R. c. Vachon, 2011 QCCQ 10505 (CanLII)
[51] Cette notion devrait généralement être prise en compte lorsque la poursuite invoque la présomption parce qu’elle réfère directement à l’absence d’intention de conduire le véhicule.
[52] Par ailleurs, il est possible qu’un défendeur ivre se réfugie dans son véhicule en attendant que quelqu’un vienne le chercher. Cela serait très imprudent surtout s’il s’installe derrière le volant mais, une telle situation pourrait tout de même constituer un élément pertinent à la fois pour repousser la présomption et évaluer la notion de garde ou contrôle.
[64] Par ailleurs, un défendeur ne pourrait pas bénéficier d’un verdict d’acquittement en présentant un plan alternatif, si arrêté soit-il, s’il décide entre-temps, comme la preuve le démontre en l’espèce, d’assumer la garde ou le contrôle de son véhicule, alors qu’il est en état d’ébriété très avancé, en accomplissant une série d’actes en rapport avec l’utilisation de son véhicule ou de ses accessoires notamment : s’asseoir derrière le volant, insérer la clé de contact, mettre en marche le moteur, le chauffage, la radio, lesquels actes entraînent la conclusion qu’il existait un risque que le véhicule soit mis en mouvement de sorte qu’il puisse devenir dangereux, même involontairement.
vendredi 23 septembre 2011
La notion de garde et contrôle
R. c. Vachon, 2011 QCCQ 10505 (CanLII)
[45] Dans l’arrêt R. c. Olivier, J.E. 98-1410, cité par le procureur de la défense, notre Cour d’appel cite l’opinion du juge McIntyre dans l’arrêt La Reine c. Toews, 1985 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 119 :
10. Il y a, bien sûr, d'autres précédents qui portent sur la question. Cependant, la jurisprudence citée illustre le point et amène à conclure que les actes de garde ou de contrôle, hormis l'acte de conduire, sont des actes qui comportent une certaine utilisation du véhicule ou de ses accessoires, ou une conduite quelconque à l'égard du véhicule qui comporterait le risque de le mettre en mouvement de sorte qu'il puisse devenir dangereux.
[46] La Cour d’appel ajoute plus loin :
18. La proposition de l'appelante suivant laquelle le fait pour un conducteur d'être assis derrière le volant d'une voiture, avec la clé dans le contact, entraîne nécessairement la conclusion que ce conducteur a le contrôle de la voiture est trop absolu : dans la très grande majorité des situations on pourra conclure que c'est le cas, mais, devant un jeu de circonstances donné, le tribunal pourra, sans errer en droit, conclure que ce n'est pas le cas;
[47] En conclusion, la Cour d’appel mentionne ceci :
20. Si la définition du mot « contrôle » est une question de droit, la question de savoir si, en l'espèce, il y avait un risque que l'intimé « mette la voiture en marche » n'est probablement pas une pure question de droit sur laquelle le pourvoi pouvait seulement porter;
[48] Ainsi, la Cour d’appel ne s’est pas prononcée sur la question de savoir s’il y avait un danger qu’Olivier mette le véhicule en marche.
[49] Elle l’a d’ailleurs rappelé dans l’arrêt R. c. Rioux, J.E. 2000-1463, paragr. 46, en réitérant que, dans l’arrêt Olivier, elle avait conclu que les juges des instances inférieures n’avaient pas commis d’erreur de droit quant à la définition du mot « contrôle » et qu’elle ne s’était pas prononcée sur le danger qu’Olivier mette la voiture en marche.
[50] Dans l’arrêt R. c. Sergerie, 2005 QCCA 1227 (CanLII), 2005 QCCA 1227, la Cour d’appel mentionne que l’évaluation du risque ne doit pas se limiter à celle du risque réaliste immédiat de mettre le véhicule en marche en se fondant uniquement sur l’intention du défendeur, mais qu’elle doit également tenir compte de la série d’actes accomplis par le défendeur, ajoute-t-elle :
[3] En l’espèce, la preuve démontre que l’appelant a accompli une série d’actes en rapport avec l’utilisation de son véhicule ou de ses accessoires (notamment, se rendre avec une amie vers son véhicule pour y récupérer son téléphone cellulaire, s’asseoir derrière le volant alors que son amie prend place du côté passager, prendre la clé de contact, mettre en marche le moteur et activer la climatisation) qui devaient nécessairement entraîner la conclusion qu’il existait un risque que le véhicule soit mis en mouvement et devienne dangereux, même involontairement, malgré que le juge de première instance ait conclu que l’appelant avait renversé la présomption de l’art. 258 (1) a) C. cr. : R. c. Ford 1982 CanLII 16 (CSC), [1982] 1 R.C.S. 231; R. c. Toews 1985 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 119.
[45] Dans l’arrêt R. c. Olivier, J.E. 98-1410, cité par le procureur de la défense, notre Cour d’appel cite l’opinion du juge McIntyre dans l’arrêt La Reine c. Toews, 1985 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 119 :
10. Il y a, bien sûr, d'autres précédents qui portent sur la question. Cependant, la jurisprudence citée illustre le point et amène à conclure que les actes de garde ou de contrôle, hormis l'acte de conduire, sont des actes qui comportent une certaine utilisation du véhicule ou de ses accessoires, ou une conduite quelconque à l'égard du véhicule qui comporterait le risque de le mettre en mouvement de sorte qu'il puisse devenir dangereux.
[46] La Cour d’appel ajoute plus loin :
18. La proposition de l'appelante suivant laquelle le fait pour un conducteur d'être assis derrière le volant d'une voiture, avec la clé dans le contact, entraîne nécessairement la conclusion que ce conducteur a le contrôle de la voiture est trop absolu : dans la très grande majorité des situations on pourra conclure que c'est le cas, mais, devant un jeu de circonstances donné, le tribunal pourra, sans errer en droit, conclure que ce n'est pas le cas;
[47] En conclusion, la Cour d’appel mentionne ceci :
20. Si la définition du mot « contrôle » est une question de droit, la question de savoir si, en l'espèce, il y avait un risque que l'intimé « mette la voiture en marche » n'est probablement pas une pure question de droit sur laquelle le pourvoi pouvait seulement porter;
[48] Ainsi, la Cour d’appel ne s’est pas prononcée sur la question de savoir s’il y avait un danger qu’Olivier mette le véhicule en marche.
[49] Elle l’a d’ailleurs rappelé dans l’arrêt R. c. Rioux, J.E. 2000-1463, paragr. 46, en réitérant que, dans l’arrêt Olivier, elle avait conclu que les juges des instances inférieures n’avaient pas commis d’erreur de droit quant à la définition du mot « contrôle » et qu’elle ne s’était pas prononcée sur le danger qu’Olivier mette la voiture en marche.
[50] Dans l’arrêt R. c. Sergerie, 2005 QCCA 1227 (CanLII), 2005 QCCA 1227, la Cour d’appel mentionne que l’évaluation du risque ne doit pas se limiter à celle du risque réaliste immédiat de mettre le véhicule en marche en se fondant uniquement sur l’intention du défendeur, mais qu’elle doit également tenir compte de la série d’actes accomplis par le défendeur, ajoute-t-elle :
[3] En l’espèce, la preuve démontre que l’appelant a accompli une série d’actes en rapport avec l’utilisation de son véhicule ou de ses accessoires (notamment, se rendre avec une amie vers son véhicule pour y récupérer son téléphone cellulaire, s’asseoir derrière le volant alors que son amie prend place du côté passager, prendre la clé de contact, mettre en marche le moteur et activer la climatisation) qui devaient nécessairement entraîner la conclusion qu’il existait un risque que le véhicule soit mis en mouvement et devienne dangereux, même involontairement, malgré que le juge de première instance ait conclu que l’appelant avait renversé la présomption de l’art. 258 (1) a) C. cr. : R. c. Ford 1982 CanLII 16 (CSC), [1982] 1 R.C.S. 231; R. c. Toews 1985 CanLII 46 (CSC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 119.
mercredi 14 septembre 2011
Dans certaines circonstances, les déclarations antérieures compatibles peuvent être admissibles en tant que partie intégrante du récit des faits
R. c. Dinardo, 2008 CSC 24, [2008] 1 RCS 788
[36] Règle générale, les déclarations antérieures compatibles sont inadmissibles (R. c. Stirling, 2008 CSC 10 (CanLII), [2008] 1 R.C.S. 272, 2008 CSC 10). Ces déclarations sont exclues principalement parce que, d’une part, elles n’ont pas de force probante (Stirling, par. 5) et que, d’autre part, elles constituent du ouï‑dire lorsqu’elles sont utilisées pour la véracité de leur contenu.
[37] Dans certaines circonstances, les déclarations antérieures compatibles peuvent être admissibles en tant que partie intégrante du récit des faits. Une fois admises en preuve, ces déclarations peuvent être utilisées dans le but limité d’aider le juge des faits à comprendre comment les faits relatés par le plaignant ont été divulgués à l’origine. La difficulté, c’est de faire la distinction entre [traduction] « l’utilisation du récit des faits dans le but inadmissible de “confirmer la véracité des déclarations faites sous serment” » et « l’utilisation du témoignage narratif dans le but admissible d’établir l’existence d’une plainte et le moment de son dépôt, ce qui pourrait alors aider le juge des faits dans son appréciation de la véracité ou de la crédibilité des déclarations » McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence (4eéd. (feuilles mobiles)), p. 11‑44 et 11‑45 (en italique dans l’original); voir aussi R. c. F. (J.E.) 1993 CanLII 3384 (ON C.A.), (1993), 85 C.C.C. (3d) 457 (C.A. Ont.), p. 476).
[38] Dans R. c. G.C., [2006] O.J. No. 2245 (QL), la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a fait remarquer que les déclarations antérieures compatibles d’un plaignant pouvaient aider le tribunal à évaluer la probabilité qu’il soit sincère, notamment dans les cas d’allégations d’agressions sexuelles commises contre des enfants. Le juge Rouleau, qui a rédigé les motifs unanimes de la Cour d’appel, s’est exprimé ainsi :
[traduction] Bien qu’elle ait été admise à bon droit au procès, la preuve d’une plainte antérieure ne peut servir à corroborer la survenance de l’incident en cause. Elle ne peut servir à prouver la véracité de son contenu. Toutefois, cette preuve peut servir à « étayer l’allégation principale en constituant un cadre logique pour sa présentation », comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, et à apprécier la sincérité de la plaignante. À cet égard, l’arrêt R. c. F. (J.E.) précise ce qui suit, à la p. 476 :
Le fait que les déclarations ont été faites est admissible en preuve pour aider le jury à suivre le déroulement des événements, de la perpétration de l’infraction jusqu’à l’engagement de poursuites, afin qu’il puisse comprendre la conduite de la plaignante et apprécier sa sincérité. Toutefois, il faut prévenir les jurés de l’importance de ne pas considérer le contenu des déclarations comme une preuve de la perpétration d’un crime.
Le juge du procès était conscient de l’utilisation limitée qui pouvait être faite de cette preuve, comme le montrent ses motifs :
[J]’ai été vraiment frappé, même si le fait de dire à quelqu’un qu’on a été agressé ne confirme pas en soi l’agression. J’ai été frappé par la manière dont elle en a parlé, cela tend à confirmer le récit [de la plaignante] — c’est‑à‑dire comment ils lisaient un livre et comment ils en sont venus à parler de l’abus sexuel des enfants.
Dans les cas d’agressions sexuelles commises contre de jeunes enfants, les tribunaux ont reconnu qu’il était difficile d’obtenir de la victime un récit détaillé des faits. Dans certains cas, la manière dont l’enfant finit par divulguer les faits peut servir d’outil utile au juge du procès dans son appréciation de la sincérité de l’enfant, soit en renforçant ou en affaiblissant la force probante logique de son témoignage. Il en est ainsi en l’espèce.
[39] Le raisonnement de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’affaire G.C. s’applique tout autant aux faits de l’espèce. Les déclarations antérieures compatibles de la plaignante n’étaient pas admissibles en preuve suivant les exceptions habituelles à la règle du ouï‑dire. Ainsi, ces déclarations ne pouvaient servir à confirmer son témoignage au procès. Toutefois, à la lumière de la preuve selon laquelle la plaignante avait du mal à replacer les événements dans leur contexte temporel et qu’elle s’embrouillait facilement et mentait à l’occasion, il importe de noter que la spontanéité de sa déclaration initiale ainsi que la répétition des éléments essentiels de ses allégations fournissent un contexte très utile à l’appréciation de sa crédibilité.
[36] Règle générale, les déclarations antérieures compatibles sont inadmissibles (R. c. Stirling, 2008 CSC 10 (CanLII), [2008] 1 R.C.S. 272, 2008 CSC 10). Ces déclarations sont exclues principalement parce que, d’une part, elles n’ont pas de force probante (Stirling, par. 5) et que, d’autre part, elles constituent du ouï‑dire lorsqu’elles sont utilisées pour la véracité de leur contenu.
[37] Dans certaines circonstances, les déclarations antérieures compatibles peuvent être admissibles en tant que partie intégrante du récit des faits. Une fois admises en preuve, ces déclarations peuvent être utilisées dans le but limité d’aider le juge des faits à comprendre comment les faits relatés par le plaignant ont été divulgués à l’origine. La difficulté, c’est de faire la distinction entre [traduction] « l’utilisation du récit des faits dans le but inadmissible de “confirmer la véracité des déclarations faites sous serment” » et « l’utilisation du témoignage narratif dans le but admissible d’établir l’existence d’une plainte et le moment de son dépôt, ce qui pourrait alors aider le juge des faits dans son appréciation de la véracité ou de la crédibilité des déclarations » McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence (4eéd. (feuilles mobiles)), p. 11‑44 et 11‑45 (en italique dans l’original); voir aussi R. c. F. (J.E.) 1993 CanLII 3384 (ON C.A.), (1993), 85 C.C.C. (3d) 457 (C.A. Ont.), p. 476).
[38] Dans R. c. G.C., [2006] O.J. No. 2245 (QL), la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a fait remarquer que les déclarations antérieures compatibles d’un plaignant pouvaient aider le tribunal à évaluer la probabilité qu’il soit sincère, notamment dans les cas d’allégations d’agressions sexuelles commises contre des enfants. Le juge Rouleau, qui a rédigé les motifs unanimes de la Cour d’appel, s’est exprimé ainsi :
[traduction] Bien qu’elle ait été admise à bon droit au procès, la preuve d’une plainte antérieure ne peut servir à corroborer la survenance de l’incident en cause. Elle ne peut servir à prouver la véracité de son contenu. Toutefois, cette preuve peut servir à « étayer l’allégation principale en constituant un cadre logique pour sa présentation », comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, et à apprécier la sincérité de la plaignante. À cet égard, l’arrêt R. c. F. (J.E.) précise ce qui suit, à la p. 476 :
Le fait que les déclarations ont été faites est admissible en preuve pour aider le jury à suivre le déroulement des événements, de la perpétration de l’infraction jusqu’à l’engagement de poursuites, afin qu’il puisse comprendre la conduite de la plaignante et apprécier sa sincérité. Toutefois, il faut prévenir les jurés de l’importance de ne pas considérer le contenu des déclarations comme une preuve de la perpétration d’un crime.
Le juge du procès était conscient de l’utilisation limitée qui pouvait être faite de cette preuve, comme le montrent ses motifs :
[J]’ai été vraiment frappé, même si le fait de dire à quelqu’un qu’on a été agressé ne confirme pas en soi l’agression. J’ai été frappé par la manière dont elle en a parlé, cela tend à confirmer le récit [de la plaignante] — c’est‑à‑dire comment ils lisaient un livre et comment ils en sont venus à parler de l’abus sexuel des enfants.
Dans les cas d’agressions sexuelles commises contre de jeunes enfants, les tribunaux ont reconnu qu’il était difficile d’obtenir de la victime un récit détaillé des faits. Dans certains cas, la manière dont l’enfant finit par divulguer les faits peut servir d’outil utile au juge du procès dans son appréciation de la sincérité de l’enfant, soit en renforçant ou en affaiblissant la force probante logique de son témoignage. Il en est ainsi en l’espèce.
[39] Le raisonnement de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’affaire G.C. s’applique tout autant aux faits de l’espèce. Les déclarations antérieures compatibles de la plaignante n’étaient pas admissibles en preuve suivant les exceptions habituelles à la règle du ouï‑dire. Ainsi, ces déclarations ne pouvaient servir à confirmer son témoignage au procès. Toutefois, à la lumière de la preuve selon laquelle la plaignante avait du mal à replacer les événements dans leur contexte temporel et qu’elle s’embrouillait facilement et mentait à l’occasion, il importe de noter que la spontanéité de sa déclaration initiale ainsi que la répétition des éléments essentiels de ses allégations fournissent un contexte très utile à l’appréciation de sa crédibilité.
mardi 13 septembre 2011
La violence requise selon les différents alinéas de l'article prohibant le vol qualifié
R. v. Bawol, 2010 ABPC 140 (CanLII)
[70] Working from my colleague’s summary of the law, the element of violence in each subsection can be broken down as follows:
For subsection A
The violence:
1. Must accompany the stealing (some of the cases use the phrase be co-existent with )
2. Must be for the purpose of either
(A) Extorting the thing or
(B) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the stealing
3. May be used against either the victim or any other person or property
4. Must be of substantial nature and must be separate from the stealing
5. May be a threat “... which reflects an intent to have recourse to violence in order to carry out the theft or prevent resistance to the theft”:
R. v. Pelletier (see para. 66 of R. v. Callihoo, supra).
Violence required under Subsection B
The violence:
1. must be “proximate” in time and can be either before or after the theft.
2. The subject of the violence must be the victim of the theft.
3. The term “personal violence” takes its colour from the activities listed in the section (wounds, beats or strikes) and so must be more than a technical assault.
4. Purpose is not required; it is gratuitous.
Violence required under Subsection C
The violence:
1. may be any form of assault as defined in section 265 of the Criminal Code. Therefore it may include a technical assault. See R. v. Fleury reflex, (1984), 57 A.R. 239 (C.A.).
2. must accompany the theft.
[70] Working from my colleague’s summary of the law, the element of violence in each subsection can be broken down as follows:
For subsection A
The violence:
1. Must accompany the stealing (some of the cases use the phrase be co-existent with )
2. Must be for the purpose of either
(A) Extorting the thing or
(B) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the stealing
3. May be used against either the victim or any other person or property
4. Must be of substantial nature and must be separate from the stealing
5. May be a threat “... which reflects an intent to have recourse to violence in order to carry out the theft or prevent resistance to the theft”:
R. v. Pelletier (see para. 66 of R. v. Callihoo, supra).
Violence required under Subsection B
The violence:
1. must be “proximate” in time and can be either before or after the theft.
2. The subject of the violence must be the victim of the theft.
3. The term “personal violence” takes its colour from the activities listed in the section (wounds, beats or strikes) and so must be more than a technical assault.
4. Purpose is not required; it is gratuitous.
Violence required under Subsection C
The violence:
1. may be any form of assault as defined in section 265 of the Criminal Code. Therefore it may include a technical assault. See R. v. Fleury reflex, (1984), 57 A.R. 239 (C.A.).
2. must accompany the theft.
Les éléments constitutifs de l'infraction de vol qualifié
R. v. Killam, 2007 ABPC 113 (CanLII)
[37] In R. v. Saunders, [1996] O.J. No. 518 (Ont. Ct. Justice – Gen. Div.), Watt, J., at paragraphs 32-34, analyzed section 343(a) as follows (and I respectfully adopt this analysis):
— 32 Robbery under s. 343(a) requires proof of:
i stealing; and
ii the use of violence, actual or threatened, to a person or property
— 33 “Stealing” means the commission of theft. “Violence” is not defined in the Criminal Code. It involves the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage to persons or property. It includes force or strength of physical action. Actual violence is not required under s. 343(a). Threatened violence is sufficient. The violence need not be directed towards the victim of the stealing. It is sufficient if it is directed against a person, for that matter property. What is necessary is some act of violence or some demonstration from which, inter alia, physical injury to the person robbed may be reasonably apprehended in all the circumstances. See, R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (Ont. C.A.).
— 34 Under s. 343(a), it is critical that the violence be administered or threatened for a proscribed purpose, that is to say,
i to extort whatever is stolen;
ii to prevent resistance to the stealing; or,
iii to overcome resistance to the stealing.
No other purpose will suffice. The purpose which accompanies the act of actual or threatened violence may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding it.
[37] In R. v. Saunders, [1996] O.J. No. 518 (Ont. Ct. Justice – Gen. Div.), Watt, J., at paragraphs 32-34, analyzed section 343(a) as follows (and I respectfully adopt this analysis):
— 32 Robbery under s. 343(a) requires proof of:
i stealing; and
ii the use of violence, actual or threatened, to a person or property
— 33 “Stealing” means the commission of theft. “Violence” is not defined in the Criminal Code. It involves the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage to persons or property. It includes force or strength of physical action. Actual violence is not required under s. 343(a). Threatened violence is sufficient. The violence need not be directed towards the victim of the stealing. It is sufficient if it is directed against a person, for that matter property. What is necessary is some act of violence or some demonstration from which, inter alia, physical injury to the person robbed may be reasonably apprehended in all the circumstances. See, R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (Ont. C.A.).
— 34 Under s. 343(a), it is critical that the violence be administered or threatened for a proscribed purpose, that is to say,
i to extort whatever is stolen;
ii to prevent resistance to the stealing; or,
iii to overcome resistance to the stealing.
No other purpose will suffice. The purpose which accompanies the act of actual or threatened violence may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding it.
Exemples jurisprudentiels de ce que constitue la violence d'un vol qualifié
R. v. Callihoo, 2006 ABPC 347 (CanLII)
[53] Set out below is relevant jurisprudence to the meaning of “personal violence” as found in s. 343(b).
[54] In R. v. Burden (1973),11 C.C.C. (2d) 491 (Ont. C.A.)(Burden) the complainant fell asleep on a bench. He awoke to find that the accused had removed his wallet. He chased the accused and got him in a bear hug. The accused struck him in the side. The robbery was analyzed pursuant to s. 302(b)[ now s. 343(b)]. Gale C.J.O. held that, if there was a reasonable doubt that the accused was defending himself, this amounted to a defence to robbery. Self defence in the circumstances would only apply if the purpose of the accused in administering blows to make the complainant from hurting him; however, if the blows were for the purpose of allowing the accused to escape this would not amount to self defence. The Chief Justice concluded that the blows were for the purpose of escape; thus did not amount to self defence. The accused’s movement o f the complainant’s arms to get at the wallet did not amount to “personal violence”; however, the striking of the complainant at the time of the escape did amount to “personal violence.”
[55] In R. v. Lew (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 140 (Ont. C.A.) the Court indicated that to satisfy robbery under s. 302(b) “something more than a mere assault was needed.” Thus, an accused who pushed a woman after removing a wallet from her purse was guilty of theft and not robbery.
[56] In R. v. Downer (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 532 (Ont. C.A.) the accused was charged with robbery pursuant to s. 302(b). The accused entered the complainant’s residence and pushed him against the wall demanding money. The complainant took money out of his pockets but the accused demanded more. He then began slapping and pushing the complainant. He broke glass jars and took the money. The trial judge directed the jury that they must find that the violence was in furtherance of the theft. The jury acquitted of the robbery but found the accused guilty of theft. The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge misdirected the jury. Martin J.A. held that the words of the section were clear and unambiguous by which Parliament meant to ignore the motive and purpose of the accused in inflicting personal violence proximate to the theft: see p. 540. At p. 541 he added:
“In the vast majority of cases the infliction of criminally culpable violence on the victim proximate to the theft will be for the purpose of facilitating the theft, or the escape of the offender, or the offender by the use of unlawful violence will have created a situation which enabled him to commit the theft or to escape afterwards. There is little, if any, difference, however, in the culpability of one who uses personal violence to the victim for the purpose of facilitating the theft, and that of one who inflicts on the victim criminal and gratuitous violence of the kind specified in s. 302(b), during the commission of the theft or immediately before or immediately thereafter, whatever the motive prompting its infliction may have been. It is, in my view, sound penal law policy to equally discourage the use of such violence in either case.”
[57] In R. v. Oakley reflex, (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 351 ( Ont. C.A.) Martin J.A. wrote at p. 365:
“ In our view, the words “personal violence” in s. 302(b)[ now s. 343(b)] takes colour from the preceding words “ wounds, beats, strikes.” A mere technical assault does not constitute personal violence under s. 302(b) . . .”
[58] The jurisprudence related to the “violence” and “threats of violence” set out in s. 343(a) is set out below.
[59] In R. v. Picard (1976), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 57 (Que. Sess. Ct.) the accused was charged with aggravated theft contrary to s. 302(a). Picard and an accomplice grabbed a handbag from a woman’s shoulder before she could offer any resistance. The trial judge acquitted the accused of theft but convicted of theft under. At p. 60 Berube J. wrote:
“In the present case, there was theft but, was there assault? Let us eliminate assault with bodily harm. Plain assault? Could the simple act of pulling on a handbag constitute assault? Could it be an act of violence?
Violence, according to the "Petit Larousse,” is the manifestation of an intense impetuous force; it is maltreatment, brutality against a person. Where is the brutality of the assault in the present case.
It is true that a certain force was exercised, rather a certain pressure to snatch the handbag, to seize it abruptly but, in my humble opinion and in the opinion of some authors whom I shall cite later, this does not constitute assault.”
[60] In R. v. D’Ovidio and Anderson (unreported 28 March 1980)(Ont. Co. Ct.) Whealey J. wrote:
“ It is clear that the gravamen of the offence [robbery] is a theft accompanied by “violence or threats of violence” used for the purpose of accomplishing the theft. I suppose every pick-pocket has some minimal contact with the victim and thus, possibly, the accusation of “violence” accompanied by theft. In my view, the incidental and minimal bodily contact is not what is aimed at by s. 302(a); rather the level of violence must be of a substantial nature, clearly identifiable as a separate act from the theft.”
[61] In R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (Ont. C.A.)(Sayers) Sayers entered a bank with McCoy. Sayers jumped on a counter. He pointed with two fingers of each hand and said “This is a robbery in progress. Just empty your drawers and give me the money.” He told the customers to keep back. Sayers jumped from the counter and approached three tellers. He took money from each one. The second teller’s drawer was locked and he told her to open the till; she did so. McCoy stood watch. The trial judge acquitted the two men because he found that the Crown had not proven a robbery pursuant to s. 302(a)[now s. 343(a)] because there were no violence or threats of violence. The Court of Appeal convicted both individuals of robbery because they found that actions of the accused came within the definition of “threats of violence.” LaCourciere J.A. wrote at p. 575:
“The two cases referred to by the learned trial judge include helpful discussions of the meaning of the words "threats of violence.” We agree with the learned editor of Snow's Criminal Code of Canada, 6th ed. (1955), p. 250, that to constitute robbery all that is necessary is "some act of ... violence or some demonstration from which physical injury to the person robbed may be reasonably apprehended.” In order to conclude that such reasonable apprehension exists it is necessary to look at the totality of the conduct of the accused.
Applying this test to the admitted facts, the words used by the respondent referred to a "robbery in progress,” together with the respondent's gestures and the manner in which the respondent Sayers spoke or screamed his commands to the tellers, could only have the effect of causing a reasonable apprehension of physical harm unless the tellers complied with the demand. The predictable reaction of the tellers was one of concern and of fear.
In our view, the learned trial judge erred in his interpretation of the robbery section and in failing to find that the respondent's words and conduct came within the legal meaning of the words "threats of violence" as used in s. 302(a).”
[62] In R. v. Trudel reflex, (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 342 (Que. C.A.)(Trudel) the accused was charged with a number of offences, including robbery contrary to s. 302(a). The accused and a companion entered a store where he yelled “This is a holdup.” His companion immobilized the store owner by holding her arms while Trudel grabbed money. The trial judge convicted of theft. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for robbery. The Court agreed something more than a mere assault was needed for the purposes of ss. (b). However, the Court held that jurisprudence interpreting ss. (b) was not applicable to ss. (a). The Court implied that a lesser degree of force might support threats of violence for the purpose of ss. (a).
[63] In R. v. Fleury reflex, (1984), 57 A.R. 239 (Alta. C.A.)(Fleury) the Court held that when the accused pulled at the purse which the woman victim had around on shoulder and yanked her to the ground this was a robbery. McGillivray C.J.A. said at para. 2:
“The facts are that there was an assault; we are not concerned with the nature of the assault. We with deference do not agree with the decision of Berube, J., in R. v. Picard where he looks to the common law and concludes that there must be something intimidating about what took place. We think that the Code speaks for itself; that there was an assault here; that it was an assault with intent to steal; and that robbery was accordingly committed.”
[64] This decision is binding upon me. However, the negative commentary of the Chief Justice related to Picard must be put into proper perspective. In Fleury the Court decided that a robbery had been proven pursuant to s. 302(3) [now s. 343 (c)]. Section 343(c) defines robbery as, “assaults any person with intent to steal from him”; hence, all the Crown needs to prove is an assault as opposed to violence.
[65] In R. v. Malzfewski [1987] B.C.J. No. 2520 (B.C.C.A.) the accused entered a store and took the money the store clerk from the cash drawer. When the store clerk confronted him, he pushed her to the ground with considerable force. The defence pointed out that s. 302 (a)[ now s. 343(a)] did not apply because the theft was complete. She then argued that s. 302(b)[now s. 343(b)] did not apply because the quality of violence was greater to support ss. (b) than (a). Hutcheon J.A. disagreed:
“I see no reason to conclude that a different quality of violence is contemplated under subsection (a) than under (b).
In the present case the judge used this language, and it is fully supported by the evidence: “She was pushed to the ground violently.” An then further on: She referred to the physical confrontation in part ‘he twisted me down’, and so on. There would be a considerable force used by her.”
[66] In Pelletier the accused entered the bank and jumped over the counter where the tellers worked. The accused ordered the manager to get to his office. The tellers moved back and the accused gathered the money. He remained silent throughout. When frustrated because a drawer would not open, he threw a cash drawer on the floor. The trial judge convicted of robbery pursuant to s. 343(a). The Court of Appeal agreed that the actions of the accused constituted threats of violence. Proulx J.A. observed at p. 441-2:
“In its ordinary meaning, a "threat" remains a "tool of intimidation which is designed to instil a sense of fear in its recipient": R. v. McCraw, Supreme Court of Canada, unreported, September 26, 1991 [since reported 66 C.C.C. (3d) 517, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, 7 C.R. (4th) 314]. In the context of s. 343(a), a threat of violence is characterized by conduct which reflects an intent to have recourse to violence in order to carry out the theft or to prevent resistance to the theft: R. v. Broughton, [1986] 1 N.Z.C.R. 641 at p. 643 (C.A.) (the provision creating the offence in the New Zealand Crimes Act contains the same constituent elements as in Canada).
A threat may be express or implicit and made by means of words, writings or actions.
It is essentially the threatening act which is more important than the effect that it creates, and in this sense, one must consider that threats of violence are made even though they do not create any fear at all, just as one must admit that even if the victim of the theft experiences momentary fear, it does not necessarily follow that threats were made to him: R. v. Broughton, supra, at p. 643:
The actual presence or absence of fear on the part of the complainant is not the yardstick. It is the conduct of the accused which has to be assessed rather than "the strength of the nerves of the person threatened" ( R. v. Smith, [1849] 2 Car + Kir 882, 887; R. v. Pacholko (1941), 75 C.C.C. 172, 175).
As the courts have reiterated on numerous occasions, the threats must be considered in an objective manner, that is from the perspective of a reasonable ordinary person: R. v. Provencal (1988), 21 Q.A.C. 129 (C.A.), where my colleague Tyndale J.A. wrote [at p. 137]: "Appellants argue, correctly, that the subjective reaction of Lamoureux is not alone sufficient to make of the thief's behaviour a threat of violence within the meaning of the article; his fear must be reasonable in the circumstances."
When it is a question of determining whether objectively the impugned conduct constitutes threats of violence, it is appropriate to consider the conduct as a whole, that is, by taking into consideration the context, circumstances, and persons threatened: R. v. Provencal, supra, at p. 140, quoting R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572, 1 O.A.C. 239 (C.A.): '"In order to conclude that such reasonable apprehension exists it is necessary to look at the totality of the conduct of the accused.”
[67] Proulx J.A. continued at p. 443 where he added:
“The fact of brutishly getting behind the bank counters by jumping over them and at the same time telling the bank manager to get out of his office and then throwing the first cash drawer on the floor is evidence of particularly bold and determined action which obviously created an element of violence.
At the very least, it was an intimidating act directed toward persons who, because of their functions and their working environment, are always susceptible to being victims of intrusions of this sort and therefore become very vulnerable when such situations arise. Such conduct cannot leave any doubt as to its author's intentions should there be resistance and it is not surprising that the three tellers had the same reaction of fear and believed that they did not need anything else in order to convince them to back away and let the intruder go about and take the money from the cash drawers.”
[68] In R. v. Bourassa 2004 NSCA 127 (CanLII), (2004), 189 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (N.S.C.A.)(Bourassa) the accused entered a bank wearing a jacket with the hood up. He put his sunglasses on. He asked her for her large bills. He kept his hands in his pockets at all times. The teller assumed he had a weapon. She froze; the accused came across the wicket and reached into the till taking the money. He then left the bank. The Crown relied upon s. 343 (a). The trial judge convicted. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Saunders J.A. wrote the decision of the Court. At para. 7 Saunders J.A. observed:
“From the definitions and the jurisprudence which has considered them, one sees in simplistic terms the difference between “ robbery” and “theft” is that robbery by confronting and intimidating the person whose property is taken, whereas theft is committed without of violence, and often occurs secretly, such that the victim is left unaware of being relieved of their property.”
[69] At para. 13 Saunders J.A. added:
“Here, the question for Cacchione J. to decide was whether, on all of the evidence, the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the offender amounted to using threats of violence. In coming to that determination the trier of fact may well apply a partly subjective and partly objective test. “
[70] At para. 15 Saunders J.A. continued:
“Ms. Miller said she was frightened and angry to find herself again the victim of a bank robbery. Such evidence was clearly subjective, but was certainly relevant to the determination of whether she felt threatened by the conduct and whether such fear was reasonable under the circumstances. To simply isolate one or two actions of the thief as the appellant suggests, presents a distorted view. The better approach is to examine the entire sequence of events through the eyes of a reasonable observer who happened upon the scene. When assessing, objectively, whether such fear was reasonable, many features of the incident would be especially persuasive, for example: the individual had the hood of his jacket up over his head as he approached the wicket; then after putting his sunglasses on, and keeping his right hand in his pocket, passed the teller a note, and by some gesture and grunting sounds made it clear that he wanted the large bills. When the teller froze and was unable to react, he reached across the till, grabbed the money and fled.”
[71] In R. v. Hodson [2001] A.J. No. 601 (Alta. C.A.) the accused was charged with robbery but was convicted by the trial judge of theft. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for robbery. The accused entered a Dairy Queen staffed by two teenage girls. The accused told them to give him all the money. He repeated the demand telling them to give him all the ten and twenty dollar bills on hand. They gave the money to him. He left the premises. At paras. 11- 13 McClung J.A. observed:
“It was recognized that threats of fear could be subtle as well as vocal. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th ed. (London, Butterworths, 1988) at 541 says flatly; "A threat of force may be implied as well as express."
Canadian authority supports the more inclusive approach.
". . . The question is whether the actions and words of the accused, in light of the context and circumstances in which they took place, could reasonably create a feeling of apprehension on the part of the victims." R. v. Pelletier reflex, (1992) 71 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (Que. C.A.)
The required review was furthered by the analysis of Doherty P.C.J. expressed in R. v. Benekritis [1994] B.C.J. No. 1739, which I quote and respectfully adopt.
"18. As I understand Mr. Cameron's argument, he submits that the threat of violence as contemplated under section 343(a) must be expressed and anything less than a direct threat does not come within this section. I disagree.
19. In my view, the threat of violence may be implicit and made up of words, writings, or actions, any or all three of which may be considered in the context of the event if they could reasonably create a feeling of apprehension on the part of the victim."
[72] McClung J.A. held that the trial judge erred by not weighing all of the intimidating aspects of the accused’s demands. The time, place, absence of customers and a repeated demand may well induce a feeling of apprehension in the young clerk. He ruled that the trial judge had ignored the essential question whether the offence was carried out in an atmosphere of apprehension exploited by the thief or whether the employer’s money was given away by some sense of largesse. In other words, was it extracted from her because of fear as opposed to being merely importuned? The judge was required to survey the whole scene so that the actual offence can be truly characterized when the actual offence was committed: see para. 15.
[53] Set out below is relevant jurisprudence to the meaning of “personal violence” as found in s. 343(b).
[54] In R. v. Burden (1973),11 C.C.C. (2d) 491 (Ont. C.A.)(Burden) the complainant fell asleep on a bench. He awoke to find that the accused had removed his wallet. He chased the accused and got him in a bear hug. The accused struck him in the side. The robbery was analyzed pursuant to s. 302(b)[ now s. 343(b)]. Gale C.J.O. held that, if there was a reasonable doubt that the accused was defending himself, this amounted to a defence to robbery. Self defence in the circumstances would only apply if the purpose of the accused in administering blows to make the complainant from hurting him; however, if the blows were for the purpose of allowing the accused to escape this would not amount to self defence. The Chief Justice concluded that the blows were for the purpose of escape; thus did not amount to self defence. The accused’s movement o f the complainant’s arms to get at the wallet did not amount to “personal violence”; however, the striking of the complainant at the time of the escape did amount to “personal violence.”
[55] In R. v. Lew (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 140 (Ont. C.A.) the Court indicated that to satisfy robbery under s. 302(b) “something more than a mere assault was needed.” Thus, an accused who pushed a woman after removing a wallet from her purse was guilty of theft and not robbery.
[56] In R. v. Downer (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 532 (Ont. C.A.) the accused was charged with robbery pursuant to s. 302(b). The accused entered the complainant’s residence and pushed him against the wall demanding money. The complainant took money out of his pockets but the accused demanded more. He then began slapping and pushing the complainant. He broke glass jars and took the money. The trial judge directed the jury that they must find that the violence was in furtherance of the theft. The jury acquitted of the robbery but found the accused guilty of theft. The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge misdirected the jury. Martin J.A. held that the words of the section were clear and unambiguous by which Parliament meant to ignore the motive and purpose of the accused in inflicting personal violence proximate to the theft: see p. 540. At p. 541 he added:
“In the vast majority of cases the infliction of criminally culpable violence on the victim proximate to the theft will be for the purpose of facilitating the theft, or the escape of the offender, or the offender by the use of unlawful violence will have created a situation which enabled him to commit the theft or to escape afterwards. There is little, if any, difference, however, in the culpability of one who uses personal violence to the victim for the purpose of facilitating the theft, and that of one who inflicts on the victim criminal and gratuitous violence of the kind specified in s. 302(b), during the commission of the theft or immediately before or immediately thereafter, whatever the motive prompting its infliction may have been. It is, in my view, sound penal law policy to equally discourage the use of such violence in either case.”
[57] In R. v. Oakley reflex, (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 351 ( Ont. C.A.) Martin J.A. wrote at p. 365:
“ In our view, the words “personal violence” in s. 302(b)[ now s. 343(b)] takes colour from the preceding words “ wounds, beats, strikes.” A mere technical assault does not constitute personal violence under s. 302(b) . . .”
[58] The jurisprudence related to the “violence” and “threats of violence” set out in s. 343(a) is set out below.
[59] In R. v. Picard (1976), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 57 (Que. Sess. Ct.) the accused was charged with aggravated theft contrary to s. 302(a). Picard and an accomplice grabbed a handbag from a woman’s shoulder before she could offer any resistance. The trial judge acquitted the accused of theft but convicted of theft under. At p. 60 Berube J. wrote:
“In the present case, there was theft but, was there assault? Let us eliminate assault with bodily harm. Plain assault? Could the simple act of pulling on a handbag constitute assault? Could it be an act of violence?
Violence, according to the "Petit Larousse,” is the manifestation of an intense impetuous force; it is maltreatment, brutality against a person. Where is the brutality of the assault in the present case.
It is true that a certain force was exercised, rather a certain pressure to snatch the handbag, to seize it abruptly but, in my humble opinion and in the opinion of some authors whom I shall cite later, this does not constitute assault.”
[60] In R. v. D’Ovidio and Anderson (unreported 28 March 1980)(Ont. Co. Ct.) Whealey J. wrote:
“ It is clear that the gravamen of the offence [robbery] is a theft accompanied by “violence or threats of violence” used for the purpose of accomplishing the theft. I suppose every pick-pocket has some minimal contact with the victim and thus, possibly, the accusation of “violence” accompanied by theft. In my view, the incidental and minimal bodily contact is not what is aimed at by s. 302(a); rather the level of violence must be of a substantial nature, clearly identifiable as a separate act from the theft.”
[61] In R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (Ont. C.A.)(Sayers) Sayers entered a bank with McCoy. Sayers jumped on a counter. He pointed with two fingers of each hand and said “This is a robbery in progress. Just empty your drawers and give me the money.” He told the customers to keep back. Sayers jumped from the counter and approached three tellers. He took money from each one. The second teller’s drawer was locked and he told her to open the till; she did so. McCoy stood watch. The trial judge acquitted the two men because he found that the Crown had not proven a robbery pursuant to s. 302(a)[now s. 343(a)] because there were no violence or threats of violence. The Court of Appeal convicted both individuals of robbery because they found that actions of the accused came within the definition of “threats of violence.” LaCourciere J.A. wrote at p. 575:
“The two cases referred to by the learned trial judge include helpful discussions of the meaning of the words "threats of violence.” We agree with the learned editor of Snow's Criminal Code of Canada, 6th ed. (1955), p. 250, that to constitute robbery all that is necessary is "some act of ... violence or some demonstration from which physical injury to the person robbed may be reasonably apprehended.” In order to conclude that such reasonable apprehension exists it is necessary to look at the totality of the conduct of the accused.
Applying this test to the admitted facts, the words used by the respondent referred to a "robbery in progress,” together with the respondent's gestures and the manner in which the respondent Sayers spoke or screamed his commands to the tellers, could only have the effect of causing a reasonable apprehension of physical harm unless the tellers complied with the demand. The predictable reaction of the tellers was one of concern and of fear.
In our view, the learned trial judge erred in his interpretation of the robbery section and in failing to find that the respondent's words and conduct came within the legal meaning of the words "threats of violence" as used in s. 302(a).”
[62] In R. v. Trudel reflex, (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 342 (Que. C.A.)(Trudel) the accused was charged with a number of offences, including robbery contrary to s. 302(a). The accused and a companion entered a store where he yelled “This is a holdup.” His companion immobilized the store owner by holding her arms while Trudel grabbed money. The trial judge convicted of theft. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for robbery. The Court agreed something more than a mere assault was needed for the purposes of ss. (b). However, the Court held that jurisprudence interpreting ss. (b) was not applicable to ss. (a). The Court implied that a lesser degree of force might support threats of violence for the purpose of ss. (a).
[63] In R. v. Fleury reflex, (1984), 57 A.R. 239 (Alta. C.A.)(Fleury) the Court held that when the accused pulled at the purse which the woman victim had around on shoulder and yanked her to the ground this was a robbery. McGillivray C.J.A. said at para. 2:
“The facts are that there was an assault; we are not concerned with the nature of the assault. We with deference do not agree with the decision of Berube, J., in R. v. Picard where he looks to the common law and concludes that there must be something intimidating about what took place. We think that the Code speaks for itself; that there was an assault here; that it was an assault with intent to steal; and that robbery was accordingly committed.”
[64] This decision is binding upon me. However, the negative commentary of the Chief Justice related to Picard must be put into proper perspective. In Fleury the Court decided that a robbery had been proven pursuant to s. 302(3) [now s. 343 (c)]. Section 343(c) defines robbery as, “assaults any person with intent to steal from him”; hence, all the Crown needs to prove is an assault as opposed to violence.
[65] In R. v. Malzfewski [1987] B.C.J. No. 2520 (B.C.C.A.) the accused entered a store and took the money the store clerk from the cash drawer. When the store clerk confronted him, he pushed her to the ground with considerable force. The defence pointed out that s. 302 (a)[ now s. 343(a)] did not apply because the theft was complete. She then argued that s. 302(b)[now s. 343(b)] did not apply because the quality of violence was greater to support ss. (b) than (a). Hutcheon J.A. disagreed:
“I see no reason to conclude that a different quality of violence is contemplated under subsection (a) than under (b).
In the present case the judge used this language, and it is fully supported by the evidence: “She was pushed to the ground violently.” An then further on: She referred to the physical confrontation in part ‘he twisted me down’, and so on. There would be a considerable force used by her.”
[66] In Pelletier the accused entered the bank and jumped over the counter where the tellers worked. The accused ordered the manager to get to his office. The tellers moved back and the accused gathered the money. He remained silent throughout. When frustrated because a drawer would not open, he threw a cash drawer on the floor. The trial judge convicted of robbery pursuant to s. 343(a). The Court of Appeal agreed that the actions of the accused constituted threats of violence. Proulx J.A. observed at p. 441-2:
“In its ordinary meaning, a "threat" remains a "tool of intimidation which is designed to instil a sense of fear in its recipient": R. v. McCraw, Supreme Court of Canada, unreported, September 26, 1991 [since reported 66 C.C.C. (3d) 517, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, 7 C.R. (4th) 314]. In the context of s. 343(a), a threat of violence is characterized by conduct which reflects an intent to have recourse to violence in order to carry out the theft or to prevent resistance to the theft: R. v. Broughton, [1986] 1 N.Z.C.R. 641 at p. 643 (C.A.) (the provision creating the offence in the New Zealand Crimes Act contains the same constituent elements as in Canada).
A threat may be express or implicit and made by means of words, writings or actions.
It is essentially the threatening act which is more important than the effect that it creates, and in this sense, one must consider that threats of violence are made even though they do not create any fear at all, just as one must admit that even if the victim of the theft experiences momentary fear, it does not necessarily follow that threats were made to him: R. v. Broughton, supra, at p. 643:
The actual presence or absence of fear on the part of the complainant is not the yardstick. It is the conduct of the accused which has to be assessed rather than "the strength of the nerves of the person threatened" ( R. v. Smith, [1849] 2 Car + Kir 882, 887; R. v. Pacholko (1941), 75 C.C.C. 172, 175).
As the courts have reiterated on numerous occasions, the threats must be considered in an objective manner, that is from the perspective of a reasonable ordinary person: R. v. Provencal (1988), 21 Q.A.C. 129 (C.A.), where my colleague Tyndale J.A. wrote [at p. 137]: "Appellants argue, correctly, that the subjective reaction of Lamoureux is not alone sufficient to make of the thief's behaviour a threat of violence within the meaning of the article; his fear must be reasonable in the circumstances."
When it is a question of determining whether objectively the impugned conduct constitutes threats of violence, it is appropriate to consider the conduct as a whole, that is, by taking into consideration the context, circumstances, and persons threatened: R. v. Provencal, supra, at p. 140, quoting R. v. Sayers and McCoy reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 572, 1 O.A.C. 239 (C.A.): '"In order to conclude that such reasonable apprehension exists it is necessary to look at the totality of the conduct of the accused.”
[67] Proulx J.A. continued at p. 443 where he added:
“The fact of brutishly getting behind the bank counters by jumping over them and at the same time telling the bank manager to get out of his office and then throwing the first cash drawer on the floor is evidence of particularly bold and determined action which obviously created an element of violence.
At the very least, it was an intimidating act directed toward persons who, because of their functions and their working environment, are always susceptible to being victims of intrusions of this sort and therefore become very vulnerable when such situations arise. Such conduct cannot leave any doubt as to its author's intentions should there be resistance and it is not surprising that the three tellers had the same reaction of fear and believed that they did not need anything else in order to convince them to back away and let the intruder go about and take the money from the cash drawers.”
[68] In R. v. Bourassa 2004 NSCA 127 (CanLII), (2004), 189 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (N.S.C.A.)(Bourassa) the accused entered a bank wearing a jacket with the hood up. He put his sunglasses on. He asked her for her large bills. He kept his hands in his pockets at all times. The teller assumed he had a weapon. She froze; the accused came across the wicket and reached into the till taking the money. He then left the bank. The Crown relied upon s. 343 (a). The trial judge convicted. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Saunders J.A. wrote the decision of the Court. At para. 7 Saunders J.A. observed:
“From the definitions and the jurisprudence which has considered them, one sees in simplistic terms the difference between “ robbery” and “theft” is that robbery by confronting and intimidating the person whose property is taken, whereas theft is committed without of violence, and often occurs secretly, such that the victim is left unaware of being relieved of their property.”
[69] At para. 13 Saunders J.A. added:
“Here, the question for Cacchione J. to decide was whether, on all of the evidence, the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the offender amounted to using threats of violence. In coming to that determination the trier of fact may well apply a partly subjective and partly objective test. “
[70] At para. 15 Saunders J.A. continued:
“Ms. Miller said she was frightened and angry to find herself again the victim of a bank robbery. Such evidence was clearly subjective, but was certainly relevant to the determination of whether she felt threatened by the conduct and whether such fear was reasonable under the circumstances. To simply isolate one or two actions of the thief as the appellant suggests, presents a distorted view. The better approach is to examine the entire sequence of events through the eyes of a reasonable observer who happened upon the scene. When assessing, objectively, whether such fear was reasonable, many features of the incident would be especially persuasive, for example: the individual had the hood of his jacket up over his head as he approached the wicket; then after putting his sunglasses on, and keeping his right hand in his pocket, passed the teller a note, and by some gesture and grunting sounds made it clear that he wanted the large bills. When the teller froze and was unable to react, he reached across the till, grabbed the money and fled.”
[71] In R. v. Hodson [2001] A.J. No. 601 (Alta. C.A.) the accused was charged with robbery but was convicted by the trial judge of theft. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for robbery. The accused entered a Dairy Queen staffed by two teenage girls. The accused told them to give him all the money. He repeated the demand telling them to give him all the ten and twenty dollar bills on hand. They gave the money to him. He left the premises. At paras. 11- 13 McClung J.A. observed:
“It was recognized that threats of fear could be subtle as well as vocal. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th ed. (London, Butterworths, 1988) at 541 says flatly; "A threat of force may be implied as well as express."
Canadian authority supports the more inclusive approach.
". . . The question is whether the actions and words of the accused, in light of the context and circumstances in which they took place, could reasonably create a feeling of apprehension on the part of the victims." R. v. Pelletier reflex, (1992) 71 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (Que. C.A.)
The required review was furthered by the analysis of Doherty P.C.J. expressed in R. v. Benekritis [1994] B.C.J. No. 1739, which I quote and respectfully adopt.
"18. As I understand Mr. Cameron's argument, he submits that the threat of violence as contemplated under section 343(a) must be expressed and anything less than a direct threat does not come within this section. I disagree.
19. In my view, the threat of violence may be implicit and made up of words, writings, or actions, any or all three of which may be considered in the context of the event if they could reasonably create a feeling of apprehension on the part of the victim."
[72] McClung J.A. held that the trial judge erred by not weighing all of the intimidating aspects of the accused’s demands. The time, place, absence of customers and a repeated demand may well induce a feeling of apprehension in the young clerk. He ruled that the trial judge had ignored the essential question whether the offence was carried out in an atmosphere of apprehension exploited by the thief or whether the employer’s money was given away by some sense of largesse. In other words, was it extracted from her because of fear as opposed to being merely importuned? The judge was required to survey the whole scene so that the actual offence can be truly characterized when the actual offence was committed: see para. 15.
La définition du mot violence
R. v. Callihoo, 2006 ABPC 347 (CanLII)
[46] “Violence” is not defined in the Code. The Supreme Court held that to determine an undefined term in a statute the words making up the term are read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; see also Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (S.C.C.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21.
[47] Recently, R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, (C.D.) the Supreme Court explored the meaning of the words “violence” and “violent offence.” In that case the Court was concerned about the meaning to be attributed to the word “violent offence” in s. 39(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act. That Act allows a judge to sentence a young person to custody in one of four situations. One of these gateways is where the young person commits a “violent offence. “ Bastarache J. wrote the majority decision. Bastarache J. felt it advisable to explore the meaning of the word “violence” in his analysis. He began with the dictionary meaning “violence” but expressed some reservations about the dictionary meaning being a complete answer. At paras. 29-30 he wrote:
“Turning first to dictionary definitions, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989), at p. 656, when the word "violent" is used to describe actions, it means that the actions are "[c]haracterized by the doing of harm or injury" or are "accompanied by the exercise of violence." The primary meaning of "violence,” according to this dictionary, is "[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property" (p. 654).
While the dictionary definition of "violence" focuses on the means employed to produce injury or damage (i.e. the exercise of physical force), one author argues that, ordinarily, the term "violence" is understood just in terms of its effects:
Violence is not an easy term to define. It is usually defined in terms of its effects. For most people, any act producing even a small amount of blood is violent. Sometimes damage to objects is accepted as a violent expression of anger or hostility against a person (as when someone vandalizes another's car or defaces the walls of a house with slogans).
It is significant that the Criminal Code, which one might assume to be the "bible" of the control of violence in society, offers no definition of violence. It is, surprisingly, perhaps the most "assumed" term within the entire Code. Offences which one might consider the most "violent" of all crimes, such as murder and assault, do not mention violence. Rather, they talk about concrete, measurable things like "death" and "bodily harm."
(T. Scassa, "Violence Against Women in Law Schools" (1992), 30 Alta. L. Rev. 809, at p. 816)”
[48] Bastarache J. concluded his analysis related to meaning of the word “violence” at para. 33:
“After examining these dictionary, ordinary and judicially constructed definitions of "violence," it can be said that "violence" is typically associated with either the application of force or the causation of harm or injury, but is also sometimes associated with both. Not only is it clear from these definitions that "violence" has a spectrum of meanings, it is also clear that "violence" can be applied to property as well as to persons. Nevertheless, while helpful, these particular definitions of "violence" are certainly not determinative of the meaning of the term "violent offence" for purposes of s. 39(1)(a) of the YCJA, because it is still necessary to examine this term in the context of the Act. Specifically, this term must be analysed in relation to the object of the YCJA, the scheme of the YCJA and the intention of Parliament. As I will demonstrate below, all three of these indicators of legislative meaning favour a narrow interpretation of the term "violent offence.”
[49] Bastarache J. continued his analysis in C.D. by examining the context of the act. At para. 87 he concluded:
“For all these reasons, I support extending the definition of "violent offence" to capture those offences in which bodily harm is threatened. Accordingly, I am of the view that, for purposes of s. 39(1)(a) of the YCJA, the term "violent offence" must be defined as an offence in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm. Since the Alberta Court of Appeal defined this term differently, I must respectfully conclude that it erred in law in doing so.”
[50] Bastarache J. reviewed the record in relation to each accused. He concluded that the admitted facts did not prove that the offences for which either accused was charged constituted “violent offences”: see paras. 88-89; para: 92.
[51] Clearly, C.D. is applicable to s. 39(1) of YCJA. C.D. is based in large part in a contextual analysis of the YCJA. So, the conclusions of the Supreme Court as to the meaning of “violent” must be carefully scrutinized prior to any conclusion as to the meaning of the word to a Code provision. Nevertheless, the findings of the Supreme Court as to the meaning of a related word “violent offence” can hardly be easily ignored.
[52] The word “violence” obviously can give rise to a whole spectrum of meanings. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the term is to be garnered by reference to its primary dictionary meaning, i.e., “the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, cause damage to, persons or property.” This ordinary meaning must be borne in mind in determining its meaning. A contextual examination of the legislation can often lead to a determination of the intent and object of parliament that can serve to discern the exact meaning of a term used in the legislation. Unfortunately examination of Code sections other than s. 343 is of little assistance in determining the meaning of violence in that section. Examination of the terminology within the section is of some limited assistance since the section makes a distinction between “assault” and “violence.” The examination of the jurisprudence defining that term in reference to ss. 343(a) and (b) is of assistance to illustrate the meaning of the word and how it has been applied.
[46] “Violence” is not defined in the Code. The Supreme Court held that to determine an undefined term in a statute the words making up the term are read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; see also Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (S.C.C.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21.
[47] Recently, R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, (C.D.) the Supreme Court explored the meaning of the words “violence” and “violent offence.” In that case the Court was concerned about the meaning to be attributed to the word “violent offence” in s. 39(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act. That Act allows a judge to sentence a young person to custody in one of four situations. One of these gateways is where the young person commits a “violent offence. “ Bastarache J. wrote the majority decision. Bastarache J. felt it advisable to explore the meaning of the word “violence” in his analysis. He began with the dictionary meaning “violence” but expressed some reservations about the dictionary meaning being a complete answer. At paras. 29-30 he wrote:
“Turning first to dictionary definitions, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989), at p. 656, when the word "violent" is used to describe actions, it means that the actions are "[c]haracterized by the doing of harm or injury" or are "accompanied by the exercise of violence." The primary meaning of "violence,” according to this dictionary, is "[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property" (p. 654).
While the dictionary definition of "violence" focuses on the means employed to produce injury or damage (i.e. the exercise of physical force), one author argues that, ordinarily, the term "violence" is understood just in terms of its effects:
Violence is not an easy term to define. It is usually defined in terms of its effects. For most people, any act producing even a small amount of blood is violent. Sometimes damage to objects is accepted as a violent expression of anger or hostility against a person (as when someone vandalizes another's car or defaces the walls of a house with slogans).
It is significant that the Criminal Code, which one might assume to be the "bible" of the control of violence in society, offers no definition of violence. It is, surprisingly, perhaps the most "assumed" term within the entire Code. Offences which one might consider the most "violent" of all crimes, such as murder and assault, do not mention violence. Rather, they talk about concrete, measurable things like "death" and "bodily harm."
(T. Scassa, "Violence Against Women in Law Schools" (1992), 30 Alta. L. Rev. 809, at p. 816)”
[48] Bastarache J. concluded his analysis related to meaning of the word “violence” at para. 33:
“After examining these dictionary, ordinary and judicially constructed definitions of "violence," it can be said that "violence" is typically associated with either the application of force or the causation of harm or injury, but is also sometimes associated with both. Not only is it clear from these definitions that "violence" has a spectrum of meanings, it is also clear that "violence" can be applied to property as well as to persons. Nevertheless, while helpful, these particular definitions of "violence" are certainly not determinative of the meaning of the term "violent offence" for purposes of s. 39(1)(a) of the YCJA, because it is still necessary to examine this term in the context of the Act. Specifically, this term must be analysed in relation to the object of the YCJA, the scheme of the YCJA and the intention of Parliament. As I will demonstrate below, all three of these indicators of legislative meaning favour a narrow interpretation of the term "violent offence.”
[49] Bastarache J. continued his analysis in C.D. by examining the context of the act. At para. 87 he concluded:
“For all these reasons, I support extending the definition of "violent offence" to capture those offences in which bodily harm is threatened. Accordingly, I am of the view that, for purposes of s. 39(1)(a) of the YCJA, the term "violent offence" must be defined as an offence in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm. Since the Alberta Court of Appeal defined this term differently, I must respectfully conclude that it erred in law in doing so.”
[50] Bastarache J. reviewed the record in relation to each accused. He concluded that the admitted facts did not prove that the offences for which either accused was charged constituted “violent offences”: see paras. 88-89; para: 92.
[51] Clearly, C.D. is applicable to s. 39(1) of YCJA. C.D. is based in large part in a contextual analysis of the YCJA. So, the conclusions of the Supreme Court as to the meaning of “violent” must be carefully scrutinized prior to any conclusion as to the meaning of the word to a Code provision. Nevertheless, the findings of the Supreme Court as to the meaning of a related word “violent offence” can hardly be easily ignored.
[52] The word “violence” obviously can give rise to a whole spectrum of meanings. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the term is to be garnered by reference to its primary dictionary meaning, i.e., “the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, cause damage to, persons or property.” This ordinary meaning must be borne in mind in determining its meaning. A contextual examination of the legislation can often lead to a determination of the intent and object of parliament that can serve to discern the exact meaning of a term used in the legislation. Unfortunately examination of Code sections other than s. 343 is of little assistance in determining the meaning of violence in that section. Examination of the terminology within the section is of some limited assistance since the section makes a distinction between “assault” and “violence.” The examination of the jurisprudence defining that term in reference to ss. 343(a) and (b) is of assistance to illustrate the meaning of the word and how it has been applied.
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