L'accusé peut faire sienne une déclaration d'un tiers vu son silence dans certaines circonstances

R. v. Saulter, 2011 CanLII 61107 (NL PC)

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[20]   It is well established that an accused person can adopt a statement made by another person as her or his own and if adopted it will be admissible against the accused (see R. v. Streu 1989 CanLII 52 (SCC), (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), at paragraphs 19 to 21, R. v. Govedarov (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 238 (Ont. C.A.), at paragraph 148, R. v. Baron (1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 525 (Ont. C.A.), at paragraph 36 and R. v. P.K. 1980 ABCA 23 (CanLII), (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 523 (Alta. C.A.), at paragraph 34).  Adoption can occur by various means, even by silence (see R. v. Christie, [1914] A.C. 545 (H.L.) and R. v. Warner 1994 CanLII 842 (ON CA), (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 540 (Ont. C.A.)).  In R. v. Tanasichuk 2007 NBCA 76 (CanLII), (2007),  227 C.C.C. (3d) 446, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal noted, at paragraph 102, that it “has long been a recognized principle in the law of evidence that ‘[a]n accused can adopt the statement of another either explicitly by words indicating [his or] her agreement, or implicitly by [his or] her silence in a situation where one could have expected [him or] her to have made some protest to a statement made within [his or] her hearing.’"  However, any statement by an accused person which the Crown seeks to introduce must be shown to have a “discernable meaning” (see R. v. Ferris, 1994 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 756) and if adoption is argued the Crown must prove that the accused accepted that statement as her or his own (see R. v. Stein (1928), 50 C.C.C. 311 (S.C.C.)).  Mere presence when another makes a statement is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish adoption (see R. v. Duboisreflex, (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (Ont. C.A.)). In Tanasichuk, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal summarized the law applicable to adoption of another’s words by the accused in the following manner (at paragraph 110):

In summary, the law requires that before an allegedly adopted statement can be put to a jury, the trial judge must find that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury might reasonably infer that the conduct of the accused amounted to an adoption of the statement. Before admitting such a statement in evidence, the judge must be satisfied that the statement was made in the presence of the accused, in circumstances such that the accused would be expected to respond, that the accused's failure to respond could reasonably lead to the inference that, by his silence, the accused adopted the statement, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. In determining whether the silence of an accused could support an inference that the accused assented to a statement, the trial judge must have regard to all of the circumstances, including whether the evidence establishes that the accused heard and understood the statement, whether the accused made any non-verbal response and the emotional state of the accused. If, upon considering all of the circumstances, the trial judge is not satisfied that the silence of the accused could support an inference that the accused assented to the statement, the evidence has no probative value, is highly prejudicial, and ought not be put to the jury. If, on the other hand, the judge concludes that the silence of the accused can support such an inference, the evidence is admissible, but it is nevertheless imperative that the judge instruct the jury as directed in Warner. The jury must be instructed that "it is for them to decide whether the accused, by his conduct, adopted the statements made in his presence and only to the extent that they were adopted should the jury accept them as true," and that, in so deciding, they must "consider all of the circumstances under which the statement was made": See Warner, at 145. Moreover, the jurors must be instructed that "if in their view the accused did not assent [...] to the correctness of the statements made in his presence, these statements would have no evidentiary value [...] and should be entirely disregarded": SeeR. v. Andrews (1962), 133 C.C.C. 347 (Ont. C.A.), at 348.

L'état du droit sur l'admission par l'accusé d'un état de fait découlant de son silence

10                       R. v. Scott, 2013 MBCA 7 (CanLII)

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            Surprisingly, I am unaware of any decisions from this court on the issue of adopted or implied admissions and, while other appellate courts have considered this issue, the Supreme Court of Canada has said very little on it since Stein v. The King, 1928 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1928] S.C.R. 553, and Chapdelaine v. The King, 1934 CanLII 46 (SCC), [1935] S.C.R. 53. 

11                        The fundamental principles surrounding the law of adopted or implied admissions, and approved in the two above-referenced Supreme Court of Canada decisions, originally came from the House of Lords in Rex v. Christie, [1914] A.C. 545.  In Christie, the House of Lords generally discussed when statements made in the presence of an accused will be admissible against the accused, and the procedure a court should follow when faced with such evidence.  Lord Atkinson stated as follows (at pp. 554-55):

… [T]he rule of law undoubtedly is that a statement made in the presence of an accused person, even upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated save so far as he accepts the statement, so as to make it, in effect, his own. ….  He may accept the statement by word or conduct, action or demeanour, and it is the function of the jury which tries the case to determine whether his words, action, conduct, or demeanour at the time when a statement was made amounts to an acceptance of it in whole or in part.  It by no means follows, I think, that a mere denial by the accused of the facts mentioned in the statement necessarily renders the statement inadmissible, because he may deny the statement in such a manner and under such circumstances as may lead a jury to disbelieve him, and constitute evidence from which an acknowledgement may be inferred by them.

Of course, if at the end of the case the presiding judge should be of opinion that no evidence has been given upon which the jury could reasonably find that the accused had accepted the statement so as to make it in whole or in part his own, the judge can instruct the jury to disregard the statement entirely. ….

[emphasis added]

12                        Lord Atkinson considered whether an instruction to the jury to disregard a statement not accepted by the accused would be effective, or whether this would result in a grave injustice, as the jury, having heard the statement, might not rid its mind of it.  Ultimately, he determined that a jury instruction to disregard the statement would effectually guard the accused against injustice, but stated that it would be a desirable rule of practice (at p. 555):

.… … [T]hat such a statement is not be admitted in evidence until a foundation has been laid for its admission by proof of facts from which, in the opinion of the presiding judge, a jury might reasonably draw the inference that the accused had so accepted the statement as to make it in whole or in part his own ….

13                        The Supreme Court of Canada first considered Christie in Stein.  In that case, a police officer explained that the accused was present during the questioning of two thieves who implicated the accused as the recipient of stolen goods.  The officer testified that the accused said nothing in response to the accusation.  Anglin C.J.C., after referring to Christie, stated (at p. 557-58):

.... It is only when the accused by “word or conduct, action or demeanour” has accepted what they contain, and to the extent that he does so, that statements made by other persons in his presence have any evidentiary value. In the present case there is no evidence in the record from which a jury might infer anything in the nature of an admission by the accused of the accuracy of what was incriminating in the statements of the thieves given in evidence by [the police officer] ....

14                        In Chapdelaine, the accused was convicted of the murder of her husband by poisoning.  At trial, several civilian witnesses testified that they heard the deceased pointedly accuse his wife, in her presence, of poisoning him.  The witnesses testified that the accused said nothing in response.  One witness testified that the accused appeared indifferent, while another said she simply smiled and changed the subject.  The trial judge failed to tell the jury, however, that the deceased’s statements were not evidence against the accused as to the facts contained therein, unless they found that she accepted the statements as her own.   Duff C.J., for the majority, applied Christie, and allowed the appeal.  He also set out, with apparent approval, the following practice recommended by Pickford J. in Rex v. Norton, [1910] 2 K.B. 496 (C.C.A.) (which had also been endorsed in Christie) (at p. 56):

The fact of a statement having been made in the prisoner’s presence may be given in evidence, but not the contents, and the question asked, what the prisoner said or did on such a statement being made.  If his answer, given either by words or conduct, be such as to be evidence from which an acknowledgment may be inferred, then the contents of the statement may be given and the question of admission or not in fact left to the jury; if it be not evidence from which such an acknowledgment may be inferred, then the contents of the statement should be excluded.  To allow the contents of such statements to be given before it is ascertained that there is evidence of their being acknowledged to be true must be most prejudicial to the prisoner, as, whatever directions be given to the jury, it is almost impossible for them to dismiss such evidence entirely from their minds.  It is perhaps too wide to say that in no case can the statements be given in evidence when they are denied by the prisoner, as it is possible that a denial may be given under such circumstances and in such a manner as to constitute evidence from which an acknowledgement may be inferred, but, as above stated, we think they should be rejected unless there is some evidence of an acknowledgment of the truth.  Where they are admitted we think the following is the proper direction to be given to the jury: - That if they come to the conclusion that the prisoner had acknowledged the truth of the whole or any part of the facts stated they might take the statement, or so much of it as was acknowledged to be true (but no more), into consideration as evidence in the case generally, not because the statement standing alone afforded any evidence of the matter contained in it, but solely because of the prisoner’s acknowledgment of its truth; but unless they found as a fact that there was such an acknowledgment they ought to disregard the statement altogether.

[emphasis added]

15                        The effect of Stein and Chapdelaine is that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that Christie applies in Canada.  The law accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada was summarized in Chapdelaine (at p. 55), quoting Lord Atkinson in Christie (at p. 554):

… [A] statement made in the presence of an accused person, even upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated save so far as he accepts the statement, so as to make it, in effect, his own. ….

[emphasis added]

16                        As far as I am aware, the only other case from the Supreme Court of Canada in which the issue of adopted or implied admissions was discussed is R. v. Hebert, 1990 CanLII 118 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.  In that case, there was no issue regarding adopted or implied admissions.  The main issue concerned the constitutionality of putting undercover officers in an accused’s jail cell to obtain incriminating admissions.  In a separate judgment, Sopinka J. wrote, in obiter, that the court’s historical solicitude for an accused’s silence is evidenced by its application of cases such as Christie and Stein.  He stated (at p. 198):

…. The essence of the Christie rule is that even if the circumstances of an accusation cry out for an explanation or denial, the accused’s silence, without more, is not evidence against him: there must be ‘word or conduct, action or demeanour’ pointing to an adoption of the statement by the accused.

[emphasis added]

17                        Sopinka J. also noted in Hebert that the Chapdelaine decision supported the practice of holding a voir dire before admitting evidence of an alleged adopted or implied admission.

18                        While most of the Christie principles have been consistently applied by appellate courts, there is some inconsistency with respect to the issue of how the silence of accused persons is to be regarded.  Some suggest that an accused’s mere silence may be sufficient to render the accusatory statement made in his or her presence evidence of its truth, if the circumstances are such that a response could reasonably have been expected.  See for example R. v. Eden, 1969 CanLII 329 (ON CA), [1970] 2 O.R. 161 at 164 (C.A.); R. v. Baron and Wertman 1976 CanLII 775 (ON CA), (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 173 (C.A.) at 186; R. v. Warner (J.R.)1994 CanLII 842 (ON CA), (1994), 75 O.A.C. 288 at para. 21; and R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220 (CanLII), 2011 ONCA 220 at para. 46, 276 O.A.C. 292.  This last case is pending before the Supreme Court of Canada.

19                        In my respectful view, these decisions do not quite accord with the principles set out in Christie, Stein and Chapdelaine, which indicate that a statement made in the presence of an accused, “even upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence” (Chapdelaine at p. 55) of the facts stated, unless he or she accepts the statement as his or her own.  Put another way, mere silence, even where it would be reasonable to expect a denial in the face of an accusation, will not constitute an admission.  There must be something more in the circumstances than the mere silence of the accused and an expectation that he or she would have said something.  In essence, these three decisions stand for the proposition that, when the accused’s own silence is the only evidence that the accusatory statement was adopted, the statement is to be excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

20                        In R. v. Tanasichuk (D.D.), 2007 NBCA 76 (CanLII), 2007 NBCA 76, 321 N.B.R. (2d) 44, leave to appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 18 (QL), Richard J.A., in a helpful and comprehensive analysis, reviewed much of the case law discussed above and dealt with issues similar to the present case.  The decision makes clear that evidence of the accused’s silence, on its own, will not constitute evidence of an adoption of the statement; further evidence of the circumstances surrounding the alleged adoption must be elicited.  As to admissibility considerations, Richard J.A., expounded on Christie, Stein and Chapdelaine, stating that (at paras. 110, 116-17):

1)               The trial judge, after looking at all the circumstances, must find sufficient evidence from which the jury might reasonably infer that the conduct of the accused amounted to the adoption of the statement in order to leave the issue with the jury;

2)               The trial judge should weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect prior to determining its admissibility;

3)               Although it is “sufficiently entrenched in the law of evidence” (at para. 117) that a trial judge should hold a voir dire, the failure to do so will not always constitute an error that vitiates a conviction. 

21                        In summary, the authorities make it clear that great caution should be exercised when considering a question of adopted or implied admission by silence as there may be other reasons for an accused’s silence.  A statement made in the accused’s presence is not evidence of the facts contained therein, even if it is reasonable to expect an explanation or denial, unless the accused accepts or adopts the statement, either expressly or by inference, as his or her own. 

22                        A trial judge has a gatekeeper function and must be satisfied that the accused had the state of mind to hear and comprehend the accusatory statement and adopted it in some verbal or non-verbal way.  A trial judge should hold a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statement as an adopted admission.  The decision on admissibility entails a consideration of all of the circumstances under which the statement was made and possibly adopted by the accused.  On the voir dire, the trial judge must determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury might reasonably draw the inference that the accused adopted the statement.  Even when there is sufficient evidence, the trial judge should balance the probative value and the prejudicial effect before determining whether to allow the statement to go to the jury.

23                        The Supreme Court of Canada authorities also establish that the mere silence of the accused, after hearing a statement made in his or her presence, will not permit an inference that the accused adopted the statement as his or her own.  More is needed.  It is only when an accused by “word or conduct, action or demeanour” (Christie at p. 554) has accepted the truth of the statement made by another person in his or her presence that the statement can have evidentiary value against the accused as to its truth.  In the absence of any such acceptance by the accused of the truth of the statement made in his or her presence, the jury should be told that the statement has no evidentiary value as to its truth, and should be entirely disregarded. 

24                        Finally, if there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the accused adopted the statement made in his presence, notwithstanding the failure to hold a voir dire, there will be no error involved in admitting the evidence.  In other words, if the trial judge would inevitably have admitted the evidence had a voir dire been held, no harm would result.  However, where there is a lack of evidence, the failure to hold a voir dire will constitute a serious procedural error.

Quand le silence de l'accusé équivaut à une admission des propos tenus par un tiers

R. v. Robinson, 2014 ONCA 63 (CanLII)

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General Principles relating to Adoptive Admissions By Silence

[48]      David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2013), at para. 36.04 sets out the general principles relating to adoptive admissions by silence, in part, as follows:

An adoptive admission is a statement made by a third party in the presence of and adopted by D. There is only adoption to the extent that D assents to the truth of the statement expressly or impliedly. Assent may be inferred from D’s

                                    i.        words;

                                    ii.        actions;

                                   iii.        conduct; or

                                 iv.        demeanour.

Assent may also be inferred from D’s silence, or an equivocal or evasive denial. Where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable expectation of reply, silence may constitute an adoptive admission.

The respective roles of judge and jury in adoptive admissions are controversial. Consistent with basic principle, where an issue arises, the trial judge should first determine whether there is any evidence of assent or adoption by D, before permitting the evidence to be adduced before the jury. Where there is evidence on which the jury could find adoption, the factual determination should be left to them with appropriate instruction. [Emphasis omitted.]

[49]      Under the heading “Related Provisions and Principles”, Watt J.A. sets out additional requirements where an accused’s silence is alleged to constitute an adoptive admission:

Where silence is the manner of an alleged adoption, there are several conditions that must be met:

i.            D must have heard the statement;

ii.            the statement must be about a subject matter of which D was aware;

iii.           D must not have been suffering from any disability or confusion;

iv.         the declarant must not be someone to whom D would be expected to reply, as for example, a child.

[50]      These principles are derived, at least in part, from the seminal case R. v. Christie, in which Lord Atkinson held, at p. 554, that a statement made in the presence of an accused person is not evidence against him of the facts stated except to the extent that he accepts it by words, conduct, action or demeanour to make it in effect his own:

[T]he rule of law undoubtedly is that a statement made in the presence of an accused person, even upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated save so far as he accepts the statement, so as to make it, in effect, his own…. He may accept the statement by word or conduct, action or demeanour, and it is the function of the jury which tries the case to determine whether his words, action, conduct, or demeanour at the time when a statement was made amounts to an acceptance of it.

[51]      In addition to the actions of an accused that might lead to an inference of adoption that are referred to in Christie, this court has consistently held that an accused’s silence may lead to an inference of adoption of a statement made in the accused’s presence in circumstances where the accused could reasonably have been expected to reply

[52]      In R. v. Eden 1969 CanLII 329 (ON CA), (1970), 2 O.R. 161 (C.A.), Gale C.J.O. explained the principle this way, at pp. 163-164:

The right of a trial Court to conclude that an accused adopted an inculpatory statement made in his presence rests upon the assumption that the natural reaction of one falsely accused is promptly to deny or assert his innocence. It follows that before such an assumption can be acted upon the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement must be such that it would be normal conduct for the person involved by the statement to deny it. When the circumstances are such that the failure to protest can be attributed to some circumstance justifying such failure, the probative value of the failure to protest is lessened and may be entirely negatived. 

[53]      In R. v. Govedarov, Popovic and Askov (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 238 (Ont. C.A.), Martin J.A. cited, at p. 278, Phipson on Evidence, 11th ed. (1970), at p. 767, for the more general proposition that:

The silence of a party will render statements made in his presence evidence against him of their truth if the circumstances be such that he could reasonably have been expected to have replied to them.

[54]      Martin J.A. repeated this basic formulation of the test in R. v. Baron and Wertman (1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 525 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 539-40:

The silence of a party will render statements made in his presence evidence against him of their truth if the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have been expected to reply to them. Silence in such circumstances permits an inference of assent. [Citations omitted.]

[55]      In R. v. Warner 1994 CanLII 842 (ON CA), (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 540, 21 O.R. (2d) 136 (C.A.), Griffiths J.A. expressed the test as follows, at p. 549:

Silence may be taken as an admission “…where a denial would be the only reasonable course of action expected if that person were not responsible”: Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada(Markham; Butterworth’s, 1992). In R. v. Baron, Martin J.A. put the principle as follows at pages 539-40:

The silence of a party will render statements made in his presence evidence against him of their truth if the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have been expected to reply to them. Silence in such circumstances permits an inference of assent.

[56]      In Warner, Griffiths J.A. went on to hold that a trial judge should make a preliminary determination that some evidence of adoption exists before leaving the issue with the jury. Further, if the issue is left with the jury, the trial judge should instruct them that they must consider all the circumstances under which the statement was made before making a finding of adoption, stating, at pp. 549-550: 

Whether or not the silence of the accused constitutes an implied admission, depends on whether, in all of the circumstances, such an expectation [of a reply] is reasonable. The trial judge should determine in advance whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that the conduct amounted to an acknowledgement of responsibility.

…

Where the trial judge concludes that the evidence should go before the jury, he is still obliged to instruct the jury that it is for them to decide whether the accused, by his conduct, adopted the statements made in his presence and only to the extent that they were adopted should the jury accept them as true. In this respect, the jury must consider all of the circumstances under which the statement was made.

[57]      This court’s most recent discussion of adoption by silence confirms the Baron and Wertman formulation of the test. In R. v. F.(J.),2011 ONCA 220 (CanLII), 2011 ONCA 220, 269 C.C.C. (3d) 258, aff’d without reference to this point, 2013 SCC 12 (CanLII), 2013 SCC 12, 293 C.C.C. (3d) 377, Rosenberg J.A. said the following, at para. 46:

There was sufficient evidence from which it can be inferred that the appellant adopted the statement about his supplying the Tylenol 3. Silence alone is evidence that the person adopted the statement, if the circumstances are such that the person could reasonably have been expected to have replied to them: R. v. Baron and Wertman. Given AS's evidence set out above, there was a foundation for finding that the appellant adopted the statement on the basis of silence. But, there was more; it was AS's evidence that they were all involved in the conversation about the Tylenol 3. … Evidence establishing on a balance of probabilities that he adopted the statement was sufficient to render it admissible against the appellant: R. v. Evans. [Citations omitted, emphasis added.]

[58]      Finally, I note that in S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich & Louis P. Strezos, McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013), the authors recommend a cautionary approach to the doctrine of adoption by silence at p. 7-137:

One must approach adoption by silence with great care. In many cases the inference of adoption is based on perceptions of how the accused should respond in what are often extreme and unusual situations. Jury suppositions about how an accused “should” behave in such circumstances may be inaccurate. They should be cautioned to use care before finding that an accused has implicitly adopted a statement by virtue of his failure to respond in a particular way. [Citations omitted.] 

Le silence de l'accusé lorsqu'un tiers fait une déclaration le concernant en sa présence

R. v. Warner, 1994 CanLII 842 (ON CA)

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Silence may be taken as an admission "where a denial would be the only reasonable course of action expected if that person were not responsible": Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (Markham: Butterworths, 1992), at p. 286. In R. v. Baron 1976 CanLII 775 (ON CA), (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 173 at p. 187, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 525 at pp. 539-40 (C.A.), Martin J.A. put the principle as follows:

The silence of a party will render statements made in his presence evidence against him of their truth if the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have been expected to have replied to them. Silence in such circumstances permits an inference of assent.

Whether or not the silence of the accused constitutes an implied admission depends upon whether, in all of the circumstances, such an expectation is reasonable. The trial judge should determine in advance whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that the conduct amounted to an acknowledgement of responsibility. In R. v. Hebert, 1990 CanLII 118 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 at p. 196, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at pp. 11-12, Sopinka J., although in dissent, said on points not in issue:

This court has consistently applied the English case of R. v. Christie, [1914] A.C. 545 (H.L.), in which Lord Atkinson stated at p. 554:

. . . the rule of law undoubtedly is that a statement made in the presence of an accused person, even upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated save so far as he accepts the statement, so as to make it, in effect, his own.

In Stein v. The King 1928 CanLII 67 (SCC), (1928), 50 C.C.C. 311 at p. 313, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 143, [1928] S.C.R. 553, this court held, on the basis of Christie, that a trial judge had erred in failing to direct the jury that, "in the absence of any assent by the accused either by word or conduct to the correctness of the statements made in his presence, they had no evidentiary value whatever as against him and should be entirely disregarded" (emphasis added). Later, in Chapdelaine v. The King 1934 CanLII 46 (SCC), (1934), 63 C.C.C. 5 at pp. 9-10, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 132, [1935] S.C.R. 53, Duff C.J.C. (Crocket and Cannon JJ. concurring), held that it would be desirable as a rule of practice in cases in which statements made in the accused's presence are sought to be adduced to require evidence of the accused's adoption of the statements to be led before the admission of the statements themselves.

La déclaration faite par un tiers en présence de l'accusé et le silence de ce dernier

R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220 (CanLII)

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[46] There was sufficient evidence from which it can be inferred that the appellant adopted the statement about his supplying the Tylenol 3. Silence alone is evidence that the person adopted the statement, if the circumstances are such that the person could reasonably have been expected to have replied to them: R. v. Baron 1976 CanLII 775 (ON CA), (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 173, [1976] O.J. No. 2304 (C.A.), at pp. 187-88 O.R. Given AS's evidence set out above, there was a foundation for finding that the appellant adopted the statement on the basis of silence. But, there was more; it was AS's evidence that they were all involved in the conversation about the Tylenol 3. Given this record and the absence of objection, there was no reason for the trial judge to conduct a voir dire. Evidence establishing on a balance of probabilities that he adopted the statement was sufficient to render it admissible against the appellant: R. v. Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, [1993] S.C.J. No. 115, at pp. 667-68 S.C.R.

[47] It would have been preferable for the trial judge to direct the jury that it was for them to find whether the appellant adopted the statement as true: R. v. Warner1994 CanLII 842 (ON CA), (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 136, [1994] O.J. No. 2658 (C.A.), at p. 145 O.R. However, in my view, the failure to direct the jury as to the test for adoptive admissions did not prejudice the appellant. The only evidence on the issue was from AS and that uncontradicted evidence established that the appellant probably adopted the statement. 

La déclaration extrajudiciaire d'un accusé est admissible en preuve contre lui

R. c. Terry, [1996] 2 RCS 207, 1996 CanLII 199 (CSC)

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28               (...)  Un aveu fait par l'accusé contre ses intérêts est admissible en vertu d'une exception reconnue à la règle du ouï‑dire, dans la mesure où sa valeur probante l'emporte sur son effet préjudiciable.

La pertinence (tant dans son volet logique de dans son volet juridique)

R. c. Mysliakovskaia, 2013 QCCS 3425 (CanLII)

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[19]        Contrairement à la matérialité, la pertinence n’est pas une notion juridique.  Le droit ne définit pas ce qu’est la pertinence. Celle-ci fait plutôt appel à la logique et à l’expérience humaine. Sera considéré comme pertinent tout moyen de preuve de nature à établir ou à rendre probable l’existence ou la non-existence d’un fait en litige. Pour qu’un fait soit pertinent à un autre, il doit exister entre ceux-ci une connexité qui permet d’inférer l’existence de l’un en raison de l’existence de l’autre.

i)  Le volet logique

[20]        Comme l’expose le juge Sopinka dans R. c. Mohan, la pertinence comporte à la fois un volet logique et un volet juridique. Sera considérée logiquement pertinente toute preuve à ce point liée au fait concerné qu’elle tend à l’établir.

[21]        En 1999, l'honorable juge Charron, siégeant alors à la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario, décrivait ainsi le critère de la pertinence logique :

« Relevance is a matter to be decided by the trial judge as a question of law. It involves the determination of the logical relationship between the proposed evidence and a fact in issue in the trial. The logical relevance of the evidence is determined by asking the following question:

a)   Does the proposed [ … ] evidence relate to a fact in issue in the trial?

b)   Is it so related to a fact in issue that it tends to prove it?

If the answer to both these questions is yes, the logical relevance of the evidence has been established …  »

[22]        Dans R. v. Watson, l’honorable juge Doherty propose la définition suivante de ce concept :

« Relevance as explained in these authorities requires a determination of whether as a matter of human experience and logic the existence of "Fact A" makes the existence or non-existence of "Fact B" more probable than it would be without the existence of "Fact A". If it does then "Fact A" is relevant to "Fact B". As long as "Fact B" is itself a material fact in issue or is relevant to a material fact in issue in the litigation then "Fact A" is relevant and prima facie admissible. »

[23]        La pertinence n’implique aucune idée de certitude. De fait, il n’existe aucun seuil de pertinence requis pour que la preuve soit admissible. Si la preuve soumise est de nature, logiquement et par l'expérience humaine, à établir l’existence ou la non- existence d’un fait, elle doit être considérée pertinente. Comme le souligne le juge en chef Dickson dans R. c. Corbett :

« [ … ] les règles fondamentales du droit de la preuve comportent un principe d'inclusion en vertu duquel il est permis de produire en preuve tout ce qui sert logiquement à prouver un fait en litige, sous réserve des règles d'exclusion reconnues et des exceptions à celles-ci. Pour le reste, c'est une question de valeur probante. La valeur probante d'un élément de preuve peut être forte, faible ou nulle. En cas de doute, il vaut mieux pécher par inclusion que par exclusion et, à mon avis, conformément à la transparence de plus en plus grande de notre société, nous devrions nous efforcer de favoriser l'admissibilité, à moins qu'il n'existe une raison très claire de politique générale ou de droit qui commande l'exclusion. »

[24]        En somme, les éléments ne constituant pas une preuve logique d’un fait à prouver ne doivent pas être admis. Par contre, tout ce qui est probant doit être admis,  à moins de devoir être exclu pour un autre motif.

[25]        Ces considérations nous amènent à traiter de la pertinence juridique.

ii)  Le volet juridique

[26]        Dans Mohan, l’honorable juge Sopinka traite ainsi de ce second volet de la pertinence :

« [ … ] Bien que la preuve soit admissible à première vue si elle est à ce point liée au fait concerné qu'elle tend à l'établir, l'analyse ne se termine pas là. Cela établit seulement la pertinence logique de la preuve. D'autres considérations influent également sur la décision relative à l'admissibilité. Cet examen supplémentaire peut être décrit comme une analyse du coût et des bénéfices, à savoir "si la valeur en vaut le coût." Voir McCormick on Evidence (3e éd. 1984), à la p. 544. Le coût dans ce contexte n'est pas utilisé dans le sens économique traditionnel du terme, mais plutôt par rapport à son impact sur le procès. La preuve qui est par ailleurs logiquement pertinente peut être exclue sur ce fondement si sa valeur probante est surpassée par son effet préjudiciable, si elle exige un temps excessivement long qui est sans commune mesure avec sa valeur ou si elle peut induire en erreur en ce sens que son effet sur le juge des faits, en particulier le jury, est disproportionné par rapport à sa fiabilité. Bien qu'elle ait été fréquemment considérée comme un aspect de la pertinence juridique, l'exclusion d'une preuve logiquement pertinente, pour ces raisons, devrait être considérée comme une règle générale d'exclusion (voir Morris c. La Reine, 1983 CanLII 28 (CSC), [1983] 2 R.C.S. 190). Qu'elle soit traitée comme un aspect de la pertinence ou une règle d'exclusion, son effet est le même. [ … ] »

[27]        Ainsi, une preuve logiquement pertinente peut néanmoins être exclue lorsque sa valeur probante est surpassée par son effet préjudiciable, lorsqu’elle exige un temps excessivement long sans commune mesure avec sa valeur ou lorsqu’elle peut induire en erreur le juge des faits en raison du caractère disproportionné de son effet par rapport à sa fiabilité.

[28]        Dans l’arrêt Wray, la Cour suprême avait reconnu le pouvoir du juge d’instance d’écarter « une preuve fortement préjudiciable à l’accusé et dont la recevabilité tient à une subtilité, mais dont la valeur probante à l’égard de la question fondamentale en litige est insignifiante ».

[29]        Ce critère fut interprété par certains comme limitant ce pouvoir discrétionnaire aux seuls cas où la preuve était extrêmement préjudiciable à l’accusé et de valeur probante modeste.

[30]        Cette interprétation restrictive fut expressément rejetée en 1989 par l’honorable juge La Forest, avec l’approbation du juge en chef Dickson, dans R. c. Potvin. On y confirma en termes généraux le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge d’instance d’écarter la preuve si, à son avis, l’effet préjudiciable de cette dernière l’emporte considérablement (« substantially ») sur sa valeur probante.

[31]        Quelques années plus tard, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario insista plus particulièrement sur l’importance de l’effet préjudiciable lorsque l’élément de preuve contesté est présenté par la défense :

« A finding that evidence is relevant does not determine its admissibility. Relevant evidence will be excluded if it runs afoul of a specific exclusionary rule, or if a balancing of its probative value against its prejudicial effect warrants its exclusion: R. v. Corbett, supra; R. v. Bevan,1993 CanLII 101 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 at p. 614, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 310 at p. 326; R. v. Terry, Supreme Court of Canada, released May 30, 1996 [now reported 36 C.R.R. (2d) 21, 106 C.C.C. (3d) 508] at pp. 13-14 [pp. 30-31 C.R.R.]. Where the evidence found to be relevant is offered by the defence in a criminal case, it will be excluded under the second of these exclusionary rules only where the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value: R. v. Seaboyer, supra, at p. 611 S.C.R., p. 391 C.C.C.; R. v. Arcangioli, 1994 CanLII 107 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 129 at p. 140, 87 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at p. 297. »

[32]        Avant de recourir à son pouvoir discrétionnaire d’écarter le rapport médical soumis par madame Mysliakovskaia, le Tribunal devra donc s’assurer que ce document comporte un effet préjudiciable l’emportant considérablement (substantially) sur sa valeur probante.