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dimanche 29 juin 2025

Les principes applicables à la détermination de la peine visant un contrevenant policier

R. v. Greenhalgh, 2011 BCSC 511 

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[53]            In R. v. Cook2010 ONSC 5016, [2010] O.J. No. 4414 (QL) [Cook], Hill J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice gathered together a number of authorities relating to sentencing of a police officer. Principles set out in that decision which I consider applicable here include the following:

1.      Police officers, as officials discharging public duties, occupy a special position of trust in the community (para. 29).

2.      As in any line of work, the moral compass of an individual police officer may become untrue as he or she elects "to cross to the other side of the road and become a criminal". Police officers have opportunities, practically on a daily basis, to cross the line and engage in prohibited conduct. The public trusts them to resist the temptation and relies upon the courts to deal firmly with those who stray (paras. 31-32).        

3.      When sentencing a police officer for a crime involving breach of the public trust the court may properly take into account that the accused would necessarily be well aware of the consequences of its perpetration (para. 35).

4.      Not surprising is the reality that individuals who find themselves before a criminal court convicted of a breach of trust crime are able to adduce abundant good character evidence – "[i]t is, of course, this very type of character profile which allows an individual to attain a position of trust" (para. 36).

5.      In any case involving conviction and sentence, the accused is stigmatized, more or less, by the process. While shame and disgrace may be amplified in the instance of a public official, these consequences are not to be over-emphasized in determining a fit punishment (para.37).

6.      Quite apart from the police corruption offence in s. 122 of the Criminal Code, breach of a position of trust is a deemed aggravating factor in sentencing: s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Code (para. 38).

7.      General deterrence and denunciation drive the sentencing process in abuse of trust prosecutions. In the absence of an exceptional mitigating factor (e.g., addiction), severe sentences are justified for police officer offenders to honour these sentencing principles (para. 38).

8.      While a police officer who breaches the public trust brings upon himself or herself the consequence of dismissal, that penalty falls to be considered within the totality of the circumstances worthy of review by a sentencing court.  The jeopardy of loss of employment on the part of a police officer cannot trump the pressing need for denunciation and deterrence (para. 42).

9.      Police officer offenders will almost inevitably serve much or all of the sentence in protective custody. This reality, involving as it does more limited social contact and institutional amenities, ordinarily warrants consideration in mitigation of punishment (para. 43).

Les pratiques douanières d'un pays ne sont pas de connaissance judiciaire

Champagne c. R., 2020 QCCA 1393

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[3]         La requête pose comme principale question l’intérêt véritable de l’appelant dans la mesure recherchée. Il convient de rappeler à ce sujet qu’il s’agit d’une question de fait laissée à l’appréciation du juge de la peine[2].

[4]         En première instance, l’appelant n’a pas réussi à démontrer à la juge comment un antécédent criminel porté à son dossier pourrait nuire à la capacité de son entreprise de s’approvisionner aux États-Unis et en Chine, alors que la preuve révèle que les achats faits par sa société se font par téléphone.

[5]         La preuve est tout aussi silencieuse sur la nécessité pour l’appelant de rencontrer les fournisseurs de son entreprise aux États-Unis ou en Chine. De plus, et contrairement à ce qu’il soutient, les pratiques douanières ne sont pas de connaissance judiciaire[3]. Les répercussions appréhendées par l’appelant à l’égard de son entreprise relèvent donc de la spéculation[4].

L'utilisation par un juge de la méthode de la peine « globale » n'est pas l'approche préconisée par la Cour d'appel, bien qu'elle ne mène pas en soi à une erreur de principe

J.T. c. R., 2023 QCCA 1457

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[14]      Le premier moyen ne mérite pas qu’on s’y attarde. Comme le rappelle la Cour dans l’arrêt R. c. Guerrero Silva, « en principe les crimes constituant des transactions criminelles distinctes entraînent, sous réserve du principe de la totalité, des peines consécutives »[7]. Ici, les actes commis à l’endroit de X en 1987 ou 1988 et à l’endroit de Y entre 1984 et 1986 sont des transactions criminelles distinctes et les motifs du juge font voir qu’il a tenu compte du principe de totalité.

[15]      En réalité, le juge a utilisé la méthode de la peine « globale », c’est-à-dire qu’il a d’abord déterminé la peine totale de trois ans pour toutes les infractions, pour ensuite la répartir entre celles-ci. Bien que cette approche ne soit pas celle préconisée dans l’arrêt Guerrero Silva, elle ne mène pas en soi à une erreur de principe ni à une peine manifestement non indiquée justifiant l’intervention de la Cour[8]. En l’espèce, les motifs du juge sont transparents et intelligibles et permettent de comprendre la démarche qu’il a suivie.

[16]      Sur le deuxième moyen, le juge ne commet pas d’erreur en retenant la manipulation psychologique au titre des facteurs aggravants. Les paroles prononcées par l’appelant pour inciter les plaignantes à se soumettre aux abus sont une forme de manipulation psychologique. Quant aux facteurs atténuants, le juge a tenu compte de l’absence d’antécédents judiciaires et du fait que l’appelant n’a eu aucun démêlé avec la justice criminelle depuis la commission des infractions. Enfin, l’appelant n’a présenté aucune preuve relative à son état de santé susceptible de justifier un allègement de la peine[9].

Les conditions à rencontrer pour que certaines autorisations judiciaires puissent être émises

R. v. Wahabi et al, 2021 MBQB 266

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[41]      The law regarding search warrants, and their issuance and review is well established and it applies with equal force to production orders.  Accordingly, the reasoning and tests set out in Garofoli  and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) et al.2009 MBCA 122, at paragraph 31, have obvious relevance for many of the issues in this case.

[42]      In Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Manitoba Court of Appeal noted as follows (at paragraph 31):

Thus, it would appear that judges have generally accepted that the law regarding search warrants should also apply to production orders.  All parties in this case, including the reviewing judge, proceeded on that assumption.  I agree with that assumption.

[43]      In commenting upon the generally deferential nature of a Garofoli review, the Manitoba Court of Appeal noted the following in R. v. Pilbeam2018 MBCA 128 (at paragraphs 6 to 8):

[6]      The deferential nature of a Garofoli review is well known (see R v Deol2006 MBCA 39 at paras 6-8).  There is a presumption of validity as to a search warrant and the sworn information supporting it (see R v Collins (1989), 1989 CanLII 264 (ON CA), 48 CCC (3d) 343 at 356 (Ont CA)).  The accused bears the burden of demonstrating, on balance, that the ITO is insufficient to establish reasonable grounds (see R v Campbell2011 SCC 32 at para 14).

[7]      Warrant review “involves a contextual analysis, not a piecemeal approach to individual items of evidence shorn of their context” (R v Beauchamp2015 ONCA 260 at para 85).  Like a painting or photograph, an ITO’s meaning can only be properly understood if it is considered as a whole.  Reviewing judges should be skeptical of attempts to deconstruct an ITO by looking at its aspects in isolation.  Such an approach is an error in principle.  Rather, the reviewing judge is to assess the facts and the reasonable inferences available by taking a “practical, non-technical, and common-sense” assessment of the totality of the circumstances (R v Whitaker2008 BCCA 174 at para 42, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32657 (30 October 2008); see also R v Evans (ED)2014 MBCA 44 at para 10).

[8]      The reviewing judge’s important, but limited, responsibility is to decide whether the record before the authorising judge or justice, as corrected and amplified on the review, provides “any basis upon which the authorizing judge [or justice] could be satisfied that the relevant statutory preconditions existed” (R v Pires; R v Lising2005 SCC 66 at para 30; see also Garofoli at p 1452; R v Araujo2000 SCC 65 at para 51Morelli at paras 40-43Campbell at para 14; and R v Vu2013 SCC 60 at para 16).

[44]      Despite the applicability of the law regarding search warrants (and their issuance and review) to production orders, I agree with the position of the Crown that it should not be assumed that all relevant statutory provisions (ss. 185186487.014487.015487.016 and 487.017 of the Criminal Code) contain the same basic requirements of reasonable and probable grounds.  Sections 185 and 186 for example, require far more than simply reasonable and probable grounds.

[45]      I note that the production order sections have varying statutory prerequisites which stipulate what the judge or justice must be satisfied of before issuing the various productions orders: 

a)           Section 487.014 — general production orders require that there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has or will be committed; and that document or data in the possession of the party will afford evidence of the offence;

b)           Section 487.015 — the production order for trace communications only requires that there are reasonable and probable grounds to suspect an offence has or will be committed; and that document or data in the possession of the party will assist in the investigation of the offence;

c)            Section 487.016 — the production order for transmission data similarly only requires that there are reasonable and probable grounds to suspect an offence has or will be committed; and that document or data in the possession of the party will assist in the investigation of the offence; and

d)           Section 487.017 — the production order for tracking data also requires that there are reasonable and probable grounds to suspect an offence has or will be committed; and that data or data in the possession of the party will assist in the investigation of the offence.

Introduction to Criminal Investigation: Processes, Practices and Thinking

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par Rod Gehl and Darryl Plecas

Lorsqu'un accusé allègue que la fouille incidente à son arrestation est illégale, il appartient à la poursuite de démontrer la légalité de l'arrestation

R. v. Desilva, 2022 ONCA 879

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[55]      While ordinarily a claimant has the burden to prove that there has been an unlawful arrest, where the claimant has brought an overlapping challenge against the warrantless search incident to arrest, the Crown bears the burden to show that the predicate arrest was lawful: R. v. Gerson-Foster2019 ONCA 405, 437 C.R.R. (2d) 193, at para. 75. This is to avoid conflicting burdens on the same issue because warrantless searches are presumptively unlawful and the Crown ordinarily bears the burden to show their lawfulness: R. v. Fearon2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, at para. 87.

mardi 24 juin 2025

La Couronne supporte toujours le fardeau de justifier d'une arrestation sans mandat

R v S (WEQ), 2018 MBCA 106 

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[14]                     When an accused challenges the validity of a warrantless arrest, the burden is on the Crown to show that the arrest was made in accordance with section 495(1) of the Code.

[15]                     Section 495(1) of the Code states as follows:

 

Arrest without warrant by peace officer

(1) A peace officer may arrest without warrant

 

(a) a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence;

 

(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; or

 

(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in force within the territorial jurisdiction in which the person is found.

 

[16]                     In The Queen v Biron1975 CanLII 13 (SCC)[1976] 2 SCR 56, Martland J, for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, considered sections 495(1)(a) and (b) (then sections 450(1)(a) and (b)), and stated (at pp 71-72):

 

Paragraph (a) of s. 450(1) permits a peace officer to arrest without a warrant:

 

(a)  a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable and probable grounds, he believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence,

 

This paragraph, limited in its application to indictable offences, deals with the situation in which an offence has already been committed or is expected to be committed.  The peace officer is not present at its commission.  He may have to rely upon information received from others.  The paragraph therefore enables him to act on his belief, if based on reasonable and probable grounds.

 

Paragraph (b) applies in relation to any criminal offence and it deals with the situation in which the peace officer himself finds an offence being committed.  His power to arrest is based upon his own observation.  Because it is based on his own discovery of an offence actually being committed there is no reason to refer to a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.

 

[17]                     Subsequent appellate case law has added to and clarified the statements made in Biron.  For example, in Regina v Stevens (1976), 1976 CanLII 1411 (NS CA)33 CCC (2d) 429 (NSSC (AD)), MacDonald JA, for the Court, considered Biron and stated (at p 434):

 

The requirement of reasonable and probable grounds relates only to arrest without warrant in indictable offences (s. 450(1)(a)) [now s. 495(1)(a)] not to summary conviction offences such as creating a disturbance.  In order to arrest a person without a warrant for a summary conviction offence it is not sufficient for the arresting officer to show that he had reasonable and probable grounds to believe such offence had been, or was about to be, committed; rather, he must go further and show that he found a situation in which a person was apparently committing an offence.

En cas d'arrestation sans mandat, il appartient à l'État de démontrer que l'arrestation est raisonnable selon la balance des probabilités

R. v. White, 2022 NSCA 61 

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[22]         The judge observed that s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code requires that on a warrantless arrest the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence.  There is a subjective and objective component when establishing reasonable grounds to arrest without a warrant.  The burden is on the Crown to show that on a balance of probabilities, a warrantless arrest was reasonable.  All the circumstances must be considered.  The judge noted the circumstances in this case included:

[43]      (a)        the police attended the parking lot to investigate a motor vehicle accident involving two vehicles – a dark or navy blue Volkswagen Jetta and a second vehicle that had fled the scene, hitting a female pedestrian as it fled;

            (b)        when officers arrived on scene, they began the investigation into the motor vehicle accident;

            (c)        Cst. McCully went to speak with the female pedestrian who had been struck by the fleeing vehicle;

            (d)      Cst. MacNeil spoke with Decoda White, Nathaniel White and Mariam Al Husseini who were in the Vokswagen [sic] vehicle in the parking lot;

            (e)        No details were provided by Decoda White, Nathaniel White or Mariam Al Husseini regarding the type or colour of the other vehicle that had fled the scene;

            (f)        Ms. Al Husseini provided the vehicle paperwork to Cst. MacNeil;

            (g)        Cst. MacNeil returned to his vehicle to begin the report on the motor vehicle accident. While in his vehicle, Cst. MacNeil received a telephone call from Staff Sgt. Perry Astephen and asked to contact Sgt. Sheppard,who had information that a firearm was present;

            (h)        Cst. MacNeil telephoned Sgt. Sheppard and was told that Sgt. Sheppard had received information from a confidential source that Decoda White was seen with a firearm in the vehicle. By that time, the paramedic had arrived to attend to the female pedestrian;

            (i)         Mariam Al Husseini was in the ambulance. Decoda White was seated in the front passenger seat of the Volkswagen with the door open and his feet outside of the vehicle, on the ground. Nathaniel White was seated in the back seat of the Volkswagen with the door open and his feet outside of the vehicle, on the ground;

            (j)         There was no firearm observed in plain view by Cst. MacNeil and there was no evidence of illicit activities.

Les peines en matière d’introduction par effraction varient de manière si significative qu’il est difficile de cerner les tendances avec précision

R. c. Beaudoin, 2016 QCCA 1241 

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[28]        Pour l’appelante, cette question appelle une réponse affirmative puisque la peine imposée déroge à la fourchette des sentences infligées aux délinquants sans antécédents judiciaires commettant des introductions par effraction multiples et qu’elle situe entre une et deux années de détention ferme.

[29]        Le juge Wagner rappelle dans R. c. Lacasse que les fourchettes des peines, dont l’objectif est l’harmonisation de celles-ci, ne sont que des lignes directrices[8]. La dérogation à une fourchette de peines ne constitue pas une erreur de droit ou de principe. Ainsi, une peine se situant à l’extérieur de la fourchette peut être tout à fait indiquée alors qu’une autre se situant à l’intérieur de celle-ci peut être manifestement non indiquée.

[30]        Les peines en matière d’introduction par effraction varient de manière si significative qu’il est difficile de cerner les tendances avec précision[9], car ces dernières sont tributaires des circonstances propres à chaque affaire. Plusieurs auteurs notent, à cet égard, qu’en dépit de la gravité objective de l’infraction prévue à l’article 348(1)d) C.cr., les peines infligées sont fréquemment clémentes[10].

[31]        Les frontières de la fourchette des peines sont, en conséquence, diffuses et difficiles à définir. En l’espèce, la peine est, à n’en pas douter, clémente mais elle prend en compte que les infractions sont graves et nombreuses et qu’elles ont été commises sur une courte période de temps (45 jours) par une délinquante, sans antécédents judiciaires, et atteinte de troubles psychologiques loin d’être anodins.

[32]        Les risques de récidive sont, en conséquence, faibles si l’intimée suit les traitements appropriés. En tenant compte de tous les facteurs aggravants et atténuants pertinents et en gardant à l’esprit que l’objectif de la réhabilitation demeure une considération importante dans le cas de jeunes délinquants tels que l’intimée, la peine imposée en l’espèce n’est pas nettement déraisonnable ni entachée d’une erreur de principe, d’une omission de prendre en compte un facteur pertinent ou d’une insistance trop grande sur un tel facteur.

Le dédommagement à la victime doit toujours être envisagé lors de la détermination de la peine

Comment le Tribunal doit se gouverner face à la demande d'un co-accusé d'avoir un procès séparé de ses complices

R. v. Zvolensky, 2017 ONCA 273 Lien vers la décision [245] It is difficult to underestimate the importance of a principled, case-specific ap...