La décision relativement à une demande de remise d’ajournement relève de la discrétion du juge, que son devoir oblige à exercer judicieusement

R. v. G. (J.C.), 2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA)

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[8]               It is undisputed that whether an adjournment or a postponement should be granted or not is a discretionary matter for the trial judge (Manhas v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 172 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 591; R. v. Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 121, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189; R. v. Darville (1956), 1956 CanLII 463 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. 113 (S.C.C.); R. v. MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), [1998] N.J. No. 340 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 132 C.C.C. (3d) 205]).

[9]               Such judicial discretion can however be reviewed on appeal if it has not been exercised judicially (R. v. Darville, supra; R. v. Ash, 1993 NSCA 190 (CanLII), [1993] N.S.J. No. 395 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 125 N.S.R. (2d) 235]). The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations (Reza v. Canada, 1994 CanLII 91 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394). Of course, if the judgment is based on reasons that are not well founded in law, a court of appeal may intervene.

[10]           On the elements to be considered by a judge when asked to grant an adjournment of a criminal trial due to the absence of a witness, the Supreme Court of Canada provided some guidelines in 1956 in R. v. Darville, supra. They can be summarized as follows:

(a) that the absent witness is a material witness in the case;

(b) that the party applying for an adjournment has been guilty of no laches or neglect in omitting to endeavour to procure the attendance of this witness; and

(c) that there is a reasonable expectation that the witness can be procured at the future time to which it is sought to put off the trial.

[11]           Moreover, as pointed out by Cartwright J. in his concurring opinion in Darville, a trial judge errs in law by refusing a request for an adjournment without having given the party seeking it an opportunity to demonstrate that the conditions described above are met. I agree with this principle of law, which has been applied by numerous courts of appeal (see for examples: R. v. T. (A.) (1991), 1991 CanLII 6104 (AB KB), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 107 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Ash, 1993 NSCA 190 (CanLII), [1993] N.S.J. No. 395 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 125 N.S.R. (2d) 235]; R. v. Casey, [1987] N.S.J. No. 340 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 1987 CanLII 9246 (NS CA), 80 N.S.R. (2d) 247]; R. v. Fahey, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2331 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 308 W.A.C. 36]; R. v. MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), [1998] N.J. No. 340 (QL) (C.A.) [reported 132 C.C.C. (3d) 205]). In other words, before concluding that a party has been negligent, the trial judge must give that party an opportunity to establish all the relevant facts.

[12]           Finally, I believe that it is proper for a trial judge when asked for a postponement to consider other relevant circumstances such as the gravity of the charges, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the accused.

[13]           Briefly stated, the decision whether or not to grant the adjournment must be made in light of the realities of each case and shall be consistent with the interests of justice.