Un juge peut tenir compte du comportement d’un témoin, de sa façon de témoigner, malgré qu'iI ne doit pas se laisser indûment influencer par un tel examen

L.L. c. R., 2016 QCCA 1367

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[88]      On peut certes s’interroger sur l’évaluation fondée sur le comportement ou l’attitude de l’appelant en témoignant et sur l’à-propos des mots « l'accusé cherche ses mots, hésite, bafouille et joue constamment avec ses mains ». Un juge peut évidemment tenir compte du comportement d’un témoin, de sa façon de témoigner : R. c. N.S., [2012] 3 R.C.S. 728. Il ne faut toutefois pas se laisser indûment influencer par un tel examen et, entre autres, il ne faut pas se baser sur ce seul constat : R. v. Rhayel, 2015 ONCA 377; R. c. Z.Z., 2013 QCCA 1498, paragr. 79-71; R. c. R.P., 2010 QCCA 2237; R. c. R. (J.), 2006 QCCA 719; R. c. Chantal, [1998] A.Q. n^o 3376 (C.A.); R. c. Norman, (1993) 1993 CanLII 3387 (ON CA), 26 C.R. (4th) 256 (C.A. Ont.), d’autant qu’il est de plus en plus reconnu qu’un tel exercice peut être déficient, comme le rappellent les auteurs Roach, Brown, Shaffer et Renaud :

[…] There is also considerable research which shows that the cues which are most widely believed to be correlated with deception such as gaze aversion, smiling and fidgeting are in fact not associated at all. […][1]

[89]      Comme le rappelle Vincent Denault dans un récent ouvrage, par ailleurs fort intéressant, « l’observation passive du comportement non verbal d’un témoin lors d’un procès, sans intervenir, sans poser d’autres questions, sans demander de clarification, pour distinguer les menteurs des personnes qui disent la vérité est injustifiée […][2] ».

[90]      En d’autres mots, c’est plutôt comme point de départ à un examen plus approfondi en cours d’interrogatoire que le comportement du témoin devrait être pris en compte par le juge.

La preuve de faits similaires & la collusion

R. v. Wilkinson, 2017 ONCA 756

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[37]      In fairness to the trial judge, there is a lack of precision in the case law concerning the treatment of unconscious collusion at the admissibility stage. In Handy and Shearing, the Court addressed collusion in its most literal sense. In both cases, it was alleged that the allegations were fabricated, and that two or more witnesses had agreed to proceed with a false story. In its treatment of this issue, the Court used different terminology to describe the same thing. Handy employs the terms “collusion”, “actual collusion” and “concoct.” Shearing refers to “collusion”, “concoction” and “concoct.” Neither case directly discusses “unconscious” or “inadvertent” collusion or tainting of similar fact witnesses.[1]

[38]      However, decisions from this court support the view that actual collusion and unconscious collusion ought to be treated the same way at the admissibility stage. In R. v. F. (J.) (2003), 2003 CanLII 52166 (ON CA), 177 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), Feldman J.A. discusses both types of collusion, at para. 77:

The trial judge's finding that B.H. was sincere, a "straight shooter", and not influenced by E.T. and the others, fails to take into account that collusion and discussion among witnesses can have the effect of tainting a witness's evidence and perception of events innocently or accidentally and unknowingly, as well as deliberately and intentionally. The reliability of a witness's account can be undermined not only by deliberate collusion for the purpose of concocting evidence, but also by the influence of hearing other people's stories, which can tend to colour one's interpretation of personal events or reinforce a perception about which one had doubts or concerns. [Emphasis added.]

[39]       R. v. B. (C.) (2003), 2003 CanLII 32894 (ON CA), 171 C.C.C. (3d) 159 (Ont. C.A.) fosters the same approach. As the court said at paras. 40-41:

Collusion can arise both from a deliberate agreement to concoct evidence as well as from communication among witnesses that can have the effect, whether consciously or unconsciously, of colouring and tailoring their descriptions of the impugned events. In this case there was evidence of, or at least the opportunity for collusion in the various discussions regarding the incidents reported by the complainants. Furthermore, taken together with the anger regarding the dismissal and pay issues between one complainant and the appellant and the joint lawsuit by the complainants for damages, there was clearly an air of reality to the possibility of collusion in this case.

It was therefore incumbent on the trial judge, in considering the admissibility of the similar fact evidence, to determine whether he was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the evidence was not tainted by collusion. In his ruling admitting the similar fact evidence, the trial judge did specifically refer to the fact that the witnesses had discussed some of the evidence with each other. [Emphasis added.]

Ultimately, the case was decided on the basis of inadequacies in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury. Nevertheless, this passage supports the conclusion that, when there is an air of reality to conscious or unconscious collusion, the similar fact evidence will not be admissible unless the Crown proves on a balance of probabilities that conscious or unconscious collusion has not tainted the testimony.  

[40]      Further support for the appellant’s position is found in the cases that require trial judges to instruct juries on the possibility of collusion, both actual and unconscious. As Feldman J.A. wrote in F. (J.), at para. 86:

Once admitted, the jury must still be warned to assess the evidence carefully and to consider whether it can be considered reliable given the possibility of deliberate or accidental tainting by collusion among the witnesses.

See also R. v. M.B., 2011 ONCA 76, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 72: and David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2015), pp. 367-368 (Final 28-E – Collusion Amongst Similar Act Witnesses).

Le comportement d'un témoin lors de son témoignage est une considération légitime dans l'appréciation de sa crédibilité

R v Giroux, 2017 ABCA 270

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[25]           Reasons for credibility findings should be read as a whole, in their entirety and in context, and with a view to determining whether the decision is legally sustainable. See: R. v. T.R., 2016 ABCA 355 at para. 10; R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 at para. 19; and R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51 at para. 56.

[26]           Demeanour during testimony is a legitimate consideration when assessing credibility. Over-reliance is an error of law. Both verbal and non-verbal communication are relevant. As did Renke, J. in R. v. J.A.B., 2016 ABQB 362 at para. 20, I endorse the following summary of the proper approach to credibility assessment on the basis of demeanour as set out by Ferguson, J. at para. 78 in R. v. Storey, 2010 NBQB 86:

No longer are judges encouraged to consider demeanour evidence to be a determining or even central tool in credibility assessment.  R. v. R.G.L. 2004 CanLII 32143 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 1944 (O.C.A.); R. v. F. (S.) (2007), 2007 PESCAD 17 (CanLII), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (P.E.I.S.C.A.D.) and also R. v. T.E. 2007 ONCA 891 (CanLII), [2007] O.J. No. 4952 (O.C.A.). Rather, the proper approach is to consider the evidence of a particular witness against the backdrop of the rest of the evidence led or other evidence tendered, searching for connectors that may not necessarily rise to the level of legal corroboration between witnesses, the other evidence tendered or a combination of the two in deciding what worth should be attributed to it. In the final analysis it becomes a matter of determining the veracity of the evidence utilizing the age old tools of logic, reason and common sense in measuring the probability, if it is deducible from the evidence, that the witness or witnesses’ honesty on the central issue or issues is assailable.

[27]           Because the trier of fact enjoys the advantage of observing witness demeanour at trial, such credibility assessments are generally entitled to deference upon appellate review. In R. v. Zaritec Industries Limited, 1975 CanLII 941 (AB CA), the Court stated, and I accept, that the greatest weight is to be accorded to the finding by the lower Court which has seen and heard the witnesses.

Ce qu'est la collusion innocente (ou inconsciente)

R. v. E.M.M., 2021 ONCA 436

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[19]      Innocent collusion occurs when, through mere conversation, false memories are implanted and overwhelm independent recollection. However, courts must be wary of jumping to the conclusion that that a witness’s evidence is no longer independent, and has been tainted by innocent collusion, simply because of a conversation. Witnesses may know each other. It is human nature to discuss what happened immediately after offending behaviour takes place: Peter Sankoff, The Law of Witnesses and Evidence in Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019), at §7.4(c), adopted in R. v. L.(R.G.) (2004), 2004 CanLII 32143 (ON CA), 185 C.C.C. (3d) 55 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 37, per Weiler J.A. (dissenting, but not on this point), appeal quashed, 2005 SCC 18, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 288.

Ce que vise l'objectif sentenciel de réhabilitation

R. c. Bissonnette, 2022 CSC 23

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[48]                        Enfin, l’objectif de réinsertion sociale vise à réformer le contrevenant en vue de sa réintégration dans la société, afin qu’il devienne un citoyen respectueux des lois. Cet objectif pénologique présuppose chez l’individu une capacité de prendre sa vie en main et de s’améliorer, avec pour conséquence ultime une meilleure protection de la société. Les auteurs M. Manning et P. Sankoff soulignent que la réhabilitation [traduction] « constitue probablement à long terme la solution la plus économique sur le plan financier et l’objectif pénologique le plus humain » (Manning, Mewett & Sankoff : Criminal Law (5^e éd. 2015), ¶1.155). Dans ce même ordre d’idées, je réitère, comme je l’ai affirmé dans l’arrêt R. c. Lacasse, 2015 CSC 64, [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089, que « [c]et objectif fait partie des valeurs morales fondamentales qui distinguent la société canadienne de nombreuses autres nations du monde » (par. 4).

La Poursuite n'est pas tenue de ''créer'' de la preuve aux fins de son obligation de communication de la preuve

R v Cathcart, 2019 SKCA 90

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[28]           The Crown has no obligation to create evidence for disclosure, or to disclose that which does not exist, but the disclosure obligation includes a duty to preserve relevant evidence in its possession once it comes into existence.

La synthèse des obligations de la Poursuite en matière de conservation de la preuve

R v K.D.S, 2021 SKCA 84

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[60]           In a recent decision, Kalmakoff J.A. succinctly summarized the principles to apply when assessing the Crown’s obligation to preserve relevant evidence: R v Cathcart, 2019 SKCA 90 at paras 27 to 29, 380 CCC (3d) 357 [Cathcart]. Of those principles, the following are germane to this appeal:

(a)               Where an accused establishes on a balance of probabilities that relevant evidence once in the Crown’s possession has been destroyed, the onus shifts to the Crown to provide an explanation for the destruction.

(b)               If the Crown’s explanation satisfies the trial judge that the evidence has not been destroyed through unacceptable negligence, the duty to disclose has not been breached.

(c)               If the explanation offered by the Crown for the loss or destruction of the evidence is insufficient to absolve it of unacceptable negligence, a breach of s. 7 of the Charter is established.

(d)               In assessing the adequacy of the Crown’s explanation, a court must analyze the circumstances surrounding the loss of the evidence. The main consideration is whether the Crown or the police (as the case may be) took reasonable steps in the circumstances to preserve the evidence for disclosure.

(e)               The degree of care expected in the preservation of evidence will generally be commensurate with its relevance.