Compétence territoriale interprovinciale : résumé des principes juridiques et de l'approche flexible des tribunaux

R v Hadikin, 2026 ABCJ 59

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Territorial Jurisdiction

[30]           As discussed in Merret, jurisdiction has at least three aspects, jurisdiction over the offence, jurisdiction over the person, and territorial jurisdiction.

[31]           Jurisdiction over the offence relates to what offences can be heard by the court. For example, a provincial court can not hear offences listed in section 469.

[32]            Jurisdiction over the person concerns whether a court may hear a matter involving that person. For example, a court has no jurisdiction to deal with a criminal act of a person under twelve or someone who enjoys diplomatic immunity.

[33]           Territorial jurisdiction concerns whether the alleged offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. It is the issue of territorial jurisdiction that has been raised by the Accused in this case.

Section 478(1)

[34]           Section 478(1) provides that a court in a province shall not try an offence committed entirely in another province. Section 476(b) provides that jurisdiction may be in more than one province if the offence is committed in one territorial division and completed in another. In such case, either province has jurisdiction. 

[35]           In short, a court in one province does not have territorial jurisdiction if the offence is committed entirely in another province.

Jurisdiction as an Element of the Offence

[36]           The Defence cites Montelone for authority that the Crown must prove jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential element of the offence.

[37]            Montelone addresses the test to be applied by a trial judge when a motion is made by the Defence for a directed verdict of acquittal after the Crown has closed its case. No where in Montelone does the Supreme Court state that jurisdiction is an essential element of an offence that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[38]           To the contrary, the preponderance of the authority is that jurisdiction is not an element of the offence.

[39]            R. v. G.L., 2003 CanLII 57437 (ON CA), 2003CanLII 57437 (ON CA) (“G.L.”), involved a charge of historical sexual assaults where the accused and the complainant resided in Ontario, but the accused wasn’t sure if the sexual assault occurred while they were camping in Ontario or Quebec.  The accused argued the Ontario trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter as the sexual assault may have occurred in Quebec. In addressing whether the location of the offence was an essential element of the offence the court said:

In particular, the location where the sexual acts occurred is not an essential element of the offence. Rather, the situs of the offence is relevant to territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The essential elements of the infraction should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, which occurred in this case. However, the situs of the offence is a question of law to decide pursuant to prove jurisdictional facts: Balcombe v The Queen, 1954 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1954] S.C.R. 303; R v Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 as p. 746… (para. 28)

[40]           A similar finding was made by Justice Fradsham in Merret:

“…the place where the offence was allegedly committed is not an element of the of the offence itself, and is, at most, a matter of the jurisdiction of the court to try the matter” (paras.24- 33) (see also R v Beckow, 2024 ABCJ 235, paras.8-11)

[41]           Finally on this point, the Quebec Court of Appeal in Ibeagha addressed territorial jurisdiction over offences related to sex trafficking in Quebec and Alberta. The Court found jurisdiction is a condition precedent to whether the court has authority to try the matter and is not an element of the offence:

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a trial of the merits and this is as true of territorial jurisdiction as it is of temporal jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an offence.  It is a preliminary matter that affects the authority of a court to proceed at trial and ideally should be resolved before the presentation of evidence on the general issue.  This does not mean that the issue cannot be raised later in a trial, but the question of jurisdiction and the general issue are conceptually distinct.  In the present case the question of territorial jurisdiction was only raised by the judge in the final pleadings of the prosecution and in a manner that suggested that territorial jurisdiction was an element of the offence rather than a condition precedent to proceeding on the merits at trial. (para. 18)

[42]           In short, whether the court has jurisdiction to try a matter is not an element of the offence but rather is a question of law to be decided pursuant to “proved jurisdictional facts”.

“Test” for Determining Whether a Court has Territorial Jurisdiction

[43]           The leading authorities on territorial jurisdiction appear to be Libman v The Queen, 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC) (“Libman”) and R v Bigelow, 1982 CanLII 2046 (ON CA) (“Bigelow”). 

[44]           Libman involved a fraudulent scheme to sell shares in mining companies in Central America to purchasers in the United States. The solicitation for the sale of shares was conducted out of a phone centre in Toronto, Ontario.  The accused argued exclusive jurisdiction belonged to the country where the gravamen of the offence took place or where the offence was completed. The court in finding that Canada had jurisdiction held:

“All that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada. As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a “real and substantial link” between an offence and this country…” (para. 74) 

[45]           The fact the phone centre where the fraudulent sales were solicited was located in Toronto was a sufficient link to ground territorial jurisdiction to Canada. 

[46]           As noted above, G.L. involved the prosecution of an uncle who was alleged to have sexually assaulted three of his nephews about 30 years earlier. At the time of the offences, the accused and the complainants lived in Ontario. One of the nephews testified he was sexually assaulted in a tent while on a camping trip in either Ontario or Quebec, he wasn’t certain. The trial judge allowed the information to be amended to provide that the offence occurred in Ontario and Quebec.

[47]           After conviction, the accused advanced several grounds of appeal including that the trial judge was wrong to find the Ontario court had jurisdiction to try a sexual assault that may have occurred in Quebec.

[48]           Drawing from Bigelow and Libman, the ONCA adopted the “real and substantial link” as the appropriate test of whether a court has territorial jurisdiction over the charge.

[49]           Starting at paragraph 29, the Court found:

In R. v. Bigelow (1982), 1982 CanLII 2046 (ON CA), 37 O.R. (2^nd) 304 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied, [1982] S.C.C.A. No. 105, this Court interpreted section 432(b) of the Criminal Code, which has since been slightly amended, and is now section 476(b) of the Code. The Court stated that the test for application of section 432(b) is to determine whether "elements" of the offence were committed in the province asserting territorial jurisdiction: Bigelow, at p. 307. On the other hand, it is clear that the Court did not mean to say that an essential element of the offence was committed in the province in question, but rather that the word "element" was used in the broadest sense, i.e. the view that there should be a real and substantial link between the offence and the province where prosecution takes place. The Court recognized three circumstances where the Ontario Court has territorial jurisdiction over the prosecution of an offence which was committed in another province, i.e. when there is (1) a continuity of operations extending from the province in question (Ontario) to the other province (2) the commission of an overt act in Ontario, or (3) the registration of effects of the Ontario offence: Bigelow, at p. 304. In particular, the Court added that the three circumstances were solely examples of categories of causes where it would be appropriate for the Court to conclude that it had territorial jurisdiction over an offence involving more than one province: Bigelow, at p. 311. The Court also underlined the importance of taking a flexible and sensible approach and to avoid an approach that is too narrow and technical:

Fundamentally, it will be recognized that these three categories of cases merely provide examples of how courts have determined whether an element of an offence has been committed in a province claiming jurisdiction over it. They, nevertheless, demonstrate the determination of the courts to construe s. 432(b) flexibly and sensibly and to avoid restricting its operation by interpreting it narrowly or technically. They simplify the inquiry in this case into the essential legal characteristics of the offence and the acts or omissions which constitute it. [My underlining.]

30.      It is noteworthy that Bigelow was decided prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Libman v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, where the Court ruled on the issue of territorial jurisdiction within the context of transnational offences. Within this context, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the relevant question is to determine whether there is a "real and substantial link" between the offence and the prosecuting country. Although this Court did not explicitly use these terms in Bigelow in my view the test adopted by this Court in Bigelow within the context of the inter-provincial offences is harmonious with the concept of the "real and substantial" link. Furthermore, within the inter-provincial context, the preoccupation with courtesy between sovereign countries is greatly mitigated, which explain my use of the concept of “real and substantial” above.

[50]           While the Court in G.L. acknowledged that the situs of the acts was uncertain, there was a real and substantial link between the charge and the province of Ontario, which was sufficient to give the Ontario court jurisdiction to try the charge even if the sexual assault occurred in Quebec. There was “a continuity of operations between Ontario and Quebec in the commission of the offence,” The accused and complainant were both Ontario residents, the relationship between the two developed in Ontario, it was possible that the accused brought the complainant from Ontario to go camping in Quebec, and the complainant suffered the effects of the offence in Ontario.

[51]           Ibeagha involved charges related to living off the avails of prostitution and sex trafficking. The complainants were sisters. One of the sisters was involved in prostitution in Montreal, and one of the two accused was described as her pimp. Pictures were taken of the complainants in Montreal, and one of the complainants was provided with a false drivers permit while in Montreal. One of the complainants was told that things would go badly if she didn’t agree to work as an escort. The complainants flew to Alberta, and while in Alberta they provided sexual services that were advertised on the internet using the photographs taken when they were in Montreal. For a couple of weeks, before the two accused joined the complainants in Alberta, some of the proceeds from the escort services were sent to the accused while they were still in Montreal.

[52]           The trial judge acquitted the two accused on the basis that the offences were committed entirely in Alberta, and the Quebec court did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal cited Bigelow that “the principle that constrains jurisdiction to more than one territorial division is that there must be a “real and substantial” link between the jurisdiction of the trial and the alleged offence” (para. 13).  At para 14, the Court stated: 

In Bigelow the court began with the general proposition that the test for finding jurisdiction in more than one territorial division is whether any element of the offence has occurred in the province claiming jurisdiction.  It will be noted, however, that the factors enumerated in Bigelow do not refer expressly to an element of the offence as defined in the substantive law.  They are not restricted to an element of the actus reus or the mens rea of an offence.  They each refer to matters of fact that could be relevant to the proof of an essential element at trial.  They include factual elements that form part of the factual narrative of the transaction in issue.  If that threshold can be met, the court of more than one territorial division (or province) can assert jurisdiction, and the outcome will follow the strength of the evidence.

[53]           The Quebec Court of Appeal found the Quebec court had jurisdiction because the scheme continued from Montreal to Alberta and back and there were overt acts in Quebec in furtherance of the criminal conduct in Alberta. 

[54]           Of significance in Ibeagha is that the Quebec Court of Appeal found it was not necessary that an element of the actus reus or mens rea occur in the province for the province to find jurisdiction.

[55]           Some principles that can be derived from the foregoing cases are:

(i)                 Whether a court has jurisdiction to try a matter is not an element of the offence but is a question of law to be decided pursuant to proved jurisdictional facts.

(ii)              A court has territorial jurisdiction if the offence has a real and substantial link to the jurisdiction.

(iii)            Courts have recognized three circumstances where a court has jurisdiction over an offence committed in another province:

(a)        where there is a continuity of operations from one province to the other;

(b)        where there is a commission of an overt act in the province claiming jurisdiction; and

(c)        where the effects of the offence are registered in the province.

These factors are not exclusive and are only examples of circumstances where a court may have jurisdiction.

(iv)            An element of the actus reus or mens rea does not have to occur in the province for the province to have jurisdiction.

(v)               In determining whether there is a real and substantial link to the jurisdiction, the court is to take a flexible and sensible approach and to avoid an approach that is too narrow and technical.

[56]           With reference to these principles, the issue to be decided is whether the Crown has adduced sufficient evidence to establish a real and substantial link between Alberta and the alleged non-consensual publication of the Image  

L'évaluation de la défense d'intoxication avancée exige une analyse contextuelle globale du comportement, de la mémoire et des preuves pour déterminer si l'accusé possédait l'intention spécifique de tuer

R v Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435

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[26]           Determining whether an accused’s level of intoxication rises to the level of impairing an accused’s foresight of the consequences of their acts is a highly factual and contextual exercise. While expert evidence is not a prerequisite to a defence of advanced intoxication as it is with intoxication akin to automatism, it is nonetheless common: R v Arjun, 2015 BCCA 273 at para 39, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] SCCA No 324. Expert evidence as to the accused’s blood alcohol level when the crime was committed, and the impact the accused’s blood alcohol level would have on their cognition, can provide important context in which to assess the accused’s actions. For her part, Dr. Massey provided only an assumption based on the evidence of Phyllis and Matchatis, that “If you did a blood alcohol reading on him, I’m pretty sure he’d be really high.”

[27]           Other relevant factors include the mannerisms of the accused (slurring, staggering, glossy eyes); ability to recall details of the day and the events in question; and ability to act responsively or to carry out purposeful actions before the commission of the offence. Further, an accused’s post-offence conduct may be considered to discredit a defence, like advanced intoxication, relating to whether an accused formed the requisite intent: R v Jaw, 2009 SCC 42, [2009] 3 SCR 26 at para 40.

[28]           Absent expert evidence on this issue, the trial judge was left with generic evidence as to Matchatis’ level of impairment. Indisputably, the evidence suggests Matchatis had been drinking all day and was intoxicated. The trial judge recounted that Tyler placed his father’s intoxication that evening at 9 on a scale from 1 to 10, and Phyllis’ evidence that he was “just about blacked out drunk” but generally can function even when drunk and it takes a lot of alcohol for him to pass out. Phyllis said Matchatis was a seasoned drinker who, after a period of abstinence, had been drinking regularly for over a year; he could handle his liquor, particularly beer.

[32]           A trial judge must weigh and consider all of the evidence of intoxication in a contextual manner to determine whether the accused’s intoxication crossed the line from mere loss of inhibition, impaired judgment and increased bravado to the point where they are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the intoxication was severe enough that its effect might have impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions. In our view, the trial judge did just that. Matchatis’ actions both before and after the shooting, together with his detailed recall of the events, evinced a sense of awareness. We defer to his ultimate finding that the nature of this homicide was consistent with an intention to kill the deceased.

La défense d'intoxication extrême pour nier l'intention de meurtre requiert de prouver l'incapacité de prévoir les conséquences de ses actes, laquelle s'évalue selon plusieurs facteurs factuels et comportementaux clés

R. v. Rogers, 2024 NSCA 100

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[56]         An accused may raise a reasonable doubt about their intent for murder through evidence of advanced intoxication. Where death is the consequence of the accused’s acts, the accused would have to establish a particularly advanced degree of intoxication to successfully avail himself of this defence. The inquiry is whether the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions was affected by intoxication.[22]

[57]         Factors that may be relevant in assessing advanced intoxication include:

1.                 The amount and type of intoxicant consumed;

2.                 Evidence of the accused’s ability to communicate, process information, and/or problem-solve;

3.                 Evidence of the accused’s fine and gross motor coordination skills and ability to perform divided-attention tasks;

4.                 Observations of the accused’s demeanour at or around the time of the offence;

5.                 Witnesses’ lay opinions of the accused’s level of intoxication;

6.                 Evidence of goal-oriented or rational behaviour by the accused;

7.                 Expert evidence linking the accused’s intoxication to the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions.[23]

La demande de modification des conditions d'une ordonnance de probation à un juge d'instance ne peut servir de substitut à l'appel pour contester la légalité de la peine initiale

Gagné c. R., 2013 QCCA 202

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[16]      La Cour supérieure a eu raison de décider que la Cour du Québec n’avait pas compétence pour supprimer les conditions de l’ordonnance de probation. L'appelant s'attaque à la légalité des conditions de l'ordonnance portant sur l'accès aux ordinateurs dans leur ensemble, ce qui relève de l'appel de la peine et non d'une requête pour modifier une condition présentée devant la Cour du Québec. N'ayant pas établi une assise pour la requête en certiorari de l'appelant, le pourvoi doit être rejeté.

[17]      Comme le note la juge de la Cour du Québec, seul un appel aurait permis à M. Gagné de faire supprimer les conditions de sa probation. Compte tenu de la nature de la condamnation, l'interdiction d'avoir accès à un ordinateur est au cœur même de l'ordonnance de probation imposée à l'appelant. L’article 732.2(3) C.cr. ne donnait pas, dans les circonstances, juridiction à la Cour du Québec de la supprimer.

[18]      Dans l’arrêt R. v. Etifier[7], la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique explique la portée limitée du pouvoir d'un tribunal de modifier les conditions d’une ordonnance de probation en application de l’article 732.2(3) C.cr. :

[7]   Section 732.2(3) is designed to give the sentencing court jurisdiction to make changes in probation orders to accommodate unforeseen developments, changes in circumstances, and the accused’s ongoing needs and capacities. While it grants the sentencing judge very broad discretion to change a probation order, its focus is on allowing the court to monitor and adjust the order as new information comes to light, or as circumstances develop. It is not designed to replace the right of an accused person to appeal if he or she considers a probation order that has been imposed to be outside the sentencing judge’s discretion, or otherwise unlawful.

[Je souligne.]

[19]      La juge de la Cour supérieure avait raison de conclure que seule la Cour d'appel pouvait supprimer l'ordonnance imposée à M. Gagné. À l'origine, la condition a été imposée car l'ordinateur et l'Internet sont les outils qu'il a utilisés pour commettre des crimes à l'endroit des enfants. Il est manifeste, à la lecture des griefs formulés par M. Gagné à l'endroit de l'ordonnance, qu'il cherche à contester la légalité de celle-ci et non à exposer une quelconque modification des circonstances survenues depuis qu'elle a été rendue.

En droit criminel, s'appuyer sur un avis juridique erroné ne constitue pas une défense valable pour échapper à sa responsabilité

Gingras c. R., 2022 QCCA 1546

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[12]      Toujours sur le verdict, l’appelant plaide avoir été privé de son droit à une défense pleine et entière en raison d’un jugement rendu par le juge avant la présentation de sa défense[12]. En effet, l’appelant avait annoncé vouloir faire entendre deux avocats experts en affaires municipales en vue d’établir qu’il a agi conformément à des avis juridiques pour justifier ses gestes. Ce moyen de défense étant apparent et clairement anticipé, le ministère public a présenté une demande visant à restreindre la portée de cette preuve, fondé sur le principe que l’erreur de droit ne constitue pas une défense à une accusation criminelle, codifié à l’article 19 du Code criminel.

[13]      Après analyse du droit applicable, le juge conclut que l’appelant ne peut mettre en preuve devant le jury des avis juridiques obtenus « afin de justifier ses faits et gestes et soutenir un moyen de défense sans enfreindre la règle édictée par l’article 19 » du Code criminel[13]. Le juge n’a pas non plus permis la preuve que l’appelant a suivi des conseils juridiques, puisque ceci reviendrait à faire indirectement ce qu’il ne peut faire directement, c’est-à-dire présenter une défense qui n’est pas juridiquement permise. Cependant, il a autorisé l’appelant à faire une certaine preuve, à savoir :

[28] Le Tribunal permettra néanmoins à l’accusé de se référer à l’obtention d’avis juridiques à titre de narration des événements pour permettre au jury d’évaluer sa conduite en fonction du fait qu’il a ou non obtenu un avis juridique, afin d’apprécier sa conduite eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances, notamment le quatrième élément constitutif de l’infraction [c’est-à-dire un écart grave et marqué par rapport aux normes que serait censé observer quiconque occuperait le poste de confiance de l’accusé].^[14]

[14]      Lors de l’argumentaire sur cette question en première instance, l’avocat de l’appelant a louvoyé, affirmant qu’il n’entendait pas, en fin de compte, mettre en preuve des opinions juridiques, mais simplement que l’appelant a consulté une firme d’avocats, qu’il a obtenu une opinion et qu’il a pris des actions. Or, dans son témoignage, l’appelant ne s’est pas prévalu de l’ouverture faite par le juge de faire référence à l’obtention d’avis juridique à titre narratif. Le juge avait également gardé une porte ouverte à revisiter son jugement si la situation le justifiait. L’appelant n’a pas soulevé de nouveau cette question.

[15]      De toute manière, le jugement sur cette question n’est pas attaquable. L’erreur de droit n’est pas une défense en droit criminel. Un accusé ne peut espérer échapper à sa responsabilité criminelle en invoquant qu’il s’est enquis de la légalité de ses actes et a agi conformément à un avis juridique qui s’est avéré erroné[15]. L’un des fondements de cette règle est la préservation de l’intégrité de l’administration judiciaire, en évitant que des citoyens tentent de se draper d’une immunité à l’encontre de poursuites criminelles par l’obtention d’opinions juridiques favorables à leur thèse[16].