La règle générale est que les faits admis dans un exposé conjoint des faits sont contraignants et incontestables par la suite, tant au procès que pour la détermination de la peine

R. v. Gouthro, 2010 ABCA 188

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[6]               Formal admissions in court have always been more than admissible evidence. They are conclusive, and obviate the need to lead evidence. The law about that is cited in R. v. Miljevic, 2010 ABCA 115, Edm. 0901-0095-A (para. 18), and need not be repeated here. It includes s. 655 of the Code.

 

[7]               In a sentencing hearing in particular, admissions are neither a shortcut, a lazy substitute, nor inferior. A recital of facts in an unsworn statement by the prosecutor is the usual way to put the facts before the sentencing court, especially if there was a guilty plea and so no trial. Even the defence’s express agreement to the facts (as given on two separate occasions here) is not necessary. The facts recited are taken as correct, and obviate the need for more evidence, unless the defence objects to them or contradicts them. The history of this is spelled out, with citations, in R. v. Markoff 1936 CanLII 160 (SK CA), [1936] 3 W.W.R. 667, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 77 (Sask. C.A., 5 judges). That practice is as common, and as legitimate, today as it was in 1936. Furthermore, s. 724(1) of the Code confirms the practice, as does s. 724(2).

 

[8]               The ordinary rule is that such agreed facts bind and are incontrovertible later. See R. v. Leger (1997) 1997 NSCA 137 (CanLII), 160 N.S.R. (2d) 143 (C.A.) (para. 5); cf. R. v. Dennis, 2005 BCCA 475, 218 B.C.A.C. 67 (paras. 27-28); R. v. Johnson, 2010 BCCA 57, [2010] B.C.J. #301 (Feb. 2) (paras. 16-18) (on sentence appeal, trying to contradict trial evidence); cf. R. v. Meigs, 2007 BCCA 394, 245 B.C.A.C. 102 (on sentence appeal, trying to contradict trial findings). See also R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20 (paras. 36-37).

 

[9]               An agreement in open court as to the facts of the crime leading to the sentencing cannot be overturned by showing a mere miscommunication about some facts between client and counsel, nor an oversight in reciting some additional facts. Still less can it be overturned by a later, more thorough trawl for more evidence. After all, the Crown must deal with defence counsel; it cannot ethically inquire into their instructions or the accuracy of counsel’s information, nor go behind counsel’s back and deal directly with an accused who has counsel.