma and has negative consequences for the repute of justice. In this regard, it is also worth noting that the sentencing structure for these offences is rather disparate. A trafficking conviction is punishable by up to life imprisonment, while a possession conviction carries a maximum seven-year sentence.

[44]           Admittedly, L’Heureux-Dubé J. refers to the idea of bringing the buyer to the seller in the following passage:

[13] In the case at bar, however, I have no difficulty concluding that the appellant did far more than act as a purchaser. My colleague has described the nature of the appellant’s participation in the sale in detail, and these facts demonstrate a concerted effort on his part to effect the transfer of narcotics. The appellant located the seller, brought the buyer to the site and introduced the parties. It is clear that without this assistance, the purchase would never have taken place. Moreover, he acted as a spokesperson, negotiated the price of the drugs, and passed the money over to the seller. He also accepted money for having facilitated the deal. As my colleague points out, without the appellant’s assistance, the buyer would never have been able to enter the apartment building and contact the seller. These are not the acts of a mere purchaser, and as a result it is clear that the appellant aided the traffic of narcotics.

(Emphasis added)

[45]           In my view, however, this passage does not state any particular test to be applied. Rather, at this point in her reasons, L’Heureux-Dubé J. applies the law to the facts, which in Greyeyes overwhelmingly indicated the culpability of the accused. In so far as L’Heureux-Dubé J. develops a test to be applied, it should be broken into two parts. First, with respect to the actus reus, where the facts reveal no more than incidental assistance of the sale through rendering aid to the purchaser, the majority suggests the proper charge is not trafficking, regardless of intent. Second, with respect to the mens rea, the majority took a different view than the minority. For the majority, the test is whether the assistance is rendered solely to the purchaser or, cast in different terms, but arriving at the same result, whether the “acts are designed to aid the purchaser” (para 11).

[46]           Any doubt as to whether s. 21(1)(b) requires the Crown to prove the mens rea as well as the actus reus of the offence is laid to rest by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 SCR 411 [Briscoe]. Briscoe provided needed clarification as to what the Crown must prove in order to convict someone of aiding or abetting the commission of an offence.

[47]           In general terms, the Court in Briscoe clarified that the actus reus and the mens rea are different for the aider or the abettor than they are for the principal offender. In specific terms, the Court made it clear that it is not the doing of the act of aiding or abetting alone that renders one criminally liable, but rather the trier of fact must consider the purpose with which the act was done:

[15] Of course, doing or omitting to do something that resulted in assisting another in committing a crime is not sufficient to attract criminal liability. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario wrote in R. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1974), 1974 CanLII 707 (ON CA), 3 O.R. (2d) 629, “one does not render himself liable by renting or loaning a car for some legitimate business or recreational activity merely because the person to whom it is loaned or rented chooses in the course of his use to transport some stolen goods, or by renting a house for residential purposes to a tenant who surreptitiously uses it to store drugs” (p. 640). The aider or abettor must also have the requisite mental state or mens rea. Specifically, in the words of s. 21(1)(b), the person must have rendered the assistance for the purpose of aiding the principal offender to commit the crime.

(Emphasis added)

[48]           The Court in Briscoe adopted the formulation of what “purpose” means in this context from its earlier decision in R v Hibbert, 1995 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 973 [Hibbert] at para 31: “purpose” in s. 21(1)(b) should be understood as essentially synonymous with “intention.” With respect to intention, the Crown must prove that “the accused intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence” (Briscoe at para 16). As part of the proof of intention, the Crown is not required to prove that the accused desired that the criminal act occur (although that particular aspect of mens rea is not particularly relevant in most cases where the crime is trafficking). Charron J. stated in Briscoe the knowledge component requires that “the aider must know that the perpetrator intends to commit the crime” (at para 17).

[49]           Briscoe concerned s. 21(1)(b), but subsequent case authority applies this same rationale to s. 21(1)(c). In R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32, [2010] 2 SCR 198, the Court summarized its analysis by stating the following:

[76] The main focus of s. 21(1)(b) and (c) is on the intention with which the aid or encouragement has been provided. The act or omission relied upon must in fact aid or abet, and it must also have been done with the particular intention to facilitate or encourage the principal’s commission of the offence, with knowledge that the principal intends to commit the crime … .

(Emphasis added)

See also, R v Vu, 2012 SCC 40 at para 58, [2012] 2 SCR 411; R v Helsdon (2007), 2007 ONCA 54 at paras 43–44, 216 CCC (3d) 1; and R v Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692 at para 67, 237 CCC (3d) 148.

[50]           Unlike other offences that Parliament has created, the offence of being a party to an offence under s. 21(1)(b) and s. 21(1)(c) of the Criminal Code requires the Crown to prove not only the doing of the act but also that the accused acted with the intention of aiding or abetting the principal offender. The Supreme Court of Canada has referred to this as a “specific mens rea” attached to the offence of being a party (see La Souveraine, Compagnie d’assurance générale v Autorité des marchés financiers, 2013 SCC 63 at para 45, [2013] 3 SCR 756). See also, R v M.R., 2011 ONCA 190 at para 40, 277 OAC 99. The specific mens rea for the offence of being a party requires the Crown to prove both intention and knowledge.

[51]           The authors of E.W. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada, loose-leaf (Rel 124, February 2016) 2d ed, vol 1 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2016) at para 15:2010 synthesize the case law well:

The fault element in aiding and abetting arises from the phrase “for the purpose of,” which is expressly stated in s. 21(1)(b) and is implied in s. 21(1)(c). The “fault element” includes both “intent and knowledge.” The aider or abettor must intend to help or encourage the principal to commit the offence and must know that the principal intends to commit that offence though the aider or abettor need not share the intent of the principal to commit the offence.

(Emphasis in original)

[52]           The minority in Greyeyes stated, “in order to satisfy the purpose requirement under s. 21(1)(b), the Crown is required to prove only that the accused intended the consequences that flowed from his or her aid to the principal offender, and need not show that he or she desired or approved of the consequences” (at para 37). Briscoe, however, confirms that the proof of the act of aiding or abetting does not fulfill the mens rea requirement of s. 21(1)(b) and s. 21(1)(c).

[53]           As part of the reasoning process of determining whether someone has aided or abetted the seller of drugs, the question to ask is not whether the purchase would have taken place without the assistance of the accused – as suggested by the Crown. The formulation of the test in these terms would catch the very transaction that concerned the majority in Greyeyes: the friend who drives the buyer to the risky part of town for the purposes of protecting the buyer.

[54]           Shortly put, the trial judge did not misinterpret the case law or set the “bar” too high in deciding whether Mr. Machushek’s actions constituted aiding or abetting a trafficker. He quoted the same passages that I have quoted from Greyeyes and referred to all of the relevant case law applying that decision. There is no reason to say he misunderstood the law.