Un juge dispose d'un large pouvoir discrétionnaire pour gérer le déroulement du procès afin de garantir son efficacité et son équité pour les parties. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire s'étend à la décision de la manière dont une requête préalable au procès sera traitée afin d'atteindre ces objectifs. En fait, il existe depuis longtemps un pouvoir discrétionnaire permettant d'exiger, lorsque cela est possible, la présentation rapide des preuves dans le cadre d'une requête préalable au procès. Une partie n'a pas le droit d'exiger le type de voir dire qu'elle préfère

R. v. Evans, 2019 ONCA 715

Lien vers la décision

[145] When counsel for Shane Evans first raised this issue at trial, he had not complied with the notice and disclosure provisions of s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code -- i.e., he had not given at least 30 days' notice to the other parties of his intention to call the expert evidence along with the names of the proposed experts and their areas of expertise and statements of qualifications (see s. 657.3(3) (a)), nor had he provided the parties with copies of the proposed experts' reports or summaries of their anticipated evidence by the close of the Crown's case (see s. 657.3(3) (c)).

[146] My references to counsel's failure to comply with the notice and disclosure requirements of s. 657.3(3) are not meant to suggest that failure to comply with the subsection, without more, entitled the trial judge to exclude the evidence. Evidentiary exclusion is not among the remedies available under s. 657.3(4) for non-compliance. But in a jury trial, where lack of timely notice and disclosure may well result in a lengthy adjournment of proceedings to permit preparation by the proposed witness (here, Insp. Page), these deficiencies may be relevant to the second step of the admissibility inquiry. [page610]

[147] Before turning to the reasons for rejecting this ground of appeal, there is one point made in the appellant Shane Evans' factum, less so in oral argument, that warrants brief mention. It concerns the form of the admissibility inquiry in connection with the proposed evidence of John Turner. The complaint is that the trial judge directed counsel to proceed on the basis of the written materials, even though John Turner was present and counsel proposed that he testify on the inquiry.

[148] Neither the common law nor the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires that any specific procedure, to the exclusion of all others, be followed to determine the admissibility of evidence. The form of voir dire is determined by the trial judge on the basis of the issues involved and the nature of the case being tried. There is no requirement that the inquiry must proceed on the basis of viva voce testimony: R. v. Kematch, [2010] M.J. No. 58, 2010 MBCA 18, 252 C.C.C. (3d) 349, at para. 43; R. v. Dietrich, 1970 CanLII 377 (ON CA), [1970] 3 O.R. 725, [1970] O.J. No. 1603, 1 C.C.C. (2d) 49 (C.A.), at p. 62 C.C.C., leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1970] 3 O.R. 744n, [1970] S.C.R. xi.