R. c. Deng, 2003 CanLII 32942 (QC C.A.)
[25] Dans son traité The Law of Sentencing, l’auteur Allan Manson s’est penché sur la question de la parité des sentences et son examen par une Cour d'appel:
Section 718.2 (b), one of the recently entrenched principles of sentencing, requires a court to take into consideration the principle that
a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
[…]
Punishments cannot be identical but only approximately the same given sentencing discretion, individualization, and recognition that cases are rarely identical
[…]
When one considers not only the individualized nature of decision making, but also the recently imposed standard of deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge’s sentencing decisions, it is clear that a “considerable latitude for disparity” (As was observed by Vancise J.A. in R. v. Laliberte 2000 SKCA 27 (CanLII), (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 503 at 538 (Sask.C.A.)) is expected and condoned across the system. The legitimate concern is about unwarranted disparity, meaning variations of a substantial degree which cannot be justified by reference to differences in individual circumstances.
[26] L'auteur ajoute que même entre coaccusés, la parité ne signifie pas une identité de peines:
At the simplest level, there should not be disparity between co-accused with similar backgrounds because the offence will be empirically identical. However, co-accused are not always dealt with at the same time by the same judge. By itself, the difference between a guilty plea and a trial may create a distinction depending on timing, effect on witnesses, and sincerity of remorse. More importantly, when co-accused are tried separately, the factual basis of sentencing may differ depending on such things as what facts formed the basis of a guilty plea, evidentiary rulings, or findings of fact. Accordingly, it is not always easy to achieve parity between co-accused.
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