La contestation d’une déclaration de disqualification d'un avocat lors de l’enquête préliminaire

R. c. Lavoie, 2019 QCCS 161

Lien vers la décision

[20]      Les tribunaux possèdent le pouvoir de déclarer un avocat inhabile à occuper afin d’assurer un procès équitable à l’accusé et préserver la confiance du public dans l’intégrité de l’administration de la justice[5].

[21]      Lorsqu’un tribunal rend une telle décision dans le cadre de la gestion de l’instance ou du procès, le recours à l’encontre de cette décision s’exerce dans le cadre de l’appel, car il ne s’agit pas d’une question de compétence et parce que les recours interlocutoires sont réprouvés vigoureusement[6].

[22]      Par contre, lorsque le juge qui préside l’enquête préliminaire déclare un avocat inhabile, cette décision s’avère finale pour l’accusé et l’appel ne lui offrira aucune voie de recours.

[23]      Bien que le recours à l’encontre d’une telle décision ait été traditionnellement refusé, car il n’était pas considéré comme une erreur de compétence[7], la jurisprudence récente fait voir qu’il s’agit plutôt d’une décision qui porte atteinte de façon irrémédiable et finale aux droits fondamentaux de l’accusé et à l’encontre de laquelle l’appel n’offre aucune réparation adéquate.

[24]      À cet égard, il faut souligner que dans l’arrêt R. c. Farrell[8], la Cour d’appel avait conclu dans une courte décision qu’en l’absence de preuve « que l’ancien client de l’avocat aurait révélé des faits confidentiels qui pourraient être pertinents dans le présent dossier »[9], le juge qui préside l’enquête préliminaire « devait respecter le choix de l’accusé à son avocat et le défaut de ce faire constitue un déni de justice naturelle qui porte atteinte à sa compétence »[10].

[25]      Dans ces circonstances limitées, la contestation de la déclaration d’inhabilité d’un avocat à l’étape de l’enquête préliminaire par l’entremise du certiorari devrait être autorisée, car elle ne constituerait pas, dans ce cadre limité, un recours interlocutoire devant être interdit.

[26]      En effet, si le juge de l’enquête préliminaire prive l’accusé de l’avocat de son choix sans raison valable, il doit y avoir un recours possible à l’encontre d’une telle décision.

[27]      Comme l’explique le juge Lamer dans l’arrêt Nelles c. Ontario[11], « il est indispensable pour assurer la sanction »[12] d’une violation de la Charte « que [l’accusé] puisse s'adresser au tribunal compétent afin d'obtenir réparation »[13], car « [c]réer un droit sans prévoir de redressement heurte de front l'un des objets de la Charte qui permet assurément aux tribunaux d'accorder une réparation en cas de violation de la Constitution »[14]. 

[28]      Pour cette raison, l’observation suivante de la juge Thibault dans l’arrêt R. c. Awashish où elle considère que « [l]a situation peut être différente dans les cas d’atteinte irréparable à un droit fondamental lorsque l’appel n’offre aucun remède efficace »[15] prend tout son sens.

[29]      Dans le cadre du pourvoi ultérieur à la Cour suprême dans cette affaire[16], le juge Rowe ne tranche pas cette question. Voici comment il s’exprime :

[21]      En obiter, la juge Thibault a mentionné que l’on pourrait recourir au certiorari lorsqu’une décision porte atteinte de façon irrémédiable aux droits fondamentaux de l’accusé et lorsque l’appel n’offre aucune réparation adéquate. Elle a donné l’exemple du tribunal qui ordonne à l’accusée d’enlever son niqab lors de son témoignage. Je remets à une autre occasion l’examen de la question de savoir si une demande de certiorari peut être accueillie en pareilles circonstances.

[Le soulignement est ajouté]

[30]      L’opinion incidente formulée par la juge Thibault constitue, au sens de l’arrêt R. c. Henry une « observation utile et convaincante »[17], même s’il ne s’agit pas de la question effectivement tranchée par la Cour d’appel dans l’affaire Awashish[18].

[31]      Cela dit, la norme de contrôle traditionnelle applicable à la contestation des décisions du juge de l’enquête préliminaire conduit au même résultat :

[19]      La portée de la révision par voie de certiorari est très limitée.  Même si à certains moments de son histoire, le bref de certiorari permettait une révision plus poussée, le certiorari d’aujourd’hui « permet dans une large mesure d’obtenir qu’une cour supérieure contrôle la façon dont les tribunaux établis en vertu d’une loi exercent leur compétence; dans ce contexte, il s’agit de “compétence” au sens restreint ou strict » :  Skogman c. La Reine, 1984 CanLII 22 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 93, p. 99.  Par conséquent, la révision par voie de certiorari n’autorise pas une cour de révision à annuler la décision du tribunal constitué par la loi simplement parce que ce tribunal a commis une erreur de droit ou a tiré une conclusion différente de celle que la cour de révision aurait tirée.  Au contraire, le certiorari permet la révision « seulement lorsqu’on reproche à ce tribunal d’avoir outrepassé la compétence qui lui a été attribuée par la loi ou d’avoir violé les principes de justice naturelle, ce qui, d’après la jurisprudence, équivaut à un abus de compétence » :  Skogman, précité, p. 100 (citant l’arrêt Forsythe c. La Reine, 1980 CanLII 15 (CSC), [1980] 2 R.C.S. 268)[19].

[Le soulignement est ajouté]

[32]      Comme on le constate, la règle traditionnelle de contrôle des décisions du juge de l’enquête préliminaire est compatible avec l’opinion incidente de la juge Thibault dans Awashish selon laquelle une demande de contrôle judiciaire s’avère possible « dans les cas d’atteinte irréparable à un droit fondamental lorsque l’appel n’offre aucun remède efficace ».

[33]      En effet, il faut rappeler que même si «[l]es règles de justice naturelle ou d'équité procédurale sont le plus souvent abordées dans le contexte du contrôle judiciaire des décisions d'organismes administratifs, […] c'est en droit criminel qu'on en retrace l'origine »[20].

[34]      Or, dans notre système de justice criminelle accusatoire et contradictoire, l’accusé possède le droit « de ne pas être privé sans raison valable de son droit de retenir les services de l’avocat de son choix »[21] ce qui constitue un droit constitutionnel fondamental[22].

[35]      La disqualification de l’avocat d’un accusé à l’étape de l’enquête préliminaire sans motif valable met certainement en cause le respect des règles de justice naturelle. 

[36]      Autrement dit, une déclaration d’inhabilité prononcée sans motif valable par le juge de l’enquête préliminaire constitue une violation des règles de justice naturelle susceptible de contrôle judiciaire selon les paramètres de l’arrêt Russell[23].

[37]      Dans la mesure où la disqualification d’un avocat à l’étape de l’enquête préliminaire s’avère finale et puisqu’il s’agit d’une décision que l’appel éventuel à l’encontre d’une condamnation ne permettra pas de réviser, le recours au contrôle judiciaire doit être autorisé. 

Le principe audi alteram partem, règle de justice naturelle et précepte fondamental de notre système juridique, exige que les tribunaux accordent aux personnes visées par leurs décisions l'occasion d'être entendues

A. (L.L.) c. B. (A.), 1995 CanLII 52 (CSC)

Lien vers la décision

27   Une seule question demeure, soit celle de savoir si un plaignant, tiers à l'instance (appelant ou non, mais en l'occurrence l'un des appelants), et le ministère public, partie à l'instance, ont tous deux qualité pour agir dans le cadre d'appels formés par des tiers.  À mon avis, cela ne fait aucun doute.  Le principe audi alteram partem, règle de justice naturelle et précepte fondamental de notre système juridique, exige que les tribunaux accordent aux personnes visées par leurs décisions l'occasion d'être entendues.  Les règles de justice naturelle ou d'équité procédurale sont le plus souvent abordées dans le contexte du contrôle judiciaire des décisions d'organismes administratifs, mais c'est en droit criminel qu'on en retrace l'origine.  Dans Blackstone's Criminal Practice (Murphy rev. 1993), les auteurs font remarquer ceci, à la p. 1529:

 

[traduction]  Traditionnellement, les règles de justice naturelle furent définies de façon un peu plus précise par deux principes majeurs ‑‑ nul ne peut être à la fois juge et partie, et le tribunal doit entendre les deux parties au litige.  [Je souligne.]

 

Voir Forsythe c. La Reine, 1980 CanLII 15 (CSC), [1980] 2 R.C.S. 268; et Procureur général du Québec c. Cohen, 1979 CanLII 223 (CSC), [1979] 2 R.C.S. 305.

L'exactitude ou l'exhaustivité d'une confession est une question de valeur probante qui est laissé à l'appréciation du juge des faits

R. v. Gauthier, 2024 ONCA 621

Lien vers la décision

[76]      The approach to be taken by an appellate court in its assessment of a trial judge’s finding of voluntariness was recently restated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tessier, 2022 SCC 35, 419 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 43:

A finding of voluntariness calls for deference unless it can be shown that it represents a palpable and overriding error. An appellate court may only intervene where the error is “overriding and determinative in the assessment of the balance of probabilities with respect to that factual issue”. The standard of review associated with the finding of voluntariness is tied to the idea that the analysis under the confessions rule must be a contextual one in which bright-line rules are few. Where the law is properly understood and the relevant circumstances considered, the trial judge is best placed to measure that context and make the relevant findings. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]

[77]      Here, the appellant argues that the voluntariness ruling is not entitled to deference because the trial judge misapplied the law and failed to grapple with and consider the gaps in the evidentiary record tendered by the Crown on the voir dire. The appellant makes three submissions:

•        The trial judge shifted the burden of proof to the accused.

•        The trial judge did not address whether the Crown had discharged its burden of production of an evidentiary record which will permit the court to fairly adjudicate the voluntariness question.

•        The trial judge also failed to consider whether the inculpatory statements were provided by an accused who was of “sound mind” when he made them.

[78]      I do not agree with the appellant that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof. Read fairly, the trial judge clearly identified that the Crown bore the burden of proof and while the statement “in the absence of any direct evidence from the accused” appears problematic, when read fairly, and in the context of the entire ruling, I am satisfied that the trial judge was stating that on the record before him, the Crown had established voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused did not raise anything that caused him to doubt the voluntariness of the accused’s statements.

[79]      I am, however, satisfied that the trial judge erred in his assessment of all the relevant circumstances. In my view, he failed to grapple with the inadequate evidentiary record tendered by the Crown on the voir dire. Regarding the alleged confession to Officer Paquette and Officer Mantha on the way to court, the trial judge acknowledged the defence argument that “there are obvious ‘gaps’ resulting from the testimony of [both police officers], who were apparently together at the relevant times the statements and utterances were made”, but other than pointing out that the two police officers did not record in their notes the same statements, he did not deal with the submission that the evidentiary record was insufficient to prove that the statements and utterances were voluntary.

[80]      The trial judge correctly observed that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply as to whether the statement was actually made. He stated that to satisfy the onus of showing that the appellant made a statement, the Crown need only introduce some evidence that the accused made the statement attributed to him. The standard of proof required is minimal, and not often the subject of dispute, except in cases such as here where it is not a formal police interview and not video recorded. The trial judge was on solid ground because the accuracy and completeness of the record of a voluntary statement is an issue of weight that is usually left for the trier of fact, in this case, the jury: R. v. Lapointe and Sicotte (1983), 1983 CanLII 3558 (ON CA), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 366 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d 1987 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1253.

[81]      However, the trial judge did not grapple with the defence submission in this case, that the accuracy and completeness of the record of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement were deficient and those gaps were fatal to the Crown in proving that the statements were voluntary: R. v. Moore-McFarlane (2001), 2001 CanLII 6363 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 67 (Ont. C.A.). In fairness to the trial judge, this distinction is often difficult to apply, especially in a case like the one at bar where no evidence is called by the defence on the voir dire.[8] It may be unclear in some cases whether the defence is raising issues of voluntariness or issues of accuracy. However, I am satisfied, in this case, the defence did raise the inadequacy of the evidentiary record specifically as a challenge to establishing voluntariness. And the trial judge acknowledged this when he summarized the position of the defence. However, in my view he did not address the deficient record introduced by the Crown in this case. This court stated in Moore-McFarlane, at para. 67:

It is important to read this statement of principle in context. The issue that arose in Lapointe – whether the accused’s capacity to understand English was sufficient for him to have given the statement alleged by the police officers – was one that related to the ultimate reliability of the statement and the weight that was to be attached to it. As the court stated, it was only where an accused’s capacity was so deficient as to make it impossible for him to have given a statement that the trial judge would be justified in excluding the statement on that basis. Hence the court concluded that, in this case, this issue was not a matter to be determined at the voir dire stage of the proceedings. The decision in Lapointe does not stand for the proposition that all issues of accuracy and completeness of recording are left to the triers of fact. Such an interpretation would run contrary to centuries of jurisprudence that require careful scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of a statement by persons in authority. And, in my view, the completeness, accuracy and reliability of the record have everything to do with the court’s inquiry into and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Crown could discharge its heavy onus of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt where proper recording procedures are not followed. [Emphasis added.]

[82]      In this case, the relevant circumstances included the following:

1.            None of the confessions was video or audio-recorded. Each is a memo book statement and required the trial judge to examine very closely the completeness of the note entries.

2.            The recordings in the notebooks were not verbatim accounts. The two police officers specifically acknowledged that their notes of the statement allegedly uttered by the appellant on the way to court were not verbatim accounts. Officer Mantha agreed with the suggestion that his independent recollection was vague, and his evidence was based entirely on his notes, and he generally had very little independent memory without his notebook.

3.            The statement allegedly made by the appellant on the way to court was a “late entry” memo book recording in the police officers’ notebooks. As noted above, Officer Paquette acknowledged that he did not make a note until more than 15 hours after the words were allegedly uttered. He agreed ultimately that he had opportunities to make his notes earlier. Constable Mantha conceded that his notes of the appellant’s admissions were a late entry, and he acknowledged failing in his duty to make timely entry. And he had no explanation for why he made contemporary notes of some of the appellant’s utterances on the way to court, but failed to make contemporaneous notes of the confession to killing his girlfriend. Officer Mantha testified he had no memory of whether he talked with Officer Paquette about it the following day and made his late entry thereafter. Regarding the confession allegedly uttered in the jail cell, Sergeant Keefe believed he probably made his notebook entry an hour after the statement was made, but acknowledged on cross-examination it may have been later or earlier, and he could not be sure. He also acknowledged inserting an additional detail of the statement into the margin of his notes later.

4.            The statements were devoid of context, and most of the time that the officers spent with the appellant is unaccounted for. In this case, there are several gaps from when the appellant was arrested to when he made these statements. The police arrested the appellant shortly before midnight on November 14, 2017. But there is sparse information as to what happened from the arrest until 6:00 a.m. in the morning. At that time, Officer Mantha and another police officer who did not testify then took the appellant to the hospital, where he made the statement that was not led in front of the jury. At 3:15 p.m. on November 15, 2017, more than 15 hours after the arrest, Officer Mantha and Officer Paquette transported the appellant to court in North Bay, about 30 minutes away, during which car trip he allegedly uttered the first confession that was heard by the jury. After the court appearance, at 4:56 p.m. he was brought to the jail in North Bay where he was placed in segregation, and there is a longer gap from 4:56 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., when Sergeant Keefe heard the inculpatory statement allegedly uttered by the appellant in his jail cell. There was no evidence led by the Crown as to the appellant’s interactions with others during that time. To the contrary, the Crown led a sparse record, only from those officers who interacted with the appellant who say he made these inculpatory statements, despite the fact that these officers were not with the appellant the entire time.

5.            The Crown’s witnesses had little independent recollection of the statements.

6.            There was very little evidence led as to the conditions of custody. There was very little evidence led about relevant information central to the voluntariness inquiry such as whether the appellant slept and when he slept, what he ate, or when he ate. There were large gaps in the record with the appellant’s interactions with jail staff besides the three officers who testified, and on what he was doing other than the culminating points discussed by the three officers who testified.

[83]      I agree with the appellant that the deficient evidentiary record alone was a sufficient basis for the trial judge to find that the Crown had not discharged its evidentiary burden. The Crown bore the onus to produce a record capable of demonstrating that the appellant’s statements were not the product of undue influence or coercion.

[84]      In sum, the trial judge did not deal with the gaps in the evidentiary record. The trial judge’s ruling does not attract deference and I would conclude that, when the relevant considerations are properly considered, the Crown has not discharged its onus to show that the statements were voluntary.

Un message électronique qui constitue la commission de l'infraction ne jouit d'aucune expectative raisonnable de vie privée

R. v. Gauthier, 2024 ONCA 621

Lien vers la décision

[41]      I accept the appellant’s argument that the jurisprudence supports a broad grant of protection to two-way electronic communications, and that the nature of the relationship between Dr. Morrison and the appellant (i.e., doctor and patient) was an important normative factor in assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy: R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608. For example, in R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 320, four justices held that there should not be a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications between adults and children who are strangers to them. This decision was summarized by Trotter J.A. in Campbell, at para. 63, where he acknowledged that an analysis of the relationship between the parties to a communication, in determining whether normative factors negate a reasonable expectation of privacy, is generally an important consideration.

[42]      However, there is another competing normative consideration in this case, namely that the evidence before the trial judge established that the appellant was committing the act of criminal harassment in the communication he now claims to have been private. In Campbell, the police arrested an individual. An officer looked at the arrestee’s cell phone, and saw notifications for incoming text messages that were indicative of a drug transaction in progress. The police took the arrestee’s phone, and texted in-character to arrange to meet, surprise, and arrest the person texting with them, who turned out to be Mr. Campbell. At trial, Mr. Campbell asserted a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text exchange with the arrestee’s phone. The Crown argued that under Mills, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Trotter J.A. disagreed. He found that the facts were very similar to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Marakah, and so presumptively there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ultimately, Trotter J.A. concluded that Marakah sets out a broad presumption of reasonable expectation of privacy over text messages, but that “Mills carved out an exception in circumstances where the electronic communications themselves constitute a crime against the recipient – in that case, the victimization of children”: Campbell, at para. 62.

[43]      In Lambert, Paciocco J.A. also recognized that a Charter claimant may have no reasonable expectation of privacy “where electronic messages sent by the Charter claimant to the victim are used as the means of committing the offence charged, such as the offence of threatening to cause death or bodily harm, or criminal harassment”: Lambert, at para. 60.

[50]      I conclude that s. 8 of the Charter was not triggered because the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the voicemail. My conclusion is fortified by the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, 327 C.C.C. (3d) 151. There the court considered whether a person who sends a threatening text message has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that message. The court held that they do not. The court noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy is a normative standard and the court reasoned that on a normative perspective, “a person who threatens another has no right to expect that the person who has been threatened will keep the threat private”: Pelucco, at para. 61. The same holds true with harassing messages.

[51]      In sum, the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the knowledge that Dr. Morrison had regarding the details disclosed in the message, and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a voicemail sent to Dr. Morrison that was the means of committing an offence with which he was charged in this case: criminal harassment: Lambert, at para. 60.[7] The reason why boils down to this: a reasonable person in Canada ought not to expect privacy in leaving a voicemail for a recipient that itself constitutes a crime.

Une invasion de domicile dans un contexte de violence conjugale est un geste grave dont les impacts psychologiques importants sur la victime ne doivent pas être ignorés ou minimisés

Goyette c. R., 2023 QCCA 1657

Lien vers la décision

[28]      Bien qu’il soit exact que l’appelant n’a pas été physiquement violent envers la victime, les gestes posés demeurent très graves et leurs impacts psychologiques importants sur la victime ne doivent pas être ignorés ou minimisés[30]. Tel que le juge de la peine l’a noté, la conduite de l’appelant constitue une « atteinte au code des valeurs fondamentales de notre société »[31]. D’ailleurs, une invasion de domicile dans un contexte de violence conjugale est un geste grave. La Cour l’a récemment rappelé dans R. c. Davidson[32] :

[39]        Domestic violence and the context of a home invasion are very important aggravating factors and should incite the courts to favour deterrence and the protection of society over the rehabilitation of an accused, particularly where that rehabilitation is incomplete and uncertain.

La réoption n'est pas un événement imprévisible ou inévitable

R. v. Long, 2023 ONCA 679

Lien vers la décision

[62]      I would also observe that the appellant re-elected a trial in the OCJ on February 7, 2020, a re-election to which the Crown had to consent. The Crown was not required to consent. Moreover, the Crown consented in the face of the appellant’s refusal to waive his s. 11(b) Charter right. As mentioned, exceptional circumstances are those that are outside the Crown’s control in the sense they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and the Crown cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances. A re-election that an accused makes on consent is not reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable: R. v. Wookey, 2021 ONCA 68, 154 O.R. (3d) 145, at para. 71. Nor were the circumstances beyond the Crown’s control.

La réoption exige toutefois le consentement du poursuivant, en vertu de l’article 561(1) du Code criminel, mais ce dernier peut poser comme condition à son consentement qu’il y ait renonciation à invoquer les délais occasionnés par ce nouveau choix de l’accusé

R. v. Wookey, 2021 ONCA 68

Lien vers la décision

[67] Writing for the court, Paciocco J.A. relied upon the passages from Jordan cited above to conclude that the 18-month presumptive ceiling applied in that case. Justice Paciocco rejected a "case-by-case approach" to determine "whether a re-election occurs late enough to warrant imposing the 30-month period of presumptive delay": Shaikh, at para. 54. He held that such an approach is at odds with the "bright line structure for s. 11(b) cases" meant to displace the Morin approach that engendered uncertainty, complexity, and unpredictability: Shaikh, at para. 54, citing Jordan, at paras. 31-37.

[68] In Shaikh, as in this case, the Crown at trial submitted that it was prejudiced by the late re-election. In that case, the re-election was made after the preliminary inquiry was originally scheduled to proceed; in this case, the accused re-elected on the scheduled commencement date for the preliminary inquiry, but it was agreed upon earlier. The complaint is that a late re-election unfairly shifted the Crown into a much shorter presumptive ceiling, automatically imperilling the case for s. 11(b) purposes.

[69] The Crown need not be exposed to vulnerability in these circumstances. The solution lies in the Crown requiring a waiver by the accused person in exchange for consent to re-elect. As Paciocco J.A. said, at para. 57 of Shaikh:

The bright line approach that I consider myself compelled to follow does not enable the defence to manufacture a s. 11(b) delay by re-electing into a shorter presumptive period of delay. Section 561(1) of the Criminal Code requires Crown consent before the accused can re-elect to a trial by a provincial court judge. Where re-election would create the risk of s. 11(b) problems, the Crown has the authority to, and should, refuse consent, absent a s. 11(b) waiver.

(Emphasis added)

See also Jordan, at para. 62 (reproduced in para. 64, above).

[70] In this case, the appellant did not offer to waive any delay, nor did the Crown request it. By November 9, 2015, the time of the formal re-election, more than two years had already elapsed from the date on which the Toronto police laid the methylone charges. Defence counsel had put the Crown on notice that delay was an issue. Moreover, Jordan (also a drug prosecution conducted by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada) was argued [page161] in the Supreme Court of Canada on October 7, 2015 and the court had reserved judgment. Still, the Crown required no waiver.

[71] Neither on appeal, nor at trial, did the Crown argue that the appellant's re-election was a "discrete event" capable of justifying the excess in delay within the meaning of Jordan (discussed below). This makes sense: given that the Crown's consent was required to facilitate the re-election in this case, as a litigation event, it could not be said to be either "reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable": Jordan, at para. 69 [emphasis in original]. It was the opposite, on both measures.