Une activité sexuelle qui n’est pas partie de l’actus reus mais qui est « integrally connected » à l’infraction reprochée pourrait être considérée comme étant l’activité à l’origine de l’accusation

R. v. Reimer, 2024 ONCA 519 

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[63]      In order to be admissible under s. 276, sexual activity evidence must be “relevant to an issue at trial”: s. 276(2)(b). In R. v. White, 2011 SCC 13, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 47, Rothstein J. explained the theory of narrative: “Evidence that is not adduced to prove a live issue, or support the prosecution’s [or defence’s] case, but that is merely provided to complete the narrative may be admitted even if it does not satisfy the strict requirements of relevance.” Put otherwise, “narrative” evidence is simply background information that is received even though it is not relevant to an issue at trial, because it enables testimony to unfold in a natural and comprehensible fashion. Therefore s. 276 applications should not be granted on the theory that the sexual experience evidence is relevant to “narrative”. The accused must show that the sexual experience evidence is relevant to an identified live issue in the case.

At Least Some Sexualized Texts Are Relevant to Consent

[65]      A number of the sexualized texts have obvious relevance on the issue of consent. As indicated, after the meeting was scheduled, the parties exchanged sexualized text messages describing what they intended to do when they met. A sample will suffice.

[69]      Evidence is “relevant” if it “has any tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue”: R. v. Grant, 2015 SCC 9, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 475, at para. 18. This is the standard that applies to the relevance requirement in s. 276 applications. It was described in the context of s. 276 by Doherty J.A. in R. v. L.S., 2017 ONCA 685, 354 C.C.C. (3d) 71, at para. 89:

Evidence does not have to establish or refute a fact in issue to be relevant; it need only, as a matter of common sense and human experience, have some tendency to make the existence or non-existence of that material fact more or less likely. There is a big difference between evidence that is relevant and evidence that is determinative.

[70]      Given their timing, context, and content, the illustrative text messages reproduced in paras. 66-68 above were statements made or adopted by the parties about what they intended to do during their pending meeting. Even though individuals can say things that they do not really mean or change their minds, it is an incontrovertible proposition of logic and human experience that a statement of present intention to do an act at a future time increases the likelihood that the speaker will engage in that act on that future occasion. Because of the sound logical foundation for this kind of reasoning, the law of evidence has recognized a hearsay exception that admits statements of present intention as evidence that the speaker later carried out that intention. That exception was reaffirmed in R. v Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144. There the Crown sought to rely on a statement made by the deceased to his girlfriend shortly before his death that he was going to go out with Starr, as evidence that Starr was with the deceased when he died, and therefore had the opportunity to kill him. The majority affirmed this long-standing exception, although it excluded the evidence in that case because, among other things, the deceased may have had real motive to lie to his girlfriend about his intentions. That outcome does not change the salient fact that in Starr the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the logical relevance of the very line of reasoning that emerges in this case and found it compelling enough to embed this kind of inference in a fixed hearsay exception. The fact that the complainant communicated an intention to engage in consensual sexual acts with Mr. Reimer when they got together, is logically relevant to the likelihood that she did so when they got together.

The Relevance of the Text Messages Does Not Offend the Contemporaneity Rule

[74]      I am also persuaded that the trial judge erred by accepting the submissions of the Crown and complainant’s counsel that the earlier expressions of consent were not relevant as a matter of law because consent must be given at the time of the sexual touching (the “contemporaneity rule”). This rule has no application to the lines of reasoning I have described. Neither of those lines of reasoning depend upon the theory that the consent the complainant expressed earlier was the consent provided in the motel. They depend, instead, on the theory that her earlier statements of intention to consent are relevant to the question of whether she did, in fact, consent during the meeting in the motel room. The Alberta Court of Appeal rejected a similar overextension of the contemporaneity rule in McKnight. The Alberta Court of Appeal commented, at para. 261, that this kind of error “conflates the law of consent with the law of evidence.” The Court in McKnight, at para. 261, cited Professor Lisa Dufraimont’s observation made in “Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials” (2019) 44:2 Queen’s L.J. 316, at p. 328, that “the fact that consent must be contemporaneous does not mean that evidence relevant to the factual question of consent must also be contemporaneous.” R. v. Ewanchuk is one of the leading authorities insisting that consent must relate to the complainant’s subjective state of mind at the time of the sexual activity: 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 26. Yet in that decision Major J. recognised, at para. 29, that, “the complainant’s words and actions, before and during the incident” can be considered in determining whether a complainant has consented at the time of the sexual activity. So long as the earlier words or action are relied upon because they have a tendency in logic and human experience to support the likelihood that the complainant consented at the time of the sexual activity, they are not rendered legally irrelevant by the contemporaneity rule. In my view, the trial judge misapprehended the contemporaneity rule, erring in law.

The Relevant Lines of Inquiry Are Not Prohibited Inferences

[75]      The trial judge also erred in concluding that the relevance of the sexualized texts depended upon the twin myth relating to consent, codified in s. 276(1)(a). The twin myth relating to consent prohibits “the inference that the complainant’s prior sexual activities, by reason of their sexual nature, make it more likely that she consented to the sexual activity in question” (emphasis added): Barton, at para. 100. The relevance of the sexualized texts I have described above does not derive from the sexual nature of the complainant’s activity of sexting. It derives instead from the fact that those texts communicated the complainant’s intentions about what she would do and agree to at the upcoming meeting. The inference that follows – that she may have acted consistently with her stated intention – does not depend upon judgments about her sexual character, disposition or propensity, or assumptions that she is more likely to consent to sex with Mr. Reimer because in the past she agreed to sext with him. Relevance does not derive from the sexual nature of the activity of sexting. It derives from her stated intentions relating to the specific occasion in question. In my view, the trial judge misunderstood the prohibited inference, thereby making a mistake of law.

[76]      There are passages to be found in jurisprudence, including appellate jurisprudence, that if read in isolation from the body of authority on point can be misunderstood as suggesting that s. 276 prevents using previous sexual behaviour from drawing any inferences about consent or credibility. This is not the law. As I will explain, not only does the text of s. 276 say otherwise but the Supreme Court of Canada has made it plain, in jurisprudence that has never been overruled, that in some, albeit rare, cases the constitutional right of the accused to make full answer and defence will require the admission of such evidence.

[77]      I will begin with the statutory language. Section 276(1) provides in material part (emphasis added):

[E]vidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant

(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, or

(b) is less worthy of belief.

[78]      The text of the provision does not bar the use of sexual activity evidence absolutely. Indeed, nowhere does it suggest that sexual activity evidence is prohibited in all cases on the issue of consent or credibility. Section 276(1) prohibits using sexual activity evidence to advance only certain kinds of inferences relating to consent and credibility, namely, those that arise “by reason of the sexual nature of that activity”. Not all inferences that arise from events involving sexual activity derive from the “sexual nature of [the] activity”, including on the issue of consent and credibility. Proceeding on the assumption that they do would render the limiting phrase “by reason of the sexual activity” meaningless yet it is this limiting phrase that saved s. 276 from being struck down because of unconstitutional overreach.

[79]      R. v. Darrach, 2000 SCC 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, was the second and most recent case in which the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to adjudicate the constitutional validity of s. 276. The version of s. 276 that was before the Darrach court, which has not been subject to material amendment since that decision, was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in R. v. Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, where the majority struck down a prior version of s. 276 because of its unconstitutional overreach. The prior version of s. 276 was so broad that it purported to exclude evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual activity, even in circumstances where it was relevant and bore significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the risks of prejudice it presented. One of the illustrations that McLachlin J. (as she then was) provided of sexual activity evidence that would be unconstitutional to exclude involved evidence relevant to the issue of consent. The hypothetical example was a highly specific pattern of previous conduct by a complainant who engaged in consensual sex in order to extort money from her sexual partners by later threatening to claim that she was sexually assaulted if they did not pay: Seaboyer, at pp. 615-16. By using this illustration to demonstrate that former s. 276 went farther than the Charter allows, McLachlin J. necessarily recognized that an accused person, charged under similar factual circumstances, would have a constitutional right to such evidence, even on the issue of consent.

[80]      In Darrach, Mr. Darrach argued that current s. 276(1) contravened the Charter because, contrary to the constitutional balance identified in Seaboyer, it purported to impose a blanket prohibition, including on the issues of consent and belief in consent, the issues in his case. Gonthier J., for the Court, found that this was not so. After noting at para. 1, that s. 276 “essentially codifies” Seaboyer, he said, at para. 32:

Far from being a ‘blanket exclusion’, s. 276(1) only prohibits the use of evidence of past sexual activity when it is offered to support two specific, illegitimate inferences… namely that a complainant is more likely to have consented or that she is less worthy of belief ‘by reason of the sexual nature of [the] activity’ she once engaged in.

[81]      In describing the inferences that are caught by s. 276(1), Gonthier J. focused on the limiting phrase, “by reason of the sexual nature of that activity”. He explained that this “is a clarification by Parliament that it is inferences from the sexual nature of the activity, as opposed to inferences from other potentially relevant features of the activity, that are prohibited” (emphasis added): Darrach, at para. 35; see also R. v. T.W.W., at para. 26, where this passage is reproduced. Of tremendous significance, in Darrach, at para. 58, Gonthier J. explicitly recognised that there are rare cases where other sexual activity will be relevant to consent without engaging twin myth reasoning.

[82]      Gonthier J.’s description of the prohibited inferences in Darrach, at para. 32 - “that a complainant is more likely to have consented or that she is less worthy of belief ‘by reason of the sexual nature of [the] activity’ she once engaged in” – is also instructive. This is essentially the same articulation of the prohibited inferences that was repeated in Barton, and that I rely upon in para. 75 above. Because its constitutional validity was directly in issue in Darrach, Gonthier J. went on to explain the operation of the legislation in detail. He said its function is to remove “discriminatory generalizations about a complainant’s disposition”: Darrach, at para. 34. This is in keeping with the fact that the prohibited inferences were historically based upon judgmental and sexist inferences about the character of “unchaste” women arising from the sexual nature of their past activity: Seaboyer, at p. 604.

[83]      The following are illustrations of prohibited lines of reasoning that flow from the sexual nature of the activity: (1) that “unchaste” women are more likely to have consented (R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at pp. 670-71, quoting Seaboyer, at p. 604; R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, at para. 101; Barton, at para. 56); (2) that by reason of her past sexual activity a complainant has a “disposition to consent” (Darrach, at para. 34) or a general “propensity to consent” (Barton, at para. 55); (3) that “because the complainant had consented to sex with [the accused] in the past, in similar circumstances, it was more likely she had consented on the [occasion] in question” (Goldfinch, at para. 47); and (4) “because the complainant had ‘typically’ consented to sex … in the past, she was more likely to have done so on this… occasion” (Goldfinch, at para. 72). I am not suggesting that this is an exhaustive list. I provide it to illustrate that the relevance of the sexualized texts that communicated the kind of activity the complainant intended to engage in during her pending date with Mr. Reimer does not derive its relevance from twin-myth reasons. Mr. Reimer was not relying on the sexual nature of the complainant’s act of engaging in sexting as proof that she likely consented in the motel. Nor was he relying on the fact that the complainant had consented in the past to engage in the sexual act of sexting with him. To put it in the terms used by Gonthier J. to describe permissible inferences, he was relying on other “relevant features of the activity”, namely, the statements that she had made in those texts about what she intended to do in the future, during the pending meeting from which the charges ultimately arose: Darrach, at para. 35. In my view, there is nothing discriminatory in inferring that her stated intention to engage in consensual sexual activity on that future occasion has a logical tendency to increase the likelihood that she consented in the motel room. This inference does not trade on sexism, and it is not built on myths about female sexuality. The evidence yielded a logical, permissive inference, and the trial judge erred in finding otherwise.

Le vol n'a pas à être réussi pour être condamné suivant l'article 343 c) du Code criminel et l'intention qui importe est celle de voler et non pas de poser un geste de violence

R. v. Moreira, 2023 ONCA 807

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[72]      Moreover, the trial judge was correct to dismiss Moreira’s claim that he was not guilty of attempted robbery because (i) the victim did not have his wallet, and (ii) that in applying force to Conery, Moreira lacked the requisite mens rea because he did not intend violence. Neither argument is a defence to robbery under s. 343(c) of the Criminal Code. Robbery under s. 343(c) does not require a complete theft: Manning et al., at § 22.70. Furthermore, the mens rea for robbery under s. 343(c) is specified as an intent to steal, not an intent to commit violence: Criminal Code, s. 343(c). 

La vraisemblance et la défense d'automatisme

R v Morris, 2024 SKCA 36

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[88]           In R v Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, [2002] 2 SCR 3, the majority of the Supreme Court clarified the test for determining when a defence should be put to a jury. In summary terms, before leaving a defence with a jury, it is the trial judge’s duty to determine whether “the evidence put forward is such that, if believed, a reasonable jury properly charged could have acquitted” (at paras 60 and 156, quoting R v Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 595 (WL) at para 66). Contained within this test is the principle that the trial judge does not “make determinations about the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, make findings of fact, or draw determinate factual inferences” (Cinous at para 54). The evidence supporting the defence is assumed to be true. There is only “a single air of reality test [that] applies to all defences” (at para 57). Importantly, the air of reality test “imposes a burden on the accused that is merely evidential, rather than persuasive” (at para 52).

[89]           McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache J. for the majority in Cinous held that, if “there is direct evidence as to every element of the defence, whether or not it is adduced by the accused, the trial judge must put the defence to the jury. By definition, the only conclusion that needs to be reached in such a case is whether the evidence is true” (at para 88). However, different considerations prevail “where the defence includes an element that cannot be established by direct evidence” (at para 89).

[90]           Later in these reasons, the importance of the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence will become relevant and will be explored more fully. At this point, it is necessary to consider the burden on the accused when a defence of automatism is alleged and what that means for the air of reality test.

[91]           In R v Daviault, 1994 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 63 (WL), Cory J., for the majority, held that extreme intoxication akin to automatism is a defence to all crimes, including “even the minimal intent required of a general intent offence” (at para 59). The Supreme Court also held that, unlike other defences, the accused bears the legal burden of establishing extreme intoxication akin to automatism on a balance of probabilities: for example, see paragraphs 63, 64 and 67. Because of this legal burden, it is up to the accused to lead (a) “evidence as to the amount of alcohol consumed and its effect” on them, and (b) expert evidence to “confirm that [they were] probably in a state akin to automatism or insanity as a result of [their] drinking” (at para 63).

[92]           In Stone, Bastarache J. extended the Daviault principle regarding the legal burden on the accused to demonstrate involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to all automatism defences, not just claims of extreme intoxication. He also recognized a presumption of voluntariness and a reversal of the burden of proof in all such cases:

[180] … The law presumes that people act voluntarily in order to avoid placing the onerous burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt on the Crown. Like extreme drunkenness akin to automatism, genuine cases of automatism will be extremely rare. However, because automatism is easily feigned and all knowledge of its occurrence rests with the accused, putting a legal burden on the accused to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities is necessary to further the objective behind the presumption of voluntariness.

[69]           Justice Kasirer, writing in Brown, confirmed the presumption of voluntariness and the legal burden on the accused to prove involuntariness “on a balance of probabilities” (at para 56).

[93]           According to Daviault, Stone and Brown, it is for the trier of fact to decide if the accused has adduced sufficient evidence to discharge the legal burden of persuasion on a balance of probabilities. However, according to Cinous, it is for the judge to determine whether there is an air of reality to any defence and that remains the case when the accused is tried by a jury. This bifurcation of roles between judge and jury gives rise to the question of whether the content of the air of reality test changes when automatism is alleged. In other words, does the trial judge weigh or evaluate the evidence to determine the likelihood of the accused being able to persuade the jury that their actions were involuntary, on a balance of probabilities?

[94]           This issue was raised and resolved in R v Fontaine, 2004 SCC 27, [2004] 1 SCR 702. The trial judge in Fontaine had held, on the basis of dicta in Stone, that it was the judge’s obligation, as part of the air of reality test, to determine whether the accused would be able to surmount the burden to demonstrate involuntariness on a balance of probabilities. The Québec Court of Appeal held that this was an error of law and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal from that decision. Justice Fish, for the Supreme Court, wrote as follows:

[54] In the case of “reverse onus” defences, such as mental disorder automatism, it is the accused who bears both the persuasive and the evidential burdens. Here, the persuasive burden is discharged by evidence on the balance of probabilities, a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Reverse onus defences will therefore go to the jury where there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably conclude that the defence has been established in accordance with this lesser standard.

…

[92] In this regard, I repeat once more, the applicable test is whether there was any evidence in the record upon which the jury, properly instructed and acting judicially, could reasonably conclude that the defence of automatism by reason of mental disorder had been made out. In my view, the Court of Appeal did not err in finding that the respondent, through his own evidence and that of [another witness], had discharged his evidential burden on that issue.

(Emphasis added)

[95]           Justice Fish also made it clear that it would be an error for a trial judge to assess “the likely success of the defence” or to “require the judge to weigh the evidence in order to determine whether it establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the accused perpetrated the criminal act charged in a state of automatism” (at para 83). The test is that fixed by Fish J.: an air of reality exists where there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably conclude that the defence has been established on a balance of probabilities.

[96]           With that by way of background, the issue to be determined is whether the evidence regarding automatism, in this case, was such that, if believed, a reasonable jury, properly charged, could reasonably have concluded that the defence had been established on a balance of probabilities. If the evidence met that standard, it was an error of law for the trial judge not to have charged the jury on automatism: “While some instructions are mandatory and their omission will constitute an error of law, whether other instructions are needed will be contingent on the circumstances of the case. Whenever an instruction is required, the judge needs to provide that instruction with sufficient detail for the jury to undertake its task” (Abdullahi at para 72).

L’intoxication extrême s’apparentant à l’automatisme

R v Morris, 2024 SKCA 36

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[45]           In R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, Bastarache J., speaking for the majority, defined automatism as “a state of impaired consciousness, rather than unconsciousness, in which an individual, though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that action” (at para 156). Later, he observed that “lack of voluntariness, rather than consciousness, is the key legal element of automatism” (at para 224).

[46]           In Stone, the majority approved the terminology of mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism rather than insane automatism and non-insane automatism, with the former better reflecting the 1992 amendments to s. 16 of the Criminal Code, which “removed all references to the term ‘insanity’ from the Code” (at para 55): similarly, see paragraph 161. The majority also approved a two-step process, which must be followed in all cases when dealing with claims of automatism:

(a)               the trial judge must first determine whether the accused has satisfied the evidentiary burden for the defence of automatism; and

(b)               if yes, the “trial judge must next determine whether the condition alleged by the accused is mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism” (at para 164) – see also, paragraphs 165, 167 and 193 to 218.

[47]           In this appeal, counsel has not raised any question with respect to the trial judge’s approach to mental disorder automatism. They have limited their submissions to the instructions to the jury regarding automatism arising from extreme intoxication. As such, the balance of my reasons will be confined to that defence.

[48]           Justice Kasirer, writing for the majority in Brown, further defined the nature of and basis for the defence of automatism:

[46] The defence of automatism denies the element of voluntariness and therefore negates the actus reus of the offence (R. v. Chaulk, 1990 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, at p. 1321; R. v. Parks, 1992 CanLII 78 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871, at p. 896). Involuntary conduct is understood to be genuinely exculpatory because, while the prohibited act was harmful, the accused lacks the capacity to answer for what they did (J. Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (2007), at p. 142). A physically involuntary act, however wrongful in outward appearance, is not a guilty act that can be imputed to an accused.

[47] Automatism is reflected in involuntary movements that may be associated with heart attacks, seizures or “external” shock, or conditions such as sleepwalking or delirium, where the body moves but there is no link between mind and body (Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, [1963] A.C. 386 (H.L.), at p. 409; Rabey [1980 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 513], at p. 523). Physical voluntariness is a principle of fundamental justice and a requirement of all true criminal offences, central to the criminal law’s desire to avoid convicting the morally innocent (Daviault, at p. 74; R. v. Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at paras. 46–47; R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 575, at para. 45). Absent a willed movement of the body, the Crown cannot prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt (R. v. Théroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, at pp. 17–18). This is distinguished from moral involuntariness, which describes scenarios where the accused retains conscious control over their body but has no realistic choice but to commit a guilty act (Ruzic, at para. 44).

[48] In addition, an automaton cannot form the mens rea, or guilty mind, if their actions are involuntary. Where an accused has no conscious awareness of their movements, they necessarily cannot intend their involuntary acts. Imposing criminal liability in the absence of proof of fault also offends the principles of fundamental justice (Motor Vehicle Reference [1985 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 486 ], at pp. 513–15).

[49]           Justice Kasirer in Brown described extreme intoxication akin to automatism as being “the highest form of intoxication – that which results in a person losing voluntary control of their actions” (at para 45). He observed that extreme intoxication akin to automatism is “an exigent defence requiring the accused to show that their consciousness was so impaired as to deprive them of all willed control over their actions” (at para 50). He contrasted this state with waking up with no memory of committing a crime, which would not “prove that an individual was acting involuntarily” (at para 50).

Sommaire des éléments constitutifs de l'infraction de port d’arme dans un dessein dangereux

R. v Jackson-Bullshields, 2017 BCSC 1159 

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[48]        In R. v. Welsh, 2012 ABPC 177 at paras. 135-138, the Court provided the following summary of the elements of a s. 88(1) offence:

Possession for A Purpose Dangerous

[135]   Section 88 contains two offences: possession or carrying a weapon for a purpose of committing an offence or possession or carrying a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. The offence under consideration here is the latter. The Crown is required to prove the following pursuant to the section:  (1) that the accused possessed a weapon and (2) that the purpose of the possession was one dangerous to the public peace: R. v. Cassidy, 1989 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 345 (SCC) at p. 351; R. v. Kerr, 2004 SCC 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 371 (SCC) (Kerr) at para. 23.

[136]   Weapon is defined in s. 2 of the Code. The definition includes something that is used as a weapon. In these circumstances the knife was used as a weapon to inflict injury.

[137]   Possession is defined in s. 4(3). This includes anything that is in the accused’s personal possession. Here, the accused had the weapon in his personal possession.

[138]   The focus of s. 88 is upon the purpose for the accused’s possession. The Crown must prove that he possessed a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. The circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether the accused had the weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. Proof may be supplied by the manner in which the weapon is used, circumstances and statements surrounding its use and the rational inferences to be drawn from proven facts: R. v. Chalifoux (1974), 1973 CanLII 1355 (BC CA), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 526 (B.C.C.A.) (Chalifoux) at p. 529.

Les tribunaux reconnaissent que l'heure sur un enregistrement vidéo peut être souvent inexacte

R. v Jackson-Bullshields, 2017 BCSC 1159

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[32]        Moreover, during the course of proceedings, defence counsel pointed out that the time stamp on the video was incorrect. While the time of day matched up with eyewitness testimony, the time stamp indicated that the date was July 17, 2016, rather than July 16, 2016. Courts have recognized that time stamps on such videos “are often inaccurate”: R. v. James, 2015 ONSC 3902 at para. 31. In cases where this is an issue, when presented with expert evidence, courts have made findings regarding the “actual time” captured in a video: R. v. Cook, 2015 BCSC 301 at para. 68. However, I have not given the video substantial weight due to the problem with the time stamp. However, it is useful to indicate once again the escape route taken by the person who caused the accident and ran from the scene.

Les critères permettant de conclure à la fiabilité d'une preuve d'identification

R. v Jackson-Bullshields, 2017 BCSC 1159 

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[21]        In considering the reliability of this evidence, a summary of relevant factors for courts to review was provided in R. v. Rai, 2016 ONCJ 629 at para. 31:

[31]     Some of the factors a court may consider in assessing the reliability of identification evidence include:  the witness’s opportunity to observe at the time of the alleged offence (duration of the observation, light conditions, whether there was a face covering, etc.); whether the witness has prior knowledge of the person being identified; the time lapse between the event and the identification; the presence of distinctive features and the amount of detail in the description provided by the witness; the presence or absence of corroborative evidence; the possibility of contamination by improper identification procedures. This is not an exhaustive list. In relation to issues with identification evidence, see generally: R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445 at paras. 50-53; R. v. Powell, 2007 CanLII 45918 at paras. 11-15 (ONSC); R. v. Jack, 2013 ONCA 80 at paras. 12-17; R. v. Miaponoose (1996110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (ONCA).

Les juges doivent appliquer le « critère d’intérêt public » lorsqu’ils décident d’écarter une recommandation conjointe

R. c. Primeau, 2021 QCCA 1768

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[22]      Dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook, la Cour suprême a établi que les juges doivent appliquer le « critère d’intérêt public » lorsqu’ils décident d’écarter une recommandation conjointe. Selon ce critère, un juge du procès « ne devrait écarter une recommandation conjointe que si la peine proposée est susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice ou si elle n’est pas par ailleurs dans l’intérêt public »[7]. Or, une recommandation conjointe déconsidérera l’administration de la justice ou sera contraire à l’intérêt public lorsqu’elle « correspond si peu aux attentes des personnes raisonnables instruites des circonstances de l’affaire que ces dernières estimeraient qu’elle fait échec au bon fonctionnement du système de justice pénale »[8]. Autrement formulé[9] :

[34]      […] il ne faudrait pas rejeter trop facilement une recommandation conjointe, une conclusion à laquelle je souscris. Le rejet dénote une recommandation à ce point dissociée des circonstances de l’infraction et de la situation du contrevenant que son acceptation amènerait les personnes renseignées et raisonnables, au fait de toutes les circonstances pertinentes, y compris l’importance de favoriser la certitude dans les discussions en vue d’un règlement, à croire que le système de justice avait cessé de bien fonctionner. Il s’agit indéniablement d’un seuil élevé – et à juste titre […].[10]

[Soulignement ajouté]

[23]      En s’appuyant sur le critère de l’intérêt public, la Cour suprême confirme qu’il y a lieu de rejeter d’autres critères comme celui de la « justesse de la peine »[11] et celui de la « peine manifestement non indiquée »[12]. Pour ce qui est du critère de la justesse de la peine, il ne devrait pas être suivi parce qu’« il en résulterait une "suppression du recours à la négociation de plaidoyers dans le cadre du processus de poursuite criminelle" »[13]. Quant au critère de la peine manifestement non indiquée, la Cour le rejette également parce que le seuil de ce dernier « peut ne pas être suffisamment souple dans le cadre de la recommandation conjointe »[14].

[24]      Le critère de l’intérêt public s’impose parce qu’il est « plus rigoureux que les autres critères proposés et il reflète le mieux les nombreux avantages que les recommandations conjointes apportent au système de justice pénale ainsi que le besoin correspondant d’un degré de certitude élevé que ces recommandations seront acceptées »[15]. Ainsi, le seuil s’avère très élevé lorsqu’un juge veut écarter une recommandation conjointe. Sinon, cela « jetterait trop d’incertitude sur l’efficacité des ententes de règlement »[16].

[25]      Ayant établi le critère applicable, la Cour énonce six éléments que les juges doivent prendre en considération « lorsqu’une recommandation conjointe relative à la peine les préoccupe »[17], dont le deuxième prend toute son importance dans les circonstances de cette cause[18] :

[52]      Deuxièmement, les juges du procès doivent appliquer le critère de l’intérêt public lorsqu’ils envisagent d’infliger une peine plus lourde ou plus clémente que celle recommandée conjointement (DeSousa, le juge Doherty). Cela ne veut pas dire pour autant que l’analyse sera la même dans les deux cas. Au contraire, du point de vue de l’accusé, l’infliction d’une peine plus clémente ne suscite pas chez lui de préoccupations relativement au droit à un procès équitable, ni ne mine sa confiance envers la certitude des négociations sur le plaidoyer. De plus, quand il se demande si la sévérité d’une peine recommandée conjointement irait à l’encontre de l’intérêt public, le juge du procès doit être conscient de l’inégalité du rapport de force qu’il peut y avoir entre le ministère public et la défense, surtout lorsque l’accusé n’est pas représenté par avocat ou est détenu au moment de la détermination de la peine. Ces facteurs peuvent atténuer l’intérêt qu’a le public dans la certitude et justifier l’imposition d’une peine plus clémente dans des circonstances limitées. Par contre, lorsque le juge du procès envisage d’infliger une peine plus clémente, il doit se rappeler que la confiance de la société envers l’administration de la justice risque d’en souffrir si un accusé profite des avantages d’une recommandation conjointe sans avoir à purger la peine convenue.

[Références omises]

[26]      En l’espèce, l’autre élément important énuméré par la Cour suprême est que le juge d’instance qui n’accepte pas les recommandations conjointes des parties devrait « énoncer des motifs clairs et convaincants à l’appui de sa décision »[19]. Dans tous les arrêts rendus par la Cour dans l’application de l’arrêt Anthony-Cook, les juges de première instance avaient imposé une peine plus sévère que celle suggérée par les parties, contrairement au présent cas[20]. Par contre, la Cour suprême a clairement envisagé le cas de l’imposition d’une peine plus clémente que celle suggérée, tel que démontré par le paragraphe précité même si en imposant une peine plus clémente que celle suggérée, l’analyse peut être différente. Le critère qui encadre la décision de s’écarter d’une suggestion commune demeure le même.

[27]      Dans les affaires Séguin[21] et Binet[22], la Cour d’appel met en garde les juges de première instance de ne pas « utiliser le critère de l’intérêt public pour simplement imposer la peine qu’ils estiment appropriée »[23]. À cet effet, ces deux affaires citent ces passages de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta qui illustrent cette interprétation de l’arrêt Anthony-Cook :

[19]      La Cour d’appel d’Alberta, dans une affaire récente, indique bien la distinction entre les principes devant guider un juge pour accepter ou refuser une suggestion commune et ceux applicables à la détermination d’une peine. Elle s’exprime ainsi :

[17]      After a review of the case law, the sentencing judge summed up the test as follows:

[51]   The principles to be drawn from these cases suggest that a joint submission will bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest when it does not adequately reflect the general principles of sentencing identified in the Criminal Code and where the benefits of accepting the joint submission do not outweigh these concerns. (Emphasis added)

This, however, is not the test for accepting a joint submission set in Anthony-Cook. It echoes the “fitness” or “demonstrable unfitness” tests that were specifically rejected in that case.

[18]      While the sentence that might have resulted after trial is relevant, it is an unhelpful approach to start the analysis by reverse engineering the joint submission. In other words, it is inappropriate to first determine what sentence would have been imposed after a trial, and then compare it to the joint submission. This inevitably invites a conclusion that the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute merely or primarily because it departs from the conventional sentence. Rather, the analysis should start with the basis for the joint submission, including the important benefits to the administration of justice, to see if there is something apart from the length of the sentence that engages the broader public interest or the repute of the administration of justice.

[20]      La Cour partage ce point de vue. Le juge a commis une erreur de principe en refusant la suggestion commune des parties. Sous le couvert de l’intérêt public, il a plutôt imposé une peine qu’il trouvait plus appropriée dans les circonstances.

[Soulignements dans l’original]

[28]      Nous sommes d’accord avec l’appelante que les circonstances de la présente affaire sont assimilables aux circonstances des affaires Séguin et Binet et que la juge rend, sous le couvert du critère de l’intérêt public, la peine qu’elle considérait la plus appropriée dans les circonstances. Essentiellement, au regard des facteurs aggravants et atténuants, la juge écarte la peine suggérée puisqu’elle considère qu’une peine privative de liberté n’est pas appropriée dans les circonstances.