Quand la requête en exclusion de la preuve doit être présentée

Mohammadi c. R., 2006 QCCA 930 (CanLII)

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[50]           The Ontario Court of Appeal held in R. v. Kutynec, a case in which the trial on a summary conviction offence proceeded before a judge alone, that motions of this nature must be presented before the evidence that is sought to be excluded is heard. As Finlayson, J.A. observed on behalf of the court in Kutynec:

Prior to the proclamation of the Charter, no one conversant with the rules controlling the conduct of criminal trials would have suggested that an objection to the admissibility of evidence tendered by the Crown could routinely be initiated after the case for the Crown was closed. It is self-evident that objections to admissibility of evidence must be made before or when the evidence is proffered.

[51]           The rationale for this principle was well‑explained by Borins, D.C.J., sitting as a summary conviction appeal judge in the same case that led to the reasons of Finlayson, J.A.:

There are additional reasons which favour the determination of s. 24 issues through the use of a pre‑trial motion. Experience has shown that most s. 24 applications are based on alleged improprieties on the part of the police in relation to rights guaranteed by ss. 8, 9, 10(a), (b), and 11(a). The pre-trial motion eliminates from the trial disputes over police conduct not relevant to the question of guilt. It avoids the possibility of having to abort a trial because the jury has been exposed to unconstitutional evidence. It avoids the expense of a useless trial in cases where exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) makes it impossible for the prosecution to prove an essential element of the offence. By giving the prosecutor advance notice of the defendant's contention, the pre‑trial motion enables the prosecution to prepare its case on the Charter motion and to have its witnesses available. The pre-trial motion facilitates prosecution and defence preparation for trial by giving them advance knowledge of the evidentiary status of the evidence which the defendant is attempting to exclude. In general, the requirement of the pre‑trial motion places a premium on effective pre‑trial preparation by forcing a defence lawyer to consider Charterissues well in advance of the trial date.

[52]           The rigidity of that approach has been subsequently tempered to a certain extent in the case‑law, as the judgments of this Court in R. v. Godbout, R. v. Tsiris and R. v. Timm illustrate. It is now generally accepted that such motions to exclude evidence should usually be made either before or as soon as the challenged evidence is presented, unless there are exceptional circumstances.

Comment la Cour doit réagir lorsque la preuve présentée au procès diverge grandement à celle présentée lors d'un voir-dire

R. v. Farrah (D.), 2011 MBCA 49 (CanLII)

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18               Although the accused did not testify at the voir dire, he did take the stand at trial.  The accused testified that, at the time of his arrest, he had no longer been living at suite 16 and that he had not been there since January 26.  In essence, he was saying that he had no privacy interest in suite 16.  This is contrary to the Crown evidence presented during the voir dire, where police officers testified that the accused had told them that, on January 31, he was still in the process of moving from suite 16 to suite 12. 

19               More importantly, this is contrary to the position taken by the accused during the voir dire.  The accused argued on the voir dire that his s. 8 Charter right had been breached when the police entered suite 16 without a warrant.  To prove a breach of his s. 8 right, the accused must first establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in suite 16.  Indeed, that was his counsel’s submission on the voir dire, relying upon the evidence of the accused that was given through the police testimony.

20               However, at the trial hearing, this important evidentiary discrepancy was not raised by counsel or by the judge.  Nevertheless, this contradiction is troublesome.  The concern and unease are clear: an accused should not be able to successfully argue a position at a voir dire based upon evidence of, or from him, and then entirely disavow or attempt to disavow that position at trial based upon a change in his evidence.  Here, the position he took regarding a privacy interest at the voir dire allowed him to obtain a favourable Charter breach ruling.  How can he then be allowed to withdraw from his earlier position and argue that he had no privacy interest in suite 16 and thus cannot be linked to the shotgun found in that suite?  The maxim quod approbo non reprobo comes to mind:  one cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time.

21               In the end, the accused’s evidence at trial no longer supported the position advanced for the accused in the voir dire or the judge’s voir dire finding that the accused “had a reasonable expectation of privacy in both suites 12 and 16 (at para. 26).”  Such a situation raises possibilities of mistrial when the matter is heard before a jury and puts a trial judge in a difficult, if not impossible, position with respect to the evidence before the court.  It could also raise difficult ethical questions which were not fully before us and upon which we reach no conclusion (see for example, The Canadian Bar Association, CBA Code of Professional Conduct, Ottawa:  CBA, 2009, ch. IX, commentary 11 which states that defence counsel must not “call any evidence that, by reason of the admissions [made by the accused], the lawyer believes to be false” and The Law Society of Manitoba, Code of Professional Conduct, Winnipeg:  Law Society of Manitoba, 2010, ch. 4, Rule 4.01(1) and the commentary on the Duty of Defence Counsel).

22               What is a judge to do when the evidence at trial no longer buttresses an earlier voir dire ruling?  To begin with, a judge is not functus officio once the voir dire has ended (see R. v. Hunter (1980), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 190 (Ont. C.A.)).  The test for when a judge may revisit a previous ruling at trial was explained by Sopinka J. in R. v. Adams, 1995 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707, as follows (at paras. 29-30):

         A court has a limited power to reconsider and vary its judgment disposing of the case as long as the court is not functus.  The court continues to be seized of the case and is not functus until the formal judgment has been drawn up and entered.  See Oley v. City of Fredericton (1983), 1983 CanLII 2822 (NB CA), 50 N.B.R. (2d) 196 (C.A.).  With respect to orders made during trial relating to the conduct of the trial, the approach is less formalistic and more flexible.  These orders generally do not result in a formal order being drawn up and the circumstances under which they may be varied or set aside are also less rigid.  The ease with which such an order may be varied or set aside will depend on the importance of the order and the nature of the rule of law pursuant to which the order is made.  For instance, if the order is a discretionary order pursuant to a common law rule, the precondition to its variation or revocation will be less formal.  On the other hand, an order made under the authority of statute will attract more stringent conditions before it can be varied or revoked.  This will apply with greater force when the initial making of the order is mandatory.

As a general rule, any order relating to the conduct of a trial can be varied or revoked if the circumstances that were present at the time the order was made have materially changed.  In order to be material, the change must relate to a matter that justified the making of the order in the first place. ….

23               In circumstances where the evidence at trial departs significantly from that of the voir dire and where it relates to a matter that justified the voir dire ruling, a court may, on its own motion, reopen the voir dire and decide the matter afresh (see R. v. Smith(1986), 1986 CanLII 103 (MB CA), 38 Man.R. (2d) 184 (C.A.); Adams at paras. 29-30; R. v. Calder, 1996 CanLII 232 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 660 at para. 21; and R. v. Underwood, 1998 CanLII 839 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 77 at para. 13).  When the contradictory evidence does not affect the voir dire ruling, the judge should note the inconsistency and factor it in when assessing the witness’s credibility.

Le fardeau applicable incombant au requérant est la balance des probabilités lorsqu'une violation d'une garantie constitutionnelle est alléguée

R. v. Boston, 2013 ONCA 498 (CanLII)

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[23]      In a Charter application, the burden of proof is on the defence to establish a breach on a balance of probabilities.  In a criminal trial, the burden of proof is on the Crown to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

[24]      In a trial with a blended voir dire, the trial judge is still required to separate the burdens and apply the appropriate onus in disposing of both the Charter application and the trial proper.

Le droit au voir-dire n'est pas absolu quand une violation constitutionnelle est alléguée

R. v. Mehan, 2017 BCCA 21 (CanLII)

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[49]        It is common ground that there is no absolute right to a voir dire where a Charter right is alleged to have been violated: R. v. Bains, 2010 BCCA 178(CanLII) at para. 69. A judge may exercise his or her discretion to decline to hold an evidentiary hearing if there is no demonstrated remedy available: R. v. Mastronardi, 2015 BCCA 338 (CanLII) at para. 63. An evidentiary hearing is a discretionary order that is “case-specific and highly contextual”: McDonald at para. 21.

Un voir-dire ne doit pas être automatiquement tenu sur la demande d'un accusé, car il s'agit d'une décision judiciaire

U.S.A. v. Ranga, 2012 BCCA 81 (CanLII)

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[13]           The respondent would divide the challenge to the ruling declining a voir dire into two parts: 1) whether the trial judge erred in relation to the application to have identification evidence ruled inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter; and 2) whether he erred in declining to stay the proceedings because of abuse of process. I accept this distinction and have found it convenient to separate the two complaints as they engage somewhat different principles.

[14]           The decision whether to hold a voir dire engages the discretion of the judge: R. v. Vukelich (1996), 1996 CanLII 1005 (BC CA), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 237 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1997] 2 S.C.R. xvi (note)). In Vukelich, Chief Justice McEachern observed that avoir dire is not required merely because an accused alleges a Charter breach; the question for the judge is whether a voir dire will assist the proper trial of the real issues. Chief Justice McEachern said at para. 26 :

Based on these authorities, it does not follow that an accused is always entitled as of right to a voir dire in the course of a criminal trial in order to challenge the constitutionality of a search. The trial judge must control the course of the proceedings, and he or she need not embark upon an enquiry that will not assist the proper trial of the real issues. ...

This statement was applied in R. v. Bains, 2010 BCCA 178 (CanLII), 254 C.C.C. (3d) 170 at para. 69.

[15]           As the issue of holding a voir dire engages the discretion of the judge, this court must accord deference except in cases in which the discretion has not been judicially exercised: R. v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 at 1465, referred to in R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, 2005 SCC 66(CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 at para. 46. See also Bains, para. 76.

[16]           In the extradition context, the party seeking a Charter voir dire bears the onus of establishing one should be held. As stated by Chief Justice Finch in United States of America v. Earles, 2003 BCCA 20 (CanLII), 171 C.C.C. (3d) 116, “before a fugitive will be allowed to embark on a Charter inquiry, there must be some ‘air of reality’ to a contention that the extradition hearing risks being unfair” (para. 34, citing United States of America v. Dynar, 1997 CanLII 359 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462).

[17]           On behalf of Mr. Ranga it is said that the failure to hold a voir dire denied his counsel the opportunity to establish a foundation through cross-examination, for the argument that the alleged Charter breaches were part of such a pattern of disregard for his rights, and the rights of others, as to warrant the exclusion of the identification evidence under s. 24(2). He refers to cases that discuss the exclusion of evidence as a response to police violation of an accused’s Charter rights, particularly where there is a pattern of disregard for Charter rights including the Charter rights of third parties; he calls upon the value of our democratic standards, and highlights the need to comply with Canadian law in the context of extradition cases: R. v. Grant, 1993 CanLII 68 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; R. v. Strachan, 1988 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980; R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235; R. v. Lauriente, 2010 BCCA 72 (CanLII), 251 C.C.C. (3d) 492; R. v. Bohn, 2000 BCCA 239 (CanLII), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 320; R. v. Larosa (2002), 2002 CanLII 45027 (ON CA), 163 O.A.C. 108, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 449; R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253; R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562; United States of America v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358 (CanLII), 106 O.R. (3d) 449; and United Stated of America v. Anekwu, 2009 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 3.

[18]           Mr. Ranga’s submission invokes high principles in aid of his contention that the judge should have declared a voir dire. In my view, this ground of appeal, however, cannot succeed.

[19]           The judge gave two reasons for denying the voir dire. The first was that there was no air of reality to the notion that the officers’ identification evidence was affected by the alleged breaches. The second was, assuming the many breaches posited, that the cumulative effect of such breaches would not justify the remedies sought.

[20]           It appears to me that this latter reason is unassailable in this appeal. In his oral ruling of June 17, 2010, the judge acknowledged that:

... breaches ... must sometimes, even in the absence of their having an effect on particular items of evidence, result in a condemnation and consequences so that the public will continue to be aware that the courts view Charter rights very seriously.

Yet he concluded:

However, what occurred in this case does not approach the kind of circumstances where that kind of statement is required from the court, and I cannot imagine, based on anything I have heard about this case, that that kind of remedy could flow from these breaches, even if, I say again, they were considered in the strongest way that they could be considered from the defence point of view.

[21]           Both the decision to hold a voir dire, and the granting of a remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter, are discretionary decisions. Assuming that on the voir dire Mr. Ranga would establish Charter breaches in terms most favourable to him, the judge concluded he would not exclude the evidence. In other words, holding a voir dire was found to be unnecessary for the proper adjudication of the issue of admissibility of the evidence. In my view, this conclusion, in the circumstances disclosed in the record, is a complete answer to the complaint that denying Mr. Ranga the opportunity to cross-examine the officers in a voir dire so reduced the force of his application for a s. 24(2) remedy that we should quash the committal order.

[22]           There is another equally cogent basis for rejecting the submission that failure to hold a voir dire and failure to exclude the officer’s evidence of identification demonstrates reversible error. The judge said, in his reasons for judgment in committing Mr. Ranga for extradition:

[20]      Counsel has referred me to many of the authorities with judicial commentary about the frailties and dangers inherent in and with identification evidence. Many of the cases he refers me to deal with evidentiary problems and identification problems similar to those that he has pointed out here, and I agree that each of the problems with the identification evidence from those cases is present here, to some extent. I also agree with his assessment of the law relating to frailties and dangers of such evidence, and I caution myself accordingly to exercise the special care required.

[21]      Having accepted all of that, I am unable to accede to the argument of counsel for the following reasons:

1.         One the burden of proof on the applicant on this issue is the balance of probabilities. If it were necessary that I be satisfied of the identification beyond a reasonable doubt, I might arrive at a different conclusion, but given what the burden here is, I am satisfied that the evidence, even considering all of the weaknesses that are present, satisfies that burden.

2.         I also look at the picture which I have referred to several times, which is in evidence, and as I am entitled to do, and again while I might come to a different conclusion if I were required to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, with the burden as it is, I am satisfied that the person in the photograph is probably the same person who appears before me. For those reasons, I reject that argument of the respondent.

Certains pouvoirs du juge gestionnaire de l'instance

R. v. Felderhof, 2003 CanLII 37346 (ON CA)

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[57] I think something should be said about the trial management power. It is neither necessary nor possible to exhaustively define its content or its limits. But it at least includes the power to place reasonable limits on oral submissions, to direct that submissions be made in writing, to require an offer of proof before embarking on a lengthy voir dire, to defer rulings, to direct the manner in which a voir dire is conducted, especially whether to do so on the basis of testimony or in some other [page505] form, and exceptionally to direct the order in which evidence is called. The latter power is one that must be exercised sparingly because the trial judge does not know counsel's brief. However, a judge would not commit jurisdictional error in exercising that power unless the effect of the ruling was to unfairly or irreparably damage the prosecution. That did not occur here. While some other judge might not have made the order that the trial judge did in this case and might very well have seen the merit of immediately proceeding with the omnibus document motion, I am not convinced that the trial judge's decision to do otherwise was a jurisdictional error. On my reading of the record, the ruling did not prevent the prosecutor from calling his case. I agree with the application judge's view (at para. 227) that deferring the documents motion did not "unfairly or irreparably" damage the position of the prosecution.

Le juge peut rejeter sommairement une requête en vertu de la Charte sous certaines circonstances

R. v. Snow, 2004 CanLII 34547 (ON CA)

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[51] Nor are we persuaded that the appellant suffered any prejudice from the fact that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper inquiry. First, it is abundantly clear from the remarks he made when dismissing the motion for a mistrial how the trial judge would have decided any inquiry on the basis of the evidence that was before him and that is now before us. The appellant made it clear at trial that he wanted the trial judge to conduct the inquiry. He did not resile from that position on appeal.

[52] Second, the appellant insisted on having the mistrial application heard one week after it was presented. The trial judge required that it be heard immediately and only dismissed the application after defence counsel refused to proceed. In our view, the trial judge was entitled to refuse to allow the appellant's serious allegations to cloud the trial for as long as a week. The appellant raised the point and, given the nature of the application, we can see no reason why he should not have been ready to proceed with it expeditiously. We would add, however, that had the appellant requested a reasonable delay to allow for proper preparation, it should have been granted.

[53] Third, the appellant has not attempted to supplement the record on appeal. We have already indicated the weaknesses in the appellant's affidavit. While the affidavit provided a sufficient basis to trigger an inquiry, certainly, it was far from compelling. Many of the appellant's allegations are based on observations he says he made from the dock in the courtroom. If that were the case, many others would have been aware of what was going on; yet, no objection was raised prior to the mistrial application and no other evidence was offered in support of the allegations. It is also noteworthy that the source given for three paragraphs (33, 42 [and] 43) was the defence counsel who was hardly reticent to complain about the trial judge's conduct; yet, he failed to object to these alleged improprieties at the time. It is significant that the appellant has not supplemented that record with any further evidence in this court. We are left with the trial record and all of its deficiencies. On the basis of that reco rd, we see no basis to interfere with the trial judge's summary determination that nothing improper occurred and that the mistrial application should be dismissed.