La défense de croyance sincère mais erronée au consentement communiqué en matière d'agression sexuelle

R. v. H.W., 2022 ONCA 15

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[47]      “[T]he common law recognizes a defence of mistake of fact which removes culpability for those who honestly but mistakenly believed that they had consent to touch the complainant”: Ewanchuk, at para. 42. The defence is a “negation of guilty intention”, rather than an affirmative defence – it is a “denial of mens rea”: Ewanchuk, at paras. 43-44.

[48]      The defence requires that the accused had “an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant actually communicated consent, whether by words or conduct”: Barton, at para. 91 (emphasis in original). From a practical standpoint, the principal relevant considerations are the complainant’s behaviour which is said to have involved communication and the “admissible and relevant evidence explaining how the accused perceived that behaviour to communicate consent”: R. v. Park, 1995 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836, at para. 44 (emphasis in original); Barton, at para. 91.

[49]      The defence is limited both by the common law and by provisions of the Code that tightly restrict “the range of mistaken beliefs an accused may lawfully hold about the complainant’s consent”: G.F., at para. 1; J.A., at para. 24. As a result, “[n]ot all beliefs upon which an accused might rely will exculpate him”: Ewanchuk, at para. 50.

[50]      For example, mistakes as to what amounts in law to consent – for example, a mistaken belief that “no”, or silence, or lack of resistance, meant “yes” – do not engage the defence: Barton, at paras. 98-100.

[51]      Moreover, s. 273.2 of the Code imposes additional restrictions on the applicability of the defence. It provides that a belief in consent that arose in certain ways will be unavailing. It imposes a precondition of reasonable steps to ascertain consent – “no reasonable steps, no defence”: Barton, at para. 104. And it requires evidence of words or conduct by which the complainant expressed consent. Section 273.2 provides:

It is not a defence to a charge under section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where

                                                (a)        the accused’s belief arose from

                                                               (i)         the accused’s self-induced intoxication,

                                                            (ii)         the accused’s recklessness or wilful blindness, or

                                                            (iii)        any circumstance referred to in subsection 265(3) or 273.1(2) or (3) in which no consent is obtained;

                                                (b)        the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting; or

                                                (c)        there is no evidence that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct.

[52]      An accused who wishes to rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent must first demonstrate that there is an air of reality to it. If there is no air of reality to the defence, it is not left with the jury. If there is, the onus is on the Crown to negative the defence. If the Crown fails to do so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The Crown might disprove the defence by, for example, proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not take reasonable steps to determine whether the complainant was consenting or that the accused’s mistaken belief was not honestly held: Barton, at paras. 121-23.

La mens rea et le consentement en matière d'agression sexuelle

R. v. H.W., 2022 ONCA 15

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[42]      Central to both the actus reus and the mens rea for sexual assault is the issue of consent, “the foundational principle upon which Canada’s sexual assault laws are based”: G.F., at para. 1.

[43]      The Code defines consent for the purpose of sexual assault. Under s. 273.1(1) of the Code, consent means “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.” It means the conscious agreement of the complainant to “every sexual act in a particular encounter”: J.A., at para. 31. Section 273.1(2) of the Code contains a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which consent is not obtained, while s. 273.1(3) “authorizes the courts to identify additional cases in which no consent is obtained, in a manner consistent with the policies underlying the provisions of the Criminal Code”: J.A., at para. 29.

[44]      Consent, so defined, is analyzed from a different perspective at the mens rea stage than it is for the purpose of determining whether the actus reus was committed: Barton, at para. 89.

[45]      At the actus reus stage of the analysis, the absence of consent is determined solely by reference to the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it occurred: R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, at para. 26; G.F., at para. 25. The question is solely whether the complainant, in her mind, wanted sexual touching to take place. Whether or not the accused thought or perceived that the complainant was consenting is irrelevant to whether the actus reus occurred: Barton, at para. 89.

[46]      The mens rea stage of the analysis is typically reached after the trier of fact has concluded that the actus reus has been committed. In the sexual assault context, this means that the trier of fact has concluded that touching of a sexual nature occurred, and that the complainant did not actually, subjectively, consent within the meaning of the Code to that sexual touching. The focus then shifts to the accused’s mental state, the question being whether the accused knew of, or was wilfully blind or reckless as to, that lack of consent: Barton, at para. 87.

Une agression armée qui a le potentiel de mettre la vie de la victime en danger ne se qualifie pas de facto comme un voies de fait grave si la conséquence prohibée ne se réalise pas

R. v. de Freitas, 1999 CanLII 14071 (MB CA)

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8                                 The Criminal Code defines assault (s. 265) and then creates three categories, simple assault (s. 266), intermediate assault[1] (s. 267) and aggravated assault (s. 268).  The maximum penalty for simple assault is five years’ imprisonment, that for intermediate assault 10 years and that for aggravated assault 14 years.

9                                 The category of simple assault covers all assaults that do not fall into one of the higher categories.  An intermediate assault is defined as one committed by a person who, in committing it, carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or causes bodily harm while an aggravated assault is defined as one which wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.

10                             These graduated categories thus progress from the least serious to the most serious.  The least serious category covers those assaults with the least risk of harm to the victim.  No weapon is involved and no bodily harm is caused.  The intermediate category involves either a more serious manner of carrying out the offence (i.e. involving a weapon) or bodily harm falling short of wounding, maiming or disfiguring the victim.  Finally, we have the most serious category in which the victim is wounded, maimed, disfigured or his or her life endangered.

11                                   What strikes me about the offence of aggravated assault is that it is defined not by reference to the manner in which it is carried out, but rather in reference to a consequence.  No matter how the offence is carried out, it becomes one of aggravated assault if the victim is wounded, maimed or disfigured.  This strongly suggests that, in adding endangerment to life, Parliament intended the phrase to refer to a consequence of an assault rather than a risk which arose from it.

12                             The use of a weapon in an assault will almost always create a risk of the victim being wounded, maimed or disfigured or his or her life endangered.  Yet the legislation does not place an assault with a weapon in the category of aggravated assault.  For this to happen, the risk must become reality.  The victim must actually be wounded, maimed or disfigured or his or her life endangered.  “Endangers the life of the complainant” is thus, in my view, intended to be as much a consequence of the assault as “wounds, maims or disfigures.”

13                             I do, however, agree with Moldaver J. (as he then was) in R. v. Melaragni (1992), 1992 CanLII 12779 (ON SC), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 546 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), when he held that bodily harm was not a necessary prerequisite of endangerment to life.  He gave the following examples of assaults which endanger life without causing actual bodily harm (at p. 550):

For example, if D. and V. are standing on a 20^th-floor balcony and D. pushes V., causing V. to go over the railing, but V. miraculously holds on and is rescued before falling, can it be doubted that D.’s common assault endangered the life of V.?  In this example, D. has assaulted V. and the assault has endangered V.’s life even though V. suffered no bodily injury.  The same could be said if D. pushed V. into a busy intersection in the face of oncoming vehicular traffic.  Assuming that an alert motorist was able to avoid striking V., can it be doubted that V.’s life was endangered?

 

14                             In my opinion, the assaults in those examples qualify as aggravated assaults because endangerment to life is the consequence of the completed assault.  Most assaults with a weapon have such potential at their inception, but do not qualify as an aggravated assault because the potential is unrealized when the assault ends.

Il n'existe aucune expectative de vie privée quant aux données contenues dans l'ordinateur de bord d'un véhicule (Event Data Recorder)

R. v. Attard, 2024 ONCA 616

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[59]      In terms of the extraction of the EDR data, the question was whether that act by the police violated the respondent’s s. 8 Charter-protected interests. To answer that question, the trial judge had to determine whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the EDR data. It is the respondent’s onus to establish that he did, failing which s. 8 protection is not extended.

[60]      Three broad categories of privacy interests have emerged over time: territorial, personal, and informational: R. v. El-Azrak, 2023 ONCA 440, at para. 30; R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, at para. 38.

[61]      At paras. 31-32 of El-Azrak, Fairburn A.C.J.O., writing for this court, summarized the legal framework - whatever the form of privacy is at issue – for whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy. That determination necessitates both a factual and a normative inquiry. The factual inquiry necessitates a command of all the circumstances in play in the case. The normative inquiry is broader in nature, with an eye to protecting that for which we ought to expect protection from a privacy perspective in a free and democratic society. The test for determining whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy asks the following:

1.   What is the subject matter of the search?

2.   Does the accused have a direct interest in that subject matter?

3.   Does the accused have a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter?

4.   Would an expectation of privacy be objectively reasonable in the circumstances of the case?

[62]      The respondent claimed an informational privacy interest in the EDR data. The first three questions in the test were easily answered, as they were not in dispute: (1) the EDR data was the subject matter of the search; (2) the respondent, as driver of the car, had a direct interest in the EDR data; and (3) the Crown conceded that the respondent had a subjective expectation of privacy in the EDR data. The parties were divided on the answer to the fourth question.

[63]      The trial judge found that, in the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the EDR data. In my view, he erred in law in so finding.

[64]      In finding that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the EDR data, the trial judge analogized an EDR to personal computers, location trackers, and wiretaps. However, those analogies are not apt.

[65]      The EDR is completely objective. It contains no information going to the driver’s biological core, lifestyle, or personal choices, nor information that could be said to directly compromise his “dignity, integrity and autonomy”: Fedan, at para. 82. The recorded EDR data has information limited to a five-second window before the crash on the vehicle’s speed, throttle, and braking. There is no data on driving patterns, driving history, or average driving speed. There is no data on location or GPS coordinates. EDRs are not reprogrammable and cannot be reinstalled once removed.

[66]      While an EDR is an electronic data storage device just as are personal computers, cell phones, and location trackers, the similarities end there. There is no personal information in the EDR akin to that which could potentially be found on a computer, cell phone or location tracker. EDR data is impersonal, automatically deleted, and limited to five seconds of information regarding the operations of the car. It has no link to any location or person. It does not identify the driver. It does not broadcast or receive data. As the court observed in Major, at paras. 68-71, the data provides no independent insight into the behaviours of anyone in the car.

[67]      In short, the EDR data provides no personal identifiers that could link the driver to its captured data. Accordingly, the respondent had no reasonable expectation of informational privacy in the EDR data after the vehicle he was driving had been lawfully seized.

[68]      This conclusion is reinforced by a recognition that EDR data is about the manner of driving, which is a public, highly regulated activity. Indeed, in the present case, the respondent’s driving was caught on camera and dashcam video. While EDR data contains more detailed information than what a member of the public might observe, the information is qualitatively similar – the speed of the vehicle and whether it is braking can be seen.

[69]      For these reasons, I agree with the courts of appeal in Fedan and Major that a driver/owner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the EDR and its data after the vehicle has been lawfully seized under s. 489(2).

[70]      The trial judge’s errors in law on Issues 1 and 2 had a material bearing on the respondent’s acquittal because, as previously noted, the evidentiary gap on acceleration and speed would have been filled by the EDR data.

Comment apprécier une défense de dénégation générale

Foomani c. R., 2023 QCCA 232

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[97]      L’étonnement du juge, ponctué par un point d’exclamation, se comprend difficilement. Certes, il formule sa conclusion à la lumière de tous les témoignages entendus, mais si les gestes qui sont reprochés à l’appelant n’ont pas eu lieu, l’appelant ne pouvait que les nier. Comment pourrait-il en être autrement?

[98]      En effet, comme l’observe le juge Beauregard dans l’arrêt Prud’homme : « Que peut faire une personne innocente accusée d'un fait qui n'a pas existé et qui, suivant la victime présumée, aurait eu lieu en l'absence de témoins? »[71].

[99]      À cet égard, dans l’arrêt Titong[72], la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta explique que la dénégation d’un accusé est compatible avec la présomption d'innocence et que le fait de la rejeter en raison de son caractère intéressé sape cette présomption. Le déni de l’accusé ne peut être transformé en un motif de ne pas le croire, car cela reviendrait à lui imposer un fardeau de preuve injustifié :

[9]        Characterizing an accused’s evidence as “self-serving” does not necessarily disclose an error of law, where, for example, use of the descriptor is contextualized with an articulation of why the accused’s evidence is self-serving or why, overall, the accused is found not to be credible: R v SMC, 2020 ABCA 19. However, a simple denial is consistent with the presumption of innocence and to reject it as self-serving, without more, would undermine that presumption and the concerns underpinning the seminal decision of R v W(D), 1991 CanLII 93 (CSC), [1991] 1 SCR 742. One may rhetorically ask what more could an innocent person say in such circumstances. As noted by this court in R v CEK, 2020 ABCA 2 at para 24, a mere denial cannot be turned into a reason to disbelieve the accused. To do so would also place an unwarranted burden of proof on the appellant: R v Huot, 2016 ABCA 339, at para 12.

[Les soulignements sont ajoutés]

[100]   Bien évidemment, je tiens à le préciser, cela ne suggère pas qu’un juge ne peut rejeter la dénégation générale d’un accusé, mais le postulat de départ de l’analyse de celle-ci ne peut s’appuyer, comme en l’espèce, sur un raisonnement qui la tient d’emblée pour suspicieuse au premier abord[73]. Ainsi, la dénégation générale par un accusé des faits relatifs à une accusation peut certes être rejetée en tout ou en partie, mais son évaluation ne peut s’amorcer à l’aune de l’incrédulité. 

[101]   Le fait de rejeter une dénégation générale ou de qualifier le témoignage d’un accusé comme étant intéressé ne révèle pas nécessairement une erreur de droit si la qualification est mise en contexte en énonçant les raisons pour lesquelles le témoignage de l'accusé est intéressé ou encore les raisons pour lesquelles, dans l'ensemble, l'accusé est jugé non crédible[74]. Le juge doit donc expliquer le rejet de la dénégation dans le contexte du dossier, car il ne suffit pas de formuler sa conclusion sans en fournir les motifs[75].

[102]   Bien que je convienne que les observations du juge ne s’avèrent que l’amorce de sa réflexion sur la crédibilité et la fiabilité du témoignage de l’appelant, celles-ci enclenchent l’analyse sur des prémisses manifestement erronées qui la faussent et minent, en conséquence, le verdict rendu[76]. Cette erreur a eu une incidence importante sur la déclaration de culpabilité de l’appelant. En effet, comme on le sait, « les raisons invoquées par le juge du procès au soutien de sa décision sont présumées refléter le raisonnement l’ayant conduit à cette décision »[77].