Petit c. R., 2005 QCCA 687 (CanLII)
[22] Comme la juge Duval Hesler, je suis d’avis que l’interprétation appropriée de l’expression « a le contrôle », que l’on retrouve aussi bien à l’art. 253 qu’au paragr. 254(2) C.cr., a été correctement énoncée par la Cour d’appel d’Ontario dans l’arrêt R. c. Lackovic, reflex, (1988) 45 C.C.C. (3d) 80, à la p. 83 :
I think that it is sufficient to say that the verb "is" (and, therefore, "has") can and should have some degree of past signification. To interpret these words as having a strictly literal (present tense only) meaning could defeat the purpose of the provision and lead to absurd results. For example, as far as "has care or control" is concerned, if the provision is confined to a literal present tense meaning it would not apply to a person who, when a police officer approaches, steps out of his car and throws his keys away or who runs away and is finally caught by the police officer a substantial distance from the car. Other examples could be given.
En d’autres mots, l’expression « a le contrôle », même si au temps présent, doit être lue comme incluant un élément passé, dont la preuve incombe cependant au ministère public.
[23] L’appelant soutient que cette interprétation a été depuis écartée par cette même Cour dans R. c. Wren, [2000] O.J. no 756. Je ne suis pas d’accord. Dans cette affaire, la police arrive sur les lieux trois heures après que l’accusé a conduit son véhicule dans un fossé d’où il ne pouvait sortir sans l’aide d’une remorqueuse. Constatant une odeur d’alcool, les policiers accusent le conducteur d’avoir eu le contrôle du véhicule alors que ses facultés étaient affaiblies en violation de l’art. 253 C.cr. On ne lui avait pas demandé de se soumettre à un ADA en vertu du paragr. 254(2) C.cr. De plus, comme l’indique l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel d’Ontario, le ministère public limite sa preuve aux faits constatés par les policiers :
[3] […] The Crown did not rely on the evidence of the respondent’s impairment when he drove the car into the ditch or attempted to extricate it from the ditch. The Crown sought the conviction based only on the fact that the respondent was in the driver’s seat at the time the police arrived at the scene.
[24] La présente affaire est très différente puisque la preuve a établi qu’au moment de l’accident l’appelant conduisait son véhicule. On a donc prouvé qu’il en avait le contrôle peu avant l’arrivée des policiers, et ce, au moment de l’accident.
[25] Par ailleurs, l’arrêt Lackovic n’est pas incompatible avec l’arrêt Wren, comme en font foi les passages suivants de ce dernier :
[17] Crown counsel submitted that this court reaffirmed the result in Saunders in its 1988 decision in R. v. Lackovic reflex, (1988), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 80, 29 O.A.C. 382 (C.A.). Lackovic drove his car into a traffic light standard. His car then crossed several lanes of traffic before finally coming to rest on top of a snow bank. The police arrived 12 minutes later to find Lackovic standing outside, but close to his car. When Lackovic refused to take the breathalyzer test, the police charged him with refusing to provide a sample. Lackovic’s defence at trial was that he did not have care or control of his vehicle at the time the demand was made.
[18] The Court of Appeal sustained the conviction and held that he had not surrendered care or control of his vehicle because he retained custody of it. Crown counsel submits that the decision in Lackovic confirms that mere custody of the vehicle, while impaired, whether or not the vehicle has the potential to be dangerous, is sufficient to amount to care or control.
[19] I do not agree. In Lackovic the court referred to the concept of danger to the public when it quoted from the reasons of McIntyre J. in Toews, in part as follows [at p. 85]:
This leaves the court with the question: What will constitute having care or control, short of driving the vehicle? It is, I suggest, impossible to set down an exhaustive list of acts which could qualify as acts of care or control, but courts have provided illustrations which are of assistance. In R. v. Thomson (1940), 75 C.C.C. 141 at pp. 143-4, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 516 at pp. 518-9, 15 M.P.R. 300 (N.S.S.C.A.D.), Baxter C.J. said:
I have had some difficulty in construing this expression but have come to the conclusion that “care” is intended to cover such a case as an intoxicated driver placing his vehicle, without applying the brakes, in such a situation that it may run away and occasion danger to the public. It is probably intended to cover the possible omission, because of intoxication, of such acts of care as would or might occasion harm, such acts, in short, as would render any person liable in damages for negligence. “Control” does not need definition. The man who is in a car has within his reach the means of operating it is in control of it.
In my view, it is implicit in this court’s conclusion in Lackovic that the court considered the appellant’s vehicle to be capable of becoming a danger in some way, so that by retaining custody of the vehicle the appellant maintained his ability, while impaired, to effect such potential danger.
[20] The requirement of some risk of danger in order to establish the actus reus of “care or control” is consistent with the basis for a finding of criminal liability under the impaired driving/care or control offences. As the Supreme Court stated in Saunders, supra, the object of the offence is to protect persons and property from danger. When the presumption has been rebutted and it has been shown that there is no potential danger either to any person or any property from the combination of the impaired person and the motor vehicle, there is no need for the protection which is the object of the offence.
[26] En l’instance, l’élément de risque a été clairement établi puisque la preuve indique que la conduite de l’appelant, dont les facultés étaient affaiblies, a causé un sérieux accident de la route.
[27] Je termine mon analyse en soulignant que retenir la proposition de l’appelant donnerait lieu à une situation aberrante : le paragr. 254(2) C.cr. ne s’appliquerait pas dans les cas d’accidents démolissant la voiture d’un conducteur ivre, alors que dans les cas où le véhicule demeurerait en état de rouler, un test au moyen d’un ADA pourrait être ordonné.
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