Ramkaran c. R., 2009 QCCA 852 (CanLII)
[30] Il importe de préciser que la preuve de l'identification de la voix est une preuve admissible. Comme l'indiquait le juge Finlayson dans R. c. Williams, [1995] O.J. No. 1012 (C.A. Ont.) :
Counsel took the court through the evidence of identification in the case on appeal and submitted that aside from previous familiarity with the appellant's voice (which was conceded) Spicer's identification was based on nothing else and that it would be unsafe to base a conviction upon it.
I cannot accept this submission. Despite his protestations to the contrary, counsel for the appellant is confusing admissibility with weight. I say this because he vacillated in his argument between complaining about the failure of the witness to testify with respect to the above factors and the failure of the trial judge to address them in his reasons for judgment. There was no obligation upon either of them to do so. If counsel for the appellant wished to challenge the reliability of Spicer's evidence of voice identification he was free to question Spicer as to any or all of the factors outlined above. They could have been put to the witness in cross-examination, but whatever the witness's response to them, his evidence would remain a part of the record for whatever weight it would carry.
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An attempt to meld the distraction between weight and admissibility as they relate to voice identification was advanced and rejected by this court in R. v. Parsons (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 465, 37 C.C.C. (2d) 497 (C.A.), in the context of wire taps. Dubin J.A., speaking for the court, held that once it is shown that the interception was carried out pursuant to a lawful authorization and in the manner authorized, the fact that the evidence falls short of identifying the voice does not render the interception inadmissible (at p. 471 O.R., p. 502 C.C.C.). It becomes a question for the trier of fact to determine the identity of the voice. Similarly in R. v. Braumberger (1967), 62 W.W.R. 295 (B.C.C.A.), the court held that the evidence of identity of an alleged robber given by a witness who had heard him speak during the perpetration of the robbery was properly admitted to be considered by the jury.
[31] Une personne peut identifier une voix en raison de sa familiarité avec celle-ci. Quant à la fiabilité de cette preuve, elle s'apprécie en regard des circonstances au cours desquelles le témoin a entendu cette voix. (...)
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