Il est adéquat pour un juge d'instance de tirer l'inférence que l'accusé a la mens rea nécessaire à la commission de l'infraction d'entrave à la justice lorsque l'ensemble de la preuve est prise en compte

R v Kaiswatum, 2019 SKCA 7 

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[53]           The sole issue at the trial was whether the Crown had proven the necessary mens rea to make out an attempt to obstruct justice. The Crown conceded it was required to prove Mr. Kaiswatum verbalized a sound with the specific intention to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice, in keeping with the decision of this Court in R v Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91, 399 Sask R 249 [Yazelle], which explains the mens rea required to prove the offence of obstruction of justice:

[4]        The Crown does not dispute that obstruction is a specific intent offence. While it had initially submitted that, in this case, the mens rea of the offence of obstruction is manifest upon proof of the actus reus of the offence, the Crown agreed in oral argument that the requisite mens rea requires proof of an intention to obstruct justice, not just an intention to do an act which has the effect of obstructing justice (see: R. v. Beaudry; R. v. Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras. 38-39; and R. v. Esau, 2009 SKCA 31, 324 Sask. R. 95). …

(Emphasis added)

[54]           Although it is correct to say there is no direct evidence of Mr. Kaiswatum’s specific intention, there was most certainly indirect evidence, in the totality of the circumstances, from which the trial judge could infer Mr. Kaiswatum’s intention, as he did. These circumstances included the initial inquiry made by Mr. Kaiswatum as to whether the accomplice could see the courtroom, the nature of the sound itself, and the implausible explanation for that sound offered by Mr. Kaiswatum when challenged about it.

[55]           In R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, the Supreme Court addressed circumstantial evidence and made the following statements:

[35]      At one time, it was said that in circumstantial cases, “conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on infer­ences drawn from proven facts”: see R. v. McIver, 1965 CanLII 26 (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.), at p. 479, aff’d without discussion of this point 1966 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254. However, that view is no longer accepted. In assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts: R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 58; see also R. v. Defaveri, 2014 BCCA 370, 361 B.C.A.C. 301, at para. 10; R. v. Bui, 2014 ONCA 614, 14 C.R. (7th) 149, at para. 28. Requir­ing proven facts to support explanations other than guilt wrongly puts an obligation on an accused to prove facts and is contrary to the rule that whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by consider­ing all of the evidence. The issue with respect to circumstantial evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof be­yond a reasonable doubt.

[36]      I agree with the respondent’s position that a reasonable doubt, or theory alternative to guilt, is not rendered “speculative” by the mere fact that it arises from a lack of evidence. As stated by this Court in Lifchus , a reasonable doubt “is a doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”: para. 30 (emphasis added). A certain gap in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. But those inferences must be reasonable given the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense.

[37]      When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v. Comba, 1938 CanLII 14 (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, per Middleton J.A., aff’d 1938 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v. Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28, 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R. v. Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35. I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable possibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v. Bagshaw, 1971 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evi­dence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation.

[38]      Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw. But the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty.

(Underlining in original, italics emphasis added)

[56]           Here, the trial judge found that there was no “possible rational explanation” for the utterance other than Mr. Kaiswatum was intending to obstruct the proceedings and Mr. Kaiswatum’s explanation was a “lie”. Although not referenced, the trial judge expressed this conclusion with an evident eye to the case law just reviewed as to when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

[57]           There is nothing remarkable in a trier of fact drawing an inference that an accused had the necessary mens rea based on the voluntary commission of the actus reus, along with any other circumstances that may be relevant. In R v Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 323 DLR (4th) 275, the court observed as follows:

[51]      The specific intent of attempting to obstruct justice often must be inferred from the conduct of an accused and its surrounding circumstances. This inference is easily made where the conduct at issue is obviously detrimental to the administration of justice. …

Le fait pour un accusé de tenter, par des moyens de corruption, de dissuader la plaignante de témoigner est de l'entrave à la justice

R. c. Morrow, 2021 CSC 21

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[1]               Le juge Moldaver — La Cour, à la majorité, est d’avis de rejeter l’appel, essentiellement pour les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel, aux par. 16 et 17 de l’arrêt de la cour. Comme l’ont fait remarquer les juges majoritaires, le dossier étaye clairement l’inférence tirée par le juge du procès selon laquelle M. Morrow a tenté, par des moyens de corruption, de dissuader la plaignante de témoigner. Monsieur Morrow savait que des accusations de harcèlement criminel avaient récemment été portées contre lui et qu’il lui était interdit de communiquer avec la plaignante. Malgré cela, il s’est présenté au domicile de cette dernière sans y être invité et a engagé avec elle une longue et pénible discussion au sujet de la procédure à suivre pour retirer les accusations ainsi que des raisons pour lesquelles elle avait porté ces accusations. La plaignante a témoigné que, du fait de cet échange, elle s’était sentie [traduction] « [c]ontrainte de se montrer accommodante » envers M. Morrow afin de l’amener à quitter la maison (d.a., vol. II, p. 30). Peu de temps après, M. Morrow l’a agressée sexuellement, ce qui a exacerbé ses craintes. Sur la base de ce témoignage, il était loisible au juge du procès de conclure que M. Morrow avait l’intention d’exercer de la pression sur la plaignante et, ultimement, de la manipuler pour qu’elle laisse tomber les accusations portées contre lui. Le fait que M. Morrow ait pu également être motivé par le désir de renouer avec la plaignante ne faisait pas obstacle à cette conclusion.

[2]               Il y avait en outre des éléments de preuve contredisant la position de M. Morrow selon laquelle il ne faisait que répondre à une demande de renseignements. La plaignante n’a présenté aucune demande de la sorte à M. Morrow, et elle ne comptait pas sur l’information qu’il a fournie, et n’était pas non plus intéressée à l’obtenir.

[3]               Compte tenu de ces circonstances, et eu égard au fait que les survivants de violence familiale sont particulièrement vulnérables aux actes d’intimidation et de manipulation, le verdict du juge du procès était raisonnable. Il n’y a pas matière à intervention en appel.

Une menace à l'égard d'une victime peut empêcher l'institution de poursuites et détourner le cours de la justice

Couture c. R., 2012 QCCA 243

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[46]        Une menace à l'égard d'une victime peut empêcher l'institution de poursuites et détourner le cours de la justice.  L'expression « le cours de la justice » inclut l'étape de l'enquête donnant lieu à une poursuite judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire[17].

L'entrave à la justice est un crime d'intention spécifique & le fait pour un accusé de demander à un témoin de s'en tenir à la vérité ne constitue pas un crime

Moreau c. La Reine, 2000 CanLII 29884 (QC CA)

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1  L'appelant a été déclaré coupable d'entrave à la justice (art. 139(2) C.cr.) Selon R. c. Charbonneau (1992) 1992 CanLII 2979 (QC CA), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 49 , cette infraction requiert la preuve d'un acte tendant à entraver le cours de la justice (Actus reus) et d'une intention spécifique de ce faire (Mens rea);

2  Le juge du procès a dit ne pas croire l'appelant quand celui-ci affirmait avoir demandé à Madame Elizabeth Gravel de s'en tenir à la vérité; or, la lecture du témoignage même de Madame Gravel (MA, page 141) révèle que celle-ci reconnaissait que l'appelant lui avait expressément dit de ne pas mentir. En somme, les deux témoignages concordaient sur cet élément capital de la preuve du Ministère public. Cette concordance aurait dû soulever un doute raisonnable dans l'esprit du juge, doute dont l'appelant devait bénéficier, quant à la preuve des éléments essentiels de l'infraction reprochée.

Des questions quant à la validité de l'émission d'un subpoena ne permettent pas au justiciable de se soustraire de la justice de son propre chef

R. v. Hussein, 2019 ONCA 230

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[7]         We do not agree with Mr. Abdul-Hussein. Mr. Abdul-Hussein’s wilful act of evading a subpoena and failing to appear as a witness at a murder trial where he had material evidence to give had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice: R. v. Houle, 2016 MBCA 121 at para. 6. The actus reus of the offence is made out without the inquiry into the validity of the subpoena.

[8]         Such inquiry would violate the general rule that collateral attacks – being attacks on an order “made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation or nullification of the order” – are impermissible: R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7, at para. 21. As Moldaver J. observed in Bird, at para. 22,

[T]he rule against collateral attacks on court orders has been consistently applied in criminal proceedings where the charge involves an alleged breach of a court order…. The citizens’ safeguard is in seeking to have illegal orders set aside through the legal process, not in disobeying them.

As Moldaver J. explained at para. 24, it violates the rule of law and the repute of the administration of justice to permit those presented with court orders to disobey them rather than to bring a challenge to their validity.

[9]         The decisions relied upon by Mr. Abdul-Hussein, R. v. Oliveira, 2009 ONCA 219, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 217, and R. v. Molina, 2008 ONCA 212, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 193, do not assist him. He asserts that those cases stand for the proposition that when the validity of a court order is an element of the offence, the collateral challenge bar does not apply. That is incorrect. Instead, those cases hold that it is not a collateral attack to defend against a charge of failing to comply with an order by relying on the failure of authorities to comply with statutory procedural protections associated with the order. Oliveira involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 505, that after issuing a promise to appear, authorities must lay the related information “as soon as practicable”. Molina involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 260(1)(c), that an offender subject to a driving prohibition must be notified of the offence of failing to comply with that prohibition. Neither case involved challenges to the validity of the underlying orders themselves.

[10]      Nor, in our view, is this a case where an exception to the general rule should be recognized. If Mr. Abdul-Hussein had concerns about the validity of the subpoena, he had an effective means to challenge the court order by applying to quash the subpoena.

[11]      Indeed, as the Crown pointed out, it is not contested that Mr. Abdul-Hussein had material evidence to give. Had he successfully challenged the subpoena before trial in this case, a new subpoena would have issued. In our view, it would turn the rationale for the rule against collateral attacks on its head to recognize an exception that would leave those who disobey orders in a better position than those who bring proper challenges.

La notion d’inférence négative en matière d'esquive de l'accusé

R. c. Douiri, 2023 QCCQ 8020

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[132]      Par ailleurs, la règle s’applique avec une nuance en l’espèce. Contrairement au scénario typique envisagé par la Cour suprême dans R. c. Noble, dans le présent dossier, le Tribunal a conclu que Douiri s’esquive dans le but spécifique d’entraver le déroulement du procès et d’éviter ses conséquences défavorables potentielles. Dans un tel cas, à l’art. 475(2) C.cr., le législateur prévoit que le Tribunal peut bel et bien « tirer une conclusion défavorable au prévenu » du fait qu’il se soit esquivé. Le Code criminel ne précise pas à quel égard une telle inférence défavorable serait tirée.

[133]      Le libellé de la disposition n’est pas limitatif. Il appert de la jurisprudence que la notion d’inférence négative jouit d’une interprétation large. Dans le récent arrêt R. v. Akhtar, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a précisé que l’art. 475 C.cr. permet de tirer des inférences défavorables à deux niveaux :

(1)  La fuite peut affecter la crédibilité de l’accusé, dans les cas où il aura fourni une version au Tribunal[57]; et

(2)  La fuite peut constituer une preuve de conscience coupable, ayant une valeur probante quant à la mens rea des infractions reprochées[58].

Propos de la Cour d'appel de l'Alberta quant aux bris de conditions

R. v. Charles, 2006 ABCA 216

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[8]               Parliament has provided several indications that s. 145(2)(a)-(b) is one offence, not two separate and distinct offences. First, the fact that neither subsection is intelligible by itself suggests that the section is meant to be read as a whole. More importantly, while subsections (a) and (b) describe different modes of committing the offence of failing to attend, a third method of committing the offence is described in the final words of the section. Thus, there are three, not two ways of committing the offence:

 

·           being at large on an undertaking or recognizance given to or entered into before a justice or judge and failing to attend court (subsection (a));

 

·           having appeared before a court, justice or judge and failing to attend court as thereafter required by the court, justice or judge (subsection (b)); and

 

·           having appeared before a court, justice or judge and failing to surrender in accordance with an order of the court, justice or judge (last paragraph of s. 145(2)).

 

Although the first and second methods of committing the offence could be charged by specifying a subsection of s. 145(2), a charge for the third method could only refer to s. 145(2), without a subsection reference. Had Parliament intended to create discrete offences, it surely would have included a subsection (c), specifically enumerating the third way of committing the offence.

 

[9]               A review of similarly structured provisions of the Criminal Code confirms the conclusion that it is proper to lay a charge under s. 145(2) without referring to a specific subsection. For example, s. 343 describes, in four enumerated subsections, different methods of committing robbery.  However, the crown is not obliged to specify the mode of committing the offence in the charge; a general charge of robbery under s. 343 is adequate: R. v. Luckett,  1980 CanLII 185 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1140. The same observation can be made for the offence of theft, under s. 322(1): the charge need not refer to a specific subsection indicating the mode of committing theft: R. v. McKenzie, 1971 CanLII 174 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 409 at 413-15.

L'objet de l'article 145(2)(b)

R. v Jerrett, 2017 NLCA 65

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[18]      The purpose of section 145(2)(b) is to enable courts to control their own process.  Failing to give effect to a judge’s order to a defendant to return for continuation of proceedings against him or her would undermine the judge’s authority to control the process of the court and render judges’ procedural orders ineffective and unenforceable, thereby impugning the integrity of the justice system.

La Poursuite doit démontrer qu'un accusé sait que sa conduite est illégale face à une accusation de bris de condition

R v Lofstrom, 2018 ABCA 5

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[43]           That the applicant was operating on a personal belief of what the law intended in that regard did not constitute a valid defence of mistaken belief or colour of right let alone an excuse, qualification or exemption: see s 19 of the Criminal Code; compare R v MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3 at paras 54 to 56, [2014] 1 SCR 37 which rejected the notion that even for a mens rea criminal offence the law required “the Crown to prove that the accused knew the law.” See likewise R v Allaby, 2017 SKCA 25 at para 42, 353 CCC (3d) 476:

42        The governing law respecting the characterization of the mistake is set out in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37 (S.C.C.) [MacDonald], and R. v. Star Phoenix 911909, 2003 SKCA 108 (Sask. C.A.) at para 27, (2003), 2003 SKQB 108 (CanLII), [2004] 3 W.W.R. 639 (Sask. C.A.). An accused who erroneously believes that his voluntary action does not contravene a legal order or who is mistaken about the application of a legal order is mistaken in law. [Emphasis added]

[44]           The interpretation of a statutory provision and particularly the definition of the essential elements of a criminal offence does raise a question of law with all that entails: see eg R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 SCR 906; Allaby. While as a matter of general policy, ambiguities in offence definitions are read strictly, that does not mean that ambiguity should be injected into the essential elements of a crime definition in an effort to limit its scope.

[45]           The object of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code -- namely s 145(3) of the Code and s 515 of the Code -- are plainly to provide an enforceable means for a Court to supplement the entitlement of anyone to go about their lives being entitled to be left alone by another person particularly where that other person’s proximity frightens or concerns them. The applicant complains about his ability to attend church, but otherwise provides no rationale for his objection to the modest limitation on his freedom of movement created by the recognizance.

[46]           As noted in a different context in relation to s 145(2) of the Criminal Code by the Court in R v Jerrett, 2017 NLCA 65 at para 18:

18        The purpose of section 145(2)(b) is to enable courts to control their own process. Failing to give effect to a judge’s order to a defendant to return for continuation of proceedings against him or her would undermine the judge’s authority to control the process of the court and render judges’ procedural orders ineffective and unenforceable, thereby impugning the integrity of the justice system.

See likewise Carey v Laiken, and also United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta, 1992 CanLII 99 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 901 at para 50 referring to contempt of court:

[50]      Both civil and criminal contempt of court rest on the power of the court to uphold its dignity and process. The rule of law is at the heart of our society; without it there can be neither peace, nor order nor good government. The rule of law is directly dependant on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and respect. To maintain their process and respect, courts since the 12th century have exercised the power to punish for contempt of court.

[47]           As noted above, the applicant disputes the reasonableness or validity or sincerity of the concerns or fears of AR. The trial judge was entitled to find otherwise. It was in any event not open to the applicant to gainsay the foundation of the condition included in the recognizance. Nor was it open to the trial judge to question it. The essence of the count under s 145(3) of the Code was to enforce a Court ordered restriction on the applicant’s behaviour vis a vis the complainant and her family. It did not require proof that his doing so would, to his knowledge, cause her fear or upset or do so without his knowledge.

[48]           The no-contact restriction was not subject to collateral attack at the applicant’s trial: see eg R v Gibbons, 2015 ONCA 47 at para 9, 318 CCC (3d) 261. See also R v Walsh, 2016 SKCA 162 at paras 11 to 13, 345 CCC (3d) 298, that “[t]he rule against collateral attack on court orders has been consistently applied in criminal proceedings where the charge involves an alleged breach of a court order”; see also R v MacKinnon, 2017 ABCA 93 at paras 10 to 12, [2017] AJ No 260 (QL), leave denied [2017] SCCA No 174 (QL) (SCC No 37569). A person subject to a Court injunction is not entitled to not engage in cavils about its scope by a side wind.

[49]           Nor should the applicant’s professed motive in attending the church be conflated with the level of volition and intent requisite to the offence under s 145(3) of the Code. Even for offences of specific intent such as obstruction of justice, the specific intent required should not be confused with the motive that the applicant might have: see eg R v Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79 at paras 40 to 58, 323 DLR (4th) 275. As noted in Carey v Laiken at para 42, albeit for civil contempt:

42        The appellant correctly notes that civil contempt is quasi-criminal in nature, which he says justifies a higher fault element where contempt cannot be purged. But civil contempt is always quasi-criminal, so this provides no justification for carving out a distinct mental element for particular types of civil contempt cases. As I have already discussed, requiring contumacious intent would open the door to mistakes of law providing a defence to an allegation of civil contempt. It could also permit an alleged contemnor to rely on a misinterpretation of a clear order to avoid a contempt finding, which would significantly undermine the authority of court orders.

[50]           Finding evidence of subjective foresight of the substantial likelihood of an outcome resulting from the accused’s volitional conduct is capable of supporting a finding that the outcome was intended by the accused: Abdullah at paras 39-41, citing inter alia R v Guess, 2000 BCCA 547, 148 CCC (3d) 321, leave denied [2000] SCCA No. 628 (QL) (SCC No 28303). That is what the trial judge found. There was to the knowledge of the applicant a substantial likelihood of his coming into contact with the complainants. That is tantamount to intent. Indeed, the trial judge reasonably inferred that he actually intended contact. Compare Procurator Fiscal v Murphy, [2015] HCJAC 78 (Scot HC) where the High Court observed on a non-contact provision that the Sheriff had “confused mens rea with motivation”.

[51]           Motive is not an element of this offence. Indeed it is rarely an element of any offence even if evidence of it might be relevant to the proof of actual elements of the crime: compare R v Skeete, 2017 ONCA 926 at paras 77 to 84, [2017] OJ No 6261 (QL). There was nothing unreasonable about the fact findings of the trial judge on this point. There was nothing unreasonable about the affirmation of the trial judge’s conclusion in this respect by the appeal judge. No clear issue of law is involved, let alone an arguable one of importance.

[52]           Returning to whether the count was given an inflated interpretation by the courts and whether the applicant was ambushed by its application to his situation, it is plain beyond doubt that the applicant’s duty to refrain from being in contact, directly or indirectly, had no “discretion” for the applicant built into it. Rather, it expressly provided for a narrow set of circumstances where the applicant could be in the vicinity of AR and the others within the recognizance’s intended zone of protection. The existence of those limited exceptions made even more clear to the applicant what the applicant was not entitled to do.

[53]           In this count, the words “contact ... directly or indirectly” were plainly distinguished in the recognizance from “communication”. “Communication” happens to be the principal word used in s 515 of the Criminal Code. One can easily understand that indirect communication could cover a situation where a message is passed along. On the other hand, indirect contact could occur without direct communication. The concept of “contact” is not restricted to physical touching and it may include contacting the mind of the recipient without communication.

[54]           It is noteworthy that even the offence of criminal harassment under s 264(1) of the Criminal Code can be made out by the accused making himself repeatedly visible to the complainant without evidence of direct communication: see the facts in R v Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346 at paras 3 to 7, 120 CCC (3d) 384, leave denied [1998] SCCA No 3 (SCC No 26409).