Un plaidoyer de culpabilité d'un co-conspirateur n'a aucune pertinence aux fins du procès de l'accusé

R. v. Dawkins, 2021 ONCA 113 

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[7] The essence of a criminal conspiracy is an agreement to pursue an unlawful object. It is a preliminary crime where the Crown has to prove that there was a meeting of the minds between at least two people -- the co-conspirators' minds -- to pursue an unlawful object: United States of America v. Dynar, 1997 CanLII 359 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, [1997] S.C.J. No. 64, at para. 87; Criminal Code, s. 465(1). As Dickson J. (as he then was) helpfully explained over 40 years ago now in R. v. Papalia, 1979 CanLII 38 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, [1979] S.C.J. No. 47, at p. 276 S.C.R., the crime of conspiracy is well named, deriving as it does from the Latin words con and spirare, meaning "to breathe together".

[8] Therefore, proof of a conspiracy involves three essential components: (a) there was an agreement between two or more persons; (b) the purpose of that agreement was to pursue a common unlawful object; and (c) the accused was a member of that conspiracy, meaning that he or she had knowledge of the unlawful nature of the agreement and made a voluntary and intentional decision to join in the agreement to achieve the common unlawful object. [page116]

(ii) A guilty plea does not form proof of the offence

[13] A co-actor's guilty plea is proof of nothing other than that the pleader was arraigned, pleaded guilty to the offence and that there was some evidence to support that plea: R. v. Caesar, [2016] O.J. No. 4007, 2016 ONCA 599, 339 C.C.C. (3d) 354, at paras. 55, 59. It is an actual admission of guilt against the pleader only. To be clear, it establishes nothing in relation to alleged co-actors.

[14] The crime of conspiracy is not exempt from this rule. It is well established that the guilty plea of one alleged co-conspirator cannot be used to establish the guilt of another. In a comment [page117] particularly apposite to this case, Watt J.A. said in Tsekouras: "The pleas of guilty or convictions of other alleged co-conspirators are not admissible to prove the existence or fact of the conspiracy in the trial of another or other alleged co-conspirators": R. v. Tsekouras, [2017] O.J. No. 1768, 2017 ONCA 290, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 349, at para. 177, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 225. See also R. v. Desgroseilliers, [1986] O.J. No. 112, 13 O.A.C. 225 (C.A.), at para. 29, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1986), 74 N.R. 320n, 21 O.A.C. 236n.

[15] While there are rare circumstances where the guilty plea of an alleged co-actor may be admissible in the trial of another, the fact of the guilty plea remains of limited use, admissible only to prove the fact of the arraignment and guilty plea: Caesar, at paras. 59, 62. Importantly, even in these rare circumstances, the guilty plea is not admissible to prove the facts underlying the plea. That is precisely how Mr. Samuel's guilty plea was used in this case.