La médiatisation et son impact lors de la détermination de la peine

Harbour c. R., 2017 QCCA 204

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[63]        La preuve révèle des difficultés réelles pour l’appelant à réintégrer le marché du travail. Je précise qu’il n’est pas question de l’impact médiatique purement subjectif à la suite d’accusations criminelles: R. c. Marchessault, [1984] J.Q. 686 (C.A.Q.). La Cour a refusé d’inférer un facteur atténuant lorsque les conséquences découlent du statut de la personnalité publique et que le crime est en soi sérieux et appelle une peine sévère : R. c. Thibault, 2016 QCCA 335, par. 36-40, ou lorsqu’on cherche à lui reconnaître un aspect atténuant uniquement en raison d’une certaine publicité découlant de la nature publique des procédures : R. c. Chav, 2012 QCCA 354, par.37; R. c. Savard, 2016 QCCA 381, par. 20.

[64]        Ainsi, comme le rappelait la juge L’Heureux-Dubé en conclusion sur cette question: « Le seul fait que le crime soit commis par un riche ou par un pauvre, par un grand ou par un petit, avec toutes les conséquences qui en découlent, ne saurait, à mon avis, être l'un de ces facteurs. Il s'agit plutôt de circonstances non aggravantes » : R. c. Marchessault, [1984] J.Q. 686 (C.A.Q.).

[65]        Évidemment, la peine juste n’est pas tributaire du statut social, comme le concluait la juge L’Heureux-Dubé. On ne peut demander la clémence d’un tribunal ou être punie plus sévèrement uniquement en raison de son statut social. Tous en conviendront.

[66]        Or, les médias ont un pouvoir indéniable. L’importance de la couverture médiatique variera selon les cas. L’impact médiatique, pris comme le simple dévoilement du crime et de son auteur, n’autorise pas en soi à inférer, dans la plupart des cas, des conséquences qui en feraient un facteur atténuant. C’est, je crois, ce confirme la Cour dans les arrêts Thibault, Chav, et Savard précités. En effet, l’inférence d’une stigmatisation découlant d’une accusation n’est pas toujours un facteur, celle-ci étant intrinsèque à des niveaux variables, correspondants au crime. À l’évidence, la gravité du crime et la stigmatisation sont directement proportionnelles : R. c. Martineau 1990 CanLII 80 (CSC), [1990] 2 R.C.S. 633.

[67]        Par contre, il me semble difficile d’affirmer que la preuve de la déchéance d’un délinquant à la suite d’une accusation et d’une condamnation, médiatisée ou non, ne puisse jamais être pertinente. Je suis plutôt d’opinion que la jurisprudence reconnaît bien cela comme circonstance pertinente dans la détermination de la peine. Un juge peut, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire lorsque la preuve le justifie, considérer que le passage à travers le système de justice criminelle contribue en soi à l’atteinte d’objectifs de la peine, notamment, mais non exclusivement, en raison de sa médiatisation.

[68]        Je note d’abord que la Cour suprême l’a elle-même reconnu dans le cas d’un avocat reconnu coupable de comportements frauduleux complexes par lesquels il avait diverti quelque 86 000$. Bien que les médias ne soient pas spécialement invoqués, il avait, dans les suites de cette affaire, perdu son droit d’exercice. L’impact de l’accusation et des procédures avait été, semble-t-il, dévastateur. La Cour d’appel avait alors écrit que « [t]he ruin and humiliation that Mr. Bunn has brought down upon himself and his family, together with the loss of his professional status, more than address the concern we must have for denunciation and deterrence. »: R. c. Bunn (1997), 1997 CanLII 22728 (MB CA), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 570, par. 23 (C.A.O.).

[69]        La Cour suprême a confirmé cette approche alors que, dans l’arrêt R. c. Bunn, 2000 CSC 9 (CanLII), [2000] 1 R.C.S. 183, au par. 23, le juge Lamer écrit :

En ce qui concerne les principes de détermination de la peine, la Cour d'appel a raisonnablement jugé que la ruine et l'humiliation subies tant par l'intimé que par sa famille, ainsi que la perte par l'intimé de son statut professionnel, conjuguées à une ordonnance d'emprisonnement avec sursis de deux ans moins un jour assortie de la détention à domicile, répondraient suffisamment aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion. […]

[70]        La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario avait également reconnu la chose pour un délinquant qui, à la suite d’un vol d’un objet de peu de valeur, avait tenté d’entraver le cours de la justice en soudoyant un policier chargé de l’enquête. La Cour avait écrit : « It is quite apparent that the publicity that has resulted from the offences has been substantial and that he has suffered shame and disgrace as a result thereof. One cannot overlook the significance of that type of result on an accused of previous good character»: R. c. Schiegel, [1984] O.J. 971, par. 6 (C.A.O.).

[71]        La Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique a également considéré ce facteur dans l’arrêt R. c. Campbell, [1995] B.C.J. 1484 (C.A.C.-B.), une affaire impliquant un homme accusé d’agression sexuelle sur une enfant mineure, 10 ans après les faits. En réduisant la peine de deux ans d’emprisonnement, la Cour écrit, aux par. 6 et 7:

6 I would adopt as the principle of law applicable to this case what Mr. Justice Hinds said for the Court in R. v. Gallacher, [1991] B.C.J. No. 762, Victoria Registry, CA V01323, (B.C.C.A.) at p. 7:

 The sentencing principle of general deterrence, which is of great importance in this type of case, has been achieved to a substantial degree in the perception of persons in the general community. That is revealed in the letters of reference filed in these proceedings. The publicity, shame and revulsion attendant upon the revelation of a charge involving sexual molestation of a young person would be a powerful deterrent to people in the general community.

7 Consequently, I consider the sentence imposed in this case to be unfit, as excessive. I would allow the appeal and reduce the sentence to one of 6 months.

(Je souligne.)

[72]        Dans l’arrêt R. c. M. (D.E.S.) (1993), 1992 CanLII 6009 (BC CA), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 371, une affaire où le délinquant, mineur, avait agressé sexuellement sa sœur adoptée et plus jeune que lui. La Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique, siégeant à cinq juges, écrivait que le caractère public des procédures contribue à la peine et aux objectifs de celle-ci :

By convicting him, society has already stigmatized him as a person who has committed a serious offence, and has denounced his offence. Quite recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has expressed itself quite strongly on the importance of stigma as a consequence of criminal proceedings. The court has been saying what most lawyers and criminologists have known all along, that a public charge, trial and conviction for a serious offence brands a person for life, constitutes serious punishment, and is an important part of the way society brings offenders to account for their misconduct.

            (Je souligne)

[73]        La Cour a repris ce principe plus récemment dans R. c. Carrillo 2015 BCCA 192, par. 37. Pour sa part, la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta dans l’arrêt R. c. Ewanchuk, 2002 ABCA 95, par. 65-68, écrit que l’humiliation publique participe à la dissuasion et à la dénonciation :

65 Canadian courts have taken publicity into account when assessing the need for denunciation, specific deterrence and general deterrence. In R. v. Ambrose (2000), 2000 ABCA 264 (CanLII), 271 A.R. 164 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 134, Fraser C.J.A. stated in dissent:

Certainly, as far as individual deterrence is concerned, the appellant's public humiliation here has been profound. This is confirmed by the appellant's psychiatrist (S.A.B. 117). The appellant was arrested on this mischief charge while at her place of employment with her students present. Her case has received considerable media attention and publicity both at trial and on appeal. Her employment as a teacher is now in jeopardy as a consequence of these proceedings. These factors too are all relevant to the question of what is a fit sentence for her crime of mischief.

The majority did not express any disagreement with those comments. In R. v. Kneale, [1999] O.J. No. 4062 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 35, Abbey J. commented:

Additionally, in most cases, and I have no doubt in this case, the stigma through publicity, which attached to a trial of this kind, and the conviction of the offender, operates itself as a public denunciation of the offender's conduct.

These cases endorse the proposition that public media scrutiny may be a mitigating factor.

66 However, in this case, although defence counsel made submissions on sentencing respecting Ewanchuk's public humiliation, there was no evidence that the publicity had any negative impact on him. We note that Ewanchuk voluntarily participated in the interview with the press which would seem to negate his allegation of public humiliation. In any event, there was no evidence with respect to the impact of the publicity. Rather, the sentencing judge appeared to take judicial notice that media scrutiny surrounding such a case would be inimical.

Voir également R. c. Foianesi, 2011 MBCA 33, par. 23.

[74]        Plus ce facteur est appuyé par la preuve, plus le juge doit le considérer tout en le pondérant avec les autres éléments et les objectifs de la peine. Il s’agit d’un élément contextuel pertinent.

[75]        En l’espèce, c’est certainement le cas.

[76]        La preuve de l’impact médiatique qui est probante est surtout invoquée ici pour son effet sur la stabilité occupationnelle de l’appelant en plus d’avoir eu un effet de nature psychologique. Le lien n’est pas théorique et ne repose sur aucune spéculation. Trois ans après les faits, alors qu’il avait réussi à réintégrer le marché du travail, il perd ses emplois en raison de la médiatisation des accusations. Des lettres non contredites le confirment. Toujours selon la preuve, une condamnation met à risque son emploi actuel. L’appelant vit maintenant une situation financière précaire. Clairement, la réinsertion sociale de l’appelant passe principalement par la possibilité de réintégrer le marché du travail. Il n’y a aucune autre facette de la réhabilitation en cause, que ce soit une problématique psychologique ou comportementale qui, en sus de l’emploi, mériterait que la peine s’y attarde de quelque manière.

Les principes généraux en lien avec la causalité, revus par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Malkowski, 2015 ONCA 887

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[14]      We begin with the following general principles concerning causation:

•        the causation standard in motor vehicle offences involving death is the same standard that applies in cases of culpable homicide, namely that the accused’s conduct be at least a contributing cause of the deceased’s death, outside the de minimis range; the accused’s conduct need not be the sole contributing cause of death, provided it contributed beyond de minimis to that death;[1]

•        in deciding whether an accused should be held responsible for causing a death, it needs to be determined whether the accused caused the death, both in fact and in law; 

•        legal causation is the inquiry into “whether the accused should be held criminally responsible for the consequences that occurred.” Legal causation is “based on concepts of moral responsibility”, and informed by legal considerations, such as the wording of the offence-creating provision and the principles of criminal justice, such as that the morally innocent should not be punished;[2] 

•        the doctrine of novus actus interveniens or intervening act, is part of the analysis of whether legal causation is established, and whether an accused should be legally accountable for the death; 

•        in R. v. Maybin, the Supreme Court discussed two different approaches to determining whether an intervening act has broken the chain of causation – i.e. 1.) considering whether the intervening act was “reasonably foreseeable”; or 2.) considering whether the accused’s actions were “effectively overtaken by the more immediate causal action of another party acting independently”. Importantly, the Court noted that these two approaches are only “analytical aids” that may be useful depending on the factual context. They are not new standards of legal causation. The test remains whether the accused’s dangerous and unlawful acts are a significant and contributing cause of the victim’s death.[3]    

En règle générale, les déclarations extrajudiciaires d’un accusé — sous réserve qu’elles soient jugées volontaires lorsqu’elles ont été faites à quelqu’un en situation d’autorité — sont recevables comme preuve contre lui, mais non à son avantage

R. c. Rojas, 2008 CSC 56

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[36] Les déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires faites par un accusé sont également visées par la règle générale d’exclusion du ouï‑dire.  Lorsque l’accusé témoigne, de telles déclarations sont généralement inadmissibles, parce qu’elles sont considérées comme intéressées et dépourvues de valeur probante.  Lorsqu’il ne témoigne pas, une autre raison d’exclure de telles déclarations s’ajoute.  Cette raison a été formulée en ces termes par le juge McIntyre dans R. c. Simpson, 1988 CanLII 89 (CSC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 3, p. 22 :

 

En règle générale, les déclarations extrajudiciaires d’un accusé — sous réserve qu’elles soient jugées volontaires lorsqu’elles ont été faites à quelqu’un en situation d’autorité — sont recevables comme preuve contre lui, mais non à son avantage. Cette règle est fondée sur la proposition juste qu’un accusé ne devrait pas être libre de faire des déclarations non solennelles, puis d’en forcer l’admission comme preuve par l’intermédiaire d’autres témoins et, ainsi, de soumettre sa défense au jury sans avoir à prêter serment et aussi sans subir de contre‑interrogatoire.

Le juge du procès un « large pouvoir discrétionnaire » dans le cadre du contre-interrogatoire pour lui permettre d’en assurer l’équité

R.R. c. R., 2013 QCCA 1790

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[38]        La Cour suprême reconnaît au juge du procès un « large pouvoir discrétionnaire » dans le cadre du contre-interrogatoire pour lui permettre d’en assurer l’équité. Il lui appartient d’établir un juste équilibre entre le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable et la nécessité d’empêcher la tenue d’un contre-interrogatoire contraire à l’éthique pour notamment empêcher le harcèlement du témoin, les déclarations inexactes, les répétitions inutiles et, plus généralement, les questions dont l’effet préjudiciable excède la valeur probante[2].

[39]        Le test applicable est bien exprimé par la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’arrêt R. c. Valley[3] :

Interventions by the judge creating the appearance of an unfair trial may be of more than one type and the appearance of a fair trial may be destroyed by a combination of different types of intervention. The ultimate question to be answered is not whether the accused was in fact prejudiced by the interventions but whether he might reasonably consider that he had not had a fair trial or whether a reasonably minded person who had been present throughout the trial would consider that the accused had not had a fair trial: see Brouillard v. The Queen, supra; R. v. Racz, [1961] N.Z.L.R. 227 (C.A.).

Le juge du procès peut intervenir lorsque les questions posées en contre-interrogatoire deviennent répétitives

Dion c. R., 2010 QCCA 941

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[83]           À mon avis, le juge était tout à fait fondé à intervenir d'autant que le témoin avait reconnu s'être trompé lors de son témoignage à l'enquête préliminaire. Dès lors, le jury était en mesure d'apprécier la fiabilité du témoignage. Une fois la contradiction établie, on ne peut refaire l'exercice à nouveau, de façon répétitive, sous prétexte de miner davantage la crédibilité du témoin. Ici, le juge a permis un contre-interrogatoire complet sur les faits dont le témoin a eu connaissance et sur la contradiction révélée lors du procès.

[84]           Il est vrai que l'appréciation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité d'un témoin est du domaine souverain du jury. Il est également vrai que le contre-interrogatoire a une importance « incontestable » pour déterminer si un témoin est digne de foi : R. c. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (CSC), [1993] 4 R.C.S. 595, p. 663. Toutefois, un juge doit voir au bon déroulement du procès et s'assurer que les questions répétitives ne deviennent un moyen de tourmenter un témoin avec obstination. Certains cas peuvent donc exiger que le juge établisse des limites au contre-interrogatoire ou encore qu'il rappelle à l'ordre le témoin. Ici, le juge a fait les deux.

[85]           La Cour d'appel de l'Ontario rappelle dans R. c. Valley (1986), 1986 CanLII 4609 (ON CA), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 207, à la page 230, que le juge du procès peut intervenir lorsque les questions posées en contre-interrogatoire deviennent répétitives :

[…] Further, I do not doubt that the judge has a duty to intervene to clear the innocent. The judge has the duty to ensure that the accused is afforded the right to make full answer and defence, but he has the right and the duty to prevent the trial from being unnecessarily protracted by questions directed to irrel­evant matters. This power must be exercised with caution so as to leave unfettered the right of an accused through his counsel to subject any witness's testimony to the test of cross-examination. The judge must not improperly curtail cross-examination that is relevant to the issues or the credibility of witnesses, but he has power to protect a witness from harassment by questions that are repetitious or are irrelevant to the issues in the case or to the credibility of the witness: see R. v. Bradbury (1973), 1973 CanLII 1442 (ON CA), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 139 at pp. 140-1, 23 C.R.N.S. 293 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Kalia (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 200 at pp. 209-11.

[Je souligne.]

Un avocat peut généralement conduire son contre-interrogatoire sans dévoiler son objectif au témoin contre-interrogé

R. v. Haussecker, 1998 ABPC 117

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[18]                  Mr. Kay is generally entitled to conduct his cross-examination without disclosing its purpose to the witness.  In 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1871 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)  at p. 670, the learned authors state:

“...the cross-examiner need not state beforehand the connection of a question which appears to be irrelevant, unless exceptionally, under the trial court’s determination.  The chief reason is that the advantages of brevity and relevancy, which might otherwise be insisted on, are in experience found to be far overbalanced by the danger of destroying the effectiveness of the great weapon of  cross-examination; for it would often be made useless by requiring in advance a betrayal of its purpose to the wary witness whose falsities are desired to be exposed:

 

W.D. Evans, 2 Notes to Pothier 230 (1806):  The benefits of cross-examination are sometimes defeated by the interposition of the Court to require an explanation of the motive and object of the questions proposed, or to pronounce a judgment upon their immateriality; whereas experience frequently shows that it is only by an indirect and apparently irrelevant inquiry that a witness can be brought to divulge the truth which he prepared himself to conceal.  The explanation of the motives and tendency of the question furnishes the witness with a caution that may wholly defeat the object of it, which might have been successfully attained if the gradual progress from immateriality to materiality was withheld from his observation.”

 

The learned authors of Wigmore, supra, reproduced the following quotation at footnote 8:

“‘An experienced equity judge once said to me in relation to a question I had asked, ‘Really, this is a long way from the point.’  ‘I am aware of that, my lord,’ was my answer; ‘if I were to begin any nearer, the witness would discover my object’” (Ballantine, Experiences of a Barrister’s Life 127 (1882)).”

 

[19]                  This concept is also referred to in 3 Wigmore, Evidence §781 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) at p. 173.  There, the learned authors state:

“...a cross-examiner need not state the purpose of his question...; the objection in such a case is not that the witness is deceived as to the ultimate purpose of the question, for it is immaterial whether or not he understands that, and it is enough if he is not deceived as to its actual tenor [emphasis is added]; the objection to a cross-examiner’s not disclosing his purpose is that the relevancy of the facts inquired about may otherwise not appear, and the rule permitting such concealment is merely a necessary exception to the general rule requiring relevancy to appear at the time of asking....”

[20]                  From this, I conclude that while a cross-examiner need not disclose his or her purpose in asking a particular question or questions, yet the questions must not be put in such a way as to mislead the witness as to what he or she is being asked.  If the context within which the questions are asked is such that it reasonably leads the witness to conclude that the questions are restricted in their scope to the theme of the preceding questions (what is referred to in Wigmore as the “tenor” of the questions), then the answers to those questions will have little or no probative value in respect of  topics which fall outside that restricted scope.  This is particularly so when the court is asked to draw a negative inference (in this case, an inference that the Informant was not provided the facts necessary for her to form reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused had committed certain offences).  If a witness is asked questions about steps he or she took, and those questions are put within a context that reasonably leads the witness to conclude that the steps about which he or she is being asked are restricted to a certain category or type of step, then the answers to those questions provide no basis to fairly infer that no steps whatsoever (other than those specified in the answers) were taken.

[21]                  As  noted, it is open to the cross-examiner to cross-examine in such a way that when the witness is finally asked the real question in which the cross-examiner is interested (“the target question”), the previous answers have logically excluded any possible answer but that answer which is sought.  The technique is described in The Art of  the Trial by Robert B. White, Q.C. (Canada Law Book Company; Aurora, Ontario) as “encirclement” (pp.117-120).  It could also be described as “questioning by exclusion”.  Simply put, the cross-examiner asks a series of questions the answers to which ultimately restrict the witness to only one possible answer when he or she is finally asked the target question.  Similarly, the cross-examiner may use the technique to exclude any possible answer to the target question but the one desired by the questioner, even though the target question is not actually put to the witness.  In that circumstance, the questioner eliminates any possible answer to the target question except the answer he or she wants, and achieves that answer not by putting the question to the witness, but by inviting the trier of fact to infer the desired conclusion based on what has been eliminated by the witness as other possible answers.  The  target question is never put to the witness, but the court is invited to infer that had it been asked there could have been no other answer except the one advocated by the questioner.

[22]                  Again, the success of the technique depends upon the content of the questions  (“the exclusionary questions”) which are  posed for their cumulative effect of excluding all answers but one to the target question.  The ability of the exclusionary questions to have their desired effect depends on whether they logically exclude all possible answers except the desired one to the target question.  The thrust of the exclusionary questions is determined not only by the actual words used in them, but also by the context in which they are put.  As noted above, the questions which precede and lead into an exclusionary question help determine what is actually being asked of the witness.  If what the witness fairly may take the exclusionary question to be asking is restricted or modified by the preceding questions, then the answer to the question  will not exclude as much as desired.  The ultimate result is that, when the trier of fact is asked to draw a particular inference in respect of the target question, the factual foundation necessary to lead to only the desired inference is missing.  As a result, the desired answer to the target question cannot be properly supplied by inference.

Quels sont les objectifs et les stratégies efficaces en lien avec le contre-interrogatoire?

R v Sylvain, 2014 ABCA 153

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[95]           The purpose of cross-examination is to explore the evidence of the witness, exposing weaknesses, biases, and inaccuracies, and thereby assist in the truth finding process. It has been said that cross-examination is more an art than a science, and the selection of appropriate questions and topics for cross-examination is one of the key skills of legal advocacy: E.F.B. Johnston, Q.C., The Art of Cross Examination, [1936] 2 DLR 673.  

[96]           Counsel have a wide discretion in the content of their cross-examination: R. v Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at paras. 41-5, [2004] 1 SCR 193. When the defence amounts to a straight denial of the charge or some necessary element of the charge, there is a school of thought that it is counterproductive to cross-examine extensively, thereby allowing the witness just to repeat his denial over and over. As Johnston notes at p. 675:

. . . One form of cross examination which is apparent to all of us as being very ineffective, is the going over of the ground in chief. I have seen very able counsel (and without being able at all, I have done it myself, to my sorrow) to take the witness, the plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be, and follow him from point to point, going over his case as developed in chief, with what result? Invariably emphasizing and giving point to the story of the witness.

This concept is number eight in I. Younger’s “A Letter in Which Cicero Lays Down the 10 Commandments of Cross-Examination” (1977) 3.2 Litigation 18 at p. 20:

 

8.         Do not ask the witness to repeat the testimony he gave on direct examination. . . . when a lawyer asks a witness on cross-examination merely to repeat his direct testimony, all he accomplishes is elevation of the witness’ credibility. What had been a perhaps becomes a doubtless. . . .

The strategy of avoiding the creation of opportunities to just repeat a straight denial would apply to defences like alibi, consent, identity (“wasn’t me”) and the flat-out denial (“I didn’t do it”). In those situations, where the accused testifies and has an opportunity to say in chief what he wants to say about his position, there is no obligation on the Crown to cross-examine on those subjects: Palmer v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 759 at pp. 780-2. Since the accused cannot be surprised by a bare challenge to his bare denial, the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893), 6 R 67 (HL) is not engaged: I.I. at para. 10.