R. v. Greenhalgh, 2011 BCSC 511
[53] In R. v. Cook, 2010 ONSC 5016, [2010] O.J. No. 4414 (QL) [Cook], Hill J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice gathered together a number of authorities relating to sentencing of a police officer. Principles set out in that decision which I consider applicable here include the following:
1. Police officers, as officials discharging public duties, occupy a special position of trust in the community (para. 29).
2. As in any line of work, the moral compass of an individual police officer may become untrue as he or she elects "to cross to the other side of the road and become a criminal". Police officers have opportunities, practically on a daily basis, to cross the line and engage in prohibited conduct. The public trusts them to resist the temptation and relies upon the courts to deal firmly with those who stray (paras. 31-32).
3. When sentencing a police officer for a crime involving breach of the public trust the court may properly take into account that the accused would necessarily be well aware of the consequences of its perpetration (para. 35).
4. Not surprising is the reality that individuals who find themselves before a criminal court convicted of a breach of trust crime are able to adduce abundant good character evidence – "[i]t is, of course, this very type of character profile which allows an individual to attain a position of trust" (para. 36).
5. In any case involving conviction and sentence, the accused is stigmatized, more or less, by the process. While shame and disgrace may be amplified in the instance of a public official, these consequences are not to be over-emphasized in determining a fit punishment (para.37).
6. Quite apart from the police corruption offence in s. 122 of the Criminal Code, breach of a position of trust is a deemed aggravating factor in sentencing: s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Code (para. 38).
7. General deterrence and denunciation drive the sentencing process in abuse of trust prosecutions. In the absence of an exceptional mitigating factor (e.g., addiction), severe sentences are justified for police officer offenders to honour these sentencing principles (para. 38).
8. While a police officer who breaches the public trust brings upon himself or herself the consequence of dismissal, that penalty falls to be considered within the totality of the circumstances worthy of review by a sentencing court. The jeopardy of loss of employment on the part of a police officer cannot trump the pressing need for denunciation and deterrence (para. 42).
9. Police officer offenders will almost inevitably serve much or all of the sentence in protective custody. This reality, involving as it does more limited social contact and institutional amenities, ordinarily warrants consideration in mitigation of punishment (para. 43).