Les tribunaux tiennent compte de toutes les circonstances entourant la possession d'un couteau par un accusé lorsqu'ils déterminent si ce dernier avait ou non l'intention d'utiliser le couteau comme arme

R v S (WEQ), 2018 MBCA 106

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[37]                     Section 2 of the Code currently defines the word “weapon” as follows:

 

[W]eapon means any thing used, designed to be used or intended for use

 

(a) in causing death or injury to any person, or

 

(b) for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person

 

and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm [remaining definition excluded as inapplicable].

 

[38]                     There are thus three ways in which a knife may be determined to be a weapon:  (1) the knife is actually used as a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person; (2) the knife is designed to be used as a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person; or (3) the knife is intended to be used as a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person.

[39]                     There is no allegation in this case that the young person actually used the knife as a weapon.  As well, a knife is normally designed to be used for utilitarian, peaceful purposes and not as a weapon, notwithstanding the fact that it can, on occasion, be used effectively in fighting and notwithstanding that some types of knives have been recognised as having been “designed to be used” as a weapon (see Regina v Arrance (1971), 1971 CanLII 1296 (BC CA), 3 CCC (2d) 341 at 345 (BC CA); see also Regina v Crawford (1980), 1980 CanLII 2889 (ON CA), 54 CCC (2d) 412 (Ont CA); and R v Constantine, 1996 CarswellNfld 24 (CA)).

[40]                     However, where there is no evidence that the young person actually used a knife as a weapon and no evidence that a knife was “designed to be used” as a weapon, then, as indicated in section 2 of the Code, a court must consider whether the knife was “intended for use”:  (a) in causing death or injury to any person; or (b) for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person.

[41]                     The courts will consider all of the circumstances surrounding an accused’s possession of a knife when attempting to determine whether or not he or she intended to use the knife as a weapon.  Courts have relied upon many different circumstances to support the inference that the accused intended to use the knife as a weapon, including:

•                    the type of knife and its usual or designed purpose;

•                    what the accused was doing and where he or she was at the time he or she was seen or arrested;

•                    where the knife was located;

•                    whether the accused had other weapons with him or her; and

•                    any explanations the accused offered for the knife’s possession.

See Regina v Blondell (1972), 1972 CanLII 1291 (BC CA), 8 CCC (2d) 130 (BC CA); and R v Roberts (1990), 1990 CanLII 2524 (NS CA), 60 CCC (3d) 509 (NS CA);

[42]                     A trial judge must consider the circumstances surrounding the possession of the items and, if there is evidence upon which the trial judge could have inferred that the accused intended to use the knives as weapons, then an appeal court should not interfere (see R v Vigneau, 1978 CarswellNS 176 at para 22 (Co Ct); R v Mantee, 1982 CarswellSask 1022 at para 13 (QB); R v Starr, 1983 CarswellSask 538 at para 7 (QB); R v Martin, 1986 CarswellBC 1839 at para 6 (Co Ct); R v SK, [1995] BCJ No 2529 at para 17 (CA); R v M (DM), 1999 CarswellBC 1820 at para 30 (SC); and R v Vader, 2018 ABQB 1 at para 9, leave to appeal to Alta CA refused 2018 ABCA 71 (in chambers)).