L'essence de l'infraction de complot est l'entente de commettre un acte illégal ou d'obtenir un résultat en utilisant des moyens illégaux

R. c. Bérubé, 1999 CanLII 13241 (QC CA)

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Examinons d'abord la définition de complot.  Dans l'arrêt La Reine c. O'Brien, 1954 CanLII 42 (SCC), [1954] R.C.S. 666, à la p. 669, la Cour suprême a adopté la définition de Willes, J. dansMulcahy c. La Reine, [1886] L.R. 3 H.L. 306, à la p. 317:

A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.  So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable.  When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties ... punishable if for a criminal object ...

Comme le rappelle le juge Cory dans l'arrêt R. c. Douglas, 33 C.C.C. 29, à la p. 40, l'essence de l'infraction de complot est l'entente de commettre un acte illégal ou d'obtenir un résultat en utilisant des moyens illégaux.  Après avoir rappelé que dans l'affaire Douglas les accusés étaient inculpés de complot pour faire le trafic de cocaïne, le juge Cory a continué de cette façon:

How that agreement is to be carried out, that is to say, the steps taken in furtherance of the agreement (the overt acts) are simply elements going to the proof of the essential ingredient of the offence, namely, the agreement.  This was the principle which was enunciated by Dickson J. as he then was, in R. v. Cotroni 1979 CanLII 38 (SCC), [1979], 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 161, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256.

If that principle is borne in mind, it is perhaps easier to consider the problems of indictments in conspiracy cases.  They may arise in either of two ways.  First, a conspiracy count may charge the accused with two or more conspiracies;  secondly, the count may charge only one conspiracy, but proof at trial may demonstrate that there was more than one conspiracy.  A count in an indictment which charges the accused with two or more conspiracies gives rise to issues of duplicity.  A count which charges just one conspiracy where the proof at trial reveals more than one conspiracy raise the question of whether the Crown has proven the conspiracy charged against the accused despite the evidence of a second conspiracy.

The issue was put forward in this way by Dickson J. in Cotroni supra, at p. 25:

A distinction must be drawn between a conspiracy count which charges the accused with two or more conspiracies, and a count which charges one conspiracy only, but is supported by proof during trial of more than on conspiracy.  The former gives rise to questions of duplicty.  The latter raises the question of whether the Crown has proven the conspiracy charged against two or more of the accused notwithstanding evidence of a second conspiracy.

He continued at p. 26:

Where several conspiracies are shown to have been committted, the problem arises of determining which one of these conspiracies is that envisaged by the charge.

Whether any or all of the conspiracies that have been proven to have been committed are covered by the indictment depends on the construction of the charge.

Appliquant ces principes aux faits de la cause, je suis d'avis qu'il faut s'en tenir à l'accusation telle que formulée, à savoir d'avoir comploté entre eux de tenir une maison de jeu.  La Couronne avait donc le fardeau de prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable une entente entre les appelants pour tenir une maison de jeu.