Le droit au contre-interrogatoire et le respect de la règle d'équité procédurale (Browne v. Dunn)

R v Wapass, 2014 SKCA 76 

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[21]   As the Court explained in R. v. Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, the rule in Browne v. Dunn “requires counsel to give notice to those witnesses whom the cross-examiner intends later to impeach” (para. 64). Giving notice in this context means that if counsel intends to challenge the credibility of a witness by calling contradictory evidence on matters of significance to the facts in issue, “the witness must be given the chance to address the contradictory evidence in cross-examination while he or she is in the witness-box” (R. v. Henderson (1999), 1999 CanLII 2358 (ON CA), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 131 at 141).

[22]   The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the rule in Browne v. Dunn in Lyttle in the criminal context as being “a sound principle of general application” (para. 65). In the circumstances of this case, however, the trial judge erred by applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn to determine the credibility of the accused and the Crown witnesses. The trial judge raised the possibility of the application of the rule after the Crown and defence had closed their cases, and applied it in his assessment of credibility.

[23]   The rule in Browne v. Dunn is not absolute in the sense that once breached the accused must be disbelieved. In Lyttle, the Court stated the extent of the application of the rule is within the discretion of the trial judge, after taking into account all the circumstances of the case (see para. 65). The Court in Lyttle made it clear that the rule is designed to provide fairness to witnesses and parties and it is not “fixed” (para. 65).

[24]        As the Court in Lyttle demonstrates, “the right of an accused to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution—without significant and unwarranted constraint—is an essential component of the right to make full answer and defence” (para. 2). The rule in Browne v. Dunn must co-exist with the right to make full answer and defence.

La règle de “Browne v Dunn”

R v Sawatzky, 2017 ABCA 179

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[21]           The “rule in Browne v Dunn” is not absolute. The trial judge is best suited to determine whether a party has failed to comply with the rule and whether the failure to cross-examine a witness on a certain point was unfair to the other side. The trial judge’s decision about whether the rule was violated, and whether any unfairness resulted, is entitled to considerable deference: R v Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237 at para 90, 125 OR (3d) 81. The extent of the rule’s application “is within the discretion of the trial judge after taking into account all the circumstances of the case”: R v Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at para 65, [2004] 1 SCR 193. When the rule has been breached, the remedy lies within the discretion of the trial judge: R v Werkman, 2007 ABCA 130 at para 9, 404 AR 378.

[22]           Unless admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception, a trial judge may not rely on an out-of-court statement for the truth of its contents. When a witness’s prior out-of-court statement is used to impeach the witness during cross-examination, any portions of the statement put to the witness are not in evidence unless the witness adopts his or her prior statement. It is an error of law, reviewable on a correctness standard, for the trial judge to rely on any facts contained in the out-of-court statement as though they formed part of the witness’s in-court testimony: R v Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41 at para 26, [2013] 2 SCR 720; R v Kelly, 2011 ONCA 549 at para 41, 88 CR (6th) 371.

Analysis

Failure to Apply the Rule in Browne v Dunn

[23]           Where a party intends to impeach a witness who was called by his or her opponent, or present evidence contradicting that witness, the party should direct the witness’s attention to the contradictory evidence. The contradictory evidence should be put to the witness during cross-examination, so that the witness has an opportunity to address or explain the contradictory evidence. If the witness is not cross-examined on any such matters of significance, the trier of fact may consider the failure to cross-examine the witness when assessing the witness’s credibility or the credibility of any contradictory evidence: Lyttle at paras 64-65; R v Paris (2000), 2000 CanLII 17031 (ON CA), 150 CCC (3d) 162 (Ont CA) at para 22; Werkman at para 7; Quansah at paras 75-86.

[24]           This is the well-known “rule in Browne v Dunn.” The rule is rooted in concerns about fairness – specifically, fairness to the witness (who should have an opportunity to address the contested point), fairness to the opposing party (who should understand what aspects of its witness’s evidence are contested), and fairness to the trier of fact (who otherwise might not have the information necessary to properly assess the witness’s credibility): Quansah at para 77; S.C. Hill, D.M. Tanovich and L.P. Strezos, eds, McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 5th ed (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2013) (loose-leaf, release 2016-2) at pp 21-107 to 21-108.

[25]           The rule is not an “ossified, inflexible rule of universal and unremitting application that condemns a cross-examiner who defaults to an evidentiary abyss”: Quansah at para 90. Any failure to cross-examine a witness must relate to a matter of substance, not an issue of little significance: Paris at para 23; Quansah at para 81; R v Abdulle, 2016 ABCA 5 at para 11, 609 AR 396. Before inviting the trier of fact to make an adverse credibility finding, the trial judge may also consider less drastic remedies, such as granting leave to recall witnesses: Werkman at para 9; Quansah at paras 119-120.

[26]           Even if a party has violated the rule, it is up to the trier of fact to determine how much weight, if any, should be placed upon counsel’s failure to cross-examine a witness about a particular matter: R v Palmer, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 759 at pp 782-783; R v MacKinnon (1992), 1992 CanLII 488 (BC CA), 72 CCC (3d) 113 (BCCA); Paris at para 27. Failure to cross-examine the witness about an issue does not require the trier of fact to accept the witness’s evidence on that point: R v Scheideman, 2001 ABCA 94 at para 2, 277 AR 331. An adverse inference is not mandatory.

La règle des faits collatéraux vue par la Cour d'Appel du Québec

Duchesne c. R., 2021 QCCA 1436

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[45]      La règle des faits collatéraux ne permet pas à une partie de produire une contre-preuve extrinsèque pour contredire la réponse d’un témoin, donnée en contre-interrogatoire, sur une question de fait qui est collatérale et qui n’est pas suffisamment pertinente à la disposition du litige[5]. Les questions sur ce genre de fait sont permises en contre-interrogatoire, mais la partie qui les pose est liée par la réponse du témoin et ne peut « présenter une preuve extrinsèque pour la contredire ». Comme la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario le fait remarquer dans l’arrêt R. v. C.F.[6] :

The rule does not impact the scope of cross-examination, but rather limits what contradictory evidence can be called to refute a witness’s answer. The rule seeks to preserve trial efficiency and avoid confusion and distraction by preventing the litigation of issues that have only marginal relevance.

[46]      Cette règle et ses exceptions soulèvent deux questions récurrentes. Dans quelle mesure un fait rapporté par un témoin en contre-interrogatoire peut-il être caractérisé comme « collatéral » et quelle est la portée des exceptions à cette règle d’exclusion?

La règle du fait collatéral

R. v. MacIsaac, 2017 ONCA 172

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[58]      The collateral fact rule does not curtail what is otherwise proper cross-examination of a witness; it potentially limits the manner in which answers given may be subsequently challenged by extrinsic evidence: see Sidney N. Lederman, Alan W. Bryant and Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2014), at pp. 1195-1201. As is often said, if the questioner asks a question that bears on a collateral issue, he or she is “stuck” with the answer, in the sense of not being permitted to lead extrinsic evidence to contradict it. However, this does not prevent proper questions from being put in the first place: see R. v. Krause, 1986 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 466, at pp. 474-475 and R. v. Khanna, 2016 ONCA 39, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 613, at para. 9.

[59]      The collateral fact rule is most often engaged when a cross-examiner attempts to challenge the credibility of a witness. Generally speaking, credibility is considered to be collateral, thereby barring the questioner from adducing extrinsic evidence that bears solely on this issue. However, the rule has developed in a manner that admits of a number of exceptions: See Earl J. Levy, Examination of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 7th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016), at pp. 509-511. The exception that might have applied in this case is that medical evidence may be adduced to prove that, by virtue of a mental or physical condition, the witness is incapable of telling or is unlikely to tell the truth. In Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1965] A.C. 595 (H.L.), at p. 608, Lord Pearce held: “…it must be allowable to call medical evidence of mental illness which makes a witness incapable of giving reliable evidence, whether through the existence of delusions or otherwise.” See also R. v. Dietrich, 1970 CanLII 377 (ON CA), [1970] 3 O.R. 725 (C.A.), at pp. 742-744.

Il est du devoir du juge d'exclure une preuve inadmissible sans que cela ne lui soit demandé

Regina v. D.C.B., 1994 CanLII 6412 (MB CA)

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In R. y. D. (L.E.) (1989), 1989 CanLII 74 (SCC), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 142, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 111, 71 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), Sopinka J. for the majority quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of Limerick J.A. in R. v. Ambrose (1975), 1975 CanLII 1434 (NB CA), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 90, 11 N.B.R. (2d) 376 (N.B.S.C.A.D.); affirmed 1976 CanLII 201 (SCC), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 97, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 673, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 717 (S.C.C.). The passage in question is this (at p. 91): "In a criminal trial there is a duty on the trial Judge to exclude inadmissible evidence even though adduced by counsel for the accused or not objected to ...".

And in Stirland v. D.P.P., [1944] A.C. 315 (H.L. (E.)), Viscount Simon L.C., said (at pp. 327-8):

It has been said more than once that a judge when trying a case should not wait for objection to be taken to the admissibility of the evidence, but should stop such questions himself: see Rex v. Ellis ([1910] 2 K.B. 746, 764). If that be the judge's duty, it can hardly be fatal to an appeal founded on the admission of an improper question that counsel failed at the time to raise the matter.

If it is the duty of a trial judge to exclude inadmissible evidence without being asked to do so, surely it is the duty of an appellate judge who observes that clearly inadmissible evidence has been relied on by the trier of fact to raise the question and, if no satisfactory explanation is given, to propose allowing the appeal on that ground. A person should not stand convicted on the strength of clearly inadmissible evidence.

Le juge du procès a le son devoir d'écarter les éléments de preuve inadmissibles

R. c. D. (L.E.), 1989 CanLII 74 (CSC)

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Par ailleurs, si le juge du procès estimait que le contre‑interrogatoire et la réponse donnée par la mère de la plaignante créeraient une impression erronée dans l'esprit des jurés et que cela fausserait les procédures, il aurait dû ordonner l'annulation du procès plutôt que d'admettre la preuve de faits similaires.  Le témoin a répondu à côté de la question, bien que sa réponse fût indubitablement instinctive et sans malice.  Quoique le contre‑interrogatoire mené par l'avocat de l'accusé ait aggravé l'erreur, et l'avocat est loin d'être sans reproche à cet égard, cela ne dégage pas le juge du procès de son devoir d'écarter les éléments de preuve inadmissibles.  Dans l'affaire R. v. Ambrose (1975), 1975 CanLII 1434 (NB CA), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 90 (C.S.N.‑B., Div. app.), conf. 1976 CanLII 201 (CSC), [1977] 2 R.C.S. 717, un témoin à charge avait fait une déclaration à côté de la question au cours du contre‑interrogatoire de l'avocat de la défense qui, plutôt que de s'opposer immédiatement à la réponse, a alors demandé au témoin de réitérer ses propos.  Je souscris à ce que dit la Division d'appel sur l'obligation d'un juge du procès, aux pp. 91 et 92:

 

   [TRADUCTION]  Il incombe au juge qui préside un procès criminel d'écarter toute preuve inadmissible, même celle apportée par l'avocat de l'accusé et celle n'ayant fait l'objet d'aucune objection, et s'il arrive qu'une preuve inadmissible soit produite, le juge du procès doit dire immédiatement au jury de ne pas en tenir compte, ou, dans le cas d'une preuve à ce point préjudiciable que le jury se verrait dans l'impossibilité d'en faire abstraction, il doit libérer le jury et ordonner la tenue d'un nouveau procès:  R. v. Farrell (1909), 1909 CanLII 201 (ON CA), 15 C.C.C. 283, 20 O.L.R. 182 (C.A.); R. v. Doyle (1916), 1916 CanLII 472 (NS CA), 26 C.C.C. 197, 28 D.L.R. 649, 50 N.S.R. 123 (C.A.)

 

Si le juge du procès était d'avis que le fait d'avertir immédiatement le jury de ne pas tenir compte de la preuve ne suffisait pas pour assurer un procès équitable, il aurait dû ordonner l'annulation du procès plutôt que d'admettre une preuve d'actes similaires précédemment exclue.

Il est inapproprié de contre-interroger son propre témoin et d'ébranler sa crédibilité

R. v. Situ, 2005 ABCA 275

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[8]               In R. v. Nicholson (1998), 223 A.R. 82, 1998 ABCA 290, this Court concluded, at para. 19,  that improper cross-examination by Crown counsel of his own witness may result in a new trial where credibility findings by the judge or jury would have been influenced by the cross-examination, causing prejudice to the accused:

 

Crown counsel is not entitled to ask leading questions of his own witness, respecting matters in issue in the trial, and is not entitled to cross-examine the witness or seek to impeach the witness, unless permitted to do so by the Court, following an application under s. 9 of the Canada Evidence Act, or an application to declare the witness hostile. Generally, the law is that responses in answer to leading questions ought to be given little weight. (See R. v. Williams (1982), 1982 CanLII 3729 (ON CA), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 234 (Ont. C.A.)). But an improper attempt by the Crown to impeach his own witness, especially a witness related to the accused, can result in prejudice to the accused and lead to a new trial. (See R. v. Milgaard (1971), 1971 CanLII 792 (SK CA), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 206.)

 

 

[9]               The Ontario Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in  R. v. Rose (2001), 2001 CanLII 24079 (ON CA), 53 O.R. (3d) 417.  Charron J.A. (as she then was), giving the judgment for the Court, summarized the law as follows at para. 9:

 

A leading question is one that suggests the answer. It is trite law that the party who calls a witness is generally not permitted to ask the witness leading questions. The reason for the rule arises from a concern that the witness, who in many instances favours the party who calls him or her, will readily agree to the suggestions put in the form of a question rather than give his or her own answers to the questions. Of course, the degree of concern that may arise from the use of leading questions will depend on the particular circumstances and the rule is applied with some flexibility. For example, leading questions are routinely asked to elicit a witness' evidence on preliminary and non‑contentious matters. This practice is adopted for the sake of expediency and generally gives rise to no concern. Leading questions are also permitted to the extent that they are necessary to direct the witness to a particular matter or field of inquiry. Apart from these specific examples, the trial judge has a general discretion to allow leading questions whenever it is considered necessary in the interests of justice: Reference Re R. v. Coffin, 1956 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 191, 114 C.C.C. 1 at pp. 211‑12 S.C.R., p. 22 C.C.C..

 

 

[10]           After citing excerpts from the examination of the witness and the exchange between counsel and the court, Charron J.A. continued at para. 13:

 

In my view, Crown counsel's questions to Beaudry were clearly suggestive of the answers. Indeed, the entire examination‑in‑chief reads more like the cross‑examination of a witness. This was highly improper, particularly in these circumstances where Beaudry, as the trial judge himself stated in his reasons, was "the primary Crown witness" and the questions concerned crucial and contentious matters.

 

 

[12]           We have reviewed the transcript of the examination of this witness by Crown counsel at trial and conclude that Crown counsel conducted an  improper cross-examination of his own witness, and impeached the witness. Undoubtedly, Dakota Cree was a difficult witness. What occurred at trial must be examined with that understanding. At first, Crown counsel properly used portions of the transcript of Cree’s evidence at the preliminary inquiry to refresh the witness’ memory. Gradually, the questioning became more persistent, and Crown counsel challenged the witness, by putting the transcript to him, by persistently asking  leading questions that suggested answers, and finally, by reminding him that he could be liable to a perjury prosecution and an increased jail sentence. In doing so, he crossed the line from controlled examination of a witness into cross-examination and impeachment.