Antonelli c. R., 2008 QCCA 1573, 500-10-004057-087
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[47] La jurisprudence reconnaît en effet qu'il doit, au stade de l'imposition de la peine, être tenu compte des problèmes de santé mentale du délinquant, du moins lorsque ces problèmes, même s'ils ne résultent pas en une déresponsabilisation pénale, ont affecté la commission du crime ou joué un rôle dans cette commission ou que, tenant compte de cette santé mentale, la peine serait d'une sévérité excessive.
[48] Dans R. v. Fraser, 2007 SKCA 113 ; [2007] 12 W.W.R. 615 , la Cour d'appel de la Saskatchewan résume ainsi l'état du droit sur la question :
32 The authors of Mental Disorder and the Law: A Primer for Legal and Mental Health Professionals (Hy Bloom & Richard D. Schneider (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006)) note, at p. 230, that a mental disorder has been factored into sentencing in one of two ways (or a combination of): (i) it may have been operative in the commission of the offence but not to an extent sufficient to have an impact on the verdict; or (ii) the accused may have quite rationally elected not to raise the issue during the course of the trial, notwithstanding the potential success of the defence. Regardless, the court must take into consideration evidence of mental disorder during the sentencing process.
33 Clayton C. Ruby (Sentencing, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) at p. 249) argues that mental illness can act as either a mitigating or aggravating factor in sentencing :
[...] To ignore relevant psychiatric evidence is to greatly increase the risk that a sentence will be utterly inappropriate. Not only does such evidence help judges determine whether an offender is fit to be sentenced, it ensures that the sentence imposed reflects the true circumstances of the offence and the offender. Where psychiatric material exists, it will inevitably be relevant to sentencing. Mental illness can act as either a mitigating or aggravating factor on sentencing.
34 Jurisprudential support for this proposition can be found in cases such as R. v. Knoblauch, 2000 SCC 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 780 ; R. v. Lenius, [2007] S.J. No. 276 , 2007 SKCA 65 ; R. v. Bartlett (1961), 131 C.C.C. 119 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Wallace (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 95 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Newby (1991), 84 Alta. L.R. (2d) 127 (C.A.); and R. v. Shahnawaz (2000), 149 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R. xvii.
35 A review of these cases raises two instances where a sentence could be reduced on psychiatric grounds:
(1) If the mental illness contributed to or caused the commission of the offence; or
(2) If the effect of imprisonment or any other penalty would be disproportionately severe because of the offender's mental illness.
The appellant implicitly raised both factors. Because there are only a few cases dealing directly with the relevance of mental illness in fashioning a fit sentence, I will discuss each case at greater length.
36 Although mental illness has been fairly consistently viewed as a mitigating factor by the courts, there is some disagreement as to whether it must be shown that the psychiatric condition contributed to the commission of the offence before evidence of such a condition can be reflected in the sentence. For example, in Bartlett, supra, the offender displayed signs of anxiety and emotional disturbance but no evidence of a major mental illness. The Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge not to give much weight to the psychiatric report because the offender's mental health condition played no role in the offences to which he pled guilty.
37 Similarly, in Lenius, supra the offender's medical condition was not raised as a defence, nor did the accused ever contend that his illness contributed to or caused him to offend. Consequently, the Court refused to consider the illness to be a mitigating factor. In contrast, the Court in Wallace, supra took into consideration the fact that the offender was prone to depression and suicidal ideations because these conditions were found to have contributed to the commission of the offence.
38 The second instance where a sentence could be reduced on psychiatric grounds is if there is evidence that the effect of imprisonment or any other penalty would be disproportionately severe due to the offender's mental illness. In Newby, supra the offender committed a fraud while afflicted with chronic fatigue syndrome (rendering his mind with the capacity of a seven year old). Because the condition could only be treated in California and the evidence showed that if incarcerated the accused would likely commit suicide, his sentence was reduced on both grounds. (See also Wallace, supra.)
39 In contrast, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Shahnawaz, supra, refused to take into account psychiatric evidence that the offender was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and more specifically, that his condition would deteriorate significantly if he was subject to incarceration. The Court accepted that imprisonment had and would probably continue to have an "extreme effect" on Mr. Shahnawaz, and noted that in some cases there may be a need to adjust the sentence imposed so that it does not become disproportionate to the crime. However, the Court ultimately refused to take into account Mr. Shahnawaz's post-traumatic stress disorder because: (i) it was too difficult to predict his future condition; (ii) there was no connection between the offender's disorder and his illegal activity; and (iii) Mr. Shahnawaz's future health while in custody was better left in the hands of correctional authorities.
40 The appellant contends that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider Mr. Fraser's mental illness and substance dependence when imposing sentence, including Dr. Nicholaichuk's comments regarding the effect of incarceration on Mr. Fraser's mental instability. The Crown agrees that the offender's moral culpability is of critical importance in fashioning a fit sentence but argues that the sentencing judge took this into consideration when he imposed a sentence at the low end of the range suggested.
41 The appellant cited a portion of the judgment of Arbour J. in Knoblauch, supra, as evidence that a long term of incarceration is not appropriate when the offender has a mental illness:
16. [...] There is no mechanism in criminal law to remove dangerous people from society merely in anticipation of the harm that they may cause. The limit of the reach of the criminal sanction is to address what offenders have done. At that stage, dangerousness is but one factor to be considered in the assessment of the appropriate sentence. Even extreme dangerousness cannot, in and of itself, justify imposing the maximum punishment in order to elevate the protection of society above all other considerations.
42 In Knoblauch, supra, the accused (who had a lengthy history of mental illness and of the dangerous handling of explosives) was found guilty of the unlawful possession of an explosive substance and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. At the sentencing hearing, the defence called in two forensic psychiatrists in support of its request for a conditional sentence (with a term requiring the accused to reside in a secure mental health institution). Thus, the question before the Court was: can a court require that a conditional sentence be served in a secure mental institution? In answering the question in the affirmative, the Court noted that the focus should always be on the risk posed by the individual offender while serving his sentence in the community.
43 Knoblauch, supra, has been cited in later decisions that focused on the question of dangerousness under a proposed conditional sentence. Thus, the focus of these decisions was on whether conditions can reasonably be crafted that would reduce the risk of re-offence to an acceptable level, and thereby reduce the danger to the offender's community. (See for example, R. v. J.W., [2007] O.J. No. 1573, 2007 ONCJ 178, where the Court chose to apply the "dangerousness test" from Knoblauch in respect of assessing risk in the context of a bail hearing). In R. v. Barnes, [2006] A.J. No. 965 (Prov. Ct.) (QL), aff'd, [2006] A.J. No. 1601, 2006 ABCA 295 , Knoblauch was distinguished on the basis the judge categorized the conditions imposed in Knoblauch as "extreme" (i.e., confining the accused to a locked psychiatric facility until such time he is released by doctors).
44 The above-mentioned excerpt from Knoblauch only serves to discourage imposition of a maximum punishment on account of extreme dangerousness or mental illness Arbour J. does not state that incarceration itself is never justified on account of these factors. Thus, I find that the comments of Arbour J. in Knoblauch are useful merely as an example of a situation in which mental illness is a relevant factor in sentencing.
45 I turn now to a consideration of the aforementioned sentencing principles regarding mental illness in light of the facts before this Court. Although mental illness is a recognized factor for consideration in the sentencing process, there is no suggestion in the case law that it is superior to any other mitigating or aggravating factors that may be present. Mr. Fraser pled guilty to the offences of which he was charged. Furthermore, the evidence indicates his substance abuse problem precipitated his violence and that in spite of a number of in-patient programs he previously participated in, he continues to abuse alcohol and drugs. Therefore, it appears that rehabilitative programming (in isolation and without a significant period of incarceration) is not sufficient to lower the risk of re-offending to an acceptable level.
46 In sum, I am satisfied that the sentencing judge adequately considered Mr. Fraser's mental health issues in the imposition of a sentence of seven years incarceration.
[49] Dans R. c. Lechasseur, 2008 QCCA 909 , B.E. 2008BE-675 , la Cour a transformé une peine d'incarcération en une peine d'emprisonnement dans la collectivité, estimant qu'en raison des déficiences psychologiques de l'appelant, le milieu carcéral n'était pas « le plus propre à être dissuasif » pour lui. Dans R. c. Chan, J.E. 93-347 , (1993) 54 q.a.c. 23, la Cour soulignait même qu'en cas de maladie mentale (il s'agissait en l'espèce d'une perte momentanée de contrôle due à une dépression majeure assortie d'éléments de psychose), « les critères usuels du sentencing ne sont pas d'une grande utilité; la jurisprudence révèle que dans ces cas, on s'est écarté beaucoup de la norme; les facteurs de l'exemplarité et de punition sont d'une importance beaucoup réduite ».
[50] Cela étant posé, le juge de première instance a-t-il ici ignoré les troubles mentaux de l’appelant? Il faut répondre à cette question par la négative.
[51] Le juge s'est en effet penché sur les troubles mentaux allégués par l’appelant, qu'il examine aux paragr. 32 à 38 de son jugement. Il conclut cependant que la preuve présentée à cet égard ne démontre pas que l'arrêt de la rispéridone, l'un des médicaments que prend l’appelant pour contrôler son trouble affectif bipolaire avec présence occasionnelle de symptômes psychotiques de type paranoïde, ait pu jouer un rôle dans la commission de l'infraction. Il note même que l'on ne sait pas, en réalité, si l’appelant a ou n'a pas cessé la rispéridone (voir le paragr. 33 du jugement) et, ajoute-t-il, « nous n'avons que sa parole qui fut rapportée par des tiers, dans les rapports produits » (paragr. 34 du jugement). Il note en outre que s'il a cessé de prendre la rispéridone, l’appelant l'a fait en toute connaissance de cause, sachant que cet arrêt pouvait accroître son impulsivité et son agressivité. Le juge écrit à ce propos que :
[36] À la page 2 de son rapport, monsieur Jean-François Bélair, m.d., FRCPC, écrit au sujet de monsieur Antonelli : « Il désire alors cesser cette médication; bien qu'il soit asymptomatique, je lui suggère de continuer compte tenu des problèmes d'agressivité antérieurs et des éléments d'impulsivité contenus dans sa personnalité de base. En juillet 2005, il décide d'arrêter la Rispéridone, mais continue de prendre les autres médicaments prescrits. »
[37] Monsieur Antonelli connaît ses problèmes d'agressivité et d'impulsivité. S'il a vraiment arrêté de prendre la Rispéridone, comme il le dit, c'est en toute connaissance de cause.
[52] Le juge conclut enfin que :
[38] Pour le Tribunal, il n'y a rien dans le dossier, qui démontre que le 19 août 2005, le jugement de monsieur Antonelli était altéré par autre chose que son désir de vengeance.
[53] On comprend de ce dernier paragraphe, placé dans le contexte de l'ensemble de la décision, que, selon le juge, la preuve ne suffit pas à démontrer que la commission de l'acte délictuel a pu être influencée par les problèmes de santé mentale de l’appelant et, plus précisément, par l'arrêt de la rispéridone. Il s'infère du jugement, par ailleurs, que le caractère délibéré et intentionnel de l'acte semble au juge peu compatible avec l'idée d'une impulsivité résultant d'un problème de santé mentale mal contrôlé.
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