Lafortune c. R., 2015 QCCS 6644
[35] L’article 650(1) C.cr. établit l’obligation de chaque accusé d’être présent lors de la tenue du procès.
[36] L’article 650(2)b) C.cr. confère au juge du procès un pouvoir discrétionnaire de permettre à un accusé d’être absent en totalité ou en partie à son procès. Le juge fixe les conditions qu’il estime appropriées, s’il fait droit à la demande.
[37] La Cour supérieure de l’Ontario, dans R. v. Durward[2], précise en ces termes les facteurs et les principes qui doivent guider les tribunaux dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire :
[32] […] :
General principles
• The discretion of the judge should be exercised in only the clearest of circumstances and in a manner in which the rights of all parties in the trial are respected. Society has an interest in minimizing the number and scope of difficulties that may arise throughout the trial process and the judge has a duty to minimize the chances of such difficulties arising (R. c. Rickard, [1995] J.Q. no 1485 (C.S.Q)).
• The judge must resolve how to balance an accused’s desire not to attend part of the trial with the public interest in avoiding unnecessary delays and problems resulting from the accused’s absence (R. v. Schindler, 2003 BCPC 565 (CanLII), at para. 8).
• Each request pursuant to s. 650(2)(b) must be considered on its own merits (R. v. Drabinsky (2008), 2008 CanLII 40225 (ON SC), 235 C.C.C. (3d) 350 at para. 12 (Ont. S.C.).
• The importance of the presence of the accused to the administration of criminal justice during his or her indictable offence proceedings has long been a basic principle of criminal law. It is well lodged in the very foundation of proper criminal procedure. However, recent reforms aimed at modernizing the system and streamlining its process have clearly been aimed at providing a level of administrative flexibility not previously available (R. v. Clark, 2011 NBQB 6 (CanLII), 226 C.R.R. (2d) 1 at para. 69 – however, this was not a case dealing with the application of s. 650(2)(b) directly).
The nature of the request for non-attendance
• The mere preference of the accused to be absent is not in itself sufficient to obtain permission of the Court to be absent (R. v. Brown, [1997] O.J. No. 6166 at para. 3 (Ont. C.J.))
• The presence of the accused is of such fundamental importance to the fairness of the trial that there ought to be a substantial cause for him/her to be absent (R. v. Brown, at para. 3).
[38] Le Tribunal doit être satisfait que le requérant a établi « a subtantial cause [3]» qui est plus que « the mere preference [4]» d’être absent. Le simple fait que l’accusé préférerait ne pas être présent n’est pas un facteur déterminant.
[39] La décision de Pazder[5] précise les principes applicables et élabore les critères qui guident le Tribunal dans l’évaluation de la demande comme suit :
[245] The presence of the accused is not merely a formality, but respects the right of the accused to fully participate in the proceeding: R v Reale, 1973 CanLII 55 (ON CA), [1973] 3 OR 905, 13 CCC (2d) 345 (Ont CA). It does not matter that an accused’s lawyer initiated and caused the non-attendance, the result of an breach of the right to participate in one’s own criminal action is still fatal to a proceeding: R v Valeanu (1995), 1995 CanLII 614 (ON CA), 80 OAC 211, 97 CCC (3d) 338 (Ont CA).
[246] Like many areas of judicial discretion, Criminal Code, s 650 is a balancing act between the Criminal Code, s 650(1) imperative that an accused attend at all parts of his trial, to modernization of the Criminal Code which allows some exceptions to occur. This is an individual process, which depends on the dynamic of the trial, trial length, the reasons for the request, and the public policy interest aspects. The view of the Crown is also highly relevant as it is primarily their risk if the trial goes sideways due to the absence of an accused. As the preceding decisions indicate, an improper absence by the accused from a court proceeding has dire consequences.
[247] That means this remedy should be granted rarely. I conclude if a court permits the accused to be absent under Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b) then that discretion should be exercised only if it is supported by some type of written undertaking. This provides and documents that the accused is fully informed and acknowledges that there are risks to this procedure. An accused individual who benefits from being permitted to be absent from trial should not later be able to rely on those risks, and as a consequence allege defects in his trial that create a reversible error on appeal.
[248] Cases that have commented on this provision since it was enacted set out some of the fundamentals which are useful to understand the correct application of Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b). This survey also includes applications of Criminal Code, s 537(1)(j.1) which has an analogous function in a preliminary hearing: R v Schindler, 2003 BCPC 565 at para 4; R v Waddell, [2008] NJ No 388 (QL) at para 52 (NL Prov Ct).
1. The powerful negative potential consequences of an incorrect Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b) absence means that an absence should only be granted:
a) in the clearest of circumstances (R c Rickard, [1995] JQ no 1485 (QCSC);
R v Durward, 2014 ONSC 2182 at para 32; R v Waddell, at para 71);
b) where the rights of all trial participants are respected (R c Rickard; R v Durward, at para 32); and
c) where the accused’s absences do not lead to unnecessary delays (R v Durward, at para 32; R v Schindler, at para 9).
2. An accused may only be permitted to not attend a proceeding where that accused establishes a “substantial cause ... to be absent that is more than ... mere preference” (R v Durward, at para 44; R v Schindler, at para 13; R v Brown, [1997] OJ No 6166 (QL) at para 3 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)), or “a powerful reason” to be absent (R v Drabinsky (2008), 2008 CanLII 40225 (ON SC), 235 CCC (3d) 350 at para 2, 79 WCB (2d) 259 (Ont Sup Ct J); R v De Zen, at para 6).
3. A Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b) absence may only occur:
a) if a part of a proceeding is “utterly unrelated” to the charges against the accused (R v Durward, at para 42; R v De Zen, 2010 ONCJ 448 at paras 2, 8, 90 WCB (2d) 259; R v Trang, 2001 ABQB 437 at para 7, 201 DLR (4th) 160);
b) for defined, short periods where the court can with confidence predict the absence will not cause issues or delay (R v Schindler, at para 9);
c) where it is “highly unlikely” that the accused would or could add anything to the evidence, or assist counsel in examination of witnesses (R v Butler (1993), 1993 CanLII 14645 (MB KB), 86 Man R (2d) 50 at para 16, 81 CCC (3d) 248 (Man QB));
d) in anticipation of conduct that is expected to disrupt the court proceedings (R v Brown, at para 3);
e) to give effect to informant privilege (R v Klymchuk, [2007] OJ No 5457 at paras 60, 64, 77 WCB (2d) 379 (Ont Sup Ct J);
f) during preliminary investigation of matters that may potentially affect trial fairness (R v Vézina, 1986 CanLII 93 (CSC), [1986] 1 SCR 2 at paras 14-15, 25 DLR (4th) 82; R v Hertrick (1982), 1982 CanLII 3307 (ON CA), 137 DLR (3d) 400, 67 CCC (2d) 510 (Ont CA), leave denied [1982] SCCA No 123; R v Chan);
g) where the accused is absent for an application that may, in the future, be repeated without prejudice to the accused: R v Flowers, 2008 CanLII 60164 (Ont Sup Ct J).
h) with a valid waiver (R v Dunbar (1982), 1982 CanLII 3324 (ON CA), 138 DLR (3d) 221, 68 CCC (2d) 13 (Ont CA); R v Waddell, at para 53; R v De Zen, at para 7), as defined by Korponey v Canada (AG), 1982 CanLII 12 (CSC), [1982] 1 SCR 41 at 73-74, 132 DLR (3d) 354, that:
i. is clear and unequivocal,
ii. the party making the waiver has full knowledge of the rights waived, and
iii. the party making the waiver knows the effect of the waiver on those rights.
4. An accused should be present for any part of the criminal proceeding that “... affected the vital interests of the accused or whether any decision made bore on “the substantive conduct of the trial ...””: R v Simon, 2010 ONCA 754, 104 OR (3d) 340, at para 116, leave to appeal refused, [2010] SCCA No. 459; see also R v Poulos, 2015 ONCA 182, 124 OR (3d) 675; R v Vézina, at para 13. This includes:
a) arraignments and pleas (R v Vézina, at para 13; R v Hertrick, at para 52);
b) jury selection (R v Durward, at para 46; R v Vézina, at para 13);
c) reception of the evidence (R v Poulos, at para 19; R v Hertrick, at para 52), including voir dire proceedings and rulings with respect to admissibility of that evidence (R v Vézina, at para 13);
d) trial arguments by counsel (R v Vézina, at para 13);
e) any interaction with the jury, including addresses by counsel to the jury, the judge’s charge, and request by the jury for instructions (R v Vézina, at para 13; R v Hertrick, at para 52);
f) receipt of the verdict (R v Vézina, at para 13);
g) sentencing (R v Vézina, at para 13);
h) discussion of (on the record) trial resolution and plea bargains (R v Poulos, at paras 19-21); and
i) when a view of a scene is conducted following the Criminal Code, s 652 procedure (R v Sappleton, 2010 ONSC 6305 at paras 7-9, 91 WCB (2d) 719; R v Hertrick, at para 52, but see R v MacDonald, [2006] OJ No 4285 at para 18, 71 WCB (2d) 543 (Ont Sup Ct J); R v Lee, 2005 ABPC 140 at para 23, 390 AR 17).
5. An accused who seeks to be absent from a trial under Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b) must retain a lawyer to attend the hearing: R v Durward, at para 44; R v De Zen, at paras 7-8, but see R v Ryle, 2010 MBQB 134 at para 2, 253 Man R (2d) 269 and the obiter comment in R v Falls, 2013 ONSC 862 at para 21.
6. An accused who obtained a court order under Criminal Code, s 650(2)(b) that permits non-attendance may revoke that permission at any time, without notice: R v Durward, at para 47; R v Brown, at para 2 (Ont Ct (Gen Div).
[40] Il ressort que chaque cas doit être apprécié à son mérite.
[41] La demande ne doit pas être accordée pour accommoder, par caprice ou préférence de l’accusé d’être ailleurs qu’à son procès. La présence d’un accusé à son procès et sa participation font partie intégrante de son droit à une défense pleine et entière.
[42] Des raisons sérieuses doivent être soumises au Tribunal pour accorder une telle demande.
[43] L’ensemble des facteurs élaborés par la jurisprudence doit être considéré à la lumière du procès et de ces particularités, notamment la situation personnelle de l’accusé, la longueur du procès, la complexité de la cause, les retards qui peuvent être entraînés par son absence, la renonciation à laquelle un accusé est prêt à s’engager, le stade des procédures, la nature de la preuve qui sera entendue en son absence, sa représentation ou non par avocat, sa participation au procès et à sa défense ainsi que la position de la poursuite à l’égard de la demande du requérant.
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