[6] The trial judge instructed himself as to the proper approach to drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence, as set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000 at para. 55: “Where the Crown’s case depends on circumstantial evidence, the question becomes whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence.” The Crown is not required to negative every other possible inference in order to meet its burden. Alternative inferences must be plausible based on the evidence, not speculative.
[11] It is well established that there is no special test for determining impairment. The offence of impaired driving is established by evidence of “any degree of impairment ranging from slight to great”: R. v. Stellato (1993), 1993 CanLII 3375 (ON CA), 12 O.R. (3d) 90 (C.A.) at 95, aff’d 1994 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 478.
[16] The trial judge noted that there was no evidence of anything such as mechanical failure, medical emergency, or road obstruction, that would explain the nature of the accident, and found that it was consistent with some sort of impairment by the driver of the Chrysler. Given the presence of an empty beer can in the passenger seat and the smell of alcohol on the appellant, it was open to the trial judge to conclude from the totality of these circumstances that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant was impaired to some degree, and to find that the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
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