La santé mentale & la détermination de la peine

R. c. Martin, 2012 QCCA 2223 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[37] D’emblée, il faut reconnaître que la maladie mentale dont il est question en l’espèce n'a pas donné ouverture à un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle. Cela étant dit, il n'y a pas lieu d'écarter l’impact de la maladie mentale sur la détermination de la peine. La Cour d’appel de Terre-Neuve et Labrador précise à ce sujet :

[18] Deterrence and punishment assume less importance in cases of mentally ill offenders. See R. v. Hynes 1991 CanLII 6851 (NL CA), (1991), 89 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 316 (NF CA). In R. v. Robinson (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (Ont CA) the Court emphasized that in cases where offenders commit crimes while they are out of touch with reality due to mental illness, specific deterrence is meaningless to them. Further, general deterrence is unlikely to be achieved either since people with mental illnesses that contribute to the commission of a crime will not usually be deterred by the punishment of others. As well, severe punishment is less appropriate in cases of persons with such mental illnesses since it would be disproportionate to the degree of responsibility of the offender. This decreased emphasis on punishment and deterrence in these circumstances is consistent with the proportionality principle in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

[19] Thus, the mental illness of an offender will often be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing even though it is not of the sort that would establish a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder at the time of the commission of the offence. The focus in sentencing such offenders may properly therefore be placed on mechanisms that will promote rehabilitation and treatment, rather than on punishment. This is especially so where lengthy prison terms are often regarded as counterproductive, even in cases not involving the mentally afflicted. See R. v. Gladue 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (SCC) at p. 408.

[38] Ainsi, lorsqu’un accusé est affligé d’une maladie mentale, il est reconnu que l’accent doit être placé sur des mécanismes permettant la réhabilitation et le traitement de l’accusé, et non pas la punition. La Cour d’appel de l’Alberta reconnaît également que lorsqu’un accusé souffre d’une maladie mentale sérieuse, une punition plus légère, reflétant la moindre responsabilité de l’accusé, est nécessaire. Hugues Parent et Julie Desrosiers notent d'ailleurs qu'on observe parfois une diminution de la peine dans les cas de personnalité limite ou « borderline ».

[39] La Cour a déjà considéré « l'état de dépression de l'appelante au moment de la perpétration des délits » comme étant une circonstance atténuante.

[40] Plusieurs tribunaux ont affirmé que, en présence de maladie mentale, on doit accorder moins d’importance aux critères d’exemplarité et de dissuasion générale. À ce sujet, Clayton C. Ruby affirme que « […] courts have come to recognize the decreased significance of general deterrence in sentencing the mentally ill offender, and they also have affirmed that specific deterrence and punishment ought to be given similarly reduced weight ». Dans une affaire concernant une peine pour, inter alia, voies de fait armées, la Cour d’appel d’Alberta examina le poids à donner à l'exemplarité et la dissuasion en présence de maladie mentale :

[14] The Crown submits that denunciation and deterrence should be the primary sentencing goals in violent crimes involving weapons and in those where the crime is committed in the victim’s home. The sentencing judge did not address denunciation and considered deterrence to be overshadowed by mental illness. Deterrence and denunciation are important principles of sentencing. However, in the context of a mentally ill offender, these principles may be considered to have less weight. Little would be achieved by making an example of an offender whose acts are committed at the time of mental illness, and specific deterrence has little impact on the mentally ill : see R v Tremblay.

[41] L’arrêt R. v. Belcourt, cité par la juge de première instance, énonce ce qui suit :

[8] The effect of a mental disorder on sentencing is helpfully summarized in C. C. Ruby, Sentencing (6th ed.) (Markham: Butterworths, 2004) at paras. 5.246 and 5.256 :

It is, therefore, clear that a sentence can be reduced on psychiatric grounds in two instances : (1) when the mental illness contributed to or caused the commission of the offence; or (2) when the effect of imprisonment or any other penalty would be disproportionately severe because of the offender’s mental illness…

General deterrence should be given very little, if any, weight in a case where an offender is suffering from a mental disorder because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others.

[42] La Cour d’appel de Terre-Neuve et Labrador a davantage développé ce principe dans R. v. Edmunds:

[25] This condition gives rise to a consideration of the need for general deterrence. The Crown submits, and I agree, that a breach of trust by a public officer, certainly by one in a position of authority over a vulnerable group of individuals, is a very serious offence that is not to be taken lightly. The Crown submits that this supports the contention that the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the need for general deterrence. The problem with the Crown’s position is, again, that it runs contrary to the principles expressed in Peters. Persons suffering from a mental illness which contributes to their commission of crimes are less likely to be deterred by the imposition of a harsher sentence on another individual.

[26] Further, “most people understand that the mentally ill require treatment and supervision, not punishment”: see R. v. Valiquette 1990 CanLII 3048 (QC CA), (1990), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (QCCA) at 331. In my view, the public’s confidence in the effective enforcement of the criminal law will not be undermined where the Mental Health Court emphasizes rehabilitation over deterrence in such circumstances.

[43] Enfin, il vaut de rappeler ce que notre Cour a affirmé au sujet de la maladie mentale et de la dissuasion générale:

Fitness must, of course, be measured not only against the objective gravity of the offense but also in the light of appellant's mental state when she committed it and all of the circumstances in which she found herself.

[…]

Persons suffering from severe mental illness of this kind do not, in my respectful opinion, require exemplary sentences to deter them from repeating the offense. Nor is a severe sentence imposed on a mentally-ill person of much value for purposes of general deterrence.

Mothers, generally, do not need exemplary sentences to deter them from killing their young children. And most people understand that the mentally-ill require treatment and supervision, not punishment.

[…]

In the circumstances of the present case, I do not see that any useful purpose can be served by a sentence of imprisonment. Appellant requires psychiatric treatment and, perhaps, close supervision for a time. But this can more appropriately be accomplished at a mental hospital than in a prison.

[44] À la lumière de ces arrêts, il ressort que la juge de première instance n'a pas trop insisté sur le volet lié à la santé mentale. En effet, il a été reconnu qu'on doit accorder une moindre importance à l'exemplarité et à la dissuasion générale lorsque l'accusé est atteint de maladie mentale.